

Feldman
£95

ELEMENTS

OF THE

PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND,

AND OF

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED

A COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC.

BY THOMAS BELSHAM.

ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΝ ΖΗΤΩ, ΤΦ' ΗΣ ΟΥΔΕΙΣ ΠΩΠΟΤΕ ΕΒΛΑΒΗ.

Marcus Antoninus.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. JOHNSON, ST. PAUL'S CHURCHYARD,

BY TAYLOR AND WILKS, CHANCERY-LANE.

1801.

PREFACE.

THE following ſheets contain the ſubſtance of a courſe of lectures, which the author delivered to his pupils, upon ſome of the moſt intereſting ſubjects which can occupy the attention of the human mind.

The author's ſole end was the inveſtigation and diffuſion of uſeful truth, and his deſire was, not to influence his pupils to adopt his own opinions, but to excite in them a ſpirit of inquiry, and to aſſiſt and encourage them to think, and to judge for themſelves.

With this view, in all diſputable queſtions he has endeavoured to ſtate the evidence on both ſides with fairneſs and impartiality; and has in no caſe intentionally omitted, or misſtated any arguments which have been produced in favour of hypotheſes, which appear to him to be erroneous.

neous. Nevertheleſs, while he was ſolicitous to do juſtice to the opinions of others, he did not regard himſelf as under any obligation to conceal his own.

He laments that diſcuſſion, which is of ſo much real uſe for the diſcovery of truth, ſhould ever degenerate into perſonal altercation and abuſe: and he has been anxious to avoid all unbecoming reflections upon the underſtandings, and the motives, of thoſe whoſe opinions he controverts. Men of equal talents and integrity will, from the different bias of their education, and from the influence of other circumſtances, often think differently upon the ſame ſubjects, and will even form different concluſions from the ſame premiſes. This circumſtance does not indeed diminiſh the value of truth, but it ought to promote candour, and to ſtimulate inquiry. The ſincere lover of truth will be as much gratified by the correction of an error, or by an acceſſion to his own intellectual ſtores, as by ſilencing an opponent. To him, truth is victory. And when truth is the object, evidence alone muſt be ſought for, and examined with calmneſs and rigour. Self-

intereſt, prejudice, and paſſion, muſt keep aloof.

The doctrine of Aſſociation, opened by Locke, improved by Gay, matured by Hartley, and illuſtrated by the luminous diſquiſitions of Dr. Prieſtley, the author regards as eſtabliſhed beyond the poſſibility of controverſy, in the judgment of thoſe philoſophers who have ſtudied, and who underſtand it. He does not preſume to think that he has added any thing material to what theſe great metaphyſicians have advanced; and ſhall deem it ſufficient praiſe, if he has ſucceeded in placing the elements of their profound inveſtigations in a light ſo clear, and diſtinct, as to facilitate the progreſs of thoſe who are deſirous of acquiring information upon the intereſting ſcience of the human mind.

As the author's ambition was not ſo much to attain the reputation of an original writer, as to communicate to his pupils the moſt valuable inſtruction in the moſt eligible form, he has made no ſcruple of collecting information from every quarter, and has uſed without heſitation the method, and ſometimes even the words, of

other authors, when they have ſuited his purpoſe. To Dr. Hartley he is principally indebted; it having been the author's main deſign, in the firſt part of the work, to illuſtrate Hartley's Theory of Aſſociation. Of other authors he has alſo made a liberal uſe, but not without acknowledging his obligation, as the references in the margin will ſufficiently teſtify. The plan he has adopted, has alſo made it neceſſary for him occaſionally to uſe ſome repetitions, which he truſts that the candid reader will excuſe.

The author has taken no notice of the theory of Kant, ſo much celebrated amongſt the metaphyſicians upon the continent; becauſe, though he has peruſed the publications of Dr. Willich, and Mr. Nitſch, he has not been able to attain a diſtinct conception of that philoſopher's peculiar principles, nor of the extraordinary diſcoveries which he is ſaid to have made, in the philoſophy of mind.

The author flatters himſelf, that he has ſtated the evidence for the doctrines of Neceſſity, and Materialiſm, in a form ſo obvious and ſuccinct, and that he has ſuggeſted

ſuch anſwers to the popular objections, as, if they fail to convince, will at leaſt abate the clamour of ignorance and prejudice, againſt theſe principles, as if they were unfavourable to virtue, and ſubverſive of religion.

The Theory of Morals, defended in this work, is that which neceſſarily follows from the Hartleyan Theory of the Mind, and from the doctrine of the Aſſociation of Ideas. And the author has endeavoured, briefly, to point out the errors into which eminent writers who have adopted a different theory have fallen, in their attempts to explain the nature of virtue, of the moral ſenſe, and of moral obligation.

A Compendium of Logic is prefixed, as a proper introduction to the inveſtigation of ſubjects of an abſtract and metaphyſical nature. The formality of ſyllogiſtic reaſoning is indeed juſtly laid aſide in modern compoſition: but the ability to define correctly, to think juſtly, to analyſe a complex proceſs of argumentation, to detect plauſible ſophiſtry, and to arrange ideas and reaſonings in a clear and luminous method, will always be of uſe.

Juſt views of human nature, and of moral obligation, have a tendency to impreſs upon the mind a proper ſenſe of the ineſtimable value of the Chriſtian revelation, which places the doctrine of a future life upon the only foundation which true philoſophy can approve, a reſurrection of the dead; and which, by the aſſurance of this intereſting fact, reconciles human nature to itſelf, and enforces the practice of virtue by the moſt efficacious and awful ſanctions. The truth, and importance of genuine Chriſtianity, is the grand concluſion which the author wiſhes to eſtabliſh: for he is firmly perſuaded that to be a rational and practical believer in the Chriſtian religion, is to employ the nobleſt powers of human nature under the beſt direction, and for the attainment of the beſt ends: it is to be wiſe, virtuous, and happy.

HACKNEY,
July 3, 1801.

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

OF THE

COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC.

PAGE

INTRODUCTION. — — iii

PART THE FIRST.

OF PERCEPTION.

SECT. I.

Of Simple Ideas. — — — vii

SECT. II.

Of Complex Ideas : of Subſtance and Mode. x

SECT. III.

Of Voluntary Collections of Ideas.—Of Compoſition, and Mixed Modes. — — xiii

SECT. IV.

Of Abſtraction and of Univerſal Ideas, of Compariſon, and Relations. — — xvi

SECT. V.

Concerning Words as the Signs of Ideas. xxii

SECT. VI.

Of Definition. — — — xxv

PART THE SECOND.

OF JUDGMENT.

SECT. I.

Of Judgment and Evidence. — — xxxi

SECT. II.

Of the Nature of Propoſitions. Diviſion of them into Affirmative and Negative. — xxxiv

PAGE

SECT. III.

Of Univerſal and Particular Propoſitions. Of Oppoſite and Subaltern Propoſitions. — xxxix

SECT. IV.

Of Abſolute and Modal, of Simple, Compound, and Disjunctive Propoſitions. — — xli

SECT. V.

Of Propoſitions True and Falſe, Certain and Uncertain, Intuitive and Demonſtrable. — xliii

PART THE THIRD.

OF REASONING.

SECT. I.

Of Reaſoning, and of the Structure of Syllogiſms. xlvii

SECT. II.

General and Special Rules of Syllogiſm demonſtrated from their Firſt Principles. — xlix

Definitions. — — — ibid.

Axioms. — — — — li

General Rules of Syllogiſm. — — liii

Moods of Syllogiſm. — — lxiv

Figures of Syllogiſm. — — lxv

Special Rules of Syllogiſm. — — lxvi

Examples of Syllogiſm. — — lxxv

SECT. III.

Compound and Imperfect Syllogiſms. — lxxvi

SECT. IV.

Topics. Different Kinds of Arguments. lxxxiv

SECT. V.

Doctrine of Sophiſms. — — lxxxvii

PART THE FOURTH.

DISPOSITION AND METHOD. — — xc

CONTENTS

OF THE

ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND.

INTRODUCTION.

SECT. I. PAGE

NATURE and Uſe of the Philoſophy of Mind. 1

SECT. II.

Rules of Philoſophiſing. Of Philoſophical Hypotheſes. — — — 5

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL ENUMERATION OF THE FACULTIES. OF PERCEPTION.

SECT. I.

General Account of the Faculties of the Mind. Hypotheſis of Common Senſe. — — 10

SECT. II.

Of Perception. Seat of the Sentient Principle. 15

CHAPTER II.

OF THE CAPACITY FOR PLEASURE AND PAIN. 20

CHAPTER III.

OF THE LAW OF ASSOCIATION, AND OF THE THEORIES WHICH HAVE BEEN PROPOSED FOR EXPLAINING THE PHENOMENA OF THE MIND.

SECT. I.

Of the Law of Aſſociation. — — 22

PAGE

SECT. II.

The ſame Subject continued. — — 30

SECT. III.

Carteſian Theory of Animal Spirits. — 35

SECT. IV.

Newtonian Theory of Vibrations. — 38

SECT. V.

The Theory of Vibrations applied to the Phenomena of Muſcular Motion. Objections anſwered. 45

CHAPTER IV.

OF SENSATION.

SECT. I.

General Diſtribution. Senſe of Feeling. 56

SECT. II.

Senſe of Taſte. — — — 64

SECT. III.

Senſe of Smelling. — — — 72

SECT. IV.

Senſe of Sight. Form of the Eye. Nature of Viſion. 77

SECT. V.

Senſations of Sight. — — — 80

SECT. VI.

Senſe of Sight continued. Ideas. Intellectual Pleaſures and Pains. Motions Automatic and Voluntary. — — — 90

SECT. VII.

Senſe of Hearing. — — — 95

N. B. By an error of the Preſs, the two laſt Sections are numbered VII and VIII inſtead of VI and VII.

CHAP-

CHAPTER V.

OF THE INTELLECT.

SECT. I.

PAGE

Of Truth and Falſehood; Knowledge and Opinion; Probability and Improbability; Aſſent and Diſſent; Nature and Kinds of Evidence. — 106

SECT. II.

Of Words and Propoſitions; Uſe of Words for the Acquiſition of Knowledge; Different Kinds of Propoſitions. — — 113

SECT. III.

Origin of Aſſent to various Claſſes of Propoſitions. Remarks. — — — 118

SECT. IV.

Concerning Innate Ideas and Principles. Evidence of the Senſes. Exiſtence of the Material World. 128

CHAPTER VI.

OF MEMORY.

SECT. I.

Phenomena of Memory. — — 133

SECT. II.

Of Succeſſion and Duration. — — 141

SECT. III.

Exiſtence of Space. — — — 149

SECT. IV.

Concerning Identity. — — 155

SECT. V.

Whether Conſciouſneſs be ever interrupted. 166

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE IMAGINATION.

SECT. I.

PAGE

Phenomena of the Imagination, Reveries, Dreams. 170

SECT. II.

Of Imperfections in the Rational Faculties. 174

SECT. III.

Phenomena of Brutes analogous to the Faculties of the Human Mind. Percipiency of Vegetables. 180

CHAPTER VIII.

CONCERNING THE AFFECTIONS NATURAL AND ACQUIRED.

SECT. I.

Concerning Inſtinct. 189

SECT. II.

Concerning Habit. 193

SECT. III.

Of Wit. 200

SECT. IV.

Origin of the Affections. 206

SECT. V.

Claſſification of the Affections. 213

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE WILL. DISCUSSION OF THE DOCTRINES OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

SECT. I.

The Queſtion ſtated. 227

SECT. II.

Arguments in favour of Philoſophical Liberty. 233

SECT.

SECT. III.

PAGE
Doctrine of Neceſſity. Argument from Conſciouſneſs. —— —— — — 239

SECT. IV.

Argument from Cauſe and Effect. — — 247

SECT. V.

Objections againſt Philoſophical Liberty. — 256
Obj. 1. Free-will an Abſurdity. — — 257
Obj. 2. Liberty of little Uſe. — — 258
Obj. 3. Confounds the Diſtinction between Virtue and Vice. — — — ibid.
Obj. 4. Dangerous to Virtue. — — 259

SECT. VI.

Objections continued.

Obj. 5. Philoſophical Liberty inconſiſtent with Moral Diſcipline. — — — 261
Obj. 6. Inconſiſtent with Divine Preſcience. 267
Obj. 7. Leads to Atheiſm. — — 269
Obj. 8. Inconſiſtent with Moral Perfection, both in God and his Creatures. — — 270

SECT. VII.

Objections againſt Philoſophical Neceſſity ſtated and anſwered. — — — 275
Obj. 1. That Neceſſity is reducible to a Contradiction. — — — — 276
Obj. 2. That Mankind are under perpetual Deluſion. — — — 277
Obj. 3. That Neceſſity is inconſiſtent with Agency, Virtue and Merit. — — 280
Obj. 4. That Neceſſity is inconſiſtent with Moral Diſcipline, and the Juſtice of Reward and Puniſhment. — — — 281

Obj. 5.

PAGE

Obj. 5. That Neceſſity conſounds Natural and Moral Qualities. — — 282

Obj. 6. That Neceſſity encourages Vice and ſuperſedes Repentance. — — 283

SECT. VIII.

Objections continued.

Obj. 7. That Neceſſity diſcourages all Attempts for the Reformation of others. — 283

Obj. 8. That Neceſſity makes God the Author of Evil. 289

Obj. 9. That Neceſſity is inconſiſtent with the Veracity of God. — — 294

Obj. 10. That Neceſſity involves Fataliſm, and diſcourages Exertion. — — 295

SECT. IX.

Recapitulation and general Obſervations. — 297

SECT. X.

Recapitulation continued. —— —— 303

Beneficial Conſequences of the Doctrine of Neceſſity. 313

CHAPTER X.

CONCERNING POWER. 319

Power conſidered as an Attribute of inanimate Subſtances. — —— —— ibid.

Power as an Attribute of Mind. — — 323

CHAPTER XI.

CONCERNING IMMATERIALITY AND MATERIALISM.

SECT. I.

The Queſtion ſtated. — — — 330

Arguments for the Hypotheſis of Immaterialiſm. 331

Arguments for the Hypotheſis of Materialiſm. 333

SECT. II.

Objections againſt the Hypotheſis of Materialiſm ſtated and ſolved. — — — 334

Obj.

PAGE

Obj. 1. From the Solidity of Matter. — 335
Obj. 2. From the Divifibility of Matter. — 337
Obj. 3. From the Inertia of Matter. — 339
Obj. 4. From the Impercipiency of Ultimate Atoms. — — — — ibid.
General Remarks. — — — 342

CHAPTER XII.

CONCERNING THE NATURAL EVIDENCE OF A FUTURE LIFE.

SECT. I.

INCONCLUSIVE ARGUMENTS.

Argument 1. Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul. — — — 345
Arg. 2. Defire of Life, and Horror of Annihilation. 347
Arg. 3. Inftinctive Principle of Confcience. 348
Arg. 4. Capacity for progreffive and endlefs Improvement. — — — — 349
Arg. 5. Juftice of God. — — 350
Arg. 6. Probability of future Life greater than the antecedent Probability of actual Exiftence. 353

SECT. II.

Probable Arguments for a future Life. — 354
Argument 1. Capacity of expecting a future Life, and of being influenced by it. — — 356
Arg. 2. Moral Conftitution of Human Nature. ibid.
Arg. 3. Appearances of a Moral Government over the World. — — — 357
Arg. 4. The Pains of Death. — — 358
Arg. 5. Provifion made for the Difcipline of the Mind. — — — — 359
Arg. 6. General Expectation of a future Life. 360
Remarks and Conclufion. — — 362

CONTENTS

OF THE

ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

SECT. I. PAGE

DEFINITION of Virtue and Vice. Diſtinction between Natural and Moral Qualities. — 369

SECT. II.

Objections anſwered. — — — 372

SECT. III.

Objections continued. Theory of the diſintereſted Affections: Reconcileableneſs of Benevolence with Self-Intereſt. — — — 375

SECT. IV.

Moral Obligation explained. Antecedency of different Obligations. — — — 381

SECT. V.

Of the Moral Senſe. Abſtract Ideas of Right and Wrong. Fit and Unfit. — — 384

SECT. VI.

Inferences from the Analyſis of the Moral Senſe. 389

SECT. VII.

Moral Value of an Action eſtimated. — 392

SECT. VIII.

Moral Value of Character. — — 397

Corollaries. — — — — 401

SECT. IX.

Analyſis of the Ideas of Merit and Demerit. Approbation and Diſapprobation. Praiſe and Blame. Reward and Puniſhment. Alſo of Fear, Shame, Remorſe and Repentance. — — 403

SECT.

PAGE

SECT. X.

Means of Virtue. — — — 408

SECT. XI.

Obſervations on the preceding Rules. — 415

SECT. XII.

Theories of Dr. Clarke, Dr. Hutcheſon, Dr. Butler, Dr. Reid, and Dr. Price. — — 418

SECT. XIII.

Theories of Wollaſton, Cumberland, Rutherforth, Browne, and Adam Smith. — — 424

SECT. XIV.

Hume's Theory of Morals. In what Senſe Utility is the proper Standard of Virtue. — 429

SECT. XV.

Account of Virtue, by Dr. Hartley, Dr. Paley, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Giſborne, and Mr. Godwin. 433

A

COMPENDIUM

OF

LOGIC,

Dialectica eſt utilis ſæpe, et finitionibus, et comprehenſionibus, et ſeparandis quæ ſunt differentia, et reſolvenda ambiguitate, et diſtinguendo, dividendo, illiciendo, implicando. QUINTILIAN.

A

COMPENDIUM

OF

LOGIC.

INTRODUCTION.

THE uſe of LOGIC is to guide and aſſiſt the intellectual powers in the inveſtigation of truth, and the communication of it to others.

This end it accompliſhes by tracing the progreſs of the intellect in the acquiſition of knowledge, and thus ſuggeſting the beſt method of avoiding error and diſcovering truth.

Hence it follows that logic is not, as ſome have ſuppoſed, a mere explanation of ſcholaſtic phraſes, nor, as others have imagined, the art of diſputing by mechanical forms; but it is one branch of the theory of the human mind applied to a valuable practical purpoſe.

PERCEPTION, JUDGMENT, REASONING, and DISPOSITION, are the operations of the mind in the acquiſition and communication of knowledge.

Hence Logic is uſually divided into four parts, correſponding with theſe four operations of the mind.

PERCEPTION, is the attention which the mind pays to impreſſions made upon it.

The reſults of perception are, SENSATIONS and IDEAS. Theſe are the materials of all our knowledge.

WORDS, are the expreſſions of ideas.

JUDGMENT, is the aſſociation or ſeparation of ideas, correſpondent to the perception of their agreement or diſagreement.

The reſult of this operation is called a JUDGMENT, or a mental propoſition; the expreſſion of a judgment is called a VERBAL PROPOSITION, or ſimply a propoſition.

REASONING, is determining the relation between two ideas, by comparing them with a third idea, or middle term.

The reſult of reaſoning is an INFERENCE. The expreſſion of an act of reaſoning is called a SYLLOGISM; for example,

A Cre-

A Creator is to be worſhipped,
God is a Creator,
Therefore, God is to be worſhipped.

All reaſoning is founded upon intuitive principles, and is the chief means of extending knowledge.

DISPOSITION, is the proper arranging of our ideas upon any ſubject.

The reſult of diſpoſition is METHOD*.

* Duncan's Logic, Introduction.
Bentham's Reflections on Logic.

PART THE FIRST.

OF PERCEPTION.

SECTION I.

Of Simple Ideas.

PERCEPTION, is the attention which the mind pays to a variety of impreſſions made upon it by external objects, or by internal feelings; or, it is the faculty by which we acquire ſenſations and ideas.

Of perception there are two modes, Senſation and Reflection.

SENSATION is the perception of an object by the organs of ſenſe; theſe are ſight, hearing, taſte, ſmell, and touch.

REFLECTION is the mind's perception of its own faculties and operations.

By perception we acquire ſenſations and ideas.

A SENSATION, is the impreſſion made upon the mind by an object actually preſent.

AN IDEA, is a revived impreſſion in the abſence of the object.

The objects of our ideas are called archetypes.

Ideas of Reflection, in the attainment of which the mind is voluntary and active, are acquired later than ideas of Senſation, in the reception of which the mind is wholly paſſive.

Ideas are either Simple or Complex*.

SIMPLE IDEAS are ſuch as exiſt in the mind under one uniform appearance, and cannot be divided into two or more ideas: for example, a colour, a ſound.

COMPLEX IDEAS, are ſuch as may be divided into two or more ſimple ideas, as matter, gold, a circle, a ſquare.

Simple ideas may always be traced up to Senſation, or Reflection, or both.

* Dr. Hartley, in his Obſervations on Man, defines ſimple ideas to be ideas of ſenſation of individual objects. Complex ideas are formed by the coaleſcence of ſimple ideas, and are what he calls intellectual ideas. This is unqueſtionably the moſt accurate account of our ideas. But Mr. Locke's definition being more intelligible to learners, I have for this reaſon retained it; and perhaps it would have been better if Dr. Hartley had uſed the words *ſingle* and *compound*, rather than terms to which long cuſtom had annexed a different ſenſe, and the uſe of which tended to throw obſcurity upon his admirable theory.

Of

Of ſimple ideas ſome may be traced up to *one* Senſe only, as light, ſound, hardneſs, ſmoothneſs.

Some to *more* Senſes than one, as extenſion. But it may be queſtioned whether viſible and tangible extenſion be not as different as any other two ideas of different ſenſes.

Some ideas may be traced up to* Reflection only, as thought, volition, and the like.

And ſome to every mode both of Senſation and Reflection, as exiſtence, unity, ſucceſſion, pleaſure, and pain†.

Of ſimple ideas it may be obſerved,

1. That the mind has no power of inventing new ones.

2. That they enter the mind only by inlets appropriated to this purpoſe.

3. That, when certain impreſſions are made upon the ſenſes, the mind cannot refuſe to receive the correſponding ideas.

4. That theſe ideas are incapable of change.

* According to Hartley's theory, ideas of reflection are nothing more than very complex ideas of ſenſation; but there is a ſufficient difference between theſe and the primary ideas of ſenſation to lay a foundation for Mr. Locke's diſtinction of them into the two claſſes of ſenſation and reflection.

† Locke's Eſſays on Hum. Underſt. book ii. ch. xxvii.

5. That

5. That they gradually wear out of the mind, and can only be revived by the ſame means by which they were originally acquired.

6. That nevertheleſs they are capable of combination in an infinite variety of forms, and are the elements and materials of all our knowledge*.

SECTION II.

Of Complex Ideas, of Subſtances, and Modes.

COMPLEX ideas are ſuch as may be divided into two or more ideas.

Complex ideas are either repreſentations of objects really exiſting, or collections made at the pleaſure of the mind.

FIRST. Of objects really exiſting. Theſe are either ſubſtances or modes.

SUBSTANCES, are beings ſubſiſting by themſelves, without any apparent ſupport, as wood, ivory, a man.

MODES, are properties of ſubſtances, and dependent upon them for ſupport, as hard-

* Duncan's Logic, book i. ch. i. ii.

neſs,

neſs, extenſion, memory, thought, and the like.

Ideas of ſubſtances are ideas of collections of properties, combined together by ſome unknown bond of union.

All ſubſtances, the exiſtence of which is known to us, are either body or ſpirit.

BODY, or matter, is extended reſiſting* ſubſtance.

SPIRIT, is thinking ſubſtance.

Whether the power of thinking be in any circumſtances the property of matter, will be a ſubject of future inquiry.

There may be a vaſt variety of ſubſtances in the univerſe which do not fall within the ſphere of our apprehenſion. The divine ſubſtance muſt differ infinitely from all created ſubſtance.

Matter, in various circumſtances, undergoes a variety of aſtoniſhing tranſmutations. Thus air, moiſture, earth, heat, &c. ſupport vegetables, vegetables nouriſh animals, and animals man : man dies and is reſolved into

* Matter is uſually defined extended *ſolid* ſubſtance; but the exiſtence of ſolidity or impenetrability has of late been called in queſtion.

his

his component principles, which are again formed into different combinations, and ſo on, ad infinitum.

Hence it has been concluded, that matter is an uniform ſubſtance; in other words, that all ultimate atoms poſſeſs the ſame eſſential properties; and that the variety obſervable in different ſubſtances is entirely owing to the various arrangement of their conſtituent particles.

Hence ariſes the diſtinction between the real and the nominal eſſences of *ſubſtances*.

The *real eſſence* of any ſubſtance is that peculiar contexture of its conſtituent particles upon which its peculiar properties depend.

Of real eſſences we know nothing; only that in different ſubſtances they muſt neceſſarily be different.

The *nominal eſſence* is that collection of properties which conſtitutes our idea of any ſubſtance, and to which the *name* is conſtantly applied.

Our ideas of ſubſtances extend no farther than to their properties; how theſe properties are combined we know not.

MODES, are either eſſential or accidental.

An

An *eſſential* mode is that which is neceſſary to the exiſtence of its ſubject, as roundneſs to a bowl.

An *accidental* mode is that which is not neceſſary to the exiſtence of its ſubject, v. g. roughneſs to a bowl.

Writers on logic commonly add many other diſtinctions of modes, ſuch as abſolute and relative, intrinſical and extrinſical, inherent and adherent, and the like, which for the ſake of brevity are not enumerated here*.

SECTION III.

Of Voluntary Collections of Ideas.—Of Compoſition and Mixed Modes.

THE SECOND claſs of complex ideas conſiſts of Collections formed at the pleaſure of the mind.

In the production of theſe ideas the mind exerts three voluntary acts, COMPOSITION, ABSTRACTION, and COMPARISON.

* Duncan's Logic, book i. ch. vi.
Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xii. xxiii. book iv. ch. vi.
Watts's Logic, part i. ch. xi. ſect. iii. iv.

COMPO-

COMPOSITION, is joining together two or more ſimple ideas, and conſidering them as one picture or repreſentation.

ABSTRACTION, is ſeparating from a particular idea thoſe circumſtances which render it the repreſentative of a ſingle determinate object, and thereby making it to denote a whole rank or claſs of things.

COMPARISON, is bringing two or more ideas at once into the view of the mind, and examining their mutual correſpondencies.

Ideas acquired by compoſition are by Mr. Locke called ſimple or mixed modes. Ideas formed by abſtraction are denominated abſtract or univerſal ideas. And from compariſon we gain our ideas of relations.

FIRST, COMPOSITION is the uniting of many conceptions into one.

I. The mind ſometimes combines ideas of the ſame kind, and ſometimes of different kinds.

Simple ideas of the SAME KIND which are capable of compoſition, are number, extenſion, and duration. Combinations of theſe ideas are called by Mr. Locke SIMPLE MODES.

UNITY is a ſimple idea, capable of perpetual addition to itſelf.

The

The great exactneſs with which the mind claſſes its ideas of number, and the paucity of the terms made uſe of to expreſs theſe combinations, renders it very eaſy to arrange and manage the moſt complex ideas of this claſs.

Ideas of DURATION and EXTENSION become clear and diſtinct, in conſequence of their connexion with ideas of number.

From the perpetual addibility of the ideas of number, ſpace, and duration, the idea of INFINITY is acquired.

The facility with which very complex ideas of number are managed, ſhows the great advantage of a proper arrangement of ideas in general. In proportion to the excellence of method, cæteris paribus, will be the extent and preciſion of knowledge, and the facility of attaining or recollecting our ideas.

II. The mind frequently combines ideas of DIFFERENT KINDS, as harmony, gratitude, treaſon, heroiſm. Theſe are denominated by Mr. Locke MIXED MODES.

The power which the mind poſſeſſes of framing ideas of this claſs is boundleſs. It is directed in the exerciſe of it by the occaſion it has for various combinations of ideas.

To

To combinations which frequently recur, NAMES are uſually given, which ſerve to connect the ideas and to ſuggeſt them to the mind, as king, judge, actor, merchant, and the like.

Combinations of ideas which are common in one age and country are unuſual in another, and many combinations of ideas occur frequently in the arts and ſciences, which do not occur in common life.

Hence it happens that ſome words in proceſs of time become obſolete, and new ones are invented. Hence there are in all languages words which cannot be tranſlated without circumlocution into other languages; and hence likewiſe all arts and ſciences have terms peculiar to themſelves which do not occur in common life*.

SECTION IV.

Of Abſtraction and Univerſal Ideas.—Of Compariſon and Relations.

THE SECOND act of the mind in the formation of complex ideas is ABSTRACTION.

* Duncan's Logic, ch. iv. ſect. i.

ABSTRACTION is the attention of the mind to thoſe properties in any object which it poſſeſſes in common with others, while it overlooks thoſe which are peculiar to it. Hence we acquire UNIVERSAL IDEAS*.

All our ideas are originally particular.

* According to this definition of abſtraction, an abſtract idea reſembles a mathematical diagram, which, though an individual object, is nevertheleſs the repreſentative of a claſs of figures; thoſe properties only being taken into account in which it agrees with other figures. This ſeems to have been the opinion of Biſhop Berkeley. Berkeley's Princip. Introd. ſect. 6—20.

The true notion of abſtraction, however, according to the Hartleyan theory, is the intimate coaleſcence of a multitude of ſimple, or ſingle ideas into one complex idea; which idea, though compounded of a great number of parts, often bears no reſemblance to any of its conſtituent principles, but, like the whiteneſs of the ſun's light, which is compounded of the ſeven primary colours, aſſumes a ſimple appearance in the mind, and is frequently miſtaken for a ſimple idea. Thus the abſtract idea of man, houſe, horſe, or dog, is formed by the coaleſcence of the ideas of all the individual objects to which the words man, houſe, &c. have been applied. Hence it follows, that Mr Locke's account of abſtract ideas, though he did not perfectly underſtand the theory of them, is by no means deſerving of the ridicule ſo liberally beſtowed upon it by Berkeley.—Hartley, vol. i. prop. 12. Prieſtley's Abridgement of Hartley, Introduction, eſſay iii.

Comparing together a number of PARTICULAR ideas, we obſerve ſome properties which they poſſeſs in common; to this collection of properties we aſſign a name which denotes a SPECIES, as man, horſe, &c. and the like.

Comparing various ſpecies, we find ſome particulars in which they agree. To theſe we annex a name, and call it a GENUS; thus horſe, dog, ſheep, elephant, &c. agree in the property of being living creatures, with four feet. Hence we form the genus *quadruped*, and all creatures having theſe properties are ſaid to belong to this genus.

Comparing together various genera, we diſcover ſome properties in which they all agree. This collection of properties with the addition of a name, forms a SUPERIOR GENUS; thus man, beaſt, bird, fiſh, inſect, reptile, agree in the common properties of animal, that is in perception, and voluntary motion, united to organized bodies. *Animal* therefore is a ſuperior genus, of which man, bird, &c. are ſpecies.

Advancing in the compariſon of genera, we at laſt find one property common to all things which exiſt; namely, BEING. This,

therefore, is the higheſt genus, which logicians call GENUS GENERALISSIMUM.

Genus generaliſſimum is never conſidered as a ſpecies. The loweſt ſpecies, which extends only to individuals, and is never conſidered as a genus, is called SPECIES SPECIALISSIMA. Intermediate claſſes, which are ſometimes genera, and ſometimes ſpecies, are called *ſubordinate genera.*

Univerſal properties are thoſe in which many individuals agree. *Univerſal ideas* are repreſentations of theſe properties. *Univerſal terms* are the expreſſions of univerſal ideas.

SINGULAR or PARTICULAR ideas are the ideas of individuals, as Sir Iſaac Newton.

COLLECTIVE IDEAS, are ideas which repreſent a number of individuals, as an army, a flock.

The PROXIMATE GENUS of any ſpecies, is the genus immediately above it, or that collection of properties, which it poſſeſſes in common with the feweſt claſſes of beings. Thus, quadruped is the proximate genus of horſe. The REMOTE GENUS, is genus generaliſſimum, or that property which it has in common with all other beings, as exiſtence. Other genera are called INTERMEDIATE.

SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE, is that property, or collection of properties, which diſtinguiſhes the ſpecies from the proximate genus, and from all ſpecies under the ſame genus. Thus, creature is the proximate genus of animal; and perception, and voluntary motion by means of corporeal organs, is the ſpecific difference by which animal is diſtinguiſhed from creature, the genus, and from vegetable, another ſpecies under the ſame genus. Plane rectilinear figure is the proximate genus of triangle: having three ſides, and three angles, is the ſpecific difference.

Hence it follows that proximate genus comprehends all the *common* properties, and ſpecific difference all the *peculiar* properties, of an univerſal idea.

NUMERICAL DIFFERENCE, is that collection of properties which diſtinguiſhes an individual from the ſpecies ſpecialiſſima, and from every individual under the ſame ſpecies. Man is the ſpecies ſpecialiſſima of Julius Cæſar. The peculiarities of time, place, birth, figure, exploits, and other incidents, conſtitute the numerical difference which diſtinguiſhes Julius Cæſar from the reſt of the ſpecies.

Hence

Hence it follows that ſpecies ſpecialiſſima comprehends all the *common* properties, and numerical difference all the *peculiar* properties, of a particular idea.

Univerſal ideas are conſidered according to their *comprehenſion* and their *extenſion*.

The COMPREHENSION of an idea expreſſes the collection of ſimple ideas contained in a complex one. The EXTENSION of an univerſal idea reſpects the number of ſpecies and individuals included under it.

Genera and ſpecies are creatures of the mind, and not, as formerly ſuppoſed, models of ſubſtances exiſting in nature. They are contrivances of the intellect, invented for the convenience of claſſing its ideas.

Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident, are called the *five predicables*; for whatever is predicated or affirmed of any ſubject muſt be one or other of theſe*.

The THIRD act of the mind in the formation of complex ideas, is COMPARISON; by which two or more objects being brought

* Duncan's Logic, book i. ch. iv. ſect. ii.
Watts's Logic, book i. ch. iii. ſect. iii.
Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xi. ſect. ix.—xiii.

at once into the view of the mind, their mutual correſpondencies are diſcovered.

Hence ariſe our ideas of RELATIONS, ſuch as greater and leſs, older and younger, father and ſon, king and ſubject, creator and creature, and the like.

Ideas of relation are very numerous. The mind is directed in the choice of them, and in annexing words to them, by the frequency of their occurrence.

Ideas of relation are of the higheſt importance, the duties of life depending upon the relations which moral agents ſuſtain with regard to each other.

Ideas of relation are often clear, when the ſubjects of theſe relations are very imperfectly known, as creator and creature, cauſe and effect, and the like*.

SECTION V.

Concerning Words as the Signs of Ideas.

WORDS, are articulate ſounds, uſed as the ſigns of ideas.

* Duncan's Logic, book i. ch. iv. ſect. iii. Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xxv.

The

The connexion between words and ideas is perfectly arbitrary. The want of attention to this circumstance has been the source of innumerable errors in judgment and reasoning.

By frequent use, a term becomes so strongly associated with an idea that it never fails to suggest it, and conversely, the idea with the name.

The use of words is to record our own trains of ideas, and to communicate our thoughts to others.

Our own ideas are recorded, by being clothed in words, and committed to writing.

Men communicate their thoughts to each other by language, in consequence of an agreement, tacit or express, to annex the same ideas to the same words.

All language may be resolved into nouns and verbs, with their respective abbreviations.

Nouns express names of things: they are divided into substantives, which are the principal things spoken of; and adjectives, which denote qualities, or circumstances belonging to them.

Verbs express modes of existence. They are of three kinds, such as denote simple

exiſtence; for example, to be: ſuch as expreſs exiſtence in an active ſtate; for example, to eat: and ſuch as expreſs exiſtence in a paſſive ſtate; as, to be eaten.

Words which are uſually repreſented as indeclinable particles, having no determinate ſignification of their own, are abbreviations of nouns or verbs, invented for the greater expedition of communicating our thoughts. Thus, *If* ſignifies give; *And* ſignifies add, being imperatives of correſponding verbs. See this theory of language ſtated and evinced in Mr. Horne Tooke's Diverſions of Purley*.

As ſimple ideas are the elements of all knowledge, ſo words expreſſive of ſimple ideas are the elements of language, beyond which we cannot explain the meaning of terms.

Names of ſimple ideas ſtanding for ſimple perceptions only, are of all words the leaſt ambiguous.

Words are properly only the ſigns of a man's own ideas; but they are ſecretly, though improperly, uſed as the ſigns of other

* Horne Tooke's Diverſions of Purley, præs. page 185. Darwin's Zoonomia, vol. i. page 531.

men's

men's ideas, and alſo of objects really exiſting.

Words expreſſive of intellectual ideas, ſuch as underſtanding, imagination, and the like, are generally borrowed from ſenſible objects. This circumſtance points to the origin of our knowledge, and indicates, that ſenſible ideas are the firſt which gain admiſſion into the mind*.

SECTION VI.

Of Definition.

DEFINITION, is the explanation of the meaning of a word.

All words capable of definition, expreſs either ſimple or complex ideas.

Words which expreſs ſimple ideas may be explained either, 1, by an intelligible ſynonymous word; or, 2, by a reference to the archetype of the idea. Thus, *vert* ſignifies *green*; or, it is the colour of graſs.

Words expreſſing complex ideas may be explained, 1, by a ſynonymous term; or, 2,

* Duncan's Logic, book i. ch. v.
Locke's Eſſay, book iii. ch. i. ii.

by

by referring to the archetype; or, 3, by enumerating the ſimple ideas comprehended in the complex idea.

Thus, for example, *verre* is *glaſs*; or, it is the ſubſtance of which windows are made; or, it is a ſubſtance, tranſparent, brittle, elaſtic, &c. &c.

The explication of words by ſynonymous terms, or by reference to the archetypes of the ideas, is called by logicians the DEFINITION OF THE NAME.

The explication of a term expreſſive of a complex idea, by the enumeration of its component ſimple ideas, is called the DEFINITION OF THE THING; our ideas being ſuppoſed, though erroneouſly, to be repreſentations of things.

The reſolution of a very complex idea immediately into its component ſimple ideas would puzzle and confound the underſtanding, as if a perſon ſhould attempt to convey a diſtinct idea of an army of a hundred thouſand men, by repeating the names of all the individuals.

The method in which the mind attains a diſtinct view of a very complex idea, is by dividing it into a few large parts; ſubdividing

ing each large diviſion into ſmaller; and each ſmaller diviſion into leſs; till at laſt it reſolves the whole complex idea into its conſtituent ſimple ones, or at leaſt into parts ſo ſmall that it can eaſily comprehend each.

Thus a million is divided into ten hundreds of thouſands; each hundred thouſand into ten ten-thouſands; each ten-thouſand into ten thouſands; each thouſand into ten hundreds; each hundred into ten tens; and each ten into ten units.

Upon this principle logicians have proceeded, in the rules they have laid down for the reſolution of a complex idea, or what they call, the definition of the thing.

All objects, conſequently all ideas of objects, have ſome properties in common with other objects, and ideas, and ſome peculiar to themſelves.

If a perſon deſirous of reſolving a very complex idea into its conſtituent principles, ſhould expreſs all the common properties by one term, and ſhould either enumerate the ſpecial properties, or expreſs them together by another term, it is evident that he divides the given idea into its larger parts. Thus, *quadruped* is *an animal*, with *four feet*.

If

If the common properties be expreſſed by a term not ſufficiently intelligible, and if he proceed farther to divide this complex idea in the ſame manner into its common and ſpecial properties, he will then have reſolved the original idea into ſtill ſmaller parts. Thus, animal is a *creature*, which perceives and moves, by means of corporeal organs.

If in this manner he proceeds with the ſeveral parts of the complex idea, he will gradually reduce it to its component ſimple ideas, and render it perfectly comprehenſible to the mind. Thus, *creature*, is derived ſubſtance; *ſubſtance* is being ſelf-ſubſiſting; *being* is a ſimple idea.

In conformity to theſe principles, logicians have laid down their rules for the definition of all complex ideas, whether univerſal or particular; that is, for the definition of the thing.

To DEFINE AN UNIVERSAL IDEA, "join "the name of the proximate genus, with the "ſpecific difference."

For example, a quadruped is an animal, with four feet. A ſquare is a quadrilateral figure, having four equal ſides and four right angles.

To

To DEFINE A PARTICULAR IDEA, "join "the name of the ſpecies ſpecialiſſima, with "the numerical difference."

Thus, Sir Iſaac Newton, was an Engliſhman who was born in ſuch a place, at ſuch a time, who was of ſuch a ſtature, complexion, &c. who poſſeſſed ſuch and ſuch talents, and who made ſuch and ſuch extraordinary diſcoveries in philoſophy, &c. &c.

Definitions of individuals are called DESCRIPTIONS.

If the term which expreſſes the ſpecies ſpecialiſſima, or the proximate genus, be not underſtood, it will be neceſſary to define it according to the rule, and ſo on till you come to genus generaliſſimum, which is a ſimple idea and therefore indefinable. By this means the original idea, how complex ſoever, is gradually reſolved into its component ſimple ideas.

This rule of definition is *complete*, for it comprehends all the common, and all the peculiar properties of the thing defined.

The rule of definition is alſo *univerſal*, for all complex ideas are either univerſal or particular, or, in other words, they repreſent either ſpecies or individuals.

Univerſal

Univerſal ideas, in their aſcent from individuals to genus generaliſſimum, become gradually more ſimple; loſing the ſpecific difference, that is, the peculiar properties of ſome ſpecies, in every ſtep of the progreſs.

Univerſal ideas, in their deſcent from genus generaliſſimum to individuals, become gradually more complex, taking up in every ſtep of the progreſs the ſpecific difference, or peculiar properties of ſome ſpecies, till they reach the individual, which is the moſt complex of all ideas*.

* Duncan's Logic, book i. ch. vi. vii.
Locke's Eſſay, vol. ii. book iii. ch. xi. ſect. 14—22.
Watts's Logic, part i. ch. vi. ſect i.

END OF THE FIRST PART OF LOGIC.

PART

PART THE SECOND.

OF JUDGMENT.

SECTION I.

Of Judgment and Evidence.

WHEN two ideas are compared together, they either concur, as milk and whiteneſs; or they coincide, as God and Creator; or they do not concur, as vice and uſefulneſs; or they do not coincide, as man and brute.

The CONCURRENCE or COINCIDENCE of ideas, or the want of this concurrence or coincidence, is perceived either immediately, or by the intervention of a third idea.

The immediate perception of the concurrence or coincidence of two ideas, or of the want of concurrence or coincidence, is called JUDGMENT.

This is the SECOND OPERATION of the mind in the acquiſition of knowledge, and is to be diſtinguiſhed from REASONING, which is the perception of the concurrence or coincidence

cidence of two ideas, or of the want of it, by the intervention of ſome third idea, as will hereafter be explained.

The SOURCES of Judgment are Conſciouſneſs, Senſe, Intuition, and Teſtimony.

CONSCIOUSNESS is the mind's perception of its own exiſtence, faculties, and operations.

The SENSES teach us the exiſtence, properties, and powers of external objects, and the co-exiſtence of different properties in the ſame ſubſtance.

For example: we learn by the ſenſes that matter exiſts, that milk is white, that fire diſſolves wax and hardens clay, that glaſs is brittle and tranſparent, that gold is malleable and fuſible, &c.

The ſenſes do not teach us the real eſſences of ſubſtances, the original cauſes of their peculiar properties and powers, nor the reaſon of the coexiſtence of different properties in the ſame ſubſtance.

Obſervations of the ſenſes are the foundations of natural knowledge, and of what is called Experimental Philoſophy.

INTUITION, is the perception of the relation between two ideas by the immediate

inſpection of the mind, as the whole is greater than its part*.

Intuition is the foundation of demonſtration, and the knowledge ſo acquired is caled, by way of eminence, *Science*.

TESTIMONY, is the criterion of facts which do not fall immediately under our own obſervation.

Moſt of our natural knowledge is acquired by teſtimony, the experiments which can fall under the cognizance of any individual, being very few in compariſon with the whole compaſs of natural philoſophy; but all knowledge of this kind is ultimately founded upon experiment.

The proper province of teſtimony is the proof of facts, which, having happened in paſt times, or in diſtant places, have not fallen under the cognizance of the ſenſes.

* Properly ſpeaking, Intuition is not a diſtinct mode of knowledge. Intuitive propoſitions are general inferences from the moſt obvious ſenſible appearances. Thus, The whole is equal to all its parts, is not aſſented to in conſequence of an intuitive perception of the coincidence of abſtract ideas, but as a fact verified by conſtant invariable obſervation.—Vid. Hartley, part i. prop. 86. Beddoes's Obſervations on Mathematical Evidence.

Teſtimony muſt be true when the relater is not himſelf deceived, and does not intend to impoſe upon others.

The knowledge acquired by teſtimony is called Hiſtorical*.

SECTION II.

Of the Nature of Propoſitions,—Diviſion of them into Affirmative and Negative.

A JUDGMENT, or what Mr. Locke calls a mental propoſition, is that union or ſeparation of the ideas which is the reſult of the act of judging†.

Judgment, that is, aſſociations of ideas, may exiſt without any connexion with words, and this muſt neceſſarily be the caſe with perſons who are born deaf and dumb. But men are ſo much uſed to connect ideas with words, that it is extremely difficult to treat of judgments as diſtinguiſhed from verbal propoſitions.

* Duncan's Logic, book ii. ch. i.
Prieſtley againſt Reid, &c. Introduction, p. 37—61.
Watts's Logic, part ii. ſect. ix.

† It comprehends in reality every claſs of aſſociations of ideas, excepting thoſe which are the reſult of reaſoning.

A PROPO-

A PROPOSITION, is a judgment clothed in words: as Gold is precious, Virtue is excellent.

Every propoſition conſiſts of three parts: the ſubject, the predicate, and the copula.

The SUBJECT of a propoſition is the idea concerning which ſomething is affirmed or denied. The PREDICATE, is the idea united to or ſeparated from the ſubject. The COPULA, is the artificial ſign which repreſents the union, or the ſeparation, of the ſubject and the predicate.

Thus, in the propoſition, God is good; God, is the ſubject, good, is the predicate, and *is*, is the copula.

The ſeveral parts of a propoſition are not always diſtinctly expreſſed. A propoſition may ſometimes be expreſſed in two words, or even in one. But every propoſition may be reſolved into theſe three parts: thus, I go; that is, I am going. Ambulo; i. e. ego ſum ambulans.

The various inflexions of the declinable parts of ſpeech in all languages, ſupply the place of formal propoſitions.

The FIRST diviſion of propoſitions is into affirmative and negative.

An AFFIRMATIVE PROPOSITION connects

the predicate with the ſubject, as, Virtue is wiſdom.

A NEGATIVE PROPOSITION, ſeparates the predicate from the ſubject, as, God, is not, a tyrant.

The negative particle belongs to the copula, whoſe property it is to unite or ſeparate the terms of the propoſition*.

In an affirmative propoſition the predicate is taken in its whole *comprehenſion*, that is, every property of the predicate is affirmed of the ſubject. Thus, when it is ſaid, Man is an animal, every idea included in animal is predicated of man.

In a negative propoſition the predicate is taken in its whole *extenſion*, that is, all ſpecies and individuals of the predicate are denied of the ſubject. Thus, in the propoſition, Vegetables are not animals, all ſpecies of animals are denied of vegetables.

* Duncan's Logic, part ii. ch. ii.
Locke's Eſſay, book iv. ch. v.
Watts's Logic, part ii. ch. i. ii. ſect. ii.

SECTION III.

Of Univerſal and Particular Propoſitions—of Oppoſite and Subalternate Propoſitions.

THE SECOND diviſion of propoſitions is into UNIVERSAL and PARTICULAR.

An UNIVERSAL PROPOSITION, is a propoſition the ſubject of which is an univerſal idea, and the predicate extends to the whole of the ſubject; as, All men are mortal; No man is perfectly happy.

The ſigns of an univerſal propoſition are uſually the words all, every, no, none.

A PARTICULAR PROPOSITION, is a propoſition the ſubject of which is an univerſal idea, but the predicate is limited to a part of the ſubject. The ſigns of this claſs of propoſitions are, uſually, the words ſome, many, few: as, Some men are wiſe; Many philoſophers have fallen into error.

COLLECTIVE PROPOSITIONS, are propoſitions the ſubject of which is a collective idea: as, The Greeks were a poliſhed people; The Romans conquered the world.

A SINGULAR PROPOSITION, is a propoſition the ſubject of which is a ſingular idea, or an individual; as, Sir Iſaac Newton was the inventor of fluxions.

Collective propoſitions are generally ſingular propoſitions, the univerſal epithets which are ſometimes uſed, only ſerving to combine the various ideas comprehended under the univerſal term which is the ſubject of the propoſition.

INDEFINITE PROPOSITIONS, are thoſe in which the ſubject is indefinitely expreſſed. Theſe are generally univerſal propoſitions, but in ſome caſes they may be particular; as, men, that is all men, are mortal; the virtuous, that is the majority of the virtuous, are happy.

In ſingular propoſitions the predicate neceſſarily belongs to the whole ſubject; conſequently, though with reſpect to the ſubject they are of all propoſitions the moſt particular, they are nevertheleſs uniformly governed by the rules of univerſals; and by logicians they are claſſed as ſuch.

All propoſitions are either univerſal or particular; and they are all either negative

or

or affirmative: all propoſitions therefore are reducible to four claſſes, univerſal affirmative, univerſal negative, particular affirmative, or particular negative.

Theſe ſeveral claſſes of propoſitions are by logicians diſtinguiſhed by the vowels A, E, I, O, of which A, ſignifies univerſal affirmative; E, univerſal negative; I, particular affirmative; and O, particular negative, according to the following diſtich;

Aſſerit A, negat E, verum generaliter ambæ.
Aſſerit I, negat O, ſed particulariter ambo.

Propoſitions, as they are affirmative or negative, are ſaid to differ in QUALITY; as univerſal or particular, they differ in QUANTITY.

If two propoſitions differ in quality, they are called OPPOSITE; if in quantity the particular is ſaid to be SUBALTERN to the univerſal.

Of OPPOSITE propoſitions there are three claſſes; CONTRADICTORY, CONTRARY, and SUBCONTRARY.

Propoſitions differing both in quantity and quality, are called CONTRADICTORY. Of theſe one muſt be true, and the other falſe: thus,

All men are wiſe.

Some men are not wiſe.

Two univerſals differing in quality, are called CONTRARY PROPOSITIONS. Of theſe, both may be falſe, but they cannot both be true.

All men are wiſe.

No men are wiſe.

Two particular propoſitions differing in quality, are ſaid to be SUBCONTRARY. Of theſe, both may be true, but they cannot both be falſe: thus,

Some men are wiſe.

Some men are not wiſe.

If propoſitions differing in quantity agree in quality, then

1. If the univerſal be true, the particular muſt be true; but not vice verſa: thus,

All men are mortal.

Some men are mortal.

2. If the particular be falſe, the univerſal muſt be falſe; but not vice verſa: thus,

All men have wings.

Some men have wings.

3. Sometimes both propoſitions are true, and ſometimes both are falſe*.

* Duncan's Logic, book ii. ch. iii.
Watts's Logic, book ii. ch. ii. ſect. i. iii.

SECTION

SECTION IV.

Of Abſolute and Modal, Simple, Compound, and Disjunctive Propoſitions.

THE THIRD diviſion of propoſitions, is into ABSOLUTE and MODAL.

An ABSOLUTE PROPOSITION aſſerts the actual connexion or coincidence of the ſubject and predicate, or the want of that connexion or coincidence; as, Learning is uſeful; No man is perfect.

A MODAL PROPOSITION affirms the manner of connexion between the ſubject and the predicate; as, Men ought to be virtuous; Truth muſt prevail.

Modal propoſitions may be reduced to abſolute ones, by making the connexion of the two ideas the ſubject, and the mode the predicate of the propoſition: thus, That men ſhould be virtuous is morally obligatory; The prevalence of truth is neceſſary.

HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSITIONS, are thoſe in which the truth or falſehood of one propoſition, called the antecedent, is made the condition of the truth or falſehood of another

propoſition, called the conſequent: thus, if God be good, the virtuous will be happy.

Theſe indeed are not, properly ſpeaking, propoſitions, but ſyllogiſms, as will hereafter appear.

The FOURTH diviſion of propoſitions is into SIMPLE AND COMPOUND.

A SIMPLE PROPOSITION has but one ſubject and one predicate; as, vice is diſhonourable.

A COMPOUND OR COPULATIVE PROPOSITION has two or more ſubjects, or predicates, or both; as, learning and virtue are better than riches and power.

A compound propoſition may be reſolved into as many ſimple propoſitions as it contains ſubjects, or predicates, or both.

A DISJUNCTIVE PROPOSITION compares two or more predicates with the ſubject, but affirms, that one only belongs to it, without determining which; as, the earth either moves or is at reſt; the three angles of a triangle are either greater or leſs than two right angles, or they are equal to two right angles.

A disjunctive propoſition is properly a ſimple propoſition, for though various predicates are compared with the ſubject, one *only*, excluſive of

of all the reſt, is affirmed to be connected with it*.

SECTION V.

Of Propoſitions True and Falſe, Certain and Uncertain, Intuitive and Demonſtrable.

THE FIFTH diviſion of propoſitions is into TRUE, AND FALSE.

A TRUE PROPOSITION, unites ideas that agree, and ſeparates thoſe which diſagree.

A FALSE PROPOSITION, affirms an agreement between ideas which diſagree, and a diſagreement between thoſe which agree.

Of true propoſitions, ſome are CERTAIN and ſome are UNCERTAIN.

A CERTAIN PROPOSITION, is a propoſition the truth of which is clearly perceived.

AN UNCERTAIN, OR DUBIOUS PROPOSITION, is a propoſition the evidence of which is not perfectly ſatisfactory.

OF CERTAIN PROPOSITIONS, ſome are intuitive and ſome demonſtrable.

AN INTUITIVE PROPOSITION, is one the truth of which is perceived immediately upon

* Duncan's Logic, book ii. ſect. iv. v.

the

the compariſon of the ideas; as, The whole is equal to all its parts taken together.

A DEMONSTRABLE PROPOSITION, is a propoſition which may be proved by a train of reaſoning called demonſtration; as, The ſquare of the hypotenuſe, is equal to the ſquares of the ſides, of a right-angled triangle.

DEMONSTRATION, is a ſucceſſion of propoſitions, beginning with ſelf-evident and advancing to remoter truths, in which every ſucceſſive propoſition is intuitively connected with the preceding, till in the end the concluſion becomes intuitive.

The moſt perfect ſpecimen of the proceſs of the mind in the acquiſition of knowledge is found in MATHEMATICS.

Mathematicians begin with clear and accurate DEFINITIONS of their terms, to which they always rigidly adhere.

From definitions they advance to ſelf-evident propoſitions, ſome of which are ſpeculative, and are called AXIOMS; others are practical, and are called POSTULATES.

They next proceed to the DEMONSTRATION of remoter truths, of which the ſpeculative, are called THEOREMS, and the practical, PROBLEMS.

From

From eaſy and intuitive principles, they thus advance, by regular gradation, to more difficult and complex truths, till they at laſt arrive at concluſions the moſt remote from the firſt principles of ſcience, and ſuch as, to a perſon not converſant in theſe inquiries, would appear beyond the reach of the human intellect: ſuch are many of the demonſtrations in aſtronomy, and in other branches of natural philoſophy.

COROLLARIES, are ſelf-evident inferences from demonſtrated truths. SCHOLIA, are obſervations which tend to illuſtrate a ſubject. LEMMAS, are preliminary propoſitions.

Mr. Locke thought, that, as moral ideas are equally capable of ſtrict definition with mathematical ideas, demonſtration is equally applicable to moral ſubjects*.

* Duncan's Logic, book ii. ch. vi.
Watts's Logic, part ii. ch. ii. ſect. vii. viii.
Locke's Eſſay, book iv. ch. iv. ſect. vi. vii.

PART

PART THE THIRD.

OF REASONING.

SECTION I.

Of Reaſoning, and the Structure of Syllogiſms.

THE THIRD OPERATION OF THE MIND IN THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE IS REASONING.

REASONING, determines the relation between two ideas by the intervention of a third with which they are compared.

If the two given ideas agree with the third idea, it is evident that they muſt agree with each other; if one agrees and the other diſagrees, their mutual diſagreement is inferred.

Hence it appears that every act of reaſoning conſiſts of three judgments, in two of which the given ideas, that is, the ideas whoſe relation is ſought, are compared with the third idea, and in the laſt they are joined to, or ſeparated from each other.

A SYLLOGISM, is the expreſſion of an act of reaſoning. If, for example, the queſtion

be concerning the relation between virtue and honour, let utility be the third idea, and the ſyllogiſm will ſtand in this form:

Whatever is uſeful, is honourable.
Virtue, is uſeful,
Therefore, Virtue, is honourable.

Again, let the queſtion be propoſed concerning the relation between vice and happineſs, and let odious be the third idea; the ſyllogiſm will ſtand thus:

Nothing odious is happy.
Vice is odious,
Therefore, Vice is not happy.

Propoſitions capable of being proved by ſyllogiſtic reaſoning, are chiefly, if not ſolely, thoſe which expreſs coincidences, or the want of them. Such are all propoſitions relating to quantity and number; and particularly the doctrine of proportions. Propoſitions which relate to concurrences are proved by conſciouſneſs, ſenſe, or teſtimony. Such are the facts in experimental philoſophy, chemiſtry, and hiſtory.

Logicians have invented various rules for the conſtruction of ſyllogiſms, ſo as to produce true and legitimate concluſions; theſe they have thrown into a mathematical form:

they

they are chiefly valuable as curious ſpecimens of logical ingenuity; but they may alſo be of ſome uſe to aſſiſt the mind in analyſing a proceſs of reaſoning, and thus detecting ſophiſtry, and eſtabliſhing truth*.

SECTION II.

The General and Special Rules of Syllogiſm demonſtrated from their Firſt Principles.

DEFINITIONS.

DEF. I.

A SYLLOGISM, is the expreſſion of an act of reaſoning, in which a propoſition affirming the agreement or diſagreement of two ideas, is inferred from two preceding propoſitions, in which thoſe ideas are compared with ſome third idea.

DEF. II.

The propoſition containing the inference is called, the CONCLUSION; the two preceding propoſitions are, the PREMISES.

* Duncan's Logic, book iii. ch. i.

DEF. III.

The ideas compared in the premiſes and the concluſion, are in general called TERMS.

DEF. IV.

Both the terms of the concluſion are called EXTREMES; and the idea with which they are compared is, the MIDDLE TERM.

DEF. V.

The ſubject of the concluſion is called, the LESS, and the predicate of it is, the GREATER EXTREME, OR TERM.

DEF. VI.

That of the two premiſes in which the greater extreme is compared with the middle term is, the MAJOR PROPOSITION; that in which the leſs extreme is compared with it is called, the MINOR PROPOSITION, and ſometimes, the ASSUMPTION*.

DEF.

* In the following ſyllogiſm:

Truth is venerable:
Chriſtianity is truth;
Therefore, Chriſtianity is venerable.

Chriſtianity, Venerable, and Truth, are the terms of the ſyllogiſm. Chriſtianity and Venerable, are the extremes, and Truth the middle term. Venerable, is the major, and Chriſtianity, the minor extreme. Truth is venerable,

DEF. VII.

A propoſition is ſaid to be UNIVERSAL, when its ſubject is taken univerſally, and PARTICULAR, when its ſubject is taken particularly*.

DEF. VIII.

AN AFFIRMATIVE PROPOSITION, is a propoſition in which two ideas are aſſerted to agree. A NEGATIVE PROPOSITION, is one in which they are aſſerted to diſagree.

AXIOMS.

AX. I.

Particular ideas, and propoſitions, are contained in univerſals, but not vice verſâ.

AX. II.

In affirmative propoſitions, the predicate is

venerable, Chriſtianity is Truth, are the premiſes. Therefore Chriſtianity is venerable, is the concluſion. Truth is venerable, is the major propoſition. Chriſtianity is Truth, is the minor propoſition, or the aſſumption.

* In an univerſal propoſition the predicate extends to the whole ſubject, whether it be a particular or univerſal idea; in a particular propoſition the predicate is limited to a part of the ſubject.

taken particularly, in negative propoſitions, univerſally*.

AX. III.

If two ideas agree with a third, they agree with each other.

AX. IV.

The agreement of two ideas with a third, cannot prove their diſagreement with each other.

AX. V.

If, two ideas being compared with a third, one agrees, and the other diſagrees, they diſagree with each other.

AX. VI.

If one agrees, and the other diſagrees, it cannot be inferred that they agree with each other.

AX. VII.

Nothing can be inferred concerning the agreement, or diſagreement of ideas with each other, by comparing them with two different

* The predicate in an affirmative propoſition being taken in its comprehenſion only; that of a negative propoſition in its extenſion. Hence the difficulty of proving a negative propoſition, and the reaſonableneſs of generally impoſing the onus probandi upon the affirmative ſide of the queſtion.

ideas with which they may be found reſpectively to agree.

AX. VIII.

Neither can any thing be inferred, concerning their mutual agreement or diſagreement, by comparing them with one and the ſame idea, with which they both diſagree.

GENERAL RULES OF SYLLOGISM.

G. RULE I.

If the middle term be not taken once, at leaſt, univerſally, nothing can be inferred.

DEM.

1. The middle term being taken twice particularly may ſignify two different ideas*.

gr. 1. Ax. 7. 2. No concluſion can be drawn. Q. E. D.

* Thus, from the premiſes, Some men are learned, Some men are unlearned, it cannot be inferred that they who are unlearned are learned, becauſe the middle term "men" in both the premiſes, being reſtricted by the form of the propoſition to a particular claſs under the general idea, is evidently taken in different ſenſes in the two premiſes.

G. RULE II.

A term cannot be taken more univerſally in the concluſion, than in the premiſes.

DEM.

1. To take a term particularly in the premiſes, and univerſally in the concluſion, would be to ſuppoſe an univerſal contained in a particular.

gr. 1. Ax. 1. 2. This concluſion is abſurd. Q. E. D.

G. RULE III.

If the major propoſition of a ſyllogiſm be a particular affirmative, the concluſion cannot be negative.

DEM.

1. The major term muſt be either the ſubject or the predicate of the major propoſition.

Hyp. Def. 7. 2. If it be the ſubject, it is particularly taken as being a particular propoſition.

Hyp.

Hyp. Ax. 2. 3. If it be the predicate, it is particularly taken as being an affirmative propoſition.

gr. 1. 2. 3. 4. The major term is particularly taken in the premiſes.

gr. 4. G. R. 2. 5. It muſt be particularly taken in the concluſion: that is, the predicate of the concluſion muſt be taken particularly.

Ax. 2. 6. The predicate of a negative propoſition muſt be taken univerſally.

gr. 5. 6. 7. Therefore the concluſion cannot be negative. Q. E. D.

G. Rule iv.

A negative concluſion cannot be drawn from two affirmative premiſes.

DEM.

Def. 8. 1. This would be to infer the diſagreement of two ideas from their

agreement with a third.

gr. 1. Ax. 4. 2. This inference is abſurd. Q. E. D.

G. Rule v.

From two negative premiſes nothing can be concluded.

DEM.

Def. 8 1. Theſe premiſes only ſhow, the diſagreement of both extremes with the middle term.

gr. 1. Ax. 8. 2. No inference can be drawn. Q. E. D.

G. Rule vi.

If one of the premiſes be negative, the concluſion muſt be negative.

DEM.

Ax. 5. 1. In this caſe a negative concluſion may juſtly be drawn.

Ax. 6. 2. An affirmative concluſion cannot be drawn.

gr. 1. 2. 3. The concluſion muſt be negative. Q. E. D.

G. Rule

G. Rule VII.

From two particular premiſes nothing can be concluded.

LEMMA.

Only three caſes of this can happen. Of theſe two particular premiſes both may be negative, or both affirmative; or one may be negative, and the other affirmative.

CASE I.

Is excluded by G. Rule V.

CASE II.

If both be particular and both affirmative, nothing can follow.

DEM.

Def. 7. 1. Both the ſubjects muſt be particularly taken becauſe they are particular propoſitions.

Ax. 2. 2. Both the predicates muſt be particularly taken becauſe they are both affirmative.

gr. 1. 2. 3. The middle term muſt be taken twice particularly.

gr. 3.

gr. 3. G. R. 1. 4. No concluſion can be drawn. Q. E. D.

CASE III.

If both the premiſes be negative, and both particular, no concluſion can be drawn.

DEM.

Hyp. G. R. 6. 1. The concluſion is negative.

gr. 1. Ax. 2. 2. The major term is univerſally taken in the concluſion.

gr. 2. G. R. 2. 3. It is taken univerſally in the major propoſition.

Hyp. Def. 7. 4. The ſubject of both premiſes is particular.

Hyp. Ax. 2. 5. The predicate of one of the premiſes is particular.

gr. 3. 4. 5. 6. Of the four terms, none but the greater extreme is univerſally taken.

gr. 6. 7. The middle term is taken twice particularly.

gr. 7. G. R. 1. 8. There can be no concluſion. Q. E. D.

From

From comparing the firſt, ſecond, and third caſes with the lemma, the rule follows univerſally.

G. RULE VIII.

If either of the premiſes be particular, the concluſion cannot be univerſal.

LEMMA.

Only three caſes can happen. Both the premiſes may be negative; or both affirmative; or one may be negative, and the other affirmative.

CASE I.

Is excluded by G. Rule V.

CASE II.

If both the premiſes be affirmative, and one particular, the concluſion cannot be univerſal.

DEM.

Hyp. Ax. 2. 1. The predicates of both are taken particularly, becauſe they are both affirmative.

Def. 7. 2. The ſubject of one is taken particularly, one being a particular propoſition.

gr. 1. 2.

gr. 1. 2. 3. Three terms being taken particularly, only one can be taken univerſally.

G. R. 1. 4. The middle term muſt be taken univerſally, if there be any concluſion at all.

gr. 3. 4. 5. Both the extremes muſt be taken particularly in the premiſes.

gr. 5. 6. The leſs extreme being taken particularly in the premiſes, muſt be taken particularly in the concluſion.

Def. 5. gr. 6. 7. The concluſion muſt be particular. Q. E. D.

CASE III.

If one of the premiſes be negative, and one affirmative, one being alſo particular, the concluſion muſt be particular.

DEM.

Hyp. Ax. 2. 1. One of the premiſes being affirmative, the predicate

predicate of it muſt be taken particularly.

Def. 7. 2. One of the premiſes being particular, the ſubject of it muſt be taken particularly.

gr. 1. 2. 3. Only two terms can be taken univerſally.

gr. 3 G. R. 1. 4. One of theſe two is the middle term.

Hyp. G. R. 6. 5. One of the premiſes being negative, the concluſion muſt be negative.

Def. 5. Ax. 2. 6. The major term being the predicate of the concluſion will be univerſally taken in it.

G. R. 2. 7. The major term muſt be univerſally taken in the premiſes, that is, in the major propoſition.

gr. 4. 7. 8. Since the middle and the major terms are both taken univerſally, and no more than theſe can be ſo taken in this caſe;

case; the minor term must be particularly taken in the premises.

gr. 8. G. R. 2. 9. The minor term must be particularly taken in the conclusion.

gr. 9. Def. 5. 10. The minor term being the subject of the conclusion, the conclusion, in the case supposed, must be a particular proposition. Q. E. D.

Thus, by comparing the three cases with the lemma, the rule is universally established.

SCHOLIUM.

By these rules we account for all the various combinations of propositions, whether universal or particular, negative or affirmative, which can possibly be admitted into any sort of syllogism.

These four distinctions are represented by the letters A, E, I, and O, of which A, signifies universal affirmative; E, universal negative; I, particular affirmative; and O, particular negative. And as only three of these can concur in a syllogism, all the pos-

ſible combinations of them are 64, as will appear by the Table that is ſubjoined. Of theſe 53 are excluded by the general rules referred to over againſt them; one is ſuperſeded, and the other ten are admitted, as will appear by what follows, when we come to treat of the figures and moods of ſyllogiſms.

The figures annexed in the Table to thoſe which are neither admitted, nor ſuperſeded, denote the general rule by which they are excluded.

TABLE.

AAA—adm.	EAA—6	IAA } 8	OAA } 8
AAE—4	EAE—ad.	IAE }	OAE }
AAI—ad.	EAI—6	IAI—ad.	OAI—6
AAO—4	EAO—ad.	IAO—4	OAO—ad.
AEA—6	EEA } 5	IEA—6	OEA } 5
AEE—ad.	EEE }	IEE—8	OEE }
AEI—6	EEI }	IEI—6	OEI }
AEO—ſup.	EEO }	IEO—3	OEO }
AIA—8	EIA } 8	IIA } 7	OIA } 7
AIE—4	EIE }	IIE }	OIE }
AII—ad.	EII—6	III }	OII }
AIO—4	EIO—ad.	IIO }	OIO }
AOA—6	EOA } 5	IOA } 7	OOA } 7 and 5
AOE—8	EOE }	IOE }	OOE }
AOI—6	EOI }	IOI }	OOI }
AOO—ad.	EOO }	IOO }	OOO }

COR.

COR.

It appears from hence that ten combinations may be admitted, viz.

AAA	EAE	IAI	OAO
AAI	EAO		
AEE	EIO		
AII			
AOO			

AEO, is ſuperſeded in AEE: and why AAI, and EAO, are not ſuperſeded by AAA, and EAE, will be ſhown under a following head.

DEF. IX.

The different combinations of propoſitions in ſyllogiſms, according as the three propoſitions of which they conſiſt are either univerſal or particular, negative or affirmative, are called MOODS.

COR.

There are but ten poſſible moods of ſyllogiſms, excepting thoſe which are ſuperſeded as above.

AX. IX.

There are four different poſitions of the middle term in the premiſes. 1. It may be the ſubject of the major, and the predicate of the

the minor. 2. It may be the predicate of both; or, 3. It may be the ſubject of both; or, 4. It may be the predicate of the major, and the ſubject of the minor.

DEF. 10.

Syllogiſms are ſaid to be of different FIGURES, according to the different poſition of the middle term in the premiſes.

SCHOL. 1.

Syllogiſms are ſaid to be of the firſt, ſecond, third, or fourth figure, according to the poſition of the middle term in the order in which they are placed in the ninth axiom. The definitions are comprehended in the following technical line.

SUBJICE PRÆ : BIS PRÆ : BIS SUB : PRÆ SUB : dato quarto.

1 2 3 4

SCHOL. 2.

From this definition of the figures, ſeveral moods which might be admitted in ſome figures will be excluded from others, by certain ſpecial rules of ſyllogiſm, which it will next be our buſineſs to enumerate and demonſtrate.

SPECIAL RULES OF SYLLOGISM.

Sp. Rule 1.

In the firſt figure SUB PRÆ, the Minor muſt be affirmative.

DEM.

G. R. 6. 1. If the minor were negative, the concluſion muſt be negative.

G. R. 5. 2. If the minor were negative, the major muſt be affirmative.

2. Ax. 2. 3. On this ſuppoſition, the major term muſt be taken particularly in the major propoſition; becauſe by hypotheſis it is the predicate of that propoſition.

1. Ax. 2. 4. On this ſuppoſition, the major term muſt be taken univerſally in the concluſion.

G. R. 3. 4. 5. The major term would be taken more univerſally in the concluſion, than in the premiſes.

Q. E. A.

Sp. Rule

Sp. Rule II.

In the firſt figure the Major muſt be univerſal.

DEM.

S. R. 1. 1. The minor muſt be affirmative.

1. Ax. 2. 2. The midddle term, being by hypotheſis the predicate of the minor, is taken particularly.

Def. 7. 3. If the major were particular, the middle term being by hypotheſis the ſubject, muſt be particular.

gr. 2. 3. 4. On this ſuppoſition, the middle term would be taken twice particularly; which is abſurd.

gr. 4. G. R. 1. 5. Therefore the major is univerſal. Q. E. D.

Sp. Rule III.

In the ſecond figure BIS PRÆ, one of the Premiſes is negative.

DEM.

Hyp. Ax. 2. 1. If both the premiſes

were affirmative, since the middle term is the predicate of both, it would be taken twice particularly.

2. Therefore one of the premises must be negative. Q. E. D.

SP. RULE IV.

In the second figure, the Major must be universal.

DEM.

S. R. 3. Hyp. 1. One of the premises in this figure being negative, the conclusion must be negative.

G. R. 6. 2. The greater extreme, that is, the predicate of the conclusion, must be taken universally.

gr. 2. G. R. 2. 3. The greater extreme must be taken universally in the premises.

Hyp. 4. The greater extreme is the subject of the major proposition.

gr. 3. 4. G. R. 2. 5. The major propoſition in the ſecond figure muſt be univerſal. Q. E. D.

SP. RULE V.

In the third figure BIS SUB, the Minor propoſition is affirmative.

DEM.

G. R. 5. 1. If the minor be negative, the major muſt be affirmative.

Hyp. Ax. 7. 2. Since the major term is by hypotheſis the predicate of the major propoſition, it muſt in this caſe be taken particularly.

gr. 1. G. R. 6. 3. The concluſion muſt upon this conſtruction be negative.

gr. 3. Ax. 2. 4. The major term muſt be taken univerſally in the concluſion.

gr. 3. 4. 5. The major term muſt be taken more univerſally in the concluſion than in the premiſes, if the minor be negative.

G. R. 2. 6. In the third figure, the minor propoſition muſt be affirmative. Q. E. D.

Sp. Rule vi.

In the third figure, the Concluſion will be particular.

DEM.

Ax. 2. S. R. 5. 1. In this figure the minor propoſition is affirmative, and therefore the minor term being the predicate, muſt be taken particularly in the premiſes.

gr. 1. G. R. 2. 2. The minor term will be particular in the concluſion.

gr. 2. Def. 7. 3. The ſubject of the concluſion is taken particularly, therefore the concluſion is a particular propoſition. Q. E. D.

Sp. Rule vii.

In the fourth figure PRÆ SUB, if the Major propoſition be affirmative, the Minor is univerſal.

DEM.

DEM.

Hyp. Ax. 2. 1. If the major be affirmative, the middle term being its predicate, muſt be taken particularly.

Hyp. Def. 7. 2. If the minor propoſition were particular, the middle term would be particularly taken in it.

G. R. 1. 3. The middle term would be taken twice particularly, which is abſurd; and therefore in this figure the minor muſt be univerſal. Q. E. D.

SP. RULE VIII.

In the fourth figure, if the Concluſion be negative, the Major is univerſal.

DEM.

Def. 5. 1. If the concluſion be negative, the major term is taken univerſally in it.

G. R. 2. 2. The major term muſt be

taken univerſally in the major propoſition.

Hyp. 3. The major term in the fourth figure is the ſubject of the major propoſition.

Def. 7. 4. The major propoſition muſt be univerſal. Q. E. D.

SP. RULE IX.

In the fourth figure, if the Minor be affirmative, the Concluſion is particular.

DEM.

Hyp. Def. 6. 1. In this figure the minor term is the predicate of the minor propoſition.

Ax. 2. 2. The minor propoſition being affirmative, the minor term is taken particularly in it.

G. R. 2. 3. The minor term muſt be taken particularly in the concluſion.

Def. 5, gr. 3. 4. The concluſion is, in this caſe, a particular propoſition. Q. E. D.

SCHOLIUM

SCHOLIUM I.

By theſe Special Rules for the different Figures, it will appear, that ſeveral of the moods not univerſally excluded by the General Rules of Syllogiſm, are excluded from ſeveral of theſe Figures, as may be ſeen in the following Table, where thoſe moods which are admitted under each Figure are ſignified by the technical terms by which they are known; and thoſe which are excluded are marked with a reference to the Rule by which they are excluded:

TABLE.

	Fig. 1.	Fig. 2.	Fig. 3.	Fig. 4.
AAA	Barbara.	3.	6.	9.
AAI	Sup. in AAA	3.	Darapti.	Bamarip.
AEE	1.	Cameſtres.	6.	Cameres
AII	Darii.	3.	Datiſi.	7.
AOO	1.	Baroco.	5.	7.
EAE	Celarent.	Ceſare.	6.	9.
EAO	Sup. in EAE	Sup. in EAE	Felapton.	Feſtapo.
IAI	2.	3.	Diſamis.	Dimatis.
OAO	2.	4.	Bocardo.	8.
EIO	Ferio.	Feſtino.	Feriſon.	Freſiſon.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is to be obſerved that AEO in the ſecond and fourth Figure is included in AEE: but from the

the firſt and third it is excluded by Special Rule II and V: and therefore upon the whole it is ſaid to be ſuperſeded; which is not the caſe with AII, nor EAO, they having a place in the third and fourth Figures, from which their univerſals AAA and EAE are excluded.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The following technical lines have been invented for remembering the moods under each figure.

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, quoque primæ
Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, ſecundæ.
Tertia Darapti ſibi vindicat atque Felapton,
Adjungens Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.
Non Bamarip, Cameres, Dimatis, Festapo, Fresison.

Which laſt line intimates that the fourth figure is hardly worth regarding, being indeed no more than an awkward tranſpoſition of the firſt.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Propoſitions of all kinds, whether univerſal or particular, affirmative or negative, which are capable of being proved by ſyllogiſms, are reducible to ſyllogiſms of the firſt figure; the other figures therefore are comparatively of little uſe. It may nevertheleſs be proper to illuſtrate them by a few examples. In all ſyl-

logiſms

logiſms regularly conſtructed, the major propoſition is placed firſt, the minor ſecond, and the concluſion laſt.

FIG. I.

Bar- All natural evils terminate in good:
ba- All wars are natural evils:
ra. Therefore, All wars terminate in good.

Ce- No well directed efforts to benefit mankind ſhall ultimately be loſt.
la- All ſeaſonable inſtructions are well-directed efforts.
rent. Therefore, No ſeaſonable inſtructions ſhall be loſt.

Da- All good men love peace:
ri- Some ſtateſmen are good men:
i. Therefore, Some ſtateſmen love peace.

Fe- No bigots are to be truſted with power:
ri- Some honeſt men are bigots:
o. Therefore, Some honeſt men are not to be truſted with power.

FIG. 2.

Ce- No reſtraint upon fair diſcuſſion, is beneficial to ſociety.
ſa- All reſtraints upon injuſtice, are beneficial to ſociety.

re.

re. Therefore, No reſtraints upon injuſtice are reſtraints upon fair diſcuſſion.

FIG 3. Bis ſub.

Da- All wiſe men, love juſt government.
rap- All wiſe men, love temperate liberty.
ti. Therefore, Some who love temperate liberty, love juſt government.

SECTION III.

Compound and Imperfect Syllogiſms.

I. HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS, are thoſe in which the major premiſe is a hypothetical propoſition.

If God be wiſe, and good, the virtuous ſhall be happy.
But God is wiſe, and good.
Therefore, the virtuous ſhall be happy.

Of Hypothetical Syllogiſms there are four MOODS, of which two are admiſſible, and two, inadmiſſible.

The admiſſible moods are, the MODUS PONENS, and the MODUS TOLLENS.

1. The MODUS PONENS, in the Minor premiſe admits the antecedent, and in the Concluſion admits the conſequent.

If

If the chriſtian hiſtory be credible, the doctrine muſt be true:

But the chriſtian hiſtory is credible;

Therefore, the chriſtian doctrine muſt be true.

2. The MODUS TOLLENS, rejects the conſequent in the Minor propoſition, and in the Concluſion rejects the antecedent.

If men were juſt, ſlavery would be aboliſhed:

But ſlavery is not aboliſhed:

Therefore men are not juſt.

No other Mood can be admitted; for we cannot argue from the removal of the antecedent to the removal of the conſequent, nor from the eſtabliſhment of the conſequent to the eſtabliſhment of the antecedent.

II. EPICHIREMA contains the proof of the Major or the Minor, or both, before it draws the Concluſion. For example,

Unbelievers pay little attention to the evidence of chriſtianity.

This appears, from the contempt in which they hold the ſubject; from their miſconceptions of the nature of the chriſtian religion; from the futility of their objections; and from their miſſtatement of facts.

But

But, Many philoſophers are unbelievers:

Therefore many philoſophers pay little attention to the evidences of chriſtianity.

III. ENTHYMEME, is an imperfect Syllogiſm, in which only one of the premiſes and the concluſion are expreſſed. Thus,

All ſciences are uſeful:

Therefore, mathematics are uſeful.

This is the Syllogiſm moſt in uſe: the rapidity with which the mind compares its ideas, and draws its concluſion, ſuperſeding the neceſſity of formal ſyllogiſm, excepting where it may be neceſſary to analyſe an argument, in order to expoſe its weakneſs, or to eſtabliſh its validity.

IV. SORITES is a Syllogiſm which conſiſts of a ſeries of propoſitions, in which the predicate of the firſt becomes the ſubject of the ſecond, and ſo on, till in the concluſion the ſubject of the firſt is joined with the predicate of the laſt. For example,

All who love wiſdom, will earneſtly deſire it.

All who earneſtly deſire wiſdom, will uſe the neceſſary means to attain it.

All who uſe the means of acquiring wiſdom, will encounter many difficulties.

All

All who encounter difficulties, muſt exerciſe patience, perſeverance, and ſelf-denial.

Therefore all who love wiſdom, muſt exerciſe patience, perſeverance, and ſelf-denial*.

V. PROSYLLOGISMUS, unites two or more ſyllogiſms together, ſo that the concluſion of the former ſhall be the major or the minor of the latter. For example,

Science is an ornament to the mind:
Philoſophy is ſcience:
Therefore philoſophy is an ornament to the mind.
But ethics is a branch of philoſophy:
Therefore the knowledge of ethics is an ornament to the mind.

DILEMMA, is a Hypothetical Syllogiſm of the modus tollens, in which the conſequent of the major is a disjunctive propoſition, containing every ſuppoſition upon which the antecedent may be ſupported. The minor removes the antecedent: and the concluſion removes the conſequent. For example,

If St. Paul's account of his converſion be not true, he was either deceived, or a deceiver.

But he could not be deceived himſelf, and

*For another inſtance of the Sorites, ſee Rom. viii. 29, 30.

it is morally impoſſible that he ſhould have been a deceiver.

Therefore it is abſurd to affirm, that St. Paul's account of his converſion, is not true; or in other words, therefore the Apoſtle's narration is true.

This mode of reaſoning is frequently uſed in mathematical demonſtration. Thus,

If circles be not to each other as the ſquares of their diameters, they are in a ratio either greater or leſs than the ſquares of their diameters.

But they are not in a ratio either greater or leſs than this:

Therefore circles are to each other as the ſquares of their diameters.

If the conſequent of the major conſiſts of three ſuppoſitions, the ſyllogiſm is called a TRILEMMA. For inſtance,

If the univerſe be not perfect, the defect muſt be owing either to the want of goodneſs, of wiſdom, or of power, in the Creator.

But there is no want of goodneſs, of wiſdom, or of power, in the Creator.

Therefore the univerſe is perfect.

VII. In-

VII. INDUCTION, is the diſtribution of a general idea into its ſeveral ſpecies and individuals, and aſcribing to the whole what is found to be the property of every part. Thus,

The eternity of future torments is not to be found in the pentateuch, in the hiſtorical books, in the poetical compoſitions, nor in the prophets, of the Old Teſtament. Neither is it to be found in the goſpels, the acts, the epiſtles, nor the apocalypſe.

Therefore, the doctrine of the eternity of future torments is not to be found in the Scriptures, either of the Old Teſtament or the New.

INDUCTION, is the kind of proof upon which the principal ſtreſs is laid in experimental philoſophy. Experiments are facts, the compariſon of which leads to the knowledge of the previous circumſtances by which they are produced, or modified. Thus philoſophers acquire an inſight into the cauſes of exiſting phenomena, and the laws by which the univerſe is regulated. This proceſs of inquiry is ſlow, but it is the only ſure method of becoming acquainted with the powers of nature: and it is to the proſecution of this mode of inveſtigation, that the moderns owe their great ſuperiority over the ancients in phyſical ſcience.

When Induction is complete, the evidence is satisfactory; but as this can seldom be attained, philosophers are constrained to have recourse to arguments from Analogy.

VIII. ANALOGY, argues from proportionable causes to proportionable effects, and from similarity of circumstances to similarity of consequences. For example,

All matter which falls under our observation gravitates.

Therefore, Gravitation is universally a property of matter.

Statesmen have ever governed their conduct by views of interest and ambition.

Therefore, they will always govern themselves by the same principles.

The argument from Analogy is sometimes almost equal in force to a complete Induction; at other times it hardly amounts to a faint probability. This depends upon the degree of resemblance between the circumstances which precede, or accompany existing phenomena, and those which constitute the analogy in any given case. For it is an established principle of reasoning, that the same causes operating in the same circumstances will invariably

invariably produce the ſame effects; and therefore ſimilar cauſes will produce ſimilar effects; and proportionable cauſes proportionable effects. Thus, that the planets are inhabited is a fact, which, though ſupported only by analogy, is as firmly credited by philoſophers, as that the earth itſelf is inhabited, which we know by obſervation and experience. But that the inhabitants of the planets are ſimilar in their form, and conſtitution, of body and mind, to the inhabitants of this world, is a concluſion, which, though favoured by ſome phenomena, is by much too dubious to be admitted without great heſitation. It may be further obſerved, that arguments from analogy are in no caſe more fallacious than where they lead to concluſions concerning the conduct of voluntary agents. Not that men with the ſame views and feelings will act differently in circumſtances preciſely ſimilar, for that is impoſſible; but, becauſe it is extremely difficult for one perſon to enter into the views and feelings of another, and conſequently, to foreſee in given circumſtances how another man will act. Nevertheleſs there are caſes in which the conduct of voluntary agents may be predicted with a preciſion

nearly approximating to that with which we foretell the effects of phyſical cauſes. For example, it is as certain that a diſhoneſt and avaricious man will take an undue advantage in buſineſs where opportunity offers, as that fire will burn, or water run down hill*.

SECTION IV.

Topics.—Different Kinds of Argument.

I. THE middle term is often called the ARGUMENT.

TOPICS or COMMON PLACES, are general ſubjects from whence arguments are drawn; ſuch as hiſtory, philoſophy, morals, theology, and the like.

The PROOF of any propoſition, is a ſyllogiſm, or ſeries of ſyllogiſms, collecting that propoſition from known and evident truths.

If the ſyllogiſms of which the proof conſiſts, admit of no premiſes but definitions, intuitive truths, and propoſitions already eſtabliſhed; the argument ſo conſtructed is called a demonſtration. Such are all the arguments in mathematics.

* Watts's Logic, part iii. ch. ii. ſect. 6. Duncan's Logic, book iii. ch. iv.

II. DE-

II. DEMONSTRATIONS are of two kinds, A PRIORI, and A POSTERIORI.

DEMONSTRATION A PRIORI, argues from the cauſe to the effect. Thus, God is infinite in power, wiſdom, and benevolence: Therefore, the univerſe which he has made, is unlimited in extent, duration, and felicity.

DEMONSTRATION A POSTERIORI, argues from the effect to the cauſe. Thus, The univerſe abounds in marks of excellent contrivance, and benevolent deſign: Therefore, there is an intelligent, and benevolent, Firſt Cauſe of All.

III. Arguments are either DIRECT, or INDIRECT.

A DIRECT ARGUMENT, is that which immediately proves the propoſition in queſtion.

An INDIRECT ARGUMENT proves the concluſion, by proving or diſproving ſome propoſition upon which the concluſion depends.

Of indirect arguments there are three caſes.

1. REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM, proves the concluſion, by demonſtrating the abſurdity of the contradictory propoſition. This is often uſed in mathematics.

2. ARGUMENTUM A FORTIORI, proves

the concluſion by proving a leſs probable propoſition upon which the concluſion depends. This mode of reaſoning is alſo much uſed by mathematicians.

3. ARGUMENTUM EX CONCESSO, proves the concluſion by proving a propoſition upon which it was agreed to yield the original queſtion.

IV. Various other arguments are diſtinguiſhed by Latin names.

1. ARGUMENTUM AD JUDICIUM, an addreſs to the underſtanding; an argument founded upon rational principles.

2. ARGUMENTUM AD FIDEM, an argument founded upon teſtimony either human or divine.

3. ARGUMENTUM AD IGNORANTIAM, an argument founded on inſufficient principles which the opponent has not ſkill to refute.

4. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM, an addreſs to a man's profeſſed principles, whether true or falſe.

5. ARGUMENTUM AD VERECUNDIAM, an argument drawn from authority we are aſhamed to diſpute.

6. ARGU-

6. ARGUMENTUM AD PASSIONES, an addreſs to the paſſions of the hearers*.

SECTION V.

Doctrine of Sophiſms.

FALSE ſyllogiſms are called PARALOGISMS.

A falſe ſyllogiſm, the fallacy of which is not obviouſly apparent, is a SOPHISM.

The principal kinds of SOPHISMS are the following.

1. IGNORATIO ELENCHI, or a MISTAKE OF THE QUESTION, when a propoſition is proved which has no neceſſary connexion with the point in diſpute: Thus, for example, If a man meaning to eſtabliſh the divine fore-knowledge of contingent events ſets himſelf to prove that the knowledge of God is infinite, he miſtakes the queſtion in diſpute: For it may be conceded by his opponent, that God is omniſcient, but it may ſtill remain a queſtion, whether future contingencies are the objects of knowledge.

* Duncan's Logic, book iii. ch. v.
Watts's Logic, part iii. ch. ii. ſect. vii. viii.

In like manner, unbelievers argue that chriſtianity is not of divine original, becauſe the doctrine of eternal torments is incredible. This is alſo an ignoratio elenchi: a corruption of chriſtianity is miſtaken for chriſtianity itſelf.

2. PETITIO PRINCIPII, BEGGING THE QUESTION, or taking for granted the propoſition to be proved.

If, for example, a zealot ſhould argue that a doctrine which he ſtigmatiſes as hereſy is unſcriptural and untrue, becauſe it is contrary to the declarations of Chriſt, and the apoſtles, he begs the queſtion, and aſſumes the principle which he profeſſes to prove. This is ſometimes called, arguing idem per idem.

3. ARGUING IN A CIRCLE, is when the premiſes are proved by the concluſion, and the concluſion by the premiſes.

Thus the papiſts argue, that the authority of the church proves the truth of the ſcriptures; and the authority of the ſcriptures eſtabliſhes the infallibility of the church.

4. NON CAUSA PRO CAUSA, the aſſignation of a falſe cauſe. As when a perſon aſcribes events to good or bad luck, to the influence of the planets, and the like.

5. FALLACIA

5. FALLACIA ACCIDENTIS, arguing from what is accidental, to what is eſſential. So the papiſts argue, that the ſcriptures are not to be read by the common people, becauſe they may be dangerouſly miſinterpreted. In the ſame way, it is argued, that certain amuſements are univerſally unlawful, becauſe they are ſometimes carried to exceſs.

6. Sophiſms of EQUIVOCATION are thoſe in which the argument depends upon the ambiguity of the terms. Of this the following is an old example.

He that ſays, You are an animal, ſays true,
He that ſays, You are a gooſe, ſays, you are an animal,
Therefore he that ſays, You are a gooſe, ſays true.

Other ſophiſms are mentioned by logicians which it is not neceſſary to ſpecify. Good ſenſe, and a habit of reaſoning juſtly upon all occaſions, will enable a perſon to detect the fallacy of plauſible ſophiſtry, far better than any mechanical rules*.

* Locke's Eſſay, vol. ii. book iv. ch. xvii.
Watts's Logic, part iii. ch. iii.

PART THE FOURTH.

DISPOSITION AND METHOD.

DISPOSITION, is arranging ideas in ſuch a manner as may beſt facilitate the acquiſition, the recollection, the improvement, or the communication of knowledge.

METHOD is the effect of Diſpoſition: it is the actual arrangement of ideas in the mind.

Method is of two kinds: the ANALYTIC, and the SYNTHETIC.

ANALYTIC METHOD, reſolves a complex idea into its component principles.

SYNTHETIC METHOD, begins with ſimple and ſelf-evident principles, and advances gradually to remote, and complex propoſitions.

He that learns the ſtructure of any machine, for inſtance, a watch, by taking it to pieces, acquires his knowledge by the Analytic Method: he that attains the ſame infor-

mation by ſeeing the artiſt combine the ſeveral parts, ſo as to form a complete whole, is inſtructed ſynthetically. In the ſame manner, he who begins with ancient hiſtory, and reads forward in regular order to the hiſtory of modern times, ſtudies hiſtory ſynthetically: he purſues cauſes to their effects, and principles to conſequences. But he, who beginning with modern hiſtory, reads in retrograde order to the accounts of ancient times, ſtudies hiſtory analytically, and traces effects back to their remote cauſes.

The Analytic Method is beſt adapted to invention, and improvement, and the Synthetic, to the communication of ſcience.

The Science of Geometry exhibits the moſt perfect ſpecimen of the Synthetic method, and experimental philoſophy and algebra of the Analytic. Nature preſents complex appearances only: it is the province of philoſophy to reſolve thoſe phenomena into their principles, and to trace them to their primary cauſes.

Analyſis, and Syntheſis, are ſometimes uſed promiſcuouſly, both in the diſcovery and the communication of knowledge. Arithmetic, and Algebra, are taught ſynthetically: but when

when acquired, are applied analytically to the ſolution of complex problems, both in numbers, and quantity. In teaching any ſcience, as for example, natural or moral philoſophy, the whole is reſolved by analyſis into its larger diviſions, and then again into leſs, till it is reduced to principles eaſily comprehended by the learner, who then acquires the knowledge of the ſcience in the ſynthetic method.

A good method is of the higheſt importance, both for the acquiſition, the recollection, and the communication of knowledge. Without method, ideas lie in confuſion in the mind, and are of little uſe to the poſſeſſor, or to others. But by lucid arrangement, new ideas eaſily find their proper places, and knowledge is readily recollected upon proper occaſions, and in its proper connexion. In the former caſe, the mind reſembles a library, in which the books are thrown together without any order, ſo that, however numerous or well choſen they may be, they are never to be found at the time when they are wanted. In the latter, the memory reſembles a library richly ſtored, in which every volume is in its proper place, and can be found readily upon every occaſion. Education conſtitutes

ſtitutes the chief diſtinction amongſt men in this reſpect. They who have ſtudied regularly and ſyſtematically, beginning with firſt principles, and advancing gradually to complex and remote truths, will form a habit of thinking cloſely and connectedly upon all ſubjects, and of digeſting their ideas into a regular and uſeful method. While others who have read and thought in a careleſs and deſultory manner, without order or connexion, though their abilities may be of a ſuperior caſt, though the ſtock of their ideas may be very conſiderable, and though they may occaſionally appear to advantage in general converſation, yet their opinions and habits of thinking will commonly be deſtitute of conſiſtency. They can ſeldom attain to any great elevation of thought, or comprehenſion of mind; and are rarely qualified in an eminent degree to extend the limits of ſcience, or to promote the intellectual and moral improvement of mankind.

THE END OF THE COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC.

ELEMENTS

OF THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

HUMAN MIND.

E cœlo deſcendit, ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΕΑΥΤΟΝ.

JUVENAL.

PHILOSOPHY

OF

THE HUMAN MIND.

INTRODUCTION.

SECTION I.

Nature and Uſe of the Philoſophy of Mind.

PHILOSOPHY is the inveſtigation of the laws of nature, by an accurate obſervation of ſelect phenomena, and the application of principles ſo diſcovered to the ſolution of other natural appearances.

The province of NATURAL PHILOSOPHY, is to inveſtigate the laws, and to reſolve the phenomena, of the material univerſe.

The PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, inveſtigates the laws, and explains the phenomena, of the intellectual world.

Knowledge, says lord Bacon, is power. NATURAL PHILOSOPHY opens, enlarges, and strengthens the mind; it teaches men to apply the powers of nature to the greatest advantage, for the improvement of the arts, and for the convenience, embellishment, and comfort of human life.

The PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND teaches man to know himself, and to improve, direct, and exert his intellectual faculties in a manner the most beneficial to himself and others.

In particular, it impresses a just sense of the dignity of our rational nature, and the great end of intellectual existence; it directs to the best method of cultivating the mental powers, of preventing or correcting prejudice and error, and of enlarging the stock of useful knowledge. By analysing the principles of action, and tracing the origin and progress of affection, habit, and character, it leads to the proper discipline of the heart, and supplies the most efficacious means of correcting all undue bias of self-love, of resisting the motives to vice, of restraining the exorbitance of the passions, of cultivating virtuous principles, and of attaining that just and beautiful

tiful ſymmetry of the affections, that elevation of mind and diſintereſtedneſs of character, which, when combined with vigour of intellect and comprehenſion of views, conſtitute the true dignity and happineſs of man.

A correct knowledge of the ſtructure of the mind, as far as it can be attained, is alſo of great uſe in ſocial life. It neceſſarily lies at the foundation of every juſt theory of religion and morals. It is eſpecially eſſential to the conduct of education upon a rational, liberal, and uſeful plan; both as it leads to the moſt eaſy and impreſſive mode of communicating inſtruction, and as, by expoſing to view the various ſprings of action in the breaſt, it directs the intelligent obſerver to that mode of conduct and of diſcipline by which the tender and ſuſceptible mind may be preſerved from the aberrations of folly, and the pollution of vice; may be formed to wiſdom, honour, and virtue; and may be led to the acquiſition of thoſe habits by which it may be qualified to appear with the moſt diſtinguiſhed luſtre and advantage in that ſphere, whether of public or of private life, in which it may be deſtined afterwards to move.

In the political world, a profound knowledge of human nature is of the moſt obvious importance. It not only qualifies the well informed and ſagacious ſtateſman to judge correctly of the true intereſt of the community at large, but it teaches him how to guide the various paſſions and contending intereſts of parties, and of individuals, to the general good: and, by adapting meaſures to circumſtances that ariſe, and by accommodating them to the views and feelings of the different claſſes of the community, to conciliate the affection of the people, and to ſecure a willing and almoſt unlimited ſubjection to civil authority, independent of the exerciſe of external force.

Finally, the analyſis of the human mind is a ſublime and intereſting ſubject of philoſophical ſpeculation, which tends beyond all others to correct, enlarge, and exalt our conceptions of the attributes and character of the Supreme Being, and to lay a foundation for the moſt rational and exalted piety.

SECTION II.

Rules of Philoſophiſing.—Philoſophical Hypotheſes.

THE RULES OF PHILOSOPHISING, which, ſince the time of Newton, have been univerſally adopted by philoſophers, and a ſtrict adherence to which has been the ſource of all modern improvements in natural philoſophy, are the following:

Firſt, that no more cauſes of phenomena are to be admitted than what are real, and ſufficient to explain appearances.

Secondly, that phenomena of the ſame ſort are to be accounted for by the ſame cauſe. And

Thirdly, that qualities which are invariably found to belong to all ſubſtances to which experiments can be applied, are to be ſuppoſed to belong to all ſubſtances.

Theſe rules, which have been ſo ſucceſsfully applied to the inveſtigation of the phenomena of nature, ought to be adhered to with equal

rigour in our attempts to ſolve the phenomena of the mind *.

A HYPOTHESIS is the ſuppoſed cauſe of known phenomena. That a charged jar will give a diſagreeable ſhock to a perſon who forms a part of the electric circuit between the inner and the outer coating is an eſtabliſhed fact. But, that by the action of the machine the equilibrium of the electric fluid is diſturbed, that one ſide of the jar is electrified poſitively, and the other negatively, and that the ſhock is produced by the effort of the electric fluid to reſtore the equilibrium, is a theory or hypotheſis.

Many perſons have conceived a ſtrong diſlike to hypotheſes, as ſuch, and think that philoſophy ſhould confine itſelf wholly to facts and experiments. This is unreaſonable.

A man who makes experiments at random may accidentally hit upon ſome important diſcovery. But as all rational hypotheſes are formed upon ſome analogies to known facts, a philoſopher who purſues a courſe of expe-

* Hartley on Man, ch. i. p. 1.
Prieſtley on Matter and Spirit, vol. i. p. 1, 2.

riments

riments to verify, correct, or disprove a hypothesis, will be much more likely to extend the limits of knowledge. And the history of philosophy proves that some of the most important discoveries have been made, accidentally or otherwise, in this way. Tycho Brahe warned Kepler against indulging fanciful hypotheses: but the ardent mind of that acute philosopher revolted from the yoke of authority. And observing that the phenomena of the solar system could not be explained by the supposition that the planets moved in circular orbits about the sun fixed in the centre, it occurred to him to examine the phenomena by placing the sun in the focus of an ellipse; and by this means he was led to the discovery of the true forms of the planetary orbits, and gradually developed the important fact, that the squares of the times of the periodical revolutions of the planets, are proportional to the cubes of their distances from the sun*.

It is an inferior, but not an inconsiderable advantage of a philosophical hypothesis, that, by arranging and classifying facts which have

* Maclaurin's View of Newton's Philosophy, p. 47.

been already diſcovered, it aſſiſts the memory in retaining and recollecting them, and thus facilitates the progreſſive improvement of ſcience*.

When a hypotheſis is fully eſtabliſhed it becomes a fact; and new hypotheſes are then invented to account for theſe facts. Thus we are gradually led on, through a ſeries of ſubordinate cauſes, to the great Firſt Cauſe of all. The Copernican theory of the univerſe, which was at firſt a hypotheſis, has long been verified by obſervation and demonſtration. And the inquiries of aſtronomers have ſince been directed to explore the hidden cauſes of the known revolutions of the celeſtial bodies.

The principal inconvenience of philoſophical hypotheſes ariſes from the danger to which the inventors or patrons of them are expoſed, of being too ſtrongly attached to them, and of aſſuming them as facts before they have been ſufficiently proved. In this caſe, the judgment is biaſſed in deciding upon experiments: arguments the moſt trivial, and appearances the moſt ſuperficial, which fa-

* Stewart's Elements of the Philoſophy of the Human Mind, p. 457—459.

vour

vour the darling ſyſtem, are often received as demonſtrations, while facts the moſt palpable, and objections the moſt weighty, are overlooked or treated with contempt. A true philoſopher will vigilantly guard againſt this ſeductive prejudice. His ſole object is truth, and he will be ready to diſcard the moſt favourite hypotheſis when it ſhall be proved to be erroneous. "It is mentioned as a "ſtriking circumſtance in the character of "Sydenham, that, although full of hypo-"thetical reaſoning, it did not render him "the leſs attentive to obſervation: and that "his hypotheſes ſeem to have ſat ſo looſely "about him, that either they did not influ-"ence his practice at all, or he could eaſily "abandon them whenever they would not "bend to experience *."

That hypotheſis is moſt agreeable to the analogy of nature, and therefore the moſt probable, which ſolves the greateſt number of appearances by the feweſt and ſimpleſt principles †.

* Dugald Stewart's Elements, &c. p. 438—440.

† Prieſtley on Electricity, part iii. ſect. i.

CHAP-

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL ENUMERATION OF THE FACULTIES—PERCEPTION.

SECTION I.

General Account of the Faculties of the Mind.—Hypothesis of Common Sense examined.

THE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN MIND are those powers or properties by which the man becomes capable of action, enjoyment, or suffering. They may be classed under the following heads:

I. PERCEPTION, or the faculty by which we acquire sensations and ideas. This is the primary faculty of mind.

II. THE CAPACITY FOR PLEASURE AND PAIN.

III. ASSOCIATION, which is that principle or faculty by which two or more sensations, ideas, or motions, are so united together that any one of them impressed alone shall excite all the rest.

This

This principle is applied by Dr. Hartley to the ſolution of all the complex phenomena of the human mind.

IV. SENSATION is the faculty of acquiring certain internal feelings, by the impreſſion of external objects upon the correſpondent organs of ſenſe. Theſe internal feelings are called ſenſations.

V. THE UNDERSTANDING, OR INTELLECT. This is the faculty by which we contemplate ideas, and purſue truth.

VI. MEMORY, which is the power of retaining and recollecting ideas, in the ſame order in which they were acquired, or in which impreſſions were made.

VII. IMAGINATION is the power of recollecting and combining ideas, in an order different from that in which they were originally impreſſed.

VIII. AFFECTIONS, OR PASSIONS, are feelings ariſing from the perception of pleaſure or pain; that is, of natural good and evil, according to the circumſtances in which they are placed. "By the affections," ſays Dr. Hartley, "we are excited to purſue happineſs "and all its means, to flee from miſery and "all its apparent cauſes."

The

The PRIMARY AFFECTIONS are ten: five grateful, and five ungrateful.

The five GRATEFUL AFFECTIONS are love, desire, hope, joy, and pleasing recollection.

LOVE arises from the contemplation of natural good abstractedly considered; DESIRE, from considering it as possible; HOPE, from natural good, considered as probable; JOY, from the actual possession of it; and PLEASING RECOLLECTION is excited by the review of it when past.

The five corresponding UNGRATEFUL AFFECTIONS are HATRED, AVERSION, FEAR, SORROW, and DISPLEASING RECOLLECTION, which are excited respectively by the consideration of natural evil in the abstract, or as possible, probable, present, or past.

The more COMPLEX AFFECTIONS are compounded of the primary ones, and their analysis will be hereafter explained*.

IX. VOLITION is that state of mind which immediately precedes actions that are called voluntary. It is a modification of the affection of desire.

* Hartley on Man, part i. ch. iii. sect. iii. ad fin.

X. POWER

X. POWER is that faculty which the mind poſſeſſes, or is ſuppoſed to poſſeſs, of executing its volitions *.

It has been advanced as a ſelf-evident fact, that all the faculties of mind are original principles, that the affections are inſtinctive, and that ſome dictates of the intellect are primary truths, which are to be regarded as the infallible ſuggeſtions of the Great Author of the conſtitution of man, and are not amenable to the tribunal of reaſon; that the ſuggeſtions of the moral inſtincts, antecedent to all reaſoning, are of the higheſt and moſt ſacred authority, and that the neglect of theſe ſuggeſtions, and much more acting in contradiction to them, is in a very high degree criminal and dangerous. Theſe innate principles have been multiplied arbitrarily and indefinitely to ſuch a degree, that the pleaſure which men take in hunting and fiſhing, and even the love of war and military glory, have been inſerted in the catalogue of natural inſtincts †.

* Hartley on Man, part i. Introduction.

† Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, p. 102—105.
——— Eſſay on Intellectual Powers, p. 304, 305.
——— Eſſay on Active Powers, p. 312.
Lord Kaims's Sketches of the Hiſtory of Man, part i.

The

The advocates of this hypotheſis do not attempt to reaſon upon it, or to bring evidence in ſupport of it. They at once aſſume it as a fact; and if any objection be propoſed, it is ſilenced by an authoritative appeal to common ſenſe.

Againſt this hypotheſis, which arrogates ſo much and proves ſo little, it is objected, that the affections, and likewiſe the intellectual and moral principles, if inſtinctive, would be univerſal, and their dictates irreſiſtible, like thoſe of ſight, hearing, and the other natural ſenſes; that ſome even of the ſtrongeſt affections are allowed to be factitious, as the love of money, from which we may reaſonably infer that all are ſo, though ſome may have been generated before the memory began to regiſter its ideas; that many principles, which are ſtated by the advocates for this hypotheſis as primary truths and ſelf-evident moral principles, have been doubted and denied; that the hypotheſis of inſtinctive principles is deſtitute of ſimplicity, and therefore contrary to the general analogy of nature; that it explains no phenomena, but rather gives up every thing as inexplicable; that reſolving all faculties and affections into inſtinct,

ſtinct, puts a ſtop to reaſoning and to philoſophical reſearch; and that appealing to common ſenſe for the eſtabliſhment of a hypotheſis, is little better than ſetting up vulgar prejudice, or gratuitous and confident aſſertion, as the ſtandard of truth*.

A much ſimpler and more truly philoſophical hypotheſis, which aſſumes perception, a capacity for pleaſure and pain, and the power of aſſociating ideas, as the only original faculties, and which explains all the phenomena of mind by theſe principles alone, has been propoſed by Dr. Hartley, and will hereafter be more fully ſtated and explained.

SECTION II.

Of Perception.—The Seat of the Sentient Principle.

PERCEPTION is the primary attribute of mind. It is the faculty by which we acquire ſenſations and ideas.

* Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind.
Oſwald's Appeal to Common Senſe in behalf of Religion.
Beattie on the Immutability of Truth.
Prieſtley's Examination of Reid, Beattie, and Oſwald.
Cooper's Tracts, p. 39—45.

SEN-

SENSATIONS, are feelings excited by the impreſſions of external objects upon the organs of ſenſe.

IDEAS, are revived impreſſions or feelings, when the object or archetype is withdrawn.

This is Dr. Hartley's account of ſenſations and ideas, and in the main it agrees with that of Mr. Locke. Dr. Reid (Int. Powers, p. 360.) diſlikes the word idea, and prefers conception. The terms are of little conſequence; the fact is obvious, and the diſtinction between ideas, or conceptions, and ſenſations, is eaſily underſtood and univerſally admitted.

PERCEPTION is an indefinable principle or power. Its exiſtence can only be known by conſciouſneſs, or the experience which every man has of what paſſes within himſelf. It is an old obſervation, that the mind is as incapable of comprehending the nature of perception, as the eye of ſeeing itſelf *.

PERCEPTION is uſually aſſumed to be a ſimple principle, an indiviſible power; and many concluſions of no ſmall importance are deduced from this ſuppoſed ſimplicity; ſuch as the immateriality, the inextenſion, the indiſ-

* Cic. Tuſc. Quæſt. lib. i. ſect. 28.

cerptibility, the incorruptibility, and even the natural immortality of the percipient principle and ſubſtance. But the abſolute ſimplicity of perception is not to be conceded without proof. Abſtract ideas, ſuch as cauſe and effect; and mental affections, ſuch as deſire, hope, fear, love, and hatred, are vulgarly thought to be ſimple feelings, but are, in fact, exceedingly complex. Life, whether vegetable or animal, is commonly preſumed to be a ſimple principle; yet it is unqueſtionably the reſult of very complex organization: why then may not perception be a complex feeling, reſulting from the combination of ſome unknown ſimple principles, capable of being reſolved into its conſtituent principles, and of being the property of a diſcerptible and diſſoluble ſubſtance? Perhaps future and more accurate obſervations of the phenomena of mind may ſolve this difficult problem; in the mean time it is unwarrantable to decide with confidence in a caſe of which we are totally ignorant.

That the SEAT OF PERCEPTION, or of the ſentient principle, whatever that be, is in the BRAIN, has been argued from the following conſiderations.

The nerves upon which ſenſation and motion depend, originate in the brain.

If a ſtrait ligature be made upon any nerve, or if it be cut aſunder, ſenſation continues in the part that is connected with the brain, and ceaſes in that which is ſeparated from it.

In men, and in moſt other animals, death enſues if the head be cut off, or the brains taken out, or the cerebellum wounded.

All known diſorders which affect the intellect are ſeated in the brain.

The principal organs of ſenſe are placed in the head, in the vicinity of the brain.

Dr. Watts remarks that, when we think, we feel a conſciouſneſs that the faculty then exerted exiſts within the head.

It is difficult to aſcertain the particular region of the brain with which the power of thinking is more immediately connected. But as the nerves originate in the medullary part of the brain, and are themſelves of a white medullary ſubſtance; as the perfection of the faculties depends upon the perfection of the medullary ſubſtance; and as all injuries to that ſubſtance affect the trains of ideas proportionably; it is ſufficiently manifeſt that the white medullary ſubſtance of the brain is the imme-

diate inſtrument by which ideas are preſented to the mind *.

Some philoſophers have ſuppoſed the ſentient principle to be ſeated in the meninges, others, in the fourth ventricle of the brain, or in the corpora ſtriata. Des Cartes thought that it had its place in the pineal gland. Some of the ancients placed it in the heart, and Van Helmont in the mouth of the ſtomach †.

* Hartley, part i. prop. 1, 2.
Darwin's Zoonomia, vol. i. ſect. 2.

† Keil's Anatomy, ch. iv. ſect. 2, 3. vii. 1—3.
Carteſias de Paſſ. ſect. 32, 38, 47.
Bacon's Natural Hiſtory, cent. 4. numb. 400.
Watts, eſſay iii. p. 78—80.
Doddridge's Lectures, prop. iv.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE CAPACITY FOR PLEASURE AND PAIN.

THE exiſtence of this CAPACITY we learn by conſciouſneſs; what PLEASURE and PAIN are we learn by experience; and they are feelings, the idea of which cannot be communicated by definition.

That which produces pleaſure is called NATURAL GOOD; that which produces pain is NATURAL EVIL.

The pleaſures and pains are either SENSIBLE or INTELLECTUAL; that is, they are the effect either of SENSATIONS or IDEAS: and each will be conſidered in its proper order.

Some degree of pleaſure or pain ſeems to accompany all our ſenſations and internal feelings, and to be neceſſary to excite attention to the objects of perception.

The pleaſures and pains of children evidently reſult entirely from preſent impreſſions: this ſeems likewiſe to be in a great meaſure

measure the case with brutes, especially with those of the less sagacious species. But as reason advances to maturity, pleasure and pain become more dependent upon association, and are less connected with immediate sensible impressions; so that, upon the whole, the balance may be greatly in favour of pleasure, when the present sensible impression is severe pain; and conversely, pain may preponderate, when the present sensation is exquisitely pleasurable. But the analysis of the various classes of pleasures and pains will be the subject of future inquiry.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE LAW OF ASSOCIATION—AND OF THE THEORIES WHICH HAVE BEEN PROPOSED FOR EXPLAINING THE PHENOMENA OF THE MIND.

SECTION I.

Of the Law of Aſſociation.

ASSOCIATION is that LAW of the mind by which two or more ſenſations, ideas, or muſcular motions are ſo united, that any one of them impreſſed alone ſhall introduce all the ideas or motions connected with it.

The exiſtence of this LAW we learn by conſciouſneſs, and it is proved by all the phenomena of mind. Of the phyſical cauſe of this coheſion of ſenſations, ideas, and muſcular motions, we are ignorant; as we alſo are of the cauſes of the coheſion and of the gravitation of matter. This LAW ſeems

to

to have been firſt noticed by Mr. Locke, but he applies it to the ſolution of very few phenomena. Mr. Gay, in a Diſſertation upon Virtue, prefixed to Law's tranſlation of King's Origin of Evil, deduces the moral feelings from aſſociation: and Dr. Hartley traces all, or at leaſt moſt of the other phenomena of mind to the ſame cauſe.

All internal feelings not being ſenſations, are by Dr. Hartley called IDEAS.

IDEAS are either SIMPLE or COMPLEX.

A SIMPLE, or, as it is ſometimes called, a ſingular or particular IDEA, is the idea of one individual object. Theſe Dr. Hartley calls ideas of ſenſation, becauſe they reſemble ſenſations.

COMPLEX IDEAS are made up of ſimple ideas. Theſe Dr. Hartley calls intellectual ideas, of which ideas ſenſations are the elements *.

The LAW OF ASSOCIATION extends to SENSATIONS, to IDEAS, and to MUSCULAR MOTIONS.

* Hartley, vol. i. part i. Introduction.

It would have been better if Dr. Hartley had uſed the words ſingle and compound, inſtead of ſimple and complex; other definitions having been previouſly appropriated to theſe terms by Mr. Locke.

FIRST, The LAW OF ASSOCIATION has reſpect to SENSATIONS. A SENSATION may be aſſociated with other SENSATIONS, with IDEAS, or with MUSCULAR MOTIONS.

CASE I. A SENSATION, after having been aſſociated a ſufficient number of times with ANOTHER SENSATION, will, when impreſſed alone, excite the SIMPLE IDEA correſponding with the other ſenſation.

Thus names excite the ideas of viſible objects, and viſible objects of names. Hearing a particular tune has been known to excite in the Swiſs troops, when at a diſtance from their country, an irreſiſtible deſire of returning home. And captain King relates, that the ſight of a half-worn pewter ſpoon, in a miſerable hut upon the banks of the river Awatſka, ſtamped on the back with the word London, excited a train of pleaſing thoughts, anxious hopes, and tender recollections, in the breaſts of himſelf and his companions, which it was impoſſible to deſcribe. The power of Aſſociation is, indeed, too obvious to be overlooked by the moſt ſuperficial obſervers of human nature *.

* Stewart on the Human Mind, p. 275—277.

REMARKS,

REMARKS.

1. A Senſation aſſociated with another Senſation can only excite the Idea of the object: not the very Senſation itſelf, for to this the preſence of the archetype is univerſally neceſſary.

2. Senſations are impreſſed either at the ſame inſtant of time, or in contiguous ſucceſſive inſtants. Hence it follows, that the correſponding aſſociations are either ſynchronous, or ſucceſſive. The name of an object, for inſtance an orange, is often impreſſed at the ſame time with the viſible appearance, the flavour, the odour, and the tangible qualities; in which caſe the name, or the viſible appearance alone, will excite at once the correſpondent ideas of all the other qualities, and the aſſociation will be ſynchronous.

But, if the impreſſions be made in ſucceſſion, as in the repetition of the alphabet, the cardinal numbers, the notes of a ſimple melody, the lines of a poem, or the like, the aſſociation will be ſucceſſive, and the firſt will introduce the ſecond, the ſecond the third, and ſo on. Thus the two or three firſt notes of

of a familiar tune ſuggeſt the ideas of the reſt in ſucceſſion.

3. Aſſociations are moſt eaſily formed, and moſt permanent, when they are attended with a conſiderable degree either of pleaſure or pain.

4. If the ſame Senſation be aſſociated at different times with various other Senſations, it will at length, when impreſſed alone, excite ideas of all the reſt; which by aſſociation will gradually coaleſce, and form one complex idea.

A child is told to call a particular animal a dog: in this caſe the word dog excites the idea of that individual only. He afterwards ſees another animal which is alſo called a dog; after which the word dog excites not the idea of the firſt, nor of the ſecond individual only, but an indiſtinct feeling compounded of both. The ſame proceſs takes place in ſucceeding caſes; till at laſt his general idea of a dog becomes a complex feeling, compounded of all the different ſenſations which have been impreſſed upon his mind: and comparing in many inſtances the points of reſemblance in thoſe animals to which the ſame name is given, he learns to apply it

with

with propriety to all animals of the ſame ſpecies, that is, which agree in certain common properties. Thus abſtract ideas are progreſſively formed, and the uſe of abſtract and general terms is gradually acquired. In the ſame manner children form the general idea, and learn the proper application, of the words man, horſe, quadruped, actor, judge, philoſopher, ſoldier, and the like.

To this ſource are to be traced all intellectual, moral, and abſtract ideas of every deſcription: ſolidity, duration, virtue. cauſe, effect, &c., may be reſolved into ſimple ideas of ſenſation.

The coaleſcence of theſe ideas is ſometimes ſo perfect that it is extremely difficult to ſeparate and analyſe them. Ideas the moſt complex will often wear the appearance of perfect ſimplicity, and will bear no reſemblance to the elements of which they are formed. So the whiteneſs of the ſun's light, though compounded of the ſeven primary colours, reſembles none of them, and is commonly miſtaken for a ſimple and original colour.

Theſe groupes of ideas are ſometimes ſo ſtrongly aſſociated with a ſingle word, that it

ſhall

ſhall excite the whole at once, with the ſame preciſion as if they had been originally ſimple ſenſations: for inſtance, king, chancellor, player, thought, affection, and the like.

5. In the caſe of compound ſenſations, the recurrence of one will by aſſociation excite the ideas of all the reſt.

In this manner the combination of the ideas of individuals forms the idea of ſpecies, the coaleſcence of the ideas of ſpecies forms the idea of genera, and that of inferior the idea of ſuperior genera: and theſe having been for a ſufficient length of time aſſociated with the name, the ſound of the word will at once excite the whole compound idea. Thus the mind riſes from the idea of individuals, through the intermediate genera, till it reaches the genus generaliſſimum, or the abſtract idea of being.

Compound ideas, which often recur, will gradually adhere more cloſely together; that is, by aſſociation ſimple ideas will run into complex ones, complex into decomplex, and ſo on ad infinitum. Truth, juſtice, benevolence, faithfulneſs, &c., are all complex ideas. Virtue comprehends them all; but the conſtituent

ſtituent ideas ſo perfectly coaleſce under this word, that one is not to be diſtinguiſhed from the reſt.

In ideas that are very complex, the viſible appearance is uſually the moſt prominent, and introduces all the reſt, like a great letter at the beginning of a word. Thus the words animal, quadruped, &c., firſt excite the viſible appearance.

Simple or original ideas of ſenſation, which are the elements of complex ideas, reſemble letters which are the elements of words: the coaleſcence of ſimple ideas into complex reſembles the coaleſcence of letters into words; the coaleſcence of complex into decomplex ideas reſembles the coaleſcence of words into ſentences; and the various combinations of decomplex ideas reſemble the combination of ſentences in a continued diſcourſe.

6. Succeſſive aſſociations do not ſo coaleſce as to become perfectly ſynchronous, but they have a manifeſt tendency ſo to do; the intervals between the ideas being ſhortened as the aſſociation becomes more familiar. A piece of muſic, or a poem, when new, appears long, becauſe the aſſociations are not formed;

formed; but when it becomes familiar the mind glances over the whole almoſt inſtantaneouſly *.

SECTION II.

The ſame continued.

CASE II. A SENSATION aſſociated a ſufficient number of times with an IDEA will at length when impreſſed alone excite that very IDEA. Thus, words aſſociated with ideas will readily excite them even when moſt complex. The words hero, philoſopher, ſcholar, juſtice, truth, benevolence, and the like, whether written or pronounced, immediately call up with preciſion the correſpondent ideas.

CASE III. A SENSATION aſſociated with a MUSCULAR MOTION, will, after a ſufficient time, excite that very MOTION without any intervening act of the will. A perſon mechanically turns his eye towards a man who calls him by his name; the flavour of food excites the action of deglutition; the appearance of the path guides the ſteps of the traveller; and the ſight of his notes governs the fingers of the muſical performer.

* Hartley on Man, part i. ch. i. ſect. 2.

SECONDLY,

SECONDLY, THE LAW OF ASSOCIATION has reſpect to IDEAS.

An IDEA may be aſſociated with a SENSATION, with an IDEA, and with a MUSCULAR MOTION.

CASE I. An IDEA aſſociated a ſufficient number of times with a SENSATION, will excite the SIMPLE IDEA belonging to that SENSATION.

Thus ideas, ſimple or complex, which have been ſufficiently aſſociated with names, will excite the ideas of their reſpective names. The colour of ſnow, will ſuggeſt the term, white; the idea of a chief executive magiſtrate, will ſuggeſt the word, king; and the idea of giving to every one his due, will call to mind the expreſſion, juſtice.

CASE II. An IDEA aſſociated with an IDEA will excite that very IDEA *.

Thus

* The numerous trains of aſſociated ideas are divided by Hume into three claſſes, which he has termed contiguity, cauſation, and reſemblance. "Nor ſhould we wonder," adds Dr. Darwin, "to find them thus connected together, "ſince it is the buſineſs of our lives to diſpoſe them into "thoſe three claſſes, and we become valuable to ourſelves "and our friends as we ſucceed in it. Thoſe who have

"combined

Thus the idea of benevolence aſſociates itſelf with that of merit; the idea of courage with that of honour; the idea of great talents with that of reverence; the idea of cowardice with that of contempt; of cruelty with horror; and of meanneſs with ſhame.

CASE III. An IDEA aſſociated with a MUSCULAR MOTION will excite that very MUSCULAR MOTION; the affection of deſire, will produce the voluntary motion of the limbs; the affection of joy, will produce a pleaſing caſt of the countenance; fear, will excite trembling; grief, dejection; and horror, diſtortion.

" combined an extenſive claſs of ideas by contiguity of time " or place, are men learned in the hiſtory of mankind, and " of the ſciences they have cultivated. Thoſe who have " connected a great claſs of ideas of reſemblance, poſſeſs the " ſource of the ornaments of poetry and oratory, and all " rational analogy. While thoſe who have connected great " claſſes of ideas of cauſation, are furniſhed with the powers " of producing effects. Theſe are the men of active wiſ- " dom, who lead armies to victory, and kingdoms to pro- " ſperity, or diſcover and improve the ſciences which melio- " rate and adorn the condition of humanity."—Hume's Eſſays, vol. ii. ſect. 3. Darwin's Zoonomia, vol. i. p. 52. Stewart on the Human Mind, ch. v.

THIRDLY,

THIRDLY, The LAW OF ASSOCIATION extends to MUSCULAR MOTIONS.

MUSCULAR MOTION may be aſſociated with SENSATIONS, IDEAS, and MUSCULAR MOTIONS.

CASE I. A MUSCULAR MOTION aſſociated a ſufficient number of times with a SENSATION, will excite the SIMPLE IDEA belonging to that ſenſation. Dancing will bring to mind the muſic with which it has been often accompanied.

CASE II. A MUSCULAR MOTION aſſociated with an IDEA will excite that very IDEA. Exerciſe often ſuggeſts the idea and expectation of health; dancing excites thoſe of cheerfulneſs and grace.

CASE III. A MUSCULAR MOTION aſſociated with a MUSCULAR MOTION will excite that very MUSCULAR MOTION.

MUSCULAR MOTIONS by frequency of concurrence gradually adhere together, and excite each other either ſynchronically or ſucceſſively, according to the order of impreſſions. The ſynchronous motions of the hands and feet in walking, and of the larynx and the fingers in ſinging to the harpſichord, are inſtances of the former; and the

ſucceſſive motions of the lips in ſpeaking, of the feet in walking, and of the fingers in playing upon a muſical inſtrument without any intervention of the volition, are obvious examples of the latter *.

Theſe caſes are an illuſtration and amplification of DR. HARTLEY'S THEOREM, in which he compriſes the whole doctrine of aſſociation.

IF ANY SENSATION A, IDEA B, OR MUSCULAR MOTION C, BE ASSOCIATED FOR A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF TIMES WITH ANY OTHER SENSATION D, IDEA E, OR MUSCULAR MOTION F, IT WILL AT LAST EXCITE THE SIMPLE IDEA BELONGING TO THE SENSATION D, THE VERY IDEA E, OR THE VERY MUSCULAR MOTION F †.

Motions originally as well as ſecondarily automatic, that is, ſuch as being originally voluntary are by habit become mechanical, may be aſſociated with each other, and that either ſynchronically or ſucceſſively; ſuch as the motions of the heart, the arteries, the bowels, and the like ‡.

* Hartley on Man, part i. prop. xx.

† Hartley on Man, prop. xx. cor. vii.

‡ Darwin's Zoonomia, vol. i. ſect. x.

Synchronous

Synchronous motions ſecondarily automatic, though ſucceeding each other with the moſt perfect facility, are often acquired with extreme difficulty. This is obvious in the caſe of learning to perform upon any muſical inſtrument. "The ſlowneſs of thoſe muſcular movements which have not been aſſociated by habit may be experienced," ſays Dr. Darwin, "by any one who ſhall attempt to ſaw the air quick perpendicularly with one hand, and horizontally with the other at the ſame time *."

SECTION III.

Carteſian Theory of Animal Spirits.

THE nerves are the media of ſenſation and motion; they originate in the medullary ſubſtance of the brain, and are continued to the ſeveral organs of ſenſe: thoſe upon which motion and feeling depend are diſtributed to every part of the body.

Various HYPOTHESES have been propoſed concerning that particular affection of the brain and nerves, which is immediately connected with and productive of ſenſations,

* Zoonomia, p. 52.

ideas, and muſcular motions: of theſe the moſt conſiderable are the Carteſian hypotheſis of ANIMAL SPIRITS, and the Newtonian theory of VIBRATIONS.

THE HYPOTHESIS OF DES CARTES, adopted by Locke and many others, and upon which the language commonly uſed concerning mental operations is founded, aſſumes as a principle, that the nerves are tubes, conductors of a certain ſubtle fluid called the animal ſpirits, which is ſecreted in the brain.

It ſuppoſes that, when an impreſſion is made upon the nerve, the animal ſpirits retreating back convey the motion to the brain; that there they make a trace correſponding with the external object, and that the formation of this trace or picture excites a ſenſation which continues as long as the animal ſpirits remain in that trace, that is, as long as the external object continues to affect the organ of ſenſe: that the trace remains after the ſpirits are returned to their proper channel, which accounts for the retention of the idea in the abſence of the archetype. The ſoul, reſiding in or near the pineal gland, was ſuppoſed to poſſeſs a power of directing the animal ſpirits at pleaſure into any one of theſe

theſe traces, and by that means to excite the idea, or revived impreſſion of the object, which would naturally be leſs vivid than the original ſenſation. Aſſociation is accounted for by the frequency of the paſſage of the ſpirits from one trace to another, wearing a track like a beaten path. To perform muſcular motion, the animal ſpirits, at the pleaſure of the mind, deſcend into the muſcle by the motory nerves, and, by diſtending the belly of the muſcle, contract its length, and thus produce the deſired motion of the limb.

Againſt this hypotheſis it has been objected, that the nerves have not yet been proved to be tubes, and, that it is moſt probable they are not; that the exiſtence of ſuch a fluid as the animal ſpirits has not been aſcertained; that the province aſſigned them in this theory is very unſuitable to the nature of a fluid; that the hypotheſis does not agree with the phenomena of the ſenſes, nor with the mode in which impreſſions are made upon the nerves; and finally, that though the hypotheſis is ingenious, and might be of uſe for the purpoſe of the connection and arrangement of ideas till a better theory was propoſed, it is entirely unſupported by facts,

and will account in a satisfactory manner for very few of the phenomena of the human mind*.

SECTION IV.

Newtonian Theory of Vibrations.

THE THEORY OF VIBRATIONS suggested by Sir Isaac Newton, adopted and amplified by Dr. Hartley, and supported by Doctor Priestley, assumes that the nerves are continuations of the medullary substance of the brain; that impressions made upon the organs of sense produce VIBRATIONS in the minute particles of the nerves †; that these vibrations are propagated to the brain; that a

* Cartesiæ Princip. et de Passionibus.
Locke's Essay, book i. ch xxxiii. sect. 6.
Watts's Essays, numb. 3.
Priestley's Abridgment of Hartley, Introd. p. viii. ix.

† The nerves are not supposed to vibrate like musical chords: "This (as Dr Hartley observes, p. 5, quarto), "is highly absurd, nor was it ever asserted by Sir Isaac "Newton, or any of those who have embraced his no- "tion of the performance of sensation and motion by "mea s of vibrations." Nevertheless, this erroneous conception of the doctrine has given birth to most of the objections which have been urged against it.

vibration

vibration is excited in the particles of the corresponding region of the medullary substance; which vibration excites a sensation in the percipient principle, which remains as long as the vibration lasts, that is, as long as the object continues to affect the organ of sense; which object being removed, the vibration gradually subsides *.

The medullary substance having once vibrated in a particular manner, does not return entirely to its natural state, but continues disposed to vibrate in that manner rather than another: as a stick which has been bent does not, when the pressure is removed, entirely recover its straightness again. This TENDENCY of the brain to the renewal of the vibration, is the cause of the retention of the idea in the absence of the archetype.

Whatever renews the vibration renews also the perception; but the renewed vibration being less vigorous than the original one, (unless when excited by the presence of the object, or in certain morbid cases) is called a MINIATURE VIBRATION, or VIBRATIUNCLE; and the renewed perception corresponding with it is an idea.

* Newton's Optics, qu. 12—14.

Vibrations may be revived not only by the repetition of external impreſſions, but by their ASSOCIATION with each other. And of vibrations which have been aſſociated together a ſufficient number of times, either ſynchronically or in ſucceſſion, if one be excited it will excite the miniatures of all the reſt. This hypotheſis affords a ſolution to the phenomena of the aſſociation of ideas.

The NERVES are divided into two claſſes, SENSORY and MOTORY: the former are the immediate inſtruments of ſenſation, the latter of motion; both originate in the medullary ſubſtance of the brain, and their vibrations influence and modify each other. Hence muſcular motions are aſſociated with ſenſations and ideas; and converſely ſenſations and ideas produce muſcular motions.

This theory ſuppoſes every ſenſation, idea, muſcular motion, affection, and internal feeling whatever, to correſpond with ſome vibratory ſtate of the medullary ſubſtance; ſo that one may be regarded as the exponent of the other.

The principal ARGUMENTS in favour of the theory of vibrations are the following:

I. IMPRES-

I. IMPRESSIONS made upon the principal organs of ſenſation are vibratory; the vibratory agitations of light and of air, or any other medium of ſound, may reaſonably be ſuppoſed to excite correſponding vibrations, directly or indirectly, in the minute particles of the optic and auditory nerves. It is not at all neceſſary to this, that the vibration of the nerve ſhould be exactly ſynchronous with that of the impinging particles. The vibrations of a muſical chord will produce correſponding vibrations in chords which are an octave above or below, and even in thirds, and fifths. The vibration of the nerve being propagated to the brain, produces a correſponding agitation in the medullary ſubſtance. From analogy it is reaſonable to believe that impreſſions made upon the leſs perfect ſenſes, produce vibrations in their correſponding nerves. Effluvia from odoriferous bodies in particular, ſtriking in ſucceſſive pulſes upon the olfactory nerve, would naturally excite a vibratory motion.

In what way the vibration of the medullary ſubſtance excites ſenſations and ideas, this hypotheſis does not pretend to explain: it only gueſſes, or at moſt forms plauſible conjectures concerning that ſtate of the me-

dullary ſubſtance which is the exponent of the phenomena of mind.

II. THE HYPOTHESIS OF VIBRATIONS ſolves, in a very ſimple and eaſy manner, many PHENOMENA of the human mind, of which no other ſolution equally ſatisfactory has yet been propoſed.

1. It accounts for SENSATION, MEMORY, and RECOLLECTION, in the manner which has been already explained.

2. It accounts for the CONTINUANCE of the ſenſation, where the original impreſſion is unuſually vivid, for a ſhort time after the ſenſible object is withdrawn, as in the caſe of gazing at a ſtrong light, &c. When vibrations are unuſually vigorous, they take a longer time before they ſubſide. And it is a fact particularly worthy of obſervation, that vibration is almoſt the only motion which can exiſt permanently in the ſame place.

3. It accounts in a very pleaſing and ſatisfactory manner for the various and intereſting phenomena relating to the law of ASSOCIATION.

4. It well ſuits the phenomena of SLEEP. Warmth expands the blood and the veſſels in the head; and the reaction of the ſkull preſſes

preſſes them back upon the medullary ſubſtance. Thus the vibrations are impeded; ſenſation is gradually ſuſpended, and ſleep induced *.

5. It is agreeable to the phenomena of DREAMS and PHRENSY; in the former caſe, the derangement of the medullary ſubſtance produced by the preſſure of the veſſels diſturbs the intellectual faculties, and the excluſion of external objects increaſes the difficulty of diſtinguiſhing between ſenſations and ideas. In the latter, the morbid ſtate of the brain renders ideal vibrations equally vigorous with the original ſenſory ones, which occaſions the correſponding ideas to be miſtaken for ſenſations. Upon this principle many ſtories of extraordinary appearances may be eaſily accounted for.

6. The theory of vibrations explains in a ſimple and probable manner the phenomena

* The remarkable caſe of the Pariſian beggar is alleged by Dr. Hartley as an argument, to ſhow that the brain is compreſſed during ſleep. This perſon had a perforation in his ſkull that did not oſſify; whence, by external preſſure upon that part, the internal regions of the brain might be affected; and it was conſtantly obſerved, that as the preſſure increaſed he grew more and more ſleepy, and at laſt fell into a temporary apoplexy.—Hartley, p. 25, quarto.

of

of PLEASURABLE and PAINFUL SENSATIONS. Moderate vibrations are the cauſes of pleaſure; violent vibrations are the cauſe of pain. Hence the ſame ſenſation which in a moderate degree is pleaſurable, may by increaſing beyond certain limits become exquiſitely painful, as in the caſe of heat. Dr. Hartley conjectures, that the preciſe limit between pleaſure and pain is the ſolution of continuity in the nerve that vibrates.

7. Hence we alſo account for the PLEASURE which accompanies the recovery from painful diſorders, and from the RECOLLECTION of paſt pains, dangers, and troubles. The vigorous vibrations which occaſion pain, ſubſide by length of time within the limits of pleaſure. Hence, perhaps, we may learn to account, in part at leaſt, for the exiſtence of evil in the univerſe, and to aſſign a reaſon why a ſtate of probation, to beings conſtituted like ourſelves, ſhould be in a conſiderable degree a ſtate of ſuffering. Pains the moſt exquiſite and durable may ultimately fall within the limits of pleaſure, and may even be eſſential to the production of the greateſt good *.

* Hartley on Man, part i. ch. i.
Prieſtley's Abridgment of Hartley, Introd. eſſay i.

SECTION

SECTION V.

The Theory of Vibrations applied to the Phenomena of Muſcular Motion—Objections anſwered.

THE contraction of a muſcle ſeems to depend in part upon the irritability of the muſcular fibre, but chiefly upon the NERVE; for, if the nerve be divided, or lacerated, or paralyſed, all motion, at leaſt all voluntary motion, ceaſes.

All VOLUNTARY MOTION depends upon the continuation of the nerve to the brain.

That the affection of the motory nerves is VIBRATORY, is argued from the ANALOGY of the ſenſory to the motory nerves, and from the dependance of motions, both automatic and voluntary, upon ſenſations and ideas.

It is alſo inferred from ANALOGY, that in every caſe of muſcular motion there is a vibration in the medullary ſubſtance of the brain, correſponding with it and productive of it.

VIBRATIONS in the SENSORY NERVES, excited by the impreſſion of external objects

and

and propagated to the brain, communicate vibrations to the correſponding motory nerves; and produce muſcular motions *.

The brain having vibrated in any particular direction a ſufficient number of times, retains a PERMANENT TENDENCY to vibrate again in the ſame direction; and thus by aſſociation MOTORY VIBRATIUNCLES may be produced in the ſame manner as ſenſory ones.

Theſe MINIATURE VIBRATIONS may be either SYNCHRONOUS or SUCCESSIVE, and by aſſociation may be ſo ſtrongly cemented together, that when one is excited it ſhall awaken all the reſt, and produce the correſpondent muſcular motions.

IDEAL VIBRATIUNCLES may by aſſociation

* It is conjectured that electricity, or rather the Galvanic principle or fluid, is the power which brings the muſcular fibres into action, but in what manner is not known.

See Dr. Crawford's Propoſitions on Animal Electricity, in Dr. Prieſtley's Lectures on Chemiſtry, p. 164— 69.

" The nerves which ſerve the purpoſes of muſcular mo-
" tion principally ariſe," ſays Dr. Darwin, " from that part
" of the brain which is lodged in the head and back, erro-
" neouſly called the ſpinal marrow; and if a ligature be
" put on any part of their paſſage, all motion ceaſes in the
" parts beneath the ligature."—Zoonomia, vol. i. p. 7.

be connected with motory vibratiuncles ſo that they ſhall excite each other.

And if ideal vibratiuncles ſhould in any circumſtances become, as in fact they may, as vigorous as ſenſory vibrations, the correſponding motory vibratiuncles will be proportionably vigorous.

Laſtly, motory vibratiuncles may alſo become aſſociated with SENSORY VIBRATIONS, different from thoſe by which they were originally produced.

MUSCULAR MOTION is either ORIGINALLY AUTOMATIC, SEMIVOLUNTARY, PERFECTLY VOLUNTARY, or SECONDARILY AUTOMATIC.

1. All muſcular motions are ORIGINALLY AUTOMATIC. The irritation of the palm of an infant, produces the action of graſping; the acceſs of air to the lungs, the act of breathing; of food to the palate and tongue, the act of ſwallowing, &c. The ſenſory vibrations aſcending to the brain, deſcend from thence along the motory nerves, and excite muſcular contraction*.

Motory

* Sir Iſaac Newton affirms, "that all ſenſation is performed, and alſo the limbs of animals moved, in a voluntary manner by the power and actions of a certain very ſubtle

Motory vibrations, produced by irritation or otherwiſe, paſſing freely along the ſurface of a membrane, ſometimes ſeem to produce a contraction in the muſcular fibres which checks them at once, in which caſe they paſs inſtantly into the adjoining muſcles, and produce ſudden and convulſive motions. On this principle Dr. Hartley accounts for the phenomena of ſneezing, ſnoring, coughing, hiccough, epilepſy, and convulſions previous to diſſolution. It ſeems to be a fact that the

" ſubtle ſpirit, i. e. by the vibrations of this ſpirit, propa-
" gated through the ſolid capillaments of the nerves, from
" the external organs of the ſenſes to the brain, and from
" the brain into the muſcles."—Hartley, p. 63, quarto ed.

According to Dr. Darwin, muſcular motion conſiſts in the contraction of the muſcular fibre.

" All muſcular motion ariſes either from irritation or the
" appulſes of external bodies, ſenſation, volition, or aſſo-
" ciation. Theſe are the faculties of the ſenſorium in their
" active ſtate, which in a ſtate of inactivity are called irri-
" tability, ſenſibility, voluntarity, and aſſociability."

Dr. Darwin will not allow the ſenſorial motions to be called vibrations of the ſenſorium, but changes or motions of it peculiar to life. He has however advanced nothing to invalidate the arguments of Newton and Hartley, which make it probable that theſe motions are vibratory.—Zoonomia, vol. i. p. 32, 33.

ceſſation

ceſſation of vibrations in any conſiderable part of the body has a tendency to increaſe thoſe of the neighbouring muſcles. The ſtretchings and yawnings of perſons diſpoſed to ſleep, may perhaps be traced to this ſource.

2. SEMIVOLUNTARY MOTIONS are thoſe which in part, but not uniformly, follow the will: ſuch for inſtance as breathing, vomiting, and the like. Theſe motions are aſſociated partly with ſenſory, partly with ideal vibrations. They are excited ſometimes by a ſtimulus independent on the will: they are at other times in part reſtrained or accelerated by volition, a ſenſe of decency, propriety, &c., with which they may happen to have been aſſociated.

3. VOLUNTARY MOTIONS are ſuch as immediately ſucceed to volition without the intervention of ſenſible impreſſions.

VOLITION, is the affection of deſire ſeparate from every tumultuous agitation of mind: it becomes aſſociated with muſcular motion, becauſe experience proves that action is the uſual means of gratifying deſire. Thus ideal vibrations become aſſociated with motory vibrations.

When deſire by any means becomes as vivid as ſenſation, the correſpondent motions will be equally vigorous with thoſe which are excited by ſenſations. In this caſe the ideal vibratiuncles are as vigorous as the ſenſory vibrations, and the motory vibrations correſpond with them.

Motions originally automatic become by aſſociation perfectly voluntary. Graſping is firſt produced by irritation; it gradually becomes aſſociated with the viſible appearance of the toy; of the child's own hand in the act of graſping; of another's hand in the ſame poſition; of the toy in the hand of another; with the ſound of the words hold, take hold, &c.; with the idea of the object or the action; and with the affection of deſire.

In theſe caſes the motory vibrations are firſt aſſociated with ſenſory vibrations, afterwards with ſenſory vibratiuncles, and by degrees with that complex ſtate of the brain which correſponds with a complex feeling of the mind.

All other voluntary actions, ſuch as thoſe of the hands and feet, and the expreſſions of articulate ſounds, are accounted for in the ſame way.

3. The DISPOSITION TO IMITATION in children is generated in a ſimilar manner. Children ſee the actions of their own hands, and hear themſelves pronounce. Theſe impreſſions become aſſociated circumſtances, and will in due time produce a repetition of the action. Similar actions in others produce ſimilar impreſſions upon the eyes and ears, which will be attended with ſimilar effects: that is, they will learn to imitate what they ſee and hear.

4. MOTIONS ORIGINALLY AUTOMATIC, after becoming perfectly voluntary, by aſſociation become gradually involuntary, and in the end completely automatic again. A perſon learning to play upon the harpſichord exerts an expreſs volition for every motion of the finger upon the keys of the inſtrument: by degrees the viſible appearance of the notes will produce the motions without the intervention of volition: after a ſufficient time the idea of the notes or of the ſounds will have the ſame effect: and at laſt the motions will cling together, and produce each other in a manner perfectly automatic, without the intervention of volition, ſenſation, or idea, and even when the attention is wholly engaged upon a ſubject foreign to the performance.

Thus, MUSCULAR MOTION may be aſſociated with SENSATION, with IDEA, with SENSATIONS FOREIGN to thoſe by which they were originally generated, and with MUSCULAR MOTION.

Againſt the THEORY OF VIBRATIONS it has been OBJECTED, that it is inconceivable that ſo great a number of vibrations ſhould exiſt in the medullary ſubſtance at the ſame time, and that they muſt confound each other. But in REPLY it has been urged,

1. That this fact is no more wonderful nor improbable, than that a number of muſical vibrations ſhould exiſt at once, and without confuſion, in ſuch a fluid as the air.

2. That vibrations in the medullary ſubſtance, like muſical tones, when nearly ſynchronous, do actually blend with and modify each other.

That vibrations in the brain ſhould correſpond with and be the exponents of all the vaſt variety of ideas, ſimple and complex, which exiſt in the mind, is no more wonderful or incredible, than that all the varieties of language ſhould be reducible to a few ſimple ſounds.

TO ACCOUNT for the variety in the vibrations of the medullary ſubſtance, Dr. Hartley obſerves,

1. That

1. That there may be a difference in degree in the ſame vibration.

2. There may be a difference in the different kinds of vibrations.

3. One vibration in the medullary ſubſtance may be diſtinguiſhed from another by its place.

4. There may be a difference in the line of direction, as entering by a particular nerve. Dr. Prieſtley adds,

5. There may be a difference in the conſtitution of the nerves of different ſenſes, ſo that they may be as diſtinguiſhable from each other as different human voices ſounding the ſame note.

It has further been objected to this hypotheſis, that the very exiſtence of theſe vibrations never has been, and never can be, proved; and that it is a hypotheſis which tends to reſolve every thing into mechaniſm, and is favourable to materialiſm.

But it is to be remembered, that the doctrine of vibrations is only propoſed as a hypotheſis, and by no means aſſumed as a fact, though pleaded for as probable. How far the hypotheſis is ſupported by evidence, muſt be left to the deciſion of thoſe who have in-

quired into the ſubject. How far it countenances the hypotheſes, either of materialiſm or of mechaniſm, is a conſideration quite foreign to the ſubject.

The theory of vibrations, if it ſhould be admitted as true, can only be regarded as advancing one ſtep in the ſcience of human nature, by affording a ſolution of the phenomena of mental aſſociation. But the proper cauſe of nervous vibrations, the manner in which ſenſations, ideas, and muſcular motions are excited by them, and the nature of perception, are myſteries which ſtill remain wholly unexplained*.

The DOCTRINE OF ASSOCIATION is to be very carefully diſtinguiſhed from the THEORY OF VIBRATIONS, being eſtabliſhed upon independent evidence, and undeniable facts. This therefore muſt ſtand, though the other ſhould be regarded only as a plauſible hypotheſis, deſtitute of ſatisfactory proof. It was to prevent the confuſion of the nature and evidence of aſſociation and vibration, that Dr. Prieſtley

* Hartley on Man, part i. ch. i. ſect. iii.
Prieſtley's Abridgement of Hartley, Introd. eſſay i.
Reid on the Intellectual Powers, eſſay ii. ch. 2—4.
Darwin's Zoonomia, vol. i. ſect v—x.

publiſhed

publiſhed his edition of Hartley's work, from which the theory of vibrations is entirely excluded. Dr. Reid has done very little towards overturning the doctrine of aſſociation by objecting to the hypotheſis of vibration. Nor does it appear that either Dr. Reid or any other of the Scottiſh metaphyſicians, without excepting even profeſſor Dugald Stewart, who has treated moſt largely upon the ſubject of aſſociation, perfectly comprehend Dr. Hartley's doctrine in its full extent.

CHAPTER IV.

OF SENSATION.

SECTION I.

General Diſtribution. Senſe of Feeling.

THE SENSES are five in number: viz. FEELING, TASTE, SMELL, SIGHT, and HEARING.

No reaſon can be aſſigned why the number of ſenſes ſhould be limited to five, but the will of the Creator. To aſſert that more were impoſſible, would be as unreaſonable as for a man born blind to deny the poſſibility of ſight.

From each of the ſenſes we derive SENSATIONS; IDEAS SIMPLE and COMPLEX; INTELLECTUAL PLEASURES and PAINS, that is, AFFECTIONS; and MUSCULAR MOTIONS, automatic, voluntary, ſemivoluntary, and ſecondarily automatic.

It will appear in the courſe of our inquiry, that the complex phenomena of the ſenſes are the

the result of the law of association, and that they are all reconcileable to the theory of vibrations, and give countenance to it.

It will also appear that the principal design of sensible impressions is to generate those intellectual ideas and feelings which constitute the most refined and permanent felicity of human beings: and hence it seems reasonable to conclude, that when these affections are sufficiently formed and fixed, they will stand in no further need of support from gross corporeal sensations, which therefore, like the scaffolding of a magnificent edifice, may, in a new and improved state of existence, be taken down and laid aside.

It will likewise be curious to observe the gradual tendency of the circumstances in which we are placed, and of the impressions to which we are exposed, to refine and spiritualize the affections, and to qualify and prepare the mind for a purer and nobler state of existence. This state of things constitutes one of the strongest natural presumptions in favour of the doctrine of a future life.

In a subject so complex and intricate, it will be necessary to limit ourselves to the selection of

of a few of the principal phenomena under each head.

FIRST, OF THE SENSE OF FEELING. This is either general or particular.

GENERAL FEELING is that which extends to all parts of the body, internal and external.

PARTICULAR FEELING is that more exquiſite degree of it which reſides in the inſide of the hands, and eſpecially at the ends of the fingers.

The papillæ at the ends of the nerves are excited by gentle friction, and thus rendered more exquiſitely ſenſible*.

I. SENSATIONS generated by the ſenſe of feeling are principally theſe,

Heat and cold, hardneſs and ſoftneſs, roughneſs and ſmoothneſs, moiſture and dryneſs, fluidity, motion and reſt, diſtance and figure.

1. The phenomena of HEAT and COLD correſpond remarkably well with the theory of vibrations.

The ſtandard of indifference to every individual is that degree of warmth to which he

* Zoonomia, vol. i. p. 109.

is

is moſt accuſtomed, and which excites no ſenſation either of pleaſure or pain. It is produced by the uſual ſtate of the nervous ſyſtem.

Gentle heat is pleaſurable, extreme heat is painful; in the firſt caſe the vibrations are moderate, in the laſt violent, ſo as to produce ſolution of continuity. When a perſon is blindfolded, the ſudden application of a very hot, or of a very cold body, excites ſenſations nearly ſimilar; the heat, producing violent vibrations by direct action upon the nerves; the cold, ſuddenly checking the vibrations in the external parts, excites them indirectly with increaſed violence in the medullary ſubſtance.

The continued impreſſion of heat makes us more ſenſible of cold, and vice verſa; the ſtandard of indifference being raiſed higher than uſual in the former caſe, and depreſſed lower in the latter. Hence a temperate climate feels cold to a perſon who has lived in the torrid zone, and warm to a man who has been uſed to the frigid.

Heat and cold are relative terms: they are different degrees of the ſame ſenſation. Heat is excited when the vibration is *above*, cold when it is *below*, the ſtandard of indifference.

A frozen

A frozen limb brought ſuddenly to the fire will firſt be much pained, and then mortify: plunged in cold water, or rubbed with ſnow, it will gradually recover life and warmth.

In the firſt caſe, the ſudden heat will produce violent vibrations, which will remove the particles to ſuch a diſtance that they cannot unite again: in the ſecond caſe, the water or ſnow, being nearer to the ſtandard of the frozen limb, produces gentle vibrations, which gradually recover life.

Friction produces heat by increaſing the vibrations: for the ſame reaſon ſtrong taſtes leave a heat upon the tongue or fauces.

All ſtrong emotions of mind increaſe the heat of the body, by increaſing the vibrations of the medullary ſubſtance.

The pain of a wound, or of diſeaſe, ſuch as the colic or the ſtone, produces chillneſs: that is, the inflammation produces a contraction of the ſkin, which checks the vibrations.

2. The SENSATIONS of OTHER TANGIBLE QUALITIES are not inconſiſtent with the theory of vibrations, though not ſo obviouſly favourable to it as the ſenſations of heat and cold.

3. VISIBLE

3. VISIBLE APPEARANCES are by aſſociation the exponents of tangible qualities, ſo that, as Berkeley expreſſes it, ſight is a philoſophical language for the ideas of feeling, and for the moſt part an adequate repreſentation of them, and a language common to all mankind.

II. IDEAS OF TOUCH are either ſimple or complex.

SIMPLE IDEAS of touch are the repreſentatives of particular ſenſations, but they are in general faint and indiſtinct, and by aſſociation with words ſoon run into complex ones.

COMPLEX IDEAS of touch are formed by aſſociation, viz. the repetition of the ſenſation of hardneſs, aſſociated with the ſound, or with the appearance, or even the idea of the word, excites the complex idea of hardneſs: ſo likewiſe ſoftneſs, heat, cold, ſenſible pleaſures, and pains.

We are ſo accuſtomed to judge of tangible qualities by viſible appearances, that the correſponding ideas are conſtantly aſſociated in the minds of perſons poſſeſſed of ſight. Hence it follows, that the tangible ideas of perſons born blind muſt be far more definite and accurate than of thoſe who ſee.

III. INTEL-

III. INTELLECTUAL PLEASURES AND PAINS: that is, AFFECTIONS.

The ten PRIMARY AFFECTIONS are generated by the original pleaſures or pains of the ſenſe of feeling, according to given circumſtances. The pain of a burn may be the object of HATRED, AVERSION, FEAR, SORROW, or DISPLEASING RECOLLECTION: ſo likewiſe may pain in general; as the pleaſures of this ſenſe may in their turn likewiſe be the objects of LOVE, DESIRE, HOPE, JOY, and PLEASING RECOLLECTION.

Exquiſite pains or pleaſures of this ſenſe aſſociate themſelves with the perſons, places, circumſtances, &c. where or by which they were produced or enhanced, and generate correſpondent COMPLEX AFFECTIONS of love, hatred, and the like. Thus the pain of a ſurgical operation, however beneficial in its conſequences, is ſometimes transferred to the idea of the operator, which never occurs afterwards without exciting ſentiments of terror and diſguſt*.

* Dr. Hartley argues, that ſince the pains of feeling are far more numerous and violent than thoſe of all the other ſenſes put together, the greateſt part of our intellectual pains are deducible from them.

Violent

Violent vibrations gradually ſubſide into moderate ones within the limits of pleaſure: hence painful ſenſations are ſometimes followed by pleaſing recollections.

IV. AUTOMATIC MOTIONS produced by the ſenſe of feeling or touch.

Theſe are the act of graſping in children: crying, as the conſequence of pain; involuntary laughter, from titillation and the like.

V. MUSCULAR MOTIONS, VOLUNTARY, SEMIVOLUNTARY, and SECONDARILY AUTOMATIC.

Motions originally automatic may be aſſociated with ſenſations, ideas, affections, and motions. Thus, the act of graſping, originally excited by preſſure upon the palm, may be aſſociated with the viſible appearance of the object, the name, the affection of deſire, with a motion of the eye, &c.

In correſpondence with theſe aſſociations the act of graſping becomes ſemivoluntary, voluntary, and ſecondarily automatic.

Crying, laughing, walking, and all other originally automatic motions, in the ſame manner, by aſſociation, paſs into voluntary, ſemivoluntary, and ſecondarily automatic *.

* Hartley, part i. ch. ii. ſect. i.

SECTION

SECTION II.

The Senſe of Taſte.

SECONDLY, THE SENSE OF TASTE, like that of FEELING, is either GENERAL or PARTICULAR.

The GENERAL SENSE OF TASTE, is that which extends through the whole ALIMENTARY DUCT.

The PARTICULAR SENSE, is that exquiſite ſenſibility which reſides in the tip of the tongue.

The peculiar ſenſibility of the tip of the tongue, is occaſioned by the extremities of the nerves being formed into ſentient papillæ, which are excited and brought into action by the friction of the tongue upon the palate.

I. SENSATIONS generated by the SENSE OF TASTE are all FLAVOURS: alſo, HUNGER and THIRST; the phenomena of which are ſubject to the law of aſſociation, and agreeable to the theory of vibrations.

1. FLAVOURS.

Senſations

Senſations of flavours muſt be as numerous and various as the diſtinct impreſſions upon the organs of taſte; no two ſapid ſubſtances having a flavour preciſely the ſame.

That many of theſe flavours are very ſimilar, is evident from the ſmall number of names by which complex ideas of flavours are expreſſed; ſuch as ſweet, ſour, bitter, acrid, ſalt, and the like.

The variety of flavours ſeems to depend upon the velocity and denſity of the correſpondent vibrations.

It is a circumſtance favourable to this ſuppoſition, that heating a ſapid liquid increaſes its flavour; alſo, converſely, that ſtrong flavours excite heat in the tongue and fauces.

We judge of flavours by viſible appearances, odours, and other aſſociated circumſtances, as well as by impreſſions upon the tongue.

The ſenſibility of the alimentary duct, declines in proportion to the diſtance from the tip of the tongue.

Things which are unpleaſant to the palate, are ſometimes grateful to the ſtomach, ſuch as bitters, ſpirits, cordials, and opium.

Alſo, ſubſtances which are offenſive to the ſtomach are ſometimes eaſy to the inteſtines; for inſtance, bile. The ſuperior inteſtines are likewiſe more irritable than the inferior.

Things which are taſteleſs, or even pleaſant in the mouth, ſometimes diſagree with the ſtomach and bowels, owing probably to a chemical decompoſition of their parts in the proceſs of digeſtion.

Senſations of taſte vary in the progreſs from infancy to age.

Sweets grow leſs agreeable, and ſometimes even diſagreeable and nauſeous.

Aſtringent, acid, and ſpirituous liquids, originally diſagreeable, become pleaſant.

Even bitters and acrids loſe their diſagreeable qualities, and after ſufficient repetition give reliſh to aliment.

Particular foods and medicines become pleaſant or diſguſting by aſſociated circumſtances.

Theſe facts are accounted for,

1. By the increaſing calloſity of the organs in advancing years.

2. By frequent repetition the ſtate of the medullary ſubſtance may be changed, and vigorous

vigorous vibrations may be renewed without a ſolution of continuity.

3. The flavour may be aſſociated with grateful or diſagreeable ſenſations, in the ſtomach and inteſtines, which in proceſs of time will blend with, and over-rule the ſimple original impreſſion.

4. The ſame effect may be produced by aſſociation with pleaſures and pains of different ſenſes, or with mental pleaſures and pains. Thus, a naufeous medicine may be ſwallowed without reluctance, becauſe it is ſalutary.

Deſire of any particular kind of food or liquor, is often much more influenced by aſſociated circumſtances than by taſte. Men like what they ſee others like, and drink to exceſs not from the love of liquor but of company.

2. HUNGER is a ſenſation at firſt moderately pleaſing, but by degrees exquiſitely painful: it is removed by aliment, and excited by abſtinence, by air, and exerciſe, and other means.

The ſeat of hunger is chiefly in the ſtomach, but it extends its influence to the tongue and palate, the flavour of food when

a perſon is hungry being very different from the flavour of the ſame food when a man has no appetite. The ſenſations of the ſtomach are alſo communicated in ſome degree to the inteſtines.

Hunger is probably produced by the natural action of the muſcles and fluids of the ſtomach upon the nervous fibrils, which are very numerous and exquiſitely ſenſible; exciting at firſt gentle, but gradually vigorous and violent vibrations.

Aliment relieves hunger: it clogs the minute veſſels, and abſorbs the acrimonious fluids: by this means it checks the violence of the vibrations.

A perſon may reliſh high-ſeaſoned food after hunger has been ſatiated with ſimpler aliment, for by irritation the vibrations may be renewed. Thus the appetite is ſtimulated by acids, ſauces, and the like.

Bitters, cold air, exerciſe, a ſmall quantity of food, and the like, excite hunger by promoting digeſtion, or by irritating the nervous fibrils, and producing vigorous vibrations.

By aſſociation hunger is excited by the viſible appearance or the odour of agreeable food.

Abſti-

Abſtinence produces hunger, by reverſing the effects of aliment.

3. THIRST.

THIRST is the converſe of hunger; it ariſes from all conſiderable degrees of heat in the fauces; the nerves of the mouth and ſtomach are occupied with vibrations of the inflammatory kind, different from thoſe of hunger. Gentle acids yield pleaſure; cold liquids afford immediate relief; and warm diluents ſoften the parts, and waſh off acrimonious particles. In fevers the cauſe of thirſt being permanent, the ſenſation returns again and again till the fever is removed.

II. IDEAS.

SIMPLE IDEAS of taſte are as numerous as the ſenſations of which they are the repreſentatives.

The ſmall number of words which expreſs the COMPLEX IDEAS of flavours, is a proof that the number of ſuch ideas is very ſmall.

Nevertheleſs, epicures, and perſons who value themſelves upon an exquiſite taſte, have numerous ideas of flavours, to which they aſſign appropriate names.

III. INTELLECTUAL PLEASURES AND PAINS.

Some flavours are originally grateful. others are ungrateful. Theſe, according to their circumſtances, will excite the correſpondent primary affections.

The pleaſures of taſte are much more numerous than the pains; they are frequently repeated, and continue from infancy to age. The miniatures of theſe ſenſations coaleſce, and form a complex idea, which may be transferred by aſſociation to other objects. Hence we trace one principal origin of the ſocial affections; for the pleaſures of taſte are uſually and in a manner neceſſarily enjoyed in ſociety.

The pains of taſte chiefly riſe from exceſs, and by frequent repetition produce hypochondriac diſorders and morbid melancholy: the veſtiges of theſe pains continually increaſing while the cauſe remains, and being liable to be called up by aſſociation, upon ſlight occaſions.

IV. AUTOMATIC MOTIONS generated by the ſenſe of taſte, or by impreſſions upon the alimentary duct*.

Theſe

* Dr. Hartley conjectures, that impreſſions firſt made upon the ſenſory nerves, are communicated by them to the

Theſe are ſuction, maſtication, deglutition, diſtortion of the face by nauſeous taſtes, periſtaltic motion of the ſtomach and bowels, vomiting, ructus, hiccough, ſpaſms, expulſion of the fæces, &c.

The pleaſurable impreſſions of food upon the tongue and fauces of infants, produce the motions which cauſe deglutition. The painful impreſſions of nauſeous liquids contract the alimentary paſſage, and produce an automatic rejection of them in young children.

V. MUSCULAR MOTIONS VOLUNTARY, SEMIVOLUNTARY, and SECONDARILY AUTOMATIC.

Suction, maſtication, deglutition, and other motions originally automatic, become by degrees completely voluntary by aſſociation, firſt, with ſenſory, and afterwards with ideal vibrations, or the feeling of deſire.

Nauſea, vomiting, expulſion of fæces, ructus, &c. in conſequence of aſſociation with ideas of decency, ſhame, fear, and the like,

the motory, and ſo to the muſcular fibre; but others ſuppoſe, that the irritation of external objects produces an immediate contraction of the fibril of the muſcle and motory nerve, and that by aſſociation only it is connected with, not produced by, the correſponding affection of the ſenſory nerve.

become ſemivoluntary, or in a conſiderable degree voluntary*.

Maſtication and deglutition become by aſſociation ſecondarily automatic, being performed generally in adults without any expreſs act of the will†.

SECTION III.

Of the Senſe of Smelling.

THIRDLY, THE SENSE OF SMELLING is of two ſorts. Firſt, that exquiſite ſenſibility which

* Nauſea, in a high degree, is produced by the motion of a ſhip. In a perſon who has ſuffered much by the ſea-ſickneſs, this nauſea will be excited by going aboard a ſhip at anchor, by the ſmell of the ſhip, by its viſible appearance, eſpecially if in motion, by the ſmell of tar, or even by converſation upon the ſubject.

See a ſingular inſtance of nauſea produced by aſſociation, in Darwin's Zoonomia, vol. i. ſect. iii. 3.

† Hartley, part i. ch. ii. ſect. ii.

Zoonomia, vol. i. ſect. xxv. page 273, 274.

Dr. Hartley juſtly obſerves, that the action of deglutition affords manifeſt evidences of the gradual tranſition of automatic motions into voluntary ones, as well as of voluntary ones into ſuch as are ſecondarily automatic.—Vol. i. page 177.

reſides

reſides in the noſe, and is excited by the impreſſion of odoriferous particles. Secondly, that ſenſation which moſt kinds of aliments or medicines impreſs upon the pituitary membrane, during maſtication, and immediately after deglutition.

I. SENSATIONS.

1. Senſations of odours are excited by the irritation of the olfactory nerve, by particles emitted from odoriferous bodies. Theſe particles are widely diffuſed, and probably repel each other. Perhaps they are thrown off by vibrations from the odoriferous body, and by their ſucceſſive pulſes excite a vibratory motion in the olfactory nerve*.

* Dr. Hartley remarks, that though odoriferous particles are more ſubtle than ſapid ones, yet they are perhaps groſſer than rays of light; for the ſmoke of a tallow candle ceaſes to ſmell when it begins to ſhine. He ranges the vibrations of the medullary ſubſtance in the following order, in reſpect of ſubtlety: heat, light, ſmell, taſtes, tangible impreſſions, and the vibrations of the air from which ſound ariſes. But theſe laſt may excite much more frequent vibrations in the auditory nerve than thoſe of the ſounding body: as vibrations from friction are much more numerous than the ſtrokes of friction, and the tremors of the particles of an anvil are much more numerous than the ſtrokes of the hammer.—Vol. i. page 184.

2. Heat,

2. Heat, friction, and effervescence, excite smells, probably by exciting vibrations.

3. To receive a smell in full strength and perfection, we make quick short alternate inspirations and expirations, analogous to rubbing the ends of the fingers upon the body to be examined by feeling, or the end of the tongue against the palate in tasting, in order to excite the sentient papillæ.

4. Pinching the nose prevents sensations in the pituitary membrane, by checking the nervous vibrations.

5. The greatness and quickness of the effect of some odours upon the nervous system, in producing fainting, &c. is accounted for by supposing that they agitate the whole system of medullary particles so much as to make them attract each other with sufficient force to stop all vibratory motions: similar to what sometimes happens in the particles of muscular and membranous fibres.

6. The specific differences of odours, like those of flavours, are probably owing to differences in the kind and degree of nervous vibrations.

7. Odours

7. Odours which in a moderate degree are grateful, in a high degree are disagreeable; owing to the increased violence of the vibrations.

8. Sensations of odours are as numerous as odours themselves, no two odours being perfectly similar, though there is frequently a strong resemblance.

II. IDEAS SIMPLE and COMPLEX.

SIMPLE IDEAS of odours must be as numerous as sensations; but they are indistinct, and soon slide out of the memory.

COMPLEX IDEAS are as numerous as the names by which they are distinguished: those in general use are very few; but persons who make a business of attending to odours, such as perfumers and others, distinguish them by a variety of names, and possess a corresponding variety of complex ideas.

III. INTELLECTUAL PLEASURES and PAINS.

The primary affections, are generated by odours, originally or by association, grateful or ungrateful, according to their respective circumstances, viz.; a person loves, desires, enjoys, &c. the odour which refreshes him: hates, fears, &c. an odour that produces sickness and the like.

Ideas

Ideas of odours ſometimes conſtitute an ingredient in the more complex affections.

Fragrance of the air, of flowers, and the like, tends to inſpire or to cheriſh the love of rural life.

Offenſive odours in various circumſtances contribute to generate the ſenſe of indecency, ſhame, diſguſt, and the like.

So far as ſmell and taſte are connected with, or reſemble each other, they mutually contribute to the formation of the ſame intellectual pleaſures and pains.

IV. AUTOMATIC MOTIONS.

The principal is ſneezing, produced by the irritation of the pituitary membrane, which, according to the theory already explained, by a ſudden contraction communicates its vibrations to the neighbouring muſcles.

V. VOLUNTARY, SEMIVOLUNTARY, and SECONDARILY AUTOMATIC POWERS.

The mind acquires a ſemivoluntary power of ſtopping, and in ſome caſes of exciting, a ſneeze; alſo of ſtopping the act of breathing through the noſtrils.

And by aſſociation with ideas of pleaſure and pain, and various ſtates of mind, it acquires a perfectly voluntary power of alternate expiration

expiration and inſpiration, for the purpoſe of exciting a more exquiſite ſenſation of odours *.

SECTION IV.

Senſe of Sight.—Form of the Eye.—Nature of Viſion.

FOURTHLY, THE SENSE OF SIGHT.

Of this ſenſe the eye is the organ, the form of which is nearly globular, and it is incloſed in three diſtinct coats or teguments.

The external coat is called tunica ſclerotica, the protuberant part of which is tranſparent, and is called the cornea.

The middle coat is called the choroides, or the uvea; the production of it under the cornea is called the iris, and gives the colour to the eye; in the middle of the iris is a circular hole, called the pupil. The iris is formed by muſcular fibres, ſome of which are circular and concentric with the pupil, and the others are tranſverſe, connecting the circular fibres together.

* Hartley, part i. ch. ii. ſect. iii.

The

The inner coat is called, from the perſon who diſcovered it, tunica Ruyſchiana.

Within the cavity of the eye is a ſoft tranſparent ſubſtance in the form of a double convex lens, called the cryſtalline humour. It is ſuſpended within the eye by certain muſcular ligaments called ligamenta ciliaria.

The cavity of the eye is thus divided into two portions, one of which is filled with a fluid nearly of the ſame denſity with water, called the aqueous humour; the other is filled with a fluid of greater denſity, called the vitreous humour.

At the back part of the eye, but not directly oppoſite to the pupil, enters the optic nerve, the fibres of which ſpreading over the innermoſt coat of the eye form a thin membrane called the tunica retina.

The innermoſt coat of the eye is every where covered with a very black ſubſtance, to hinder rays of light from being reflected to the retina, and rendering the images indiſtinct.

To form a general idea of the nature of viſion, it is neceſſary to obſerve,

That rays of light proceed from every point

point in the ſurface of a viſible body, in all directions and in right lines.

A number of rays diverging from a radiant point, conſtitute a cone or pencil of rays.

A pencil of rays paſſing through a convex lens converge to a focal point in a direction nearly oppoſite to the radiant point.

When the radiant points are contiguous to each other, the correſponding focal points will alſo be contiguous, and an exact but inverted image of the object will be formed in the focus of the lens: this appears in the common experiment of the camera obſcura.

The humours of the eye are ſo conſtructed as to act upon the pencils of rays iſſuing from every point of a viſible object and entering at the pupil, like a convex lens cauſing each pencil to converge to a focal point at the back of the eye, and thus impreſſing upon the retina an inverted image of the object.

The impreſſion of this image produces viſion, probably by exciting vibrations in the retina; and viſion is more or leſs diſtinct according to the diſtinctneſs or indiſtinctneſs of the image upon the retina.

Some have ſuppoſed the choroides to be the ſeat of viſion, becauſe the ſurface of this

coat is ſmoother than the retina, and becauſe an object is inviſible when the image falls upon the place where the optic nerve enters the eye*.

SECTION V.

Senſations of Sight.

I. SENSATIONS OF SIGHT. Phenomena explained.

The SENSATIONS OF SIGHT are LIGHT, COLOURS, VISIBLE FIGURE, VISIBLE MAGNITUDE, MOTION, and POSITION.

1. LIGHT.

LIGHT is a ſubſtance emitted from luminous bodies in all directions and in right lines.

The pulſes of light excite vibrations in the optic nerve, which, being communicated to the brain, excite the ſenſation of light†.

* Rowning's Philoſophy, part iii. ch. v. vi.
Adams's Philoſophy, vol. ii. lect. xvii.
Zoonomia, vol. i. page 117.

† "The rays of light," ſays Dr. Darwin, p. 1[illegible], "excite the retina to animal motion by their ſtimulus;" which motions he very properly diſtinguiſhes both from communicated motions, from gravitating motions, and from the chemical claſs of motions.

After

After fixing the eyes ſteadily upon a luminous object, the luminous image remains a few ſeconds after the eyes are cloſed; the vibrations of the retina gradually ſubſiding.

A ſtroke upon the eye produces a flaſh of light: a luminous appearance like the eye of a peacock's feather is produced by ſhutting the eye and rubbing it in a morning. In theſe inſtances the optic nerve is put into violent agitation *.

2. Colours.

The rays of the ſun's light conſiſt of ſeven diſtinct ſpecies, which, being differently refrangible, are eaſily ſeparated by a glaſs priſm.

Each ſpecies of light, by the irritation of the optic nerve, produces a correſpondent ſenſation of colour. The moſt refrangible rays excite the ſenſation of violet, the ſecond of indigo, the third blue, the fourth green, the fifth yellow, the ſixth orange, and the leaſt refrangible, red.

Theſe are called the primary colours. The whiteneſs of the ſun's light is owing to the union of all the ſeven primary colours.

* Zoonomia, vol. i. ſect. iii.

Sir Iſaac Newton conjectures, that the ſenſations of different colours are owing to the different bigneſſes of the nervous vibrations excited by the different ſpecies of light; and particularly conjectures, that the moſt refrangible rays excite the ſhorteſt vibrations for the ſenſation of a deep violet, and the leaſt refrangible the largeſt for a ſenſation of deep red; the intermediate rays exciting vibrations of intermediate bigneſſes for the ſenſations of the intermediate colours *.

3. VISIBLE MAGNITUDE.

Viſible magnitude is extenſion of two di-

* Sir Iſaac Newton alſo conjectures, (Qu. 14.) that the harmony and diſcord of colours ariſe from the proportions of the vibrations propagated through the optic nerves into the brain, as the harmony and diſcord of ſounds ariſe from the proportions of the vibrations of the air.

Hartley purſues this idea, and conjectures, that the vibrations which excite the ſenſations of the primary colours are to each other in frequency, as

$$100 : 112\tfrac{1}{2} : 120 : 133\tfrac{1}{3} : 150 : 166\tfrac{2}{3} : 177\tfrac{4}{9} : 200.$$

which he obſerves are the ſimpleſt of ratios which are conſiſtent with each other, and are the ſame ratios with thoſe of the five tones and the two ſemitones comprehended within the octave.—Hartley, Obſervations on Man, prop. 56. Newton's Optics, b. iii. q. 13.

menſions

menſions only: the ſenſe of ſight does not perceive a third dimenſion.

The viſible magnitude of an object is not in proportion to its real magnitude, but to the magnitude of the image upon the retina.

The image upon the retina is in exact proportion to the optic angle, which is an angle formed by two imaginary lines drawn from the centre of the pupil to the extremities of the object, and is vertically oppoſite to that which is ſubtended by the image upon the retina.

4. VISIBLE FIGURE.

Figure is limited extenſion; and viſible magnitude being of two dimenſions only, viſible figure is alſo limited to two dimenſions.

To perſons reſtored to ſight after having been long blind, all objects ſeem to touch the eye: it is by experience and by the ſenſe of feeling only, that they acquire the idea of diſtance.

Solid figures appear to the eye as plane figures only, v. g. a cone appears as a triangle, and a ſphere as a circle, with certain diverſities of light and ſhade.

5. VISIBLE MOTION.

This is a ſenſation acquired by the motion of images upon the retina correſponding with change of place in external objects.

But viſible motion is a change of place in objects upon the ſame plane, and excites no ſenſation of true relative diſtance.

Giddineſs is an apparent irregular motion of viſible objects; it often immediately precedes a privation of ſenſe and motion; and is owing to a general diſorder in the medullary ſubſtance extending itſelf to the optic nerve.

6. VISIBLE POSITION.

Viſible poſition is the relative ſituation of viſible objects.

The viſible ſenſation excited by the actual poſition of viſible objects, is that of a picture, ſimilar to that which is formed upon the retina, in which all the objects are upon the ſame plane, no one object being nearer or more remote than another.

Objects appear erect, though their images are inverted upon the retina. By experience, that is, by the ſenſe of feeling, we learn the real poſition of viſible objects, and by aſſociation we form a true idea of the real poſition from the viſible appearance.

7. By

7. By association visible appearances become the EXPONENTS of tangible qualities*.

1. OF SOLIDITY AND FIGURE.

The visible appearance of solid bodies is that of a flat surface diversified with light, shade, and colour: by experience we associate the tangible qualities with the visible appearance; and constantly infer the latter from the former.

This judgment is commonly true, but in optical deceptions is erroneous. The association is so familiar, that the tangible quality is often mistaken for a visible sensation †.

2. OF TANGIBLE MAGNITUDE.

Of this we constantly judge by association, from the visible appearance.

* Berkeley's Theory of Vision.

† If a blind person, who by feeling could distinguish accurately between a globe and a cube, should suddenly be restored to sight, and a globe and cube should be placed before him upon a table, it is asked, whether he would be able, from the visible appearance only, to ascertain which was the globe and which the cube?

This question was proposed by Mr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke, and has been considered as a metaphysical puzzle ever since.—Locke's Essay, book ii. ch. ix. sect. 8, 9. Smith's Optics, vol. ii. Appendix, p. 27, 28. Locke's Fam. Lett. p. 134—138. Reid's Enq. ch. vi. sect. iii. Reid on Intellectual Powers, essay ii. ch. xxii. p. 288, &c.

If the diſtances of two objects are equal, that which appears under the larger angle is the larger object.

If the angles under which two objects appear are equal, that which is, or is ſuppoſed to be, at the greateſt diſtance, is judged to be the larger object.

Whatever occaſions an error in our judgment of the diſtance, produces an equal error in our judgment of magnitude.

Hence a fly in a window, referred to a diſtance in the field, is taken to be a horſe grazing.

Objects ſeen through a fog are magnified, becauſe from their indiſtinctneſs they are ſuppoſed to be at a greater diſtance.

The moon in the horizon being referred to a greater diſtance than when when ſhe is in the meridian, is thought to appear larger, though the angle ſubtended by her diſk is preciſely the ſame.

3. DISTANCE

Is an idea of touch, of which viſible appearances are by aſſociation the conſtant exponent.

1. If the magnitude of the object be known, the diſtance is judged of by the apparent

parent magnitude, that is, by the angle under which it appears.

If the real magnitudes are equal, that which appears under the largeſt angle is the neareſt.

If the angles under which two objects appear are equal, but the real magnitudes unequal, the largeſt object is the moſt remote.

Where magnitudes are miſtaken, diſtances are alſo miſtaken. Hence mountains at a diſtance are judged to be nearer than the fact. Objects magnified by a teleſcope ſeem nearer than they are; diminiſhed they are judged to be more diſtant.

Children judge accurately only of ſmall diſtances, and men by aſſociation judge more truly of diſtances upon level ground than from a lofty eminence, or a deep well.

2. We judge of diſtances by intervening objects.

For theſe ſerve as a ſort of meaſure, without which our ideas of diſtance are very imperfect.

Hence, that is, from the want of intervening bodies, objects at ſea appear nearer than they really are. And the zenith ſeems to be nearer

than the horizon. Hence the celeſtial bodies appear to be larger in the horizon than in the meridian. We are incapable of judging of their relative diſtances, as they all appear equally remote.

3. By the degree of diſtinctneſs with which minute parts are ſeen.

Objects indiſtinct are ſuppoſed to be diſtant: upon this principle diſtant objects are repreſented in landſcapes.

4. By the brightneſs or obſcurity of the viſible object.

By this and the preceding rule, ſailors learn by habit to judge of diſtances at ſea with tolerable preciſion.

5. By the direction of the optic axes when objects are very near.

The optic axes are imaginary lines drawn from the points of diſtinct viſion in each eye directly to the object.

The angle formed by theſe lines muſt be larger or leſs, as the object is nearer to or more remote from the eye.

That we judge of diſtance and poſition by the direction of the optic axes is evident, becauſe a perſon who ſhuts one eye will not be able

able immediately to guide his finger to a viſible object within his reach.

6. The difference of the conformation of the eye, by moving or changing the figure of the cryſtalline humour, as the viſible object is nearer or more remote, affords ſome aſſiſtance in judging of ſmall diſtances.

4. MOTION.

Of real motion we judge by the motion of images upon the retina, by gradual increaſe or diminution of magnitude, brightneſs, diſtinctneſs, &c.

5. POSITION.

Poſition is relative diſtance; and real tangible poſition is judged of by the rules of real diſtance*.

6. That objects appear SINGLE when diſtinct images are formed on the retina of each eye, is evidently owing to habit, that is, to aſſociation: for, if one eye be diſtorted, ſo that the images do not fall upon correſponding

* We judge of the ſeat of impreſſions made on the external ſurface of the body, by the touch, by the viſible appearance, and by experience; and of the ſeat of internal pains, by their proximity to the external parts, by ſkill in anatomy, the theory of diſeaſes, &c. Hartley, prop. 31, 32.

points

points in each retina, the object appears double till cuſtom rectifies the judgment, and with it the viſible appearance*.

SECTION VII.

Senſe of Sight continued.—Ideas.—Intellectual Pleaſures and Pains.—Motions, Automatic and Voluntary.

II. IDEAS generated by viſible impreſſions.

SIMPLE IDEAS being the repreſentatives of ſenſations, the number of ſimple ideas correſponds with that of diſtinct viſible impreſſions, and is continually changing, as old impreſſions are gradually effaced, and new ſenſations are excited.

COMPLEX IDEAS of ſight being formed by the gradual coaleſcence of ſimple ideas, are as numerous, and perhaps more ſo than the names by which they are diſtinguiſhed.

OBSERVATIONS concerning ideas of ſight.

* It reſembles this, ſays Hartley, and illuſtrates it, that if we croſs the fingers and roll a pea between two ſides which are not contiguous naturally, it feels like two peas, p. 205.—Hartley's Obſervations, part i. ch. ii. ſect. iv. prop. 56—59. Reid's Enq. into the Hum. Mind, ch. vi.

1. Theſe

1. Theſe ideas are more vivid and definite than the ideas of any other ſenſe.

2. This vividneſs and preciſion relates more to tangible qualities than to colours. Magnitude and figure recur inceſſantly: ideas of colours often require an exertion of the voluntary powers.

3. The preciſion and vividneſs of theſe ideas is chiefly owing to the diſtinctneſs of their impreſſions upon the retina, and the perpetual recurrency of viſible objects during the whole time that we are awake.

4. Theſe ideas are aſſociated with various internal feelings, ſome of which are aſſociated with words, others have no names. Hence ariſe the voluntary and ſemivoluntary powers of exciting viſible ideas.

5. A deſire to excite ſome viſible idea, v. g. if a perſon is told to think of a horſe, will produce ſome individuum vagum, or indefinite notion connected with the train of ideas or feelings then paſſing through the mind: in this caſe the effect is imperfectly voluntary.

6. A viſible idea is perfectly voluntary when it conſtantly follows the volition; and the previous circumſtances which determine the

the volition, generally excite the idea: for example, if a perſon deſires me to think of a particular horſe, the ſound of the words both determines the volition and excites the idea.

7. There is a peculiar connexion between the ideas of ſight and hearing*.

The name of an object excites the viſible idea, and the viſible appearance of an object excites the idea of the name.

8. Trains of viſible ideas are in a particular manner affected by the general ſtate of the brain, as in delirium, madneſs, and the like. It ſeems probable either that the region correſponding to the optic nerve is comparatively large, or peculiarly ſuſceptible of impreſſions, or both.

9. The imagery of the eye ſympathizes with the ſtate of the ſtomach: the grateful impreſſions of opium raiſe up pleaſing viſible ideas, ſpaſms and indigeſtions the contrary.

10. Our ſtock of viſible ideas is a key to a great part of our knowledge. In poetry and painting it is a principal ſource of invention;

* This aſſociation is not ſo intimate as that between viſible appearances and tangible qualities. Senſations of ſight and hearing are never confounded with each other, like thoſe of ſight and touch.

in

in mathematics and mechanics the invention of the diagram is the ſolution of the problem: viſible ideas aſſiſt the memory in reſpect to paſt facts, and the preſervation of the order of time. Hence eye-witneſſes generally relate in the order of time, without any expreſs deſign of doing ſo.

11. By aſſociation of different circumſtances the ſame portrait may appear more like the original to one perſon than to another: alſo by aſſociation, painters, architects, ſtatuaries, anatomiſts, &c. form viſible ideas with great facility, and retain them with great accuracy.

12. Fables, allegories, and the like, pleaſe and inſtruct on account of their viſible imagery. This may be one reaſon why idolatry has prevailed in the world; and why ſyſtems of ſuperſtition which amuſe or aſtoniſh the imagination, are more acceptable to the maſs of mankind than truth and ſimplicity.

III. INTELLECTUAL PLEASURES AND PAINS.

The original or aſſociated pleaſures or pains of viſion, excite in their reſpective circumſtances, the grateful or ungrateful primary paſſions.

Viſible ideas aſſociating themſelves with almoſt all our internal feelings, the pleaſures and pains derived from this ſenſe muſt conſtitute a principal ingredient in the moſt complex intellectual affections: The viſible appearance of a friend, or the idea of it, excites and cheriſhes friendſhip, &c.

A reliſh for the beauties of nature, and a taſte for the imitative arts, may in part be traced to the pleaſures of this ſenſe.

IV. AUTOMATIC MOTIONS excited by viſible impreſſions.

Theſe are either external, relating to the globe of the eye, the eye-lid, &c. or internal, ſuch as the contractions of the iris or ciliar ligaments.

Light produces an irritation, and conſequently excites the action of the muſcles of the eye; the luminous object, acting at the ſame time upon each eye, produces the congruous motions of the eyes: and agreeably to this theory, if children are ſo laid in the cradle as that one eye ſhall be covered and the other expoſed to the action of light, the eyes will not move congruouſly, that is, they will learn to ſquint.

V. VOLUN-

V. VOLUNTARY AND SEMIVOLUNTARY POWERS.

Adults poſſeſs a perfectly voluntary power, which children do not, of directing the optic axes to the ſame object.

Irritation of external objects produces at firſt an automatic cloſure of the eye-lids; by degrees the apprehenſion of any external irritation, or the experience of the pleaſure of moiſtening and cooling the eye, &c. makes this action voluntary; and by frequent repetition it becomes ſecondarily automatic*.

SECTION VIII.

Senſe of Hearing.

V. THE SENSE OF HEARING.

1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION of the ORGAN OF HEARING.

The uſe of the external ear is like a tunnel to gather ſounds, and by its ridges and hollows to direct them to the meatus auditorius. This is a crooked paſſage, about an inch long and three or four lines wide, which leads

* Hartley, part i. ſect. iv. prop. 60—63.

from

from the concha or hollow of the external ear to the tympanum.

The membrana tympani is a thin tranſparent membrane which cloſes the inner extremity of the meatus; behind this membrane is a cavity called the tympanum, about four lines deep and wide, and above two lines high.

Within the tympanum are four ſmall bones called the malleolus, the incus, the ſtapes, and the os orbiculare, the uſes of which are little known.

The Euſtachian tube is a conduit leading from the tympanum to the palate; it preſerves a communication between the tympanum and the external air; and probably aſſiſts the impreſſions of a perſon's own voice, and when the mouth is open of external ſounds alſo.

At the back of the tympanum is a hole called feneſtra ovalis, which opens into a cavity called the veſtibulum, behind which are three ſemicircular pipes called the labyrinth, opening by five orifices into the veſtibulum.

Another orifice of the tympanum called feneſtra rotunda, covered by a fine membrane,

brane, leads to the cochlea, a cavity reſembling a ſnail's ſhell; in it is a canal winding in a ſpiral line and divided into two parts, the upper and lower, by a thin lamina: the upper opens into the tympanum, the lower into the veſtibulum.

The auditory nerve conſiſts of two branches; the one hard, the other ſoft. Five branches of the portio mollis enter the veſtibulum and form a delicate web, which ſends ſlips to the ſemicircular canal; the reſt of the portio mollis enters the cochlea, and winds with the ſpiral line. The portio dura is diſtributed among the external parts of the ear.

The winding of the auditory nerve through the cochlea and the labyrinth, expoſes a conſiderable portion of it to the impreſſion of ſounds, while the narrowneſs of the channel prevents the pulſes from being too much dilated and weakened. By this conſtruction of the organ of hearing, thoſe very ſoft ſounds become audible, which cæteris manentibus would otherwiſe be loſt and unheard*.

Secondly, PHENOMENA EXPLAINED.

* Keill's Anatomy, ch. iv. ſect. v.

I. SENSATIONS acquired by the ſenſe of hearing are thoſe of SOUND only.

1. Sounds are cauſed by the vibrations of ſonorous bodies, which, producing correſpondent vibrations in the conducting medium, probably excite proportional vibrations in the auditory nerve, which, being propagated to the brain, excite the ſenſation of ſound.

2. Air is the uſual medium; but wood, metals, and even water, are good conductors of ſound*.

3. The different ſtrength of ſounds depends upon the condenſation of the pulſes of the conducting medium: the difference in the acuteneſs and gravity of ſounds ariſes from a difference in the velocity of the pulſes. A muſical chord vibrates with twice the velocity of another which ſounds an octave below it.

4. Soft tones are originally agreeable; loud noiſes originally diſagreeable; the former being generated by moderate, the latter by violent vibrations. But even theſe ſometimes ſubſide within the limits of pleaſure,

* Franklin's Experiments on Electricity, &c. Lett. 44.

as

as in the caſe of thoſe who love noiſy mirth and the like.

5. Concords, that is, muſical notes, the ratios of whoſe vibrations are ſufficiently ſimple, are agreeable: when the ratios are leſs ſimple they are diſagreeable, and are called diſcords. Concords are probably originally diſagreeable to children, but by uſe fall gradually within the limits of pleaſure, in proportion to the ſimplicity of their ratios. It confirms this ſuppoſition, that even diſcords in ſome circumſtances become pleaſant to an ear converſant with muſic.

6. Each articulate ſound makes a diſtinct ſeparate impreſſion upon the auditory nerve, and excites a diſtinct correſponding ſenſation.

The ear is, perhaps, furniſhed with ſome contrivance, ſimilar in its uſe to the jacks of a harpſichord, to extinguiſh ſtrong ſounds, and to keep up weak ones.

It is difficult at a diſtance to diſtinguiſh articulate ſounds, numberleſs reflections confounding the vibrations.

7. The known vibratory nature of ſounds illuſtrates and confirms the doctrine of vibrations in general. The various vibrations exiſting at the ſame time in the air without

interrupting each other, make it credible that a ſimilar phenomenon may take place in the medullary ſubſtance.

8. By ASSOCIATION ſounds become SIGNS.

1. Of TANGIBLE QUALITIES.

1. Of DISTANCE: ſounds decreaſing in a certain ratio as diſtances increaſe. This ſign of diſtance is very incorrect, depending upon variable circumſtances, ſuch as the direction of the wind, and the original ſtrength or acuteneſs of the ſound, and the like.

2. Of POSITION: we judge of the poſition of ſonorous bodies by the direction of the ſound. But this rule is very inaccurate, the direction varying by reflections of ſurrounding bodies, and other adventitious circumſtances.

Hence ventriloquiſts acquire the art of throwing the feigned voice to a diſtance, and of making it ſeem to come from any ſituation in a room*.

2. Sounds become ſigns of VISIBLE IDEAS. The words ſun and moon excite the viſible

* Probably by indiſtinctneſs, and by not moving the lips, they make it difficult to aſcertain from whence the voice iſſues; and by habit they give the voice the degree of intenſity which it would have if it actually proceeded from the place from which it is thought to iſſue.

ideas

ideas of thoſe celeſtial luminaries. The name of a perſon excites the idea of his viſible appearance, and the ſound of a word the viſible form of the letters of which it is compoſed.

The action of writing is aſſociated with the viſible idea in thoſe who ſpell correctly. That we ſometimes write from the audible idea is plain, from the miſ-ſpelling of a word in conformity to the pronunciation.

3. Sounds by aſſociation excite the ideas of OTHER SOUNDS, articulate or otherwiſe.

A few notes of a familiar melody, excite an idea of the whole.

A few prominent words in a ſentence, excite the idea of the complete ſentence.

Thus, in a difficult hand-writing we judge of a word by a few letters, and of a ſentence by a few words.

We judge of a perſon's meaning by familiar acquaintance with his voice, pronunciation, geſture, and other circumſtances.

Hence we eaſily underſtand a ſpeaker to whoſe manner we are accuſtomed.

Hence, alſo, it is difficult to underſtand a ſtranger; alſo, to diſtinguiſh proper names, and articulate ſounds in an unknown language.

And, hence, ventriloquiſts, by uttering a few ſounds articulately, make themſelves underſtood.

4. By aſſociation articulate ſounds readily excite SIMPLE, COMPLEX, and DECOMPLEX IDEAS; and few complex ideas can be diſtinctly recollected which are not aſſociated with names.

Hence it ſeems probable that deaf and dumb perſons do not acquire many complex or univerſal ideas.

II. IDEAS generated by audible impreſſions.

Every ſeparate ſound generates its correſpondent ſimple idea; but theſe are very evaneſcent.

Similar ſimple ideas coaleſce into complex ones, and are aſſociated with names, as the ſound of a violin, a flute, a trumpet, a voice, &c.; and the words concord, diſcord, ſoft, loud, melody, harmony, muſic, and the like, all expreſs complex ideas of ſound.

Children learn to ſpeak by repeating ſounds which they hear: hence the audible idea is aſſociated with the act of ſpeaking, and is often too evaneſcent to excite the attention of the mind.

Ideas

Ideas of ſight and hearing are the principal ſtorehouſes of the imagination, and are equally related to the imaginative arts of painting and muſic reſpectively, and alſo to poetry.

A technical memory, particularly adapted for retaining numbers, may be formed by the audible impreſſions of correſponding articulate ſounds, as in Grey's Memoria Technica.

III. INTELLECTUAL PLEASURES AND PAINS.

The primary pleaſures and pains of this ſenſe are eaſily explained by aſſociation. Thus we love, deſire, hope for, are delighted with, and retain a pleaſing recollection of fine muſic: we hate, are averſe to, fear, are pained by, and have a diſagreeable recollection of harſh, jarring, and diſcordant ſounds.

The pleaſures of muſic are transferred by aſſociation to the places where, and the perſons with whom we enjoy that entertainment. This is one ingredient in the attachment which many feel to a town life, to cathedral worſhip, &c. In like manner, the warbling of birds is one of the many cauſes which operate to produce delight in the ſpring, or love to rural life.

The pleaſure of articulate ſounds, like that of viſible appearances, is very evaneſcent: and this circumſtance renders the ear as well as the eye the proper vehicle of mental information and improvement.

The love of muſic ſeems to be generated by the following proceſs:

1. Some ſoft tones are originally pleaſing to the ear, as ſome colours are grateful to the eye.

2. Some ſounds originally diſagreeable, ſubſide by uſe within the limits of pleaſure. This happens in all concords, and in ſome caſes even in diſcords.

3. Some tones reſemble the natural expreſſions of pleaſure and pain; and the latter may be ſo ſoftened as to fall within the limits of the former.

4. By far the greater part of the pleaſures of muſic ariſe from accidental aſſociations. The ringing of bells has no connection with joy, nor tolling them with ſorrow, but by aſſociation. Hence every country has its favourite melodies and ſtyle of muſic. Thus an air which is perfectly indifferent to a ſtranger, excites in a Swiſs an irreſiſtible deſire of home.

5. The

5. The ſkill and ingenuity in the compoſition of ſome harmonies, excites the admiration of thoſe who are competent to judge.

6. Extreme difficulty in the execution exciting the aſtoniſhment of the hearers, ſeems to conſtitute a principal ſource of the delight afforded by modern muſic.

IV. MOTIONS AUTOMATIC AND VOLUNTARY.

Certain automatic motions are produced within the ear, by the pulſes of that medium which is the conductor of ſound: but of the nature and direction of theſe motions we are totally ignorant.

The muſcles of the external ear over which the mind might acquire a voluntary power, are reſtrained from action by the practice of binding down the ears of new-born children cloſe to the head*.

* Hartley, ch. ii. ſect. v. prop. 64—72. Reid's Enquiry, ch. iv.

CHAP-

CHAPTER V.

OF THE INTELLECT.

SECTION I.

Of Truth and Falſehood.—Knowledge and Opinion.—Probability and Improbability.—Aſſent and Diſſent.—Nature and Kinds of Evidence.

THE FIFTH FACULTY of the human mind is INTELLECT, or the faculty by which we judge of truth.

I. Concerning TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD.

TRUTH has reſpect to ideas and words.

TRUTH IN IDEAS ſignifies the conformity of ideas to the actual nature, exiſtence, and ſtate of things.

When internal feelings or perceptions are juſt images or ſymbols of external objects, and when thoſe ideas are joined whoſe archetypes are joined in nature, and thoſe ideas are ſeparated whoſe archetypes are ſeparated.

Thus

Thus the aſſociation of the ideas of God and perfection, of virtue and utility, of matter and reſiſtance, are true combinations of ideas. In like manner, the ſeparation of the ideas of God and tyranny, of vice and honour, of creature and independence, are caſes of truth in thought.

TRUTH IN WORDS is either logical or ethical.

LOGICAL TRUTH is the expreſſion of truth in thoughts: as in the propoſition, God is good.

ETHICAL TRUTH is the conformity of the language to the conceptions of the ſpeaker, whether thoſe conceptions be true or falſe: as when a papiſt affirms, that tranſubſtantiation is true.

FALSEHOOD is the reverſe of truth: it has reſpect both to thoughts and words.

FALSEHOOD IN THOUGHTS or conceptions is called ERROR: it is joining ideas whoſe archetypes diſagree, and ſeparating thoſe whoſe archetypes agree. The ſeparation of juſtice from the idea of God, and the combination of happineſs with the idea of vice, or of diſgrace with virtue, are caſes of mental error.

FALSEHOOD IN WORDS is either logical or ethical. Logical falſehood is the expreſſion of mental error. Such are the propoſitions,

God is unjuſt; vice leads to happineſs; virtue is diſhonourable.

Ethical falſehood is the diſagreement of the language with the ideas of the ſpeaker*.

II. Concerning KNOWLEDGE and OPINION, CERTAIN and UNCERTAIN, PROBABLE and IMPROBABLE, BELIEF and DOUBT.

KNOWLEDGE is either an operation of mind, or the reſult of that operation.

Knowledge, in the firſt ſenſe, is the clear perception of truth: I know, that is, I clearly perceive, that the whole is equal to all its parts taken together.

Knowledge, in the ſecond ſenſe, is the treaſure of aſſociated ideas ſtored up in the mind in conſequence of clear perceptions. Mathematics, aſtronomy, ethics, hiſtory, &c. are in this ſenſe branches of knowledge.

OPINION is the reſult of obſcure and indeterminate perception. That the planets revolve about the ſun, is a branch of knowledge; that they are inhabited by beings ſimilar to men is only an opinion.

Knowledge is ſaid to be CERTAIN, opinion UNCERTAIN.

* Doddridge's Lectures, No. 68.

CERTAINTY,

CERTAINTY, by whatever means attained, admits of no perceptible degrees. I am equally certain that I exiſt, that the whole is greater than its part, and that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; one of which truths I learn by conſciouſneſs, another by intuition, and the third by demonſtration.

UNCERTAINTY admits of an infinite variety of degrees between the limits of certain truth and palpable falſehood.

Of opinions, ſome are PROBABLE and others IMPROBABLE.

A PROBABLE OPINION is one the evidence of the truth of which preponderates over that of its falſehood.

An IMPROBABLE OPINION is that, the evidence of whoſe falſehood preponderates over that of its truth.

III. BELIEF is the ſtate of mind produced by the perception of probability: UNBELIEF, or doubt, by the perception of improbability.

Of probability there are various degrees, from a moral certainty to the ſlighteſt preponderance of evidence: and the degrees of belief are proportionably various. In like manner the degrees of improbability are in-

definitely various, from the leaſt deviation from the equilibrium to the loweſt degree upon the ſcale of evidence, and even to a moral impoſſibility. Hence degrees of doubt are proportionably various: and the mind often vibrates between belief and unbelief, as it attends moſt to the evidence for or againſt any opinion in queſtion.

It may be obſerved here, that the limits of human knowledge are very contracted, and that the evidence of thoſe principles by which human life is chiefly governed, ſeldom amounts to more than to a high degree of probability*.

IV. Of ASSENT and DISSENT, and of the nature and various kinds of EVIDENCE.

ASSENT is of two kinds, SPECULATIVE and PRACTICAL.

SPECULATIVE ASSENT is a readineſs to affirm the truth of a propoſition. SPECULATIVE DISSENT is the reverſe of this.

* This is clearly the caſe in the choice of connections, profeſſions, and ſituations in life: and even the moſt important doctrines of natural and revealed religion are more properly the objects of rational belief than of certain knowledge. "We walk by faith, not by ſight."

PRACTICAL

PRACTICAL ASSENT is a readineſs to act in conformity to ſpeculative principles. PRACTICAL DISSENT is the contrary.

Aſſent is generated by EVIDENCE.

EVIDENCE is the means of knowledge: it is the medium by which coincidences or concurrences of things or ideas are made apparent to the mind.

Of evidence there are five ſpecies: CONSCIOUSNESS, SENSE, INTUITION, REASONING, and TESTIMONY.

1. By CONSCIOUSNESS we learn our own exiſtence, faculties, and operations.

2. By SENSE we learn the exiſtence, properties, and powers, of external objects, and the coexiſtence of different attributes in the ſame object.

3. By INTUITION we learn the coincidences of ideas in the moſt ſimple and obvious caſes. For inſtance, the whole is greater than its part*.

4. REASONING

* What we call intuition, is probably nothing more than the general reſult of the moſt obvious ſenſible obſervations.

Dr. Hartley obſerves, that "the cauſe that a perſon affirms "the truth of the propoſition, *twice two is four*, is the en- "tire

4. REASONING is discovering the relation between two given ideas by the intervention of a third, v. g. the three internal angles of a triangle coincide with two right angles, because both these quantities coincide with the internal and external angle taken together.

A SYLLOGISM is the expression of the act of reasoning. It consists of three propositions: in the two first, called the PREMISES, the two given ideas are compared with the third or middle term; in the last, called the CONCLUSION, they are joined to or separated from each other, as they appear upon comparison to agree or disagree.

Virtue is wisdom,
Benevolence is virtue:
Therefore Benevolence is wisdom*.

5. TESTIMONY is the evidence by which

" tire coincidence of the visible or tangible idea of twice " two with that of four, as impressed upon the mind by " various objects. We see every where that twice two " and four are only different names for the same impres- " sion: and it is mere association which appropriates the " word truth, its definition, or its internal feeling, to this " coincidence."—Hartley on Man, prop. 86, p. 192, quarto. See also Dr. Beddoes's Observations on Demonstrative Evidence.

* Duncan's Logic, part iii. ch. i.

we

we acquire the knowledge of facts and concluſions which do not fall under our own obſervation.

SECTION II.

Of Words and Propoſitions.—Uſe of Words for the Acquiſition of Knowledge. — Different Kinds of Propoſitions.

I. OF WORDS AND PROPOSITIONS.

WORDS are articulate ſounds uſed to expreſs ideas.

All language may be reſolved into NOUNS and VERBS, with their reſpective ABBREVIATIONS.

NOUNS expreſs names of things: they are divided into SUBSTANTIVES, which are the principal things ſpoken of, and ADJECTIVES, which denote qualities or circumſtances belonging to them.

VERBS expreſs exiſtence and its modes. They are of three kinds: ſuch as denote ſimple exiſtence, viz. to be: ſuch as expreſs exiſtence in an active ſtate, viz. to eat: and ſuch as expreſs exiſtence in a paſſive ſtate, viz. to be eaten.

Words which are uſually repreſented as indeclinable particles having no determinate ſignification of their own, are ABBREVIATIONS of nouns or verbs invented for the greater expedition of communicating our thoughts. See this Theory of language illuſtrated and eſtabliſhed in Tooke's Diverſions of Purley *.

A PROPOSITION, is a word, or a combination of words, by which the univerſal or partial concurrence or coincidence of ideas, or the want of that concurrence or coincidence, is expreſſed: viz. Man is mortal. A circle is not a ſquare.

A propoſition in its proper form conſiſts of three parts; the ſubject, the predicate, and the copula.

* Thus *if* ſignifies *give: and* ſignifies *add: that*, though often called a conjunction, is uniformly uſed as a pronoun: for inſtance,

He ſaid *that if* England *and* Ireland were united they would form a powerful empire.

This ſentence analyſed would ſtand in this form:

Give England *add* Ireland united they would form a powerful empire. He ſaid *that.*

"In this work," ſays Dr. Darwin, "Mr. Tooke has un-
"folded, by a ſingle flaſh of light, the whole theory of lan-
"guage which had ſo long lain buried beneath the learned
"lumber of the ſchools."—Zoonomia, vol. i. p. 531.

The SUBJECT is the idea concerning which ſomething is affirmed or denied; the PREDICATE is that which is united to or ſeparated from the ſubject; the COPULA is an artificial ſign which denotes the union or the ſeparation of the ſubject and the predicate.

II. USE OF WORDS IN ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE.

Words are not eſſential to the acquiſition of knowledge, that is, to the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of ideas, and to the ſtates of mind correſponding therewith.

All our original impreſſions are very complex; many of them both of the ſame and of different ſenſes being made upon the mind at once. For example: the impreſſions of the nurſe, the chair, the fire, the nurſery, &c. are made at one and the ſame time upon the ſenſorium of the child.

By obſervation and experience we gradually learn to ſeparate an idea from its variable adjuncts, viz. the nurſe from the furniture of the nurſery, the inhabitant from the houſe, and the like.

The ſenſes teach us that certain properties uniformly belong to certain ſubſtances; that

other properties never adhere to them; and again, that ſome properties belong to them at ſome times and in ſome circumſtances, but not in others.

Hence we gain the idea of univerſal or partial concurrence, or of the univerſal want of it.

The ſenſes alſo teach us that certain ideas univerſally coincide, viz. the whole with all its parts; and that in others there is a partial coincidence, viz. two is an aliquot part of ten; and laſtly, that in others there is no coincidence whatever, viz. in black and white.

Thus it appears that we might acquire very diſtinct ideas of a great variety of concurrences and coincidences of objects, if language had no exiſtence*.

Words are acquired long after ideas are impreſſed, and are an artificial contrivance to aſſiſt the operations of the intellect, and to fa-

* Hence it follows that deaf and dumb perſons are capable of reaſoning, and of acquiring knowledge; but not ſo eaſily or accurately as thoſe who can uſe articulate ſounds as the ſigns of univerſal ideas, unleſs they happen to diſcover ſome other artificial contrivance for the ſame purpoſe.

cilitate

cilitate the acquiſition and the communication of knowledge.

Words facilitate reaſoning, and aſſiſt the operations of the intellect, chiefly as being the ſigns of univerſal ideas, and of their various modes and combinations.

III. DIFFERENT KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS.

Propoſitions are diſtinguiſhed,

1. Into AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE.

An AFFIRMATIVE PROPOSITION connects the predicate with the ſubject, viz. God is good.

A NEGATIVE PROPOSITION ſeparates the predicate from the ſubject, viz. God is not a tyrant.

2. UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR.

A UNIVERSAL PROPOSITION is that, the ſubject of which is a univerſal idea; and the predicate extends to the whole ſubject, viz. All that are virtuous will be happy.

A PARTICULAR PROPOSITION is that, the ſubject of which is a univerſal idea, and the predicate is limited to a part of the ſubject, viz. Some princes are benefactors to mankind.

As every propoſition is either affirmative or negative, and alſo either univerſal or particular,

ticular, all propoſitions are diſtinguiſhed into four claſſes, Univerſal Affirmative, Univerſal Negative, Particular Affirmative, and Particular Negative.

SINGULAR PROPOSITIONS, or thoſe the ſubject of which is a ſingular idea, are reckoned in the claſs of Univerſals, becauſe the predicate is connected with the whole ſubject, viz. Sir Iſaac Newton invented fluxions.

The ſame may be obſerved of COLLECTIVE PROPOSITIONS, the ſubjects of which are collective ideas, viz. The Engliſh are a commercial people.

3. PROPOSITIONS ARE TRUE OR FALSE.

A TRUE PROPOSITION unites ideas that agree, or ſeparates thoſe which diſagree.

A FALSE PROPOSITION affirms an agreement between ideas which diſagree, or a diſagreement between thoſe which agree.

SECTION III.

Origin of Aſſent to various Claſſes of Propoſitions.—Remarks.

1. SOME propoſitions expreſs the COINCIDENCE of the ſubject and the predicate. Such

Such are the propoſitions in arithmetic and geometry, and equations in algebra.

1. In SIMPLE caſes of this kind ASSENT is produced by the perception of coincidences in things themſelves, or in diſtinct ſenſible ideas, viz. Two and three are equal to five.

2. COMPLEX propoſitions of this ſort are proved by DEMONSTRATION.

DEMONSTRATION is a ſucceſſion of propoſitions, beginning with ſelf-evident and advancing to remote truths, in which every propoſition is intuitively connected with the preceding, till in the end the concluſion itſelf becomes intuitive*.

Demon-

* The moſt perfect ſpecimen of the progreſs of the human mind in the acquiſition of knowledge is to be found in mathematics. Mathematicians begin with clear and accurate Definitions of their terms, to which they rigidly adhere. From definitions they advance to ſelf-evident propoſitions, ſome of which are ſpeculative, and are called Axioms; others are practical, and are called Poſtulates. They next proceed to the demonſtration of remoter truths, of which the ſpeculative are called Theorems; the practical, Problems. Thus, from eaſy intuitive principles they advance by regular gradations to remote and complex truths, till they ultimately arrive at propoſitions ſo far diſtant from the primary elements of knowledge, that a priori they might be thought to be beyond

Demonſtrative and even mathematical reaſoning is ultimately reſolvable into intuitive, that is, as Dr. Beddoes has proved in the work before referred to, into the moſt obvious ſenſible propoſitions.

3. In general, in complex caſes the perceived coincidence of words, or other ſymbols, produces ſpeculative or rational aſſent*.

4. This

the limits of the human intellect; ſuch, for inſtance, as the demonſtration of the laws which regulate the motions of the celeſtial bodies. To demonſtrations mathematicians ſometimes prefix Lemmas, which are propoſitions, the truth of which muſt be eſtabliſhed previous to the main propoſition; and they ſometimes ſubjoin Corollaries, which are intuitive inferences from demonſtrated truths; and Scholia, which are obſervations illuſtrative of the ſubject.

The want of ideas ſufficiently definite, is the reaſon why mathematical evidence cannot be applied to morals, metaphyſics, and other branches of ſcience, with ſo much ſucceſs as to quantity and number: but the more nearly we can approximate to this mode of reaſoning by clearneſs of definition, accuracy of expreſſion, and cloſe connected argument, the more ſatisfactory will be our concluſions, and the leſs obnoxious will they be to cavils and objections.—Duncan's Logic, book ii. ch. vi. Locke's Eſſay, book iv. ch. iv. ſect. vi, vii.

* N. B. Perceived coincidences of words and ſymbols are a juſt foundation for rational aſſent; for they always ſuppoſe

4. This aſſent is alſo produced by the recollection that the propoſition was once proved to be true, though the ſteps of the demonſtration are now forgotten.

5. Aſſent is produced indirectly by the authority of other perſons in whoſe knowledge and veracity we confide.

6. Practical aſſent is effected by annexing ideas of utility, convenience, neceſſity, and the like, to ſpeculative truths.

II. Propoſitions which expreſs the CONCURRENCES of ideas, or the properties of things, are diſtinguiſhed into Vulgar and Scientific.

ſuppoſe coincidences of ideas, and may be reſolved into ideas which ſenſibly coincide with each other. $12 \times 12 = 144$ is a coincidence of the numeral figures which are uſed as ſymbols of the numbers on each ſide of the equation: Twelve times twelve is equal to a hundred and forty-four, is a coincidence of words: and twelve times twelve counters reckoned one by one, would be ſeen, and felt, to coincide exactly with 144 counters reckoned in the ſame manner.

Aſſent to propoſitions in any numeral ratio is generated by the ſame means; that is, by perceiving the coincidences of the ideas or ſymbols, viz. A is equal to half B; B is ſuppoſed to be equally divided, and A to coincide with one of the parts.

1. VULGAR

1. VULGAR PROPOSITIONS aſſert the moſt obvious properties of ſenſible objects, ſuch as, Milk is white, a dog barks, &c. To ſuch propoſitions common obſervation produces aſſent.

2. SCIENTIFIC PROPOSITIONS ſuppoſe the definition of a thing by its moſt obvious properties, and aſſert another property or power as a conſtant aſſociate. Thus, Gold is ſoluble in aqua regia.

ASSENT to theſe propoſitions is produced by obſervation and experiment, united with a ſuppoſition drawn from innumerable obſervations of ourſelves and others, that in natural ſubſtances wherever three or four of the principal properties are found, the other properties are uniformly aſſociated with them.

PRACTICAL ASSENT in theſe inſtances is produced by aſſociations of convenience, utility, and the like.

This is ſometimes greater than the ſpeculative aſſent will warrant: for example, a medicine is ſometimes pronounced infallible which has produced one or two cures.

Sometimes the practical aſſent is much leſs than the ſpeculative ought to produce. Thus the practice of temperance is not ſo univerſal

as

as the conviction of its utility would require.

III. ASSENT to the truth of propoſitions which aſſert PAST FACTS is produced by Memory and Teſtimony.

A lively and diſtinct recollection, &c. is the aſſociate of truth in the remembrance of paſt facts, and generates aſſent*.

Sagacity, integrity, attention, &c. in the witneſſes, are the aſſociates of truth in teſtimony, and the ground of aſſent to hiſtorical facts.

IV. ASSENT to propoſitions concerning FUTURE EVENTS reſts upon EXPERIENCE and ANALOGY.

Whatever is, or has been, was once future, and repeated obſervation that ſimilar events have uniformly ſucceeded to ſimilar previous circumſtances, naturally generates an expectation that the like will happen in any future time: in other words, Similar conſequences are inſeparably aſſociated in the mind with

* Probably becauſe vivid perceptions are the conſtant aſſociates of actual ſenſations: but the evidence of memory, though generally and juſtly relied upon, is not invariably correct, as will be hereafter obſerved.

ſimilar previous circumſtances. The invariable regularity of the courſe of nature excites the expectation when the ſun ſets, that he will riſe again. This does not indeed demonſtrate the truth of the propoſition, that the ſun will riſe, but it generates an aſſent which the moſt obſtinate ſceptic cannot withhold.

REMARKS.

1. RATIONAL and practical aſſent do not always coincide with reſpect to their object, and ſtill leſs in their degree: yet they have a reciprocal influence upon, and tendency to produce, each other. The common language of human frailty, "Video meliora proboque, deteriora ſequor," is a proof of a diſagreement between the rational and practical aſſent. Alſo the prejudices of vicious men againſt, and of virtuous minds in favour of, the truth of divine revelation, are inſtances of the great influence of the practical over the rational aſſent.

2. As ASSENT is produced by the perception of the concurrence or coincidence of ideas, or ſymbols, ſo DOUBT is produced by obſerving the want of a *uniform* concurrence

or

or coincidence; and DISSENT, by perceiving the total abſence of this agreement of ideas or ſigns. Practical diſſent is produced by aſſociating ideas of difficulty, pain, ridicule, and the like.

3. Original ſenſible impreſſions are very complicated, and produce automatic motions, which, by aſſociation, gradually become voluntary; and theſe actions are often in correſpondence with ſome general principle, as though that principle had been laid down as an axiom to govern the conduct; ſuch as, The whole is greater than its part; I exiſt; The objects of perception have a real exiſtence, &c.

But no perſon can properly be ſaid to believe, that is, to aſſent to any propoſition as true, till upon compariſon he diſcerns the concurrence or coincidence of the ideas, or of their ſymbols. Thus, brutes cannot be ſaid to *believe* even their own exiſtence: and it is a long time before children can with propriety be ſaid to believe any thing. It often happens that men grow up to maturity, and even paſs their whole lives, without giving an explicit aſſent to many propoſitions, which nevertheleſs in all their conduct they ſeem to take for granted, ſuch as the exiſtence

ence of a material world, or the law of aſſociation: for the ideas compoſing theſe propoſitions have never been compared, nor their coincidence obſerved. Nor is it neceſſary to mental operations that men ſhould be acquainted with the ſtructure of their minds, any more than it is to corporeal operations that they ſhould underſtand the ſtructure of their muſcles, though the knowledge of the former is of eſſential ſervice to the philoſopher, as ſkill in the latter is to the anatomiſt.

4. Internal feelings, and different ſtates of mind, are objects of perception equally with external objects. Whatever excites attention to them, whether it be the pleaſure or pain accompanying them, or any external ſuggeſtion, ſuch as books, converſation, or the like, will produce in the mind correſponding ſenſations and ideas, which ideas may by aſſociation become very complex, and being connected with words and ſymbols may be the ſubjects of judgment and reaſoning, equally with external objects. Theſe ideas Mr. Locke calls ideas of reflection, though in fact nothing more than very complex ideas of ſenſation.

5. It

5. It is plain that words, or ſymbols of ſome kind, are abſolutely neceſſary to the proceſs of reaſoning, and the improvement of ſcience. Actual coincidences of ideas are perceptible only in the ſimpleſt caſes even in mathematics and arithmetic, the cleareſt and ſimpleſt of all ſciences. Words capable of definitions are ſoon ſubſtituted for viſible ideas, and ſigns for words; and the agreement of the ſigns or words infers the agreement of the things ſignified. Thus, names are the exponents of numbers, figures of names; and, in algebra, letters are the exponents of figures, and alſo of geometrical quantities, the mutual coincidences or diſagreements of which infer the coincidences of diſagreements of the correſpondent numbers or quantities. In fact, in common language all univerſal terms are uſed like algebraic ſymbols, not conveying any diſtinct viſible idea, but ſtanding in a known relative ſituation to the other terms; by which means a train of reaſoning is carried on, till in the laſt ſtep of the proceſs, by recurring to the definitions, the concluſion becomes diſtinct and intelligible*.

SECTION

* Dr. Hartley has given many excellent rules for aſcertaining

SECTION IV.

Concerning innate Ideas and Principles.—The Evidence of the Senſes.—Exiſtence of the Material World.

ALL our original IDEAS are the reſult of ſenſible impreſſions: we have no reaſon to ſuppoſe any of them to be INNATE.

States of mind produced by aſſociation of ideas are objects of perception, and, being perceived, become the ſource of a new ſet of ideas, which Mr. Locke calls ideas of re-

aſcertaining the value of evidence, whether dependent or independent, and ſome beautiful illuſtrations of the probability of general concluſions formed by induction and analogy, and of the various methods of arriving at theſe general concluſions: he has alſo exemplified the application of theſe principles to the ſciences of philology, mathematics, logic, natural hiſtory, civil hiſtory, natural philoſophy, and theology. The whole of what he has advanced upon theſe ſubjects is very curious, and highly intereſting to all who are deſirous of tracing the progreſs of the human intellect in the acquiſition and improvement of knowledge.—Hartley on Man, part i. ch. iii. ſect. iii. prop. 86, 87, 88. Prieſtley againſt Reid, &c. Introd. page 1—9. Berkeley's Principles, Introd. ſect. vi—xx. Locke's Eſſay, book i. ch. ii.

flection; and Dr. Hartley, more properly, complex ideas of ſenſation.

Theſe are the true ſources of ideas; they are known to exiſt, and they are ſufficient to account for all the phenomena of the mind: to ſuppoſe any other ſource of ideas, therefore, is unreaſonable and unphiloſophical.

PROPOSITIONS being nothing more than expreſſions of the coincidences or concurrences of ideas, or of the want of ſuch coincidences or concurrences, cannot poſſibly be INNATE, unleſs both ideas and words are innate.

Every propoſition is eaſily diſtinguiſhable by the evidence upon which aſſent to it is founded: whether conſciouſneſs, ſenſe, intuition, reaſoning, or teſtimony. Hence it would be eaſy to diſtinguiſh innate propoſitions from others; but no ſuch diſtinction can be made, nor any catalogue formed.

Innate propoſitions would be univerſal, and would carry irreſiſtible conviction; but ſome of the moſt important truths, and thoſe which have the faireſt claim to be regarded as innate, have to multitudes been unknown, and by many have been diſputed and denied*.

That the SAME QUALITIES in external

* Locke's Eſſay, b. I. ch. ii—iv.

 objects

objects produce the SAME SENSATIONS in different perſons, is, by thoſe who attend to the queſtion, generally admitted. The Scotch philoſophy pleads that the belief of this fact is inſtinctive. The difficulty occurs only to a few ſpeculative minds, and the queſtion does not admit of experimental ſolution; but the truth of the propoſition is aſſumed, upon the general principle, that ſimilar cauſes in ſimilar circumſtances, will produce ſimilar effects, upon ſimilar objects ſimilarly ſituated: and we have never ſeen reaſon to ſuſpect a fallacy in the application of this principle to the preſent caſe, though the whole of our language and conduct is formed upon the aſſumption of the fact.

Philoſophic Theiſts have generally admitted that ſenſations are the effect of a divine energy immediately exerted upon the mind: upon theſe principles it has been aſked, what evidence have we of the exiſtence of external objects, and what the uſe of the MATERIAL WORLD?

The Scotch philoſophy again refers us to inſtinctive conviction, a doctrine already ſufficiently exploded*.

* Reid's Inq. into the Human Mind, ch. v. ſect. vii.

BISHOP

BISHOP BERKELEY contends, that the material world is an uſeleſs incumbrance, and that the Deity excites ſenſations without the intervention of a material archetype*.

This hypotheſis muſt be allowed to be poſſible. But, if it be admitted, we have no evi-

* "As to what is ſaid of the abſolute exiſtence "of unthinking things, without any relation to their "being perceived, that ſeems perfectly unintelligible. "Their *eſſe*, is *percipi*. Nor is it poſſible they ſhould "have any exiſtence out of the minds or thinking things "which perceive them.

"It is an opinion *ſtrangely* prevalent amongſt men, "that houſes, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all ſen- "ſible objects have an exiſtence, natural or real, diſtinct "from their being perceived by the underſtanding. But "with how great aſſurance ſoever theſe principles may be "received in the world, whoever ſhall call it in queſtion "may perceive it to involve a manifeſt contradiction."—Berkeley, page 38, &c.

"To what purpoſe is it," ſays Dr. Reid, "for philoſophy "to decide againſt common ſenſe, in this or any other "matter? The belief of a material world is older and of "more authority than any principles of philoſophy. It "*declines the tribunal of reaſon*, and laughs at all the ar- "tillery of the logician."—Reid's Inq. page 105.

That ſenſations themſelves ſhould exiſt out of the mind perceiving them is indeed a contradiction; but the exiſtence of external objects as the means of exciting ſenſations, is no contradiction; and this is all that Berkeley's opponents contend for.

dence of the exiſtence of any beings in the univerſe, but the Deity and ourſelves. All that we ſee, or perceive by the ſenſes, and every perſon with whom we converſe, are mere entia rationis, having no real exiſtence: and for the loſs of theſe it is a poor compenſation, that we may infer from the benevolence of God, that there are in the univerſe other ſolitary individuals like ourſelves, ſubject to the ſame illuſive impreſſions.

The exiſtence of an external world is not often made the ſubject of inquiry, and cannot therefore be called the proper object of belief or diſbelief. To thoſe who ſpeculate upon the ſubject, the ſuppoſition of the real exiſtence of external objects commonly appears more pleaſing in itſelf, and therefore more agreeable to divine benevolence, than to ſuppoſe that we are ſubjected to a perpetual illuſion; and no caſe has ever occurred which can lay a foundation for doubting the truth of this concluſion*.

* Berkeley's Principles and Dialogues.
Beattie on the Immutability of Truth, part ii. ch. ii. ſect. ii.
Prieſtley againſt Beattie, ſect. iii.
Reid on the Intellectual Powers, eſſay ii. ch. xi, xii.

CHAP.

CHAPTER VI.

OF MEMORY.

SECTION I.

Phenomena of Memory.

MEMORY is defined by Hartley, to be that faculty by which traces of ſenſations or ideas recur, or are recalled, in the ſame order or proportion, accurately or nearly as they were originally preſented.

The principal PHENOMENA OF MEMORY are the following:

1. A vaſt ſtock of ideas is treaſured up in the memory, which it eaſily produces upon a variety of occaſions, either by voluntary or involuntary recollection.

2. The rudiments of memory are laid in the perpetual recurrency of the ſame impreſſions or cluſters of impreſſions. Theſe being fixed in the mind and frequently recurring, facilitate the recollection of new impreſſions, which either conſiſt of the old cluſters va-

riouſly diverſified, or of new ones in ſome way or other connected and aſſociated with them. Barbarous and unconnected words are difficult to be remembered, becauſe they are aſſociated with no former impreſſions; but new facts in any art or ſcience are with great eaſe remembered by thoſe who are converſant with that art or ſcience, becauſe they are readily combined with what they knew before.

3. Ideas of recollection are diſtinguiſhed from ſenſations, chiefly by a difference in the vividneſs of the impreſſions*, and by the aſſociates which accompany them. The parts of old impreſſions are ſtrongly cemented together, and readily ſuggeſt each other; which is not the caſe with new ones.

4. Ideas of memory are diſtinguiſhed from reveries, chiefly by the readineſs and ſtrength of the aſſociations by which they are cemented together. Hence recollections of recollections are ſometimes miſtaken for recollections of facts; which is frequently the caſe with old people. Alſo, recollections of nar-

* When from diſeaſe, or any cauſe, ideas become as vivid as ſenſations, they are miſtaken for ſenſations, as in phrenſy.

rations are by degrees miſtaken for recollections of facts, and that even when they are in part at leaſt unfounded in truth, and originally known to be ſo. Perſons of lively imaginations, who accuſtom themſelves to embelliſh facts with fictitious circumſtances, are often known to relate a ſtory till they are incapable of diſtinguiſhing the real facts from the ornamental circumſtances, and believe the whole to be true. Hence it follows, that we are to judge of the credit due to memory by experience, and not, as the Scotch philoſophy teaches, by inſtinct*.

Recol-

* Dr. Reid deſcribes memory as an original faculty of which we can give no account, but that we are ſo made. "I believe moſt firmly, ſays he, what I diſtinctly re-"member: but I can give no reaſon for this belief. It "is the inſpiration of the Almighty that gives this un-"derſtanding. This belief (page 305) is no leſs cer-"tain than if grounded on demonſtration; no man in "his wits calls it in queſtion, or will hear any argument "againſt it." This, ſurely, is neither the language of philoſophy, nor of truth. How often is it found, notwithſtanding this "inſpiration," that men are under an error with reſpect to facts which they moſt diſtinctly remember, or (which is the ſame thing) which they *think* that they remember? For, if the internal feeling of recollection is the ſame, to deny that to be me-

Recollected ideas are also distinguished from reveries by their connection with known facts, and by various methods of reasoning.

5. Memory depends entirely or chiefly upon the state of the brain. Diseases, concussions of the brain, and spirituous liquors, impair it; and it generally returns again with the return of health*.

6. Memory differs at different ages. Children soon learn and soon forget: old people learn with difficulty, and remember best what they learned when young. This is agreeable to the theory of vibrations: the softness of the brain in children disposes it after it has received impressions to return soon to its original

mory which is incorrect in respect to fact, is perfectly gratuitous. It is true, you cannot easily persuade men that they are mistaken in what they believe that they distinctly recollect; but this is no proof that memory is infallible.—— Reid on the Intellectual Powers, essay iii. sect. i, ii.

* What that affection of the brain is, which by the constitution of human nature causes memory, we cannot absolutely ascertain. The hypothesis of vibrations, which has been already explained, is the most probable. It is trifling to object, that if the existence of impressions upon the brain could be proved, memory would remain as unaccountable as before: all which this hypothesis pretends to,

ginal ſtate: and the calloſity of the brain in old people fixes aſſociations already formed, and indiſpoſes it to the reception of others. Alſo, the memory of children muſt be imperfect, as they are deficient in thoſe cluſters of the moſt uſual impreſſions which conſtitute the elements of memory, and in the knowledge of words and other ſymbols.

7. Senſations attended with great pleaſure or pain, make a deep impreſſion upon the memory, owing probably to the vigorous vibrations which they excite.

8. Senſible ideas gradually decay in the memory, if not refreſhed by new ſenſations.

9. Voluntary recollection is performed by calling up aſſociated ideas, which by degrees introduce the idea in queſtion. But where the deſire is too eager it has a contrary effect. If I want to recollect the name of a perſon, I

to, is to advance a ſtep in tracing the proceſs of the connection between external objects and mental feelings. It is curious to obſerve, that Dr. Reid, after ſtarting ſeveral objections againſt the commonly received hypotheſes, is obliged to admit (page 341,) that "many well-known facts lead us to conclude, that a certain conſtitution or ſtate of the brain is neceſſary to memory."—Reid on the Intellectual Powers, page 338—342.

call up the viſible idea of the perſon, or ſome other aſſociated circumſtance: this commonly introduces the name: and the ſame in other caſes.

10. Some perſons of weak judgments have retentive memories. Where this extraordinary memory conſiſts only in a correct recollection of a multitude of ideas or words for a ſhort time, the introduction of new ideas may perhaps obliterate the old. There are limits beyond which the two powers of receiving and retaining ideas cannot conſiſt with each other.

11. Memory is a faculty inceſſantly exerciſed while thought continues; nor is the mind ever wholly deprived of it, though it is often much impaired.

12. The excellence of memory conſiſts partly in its ſtrength of retention, partly in the quickneſs of recollection.

13. All the faculties of the mind are dependent on the memory: and though ſome perſons may have ſtrong memories with weak judgments, no perſon can have a ſtrong judgment whoſe memory is remarkably defective*.

14. Memory

* Profeſſor Dugald Stewart has advanced ſome very ingenious

14. Memory is a ſource of refined and permanent pleaſure: painful recollections gradually ſubſide within the limits of pleaſure:

ingenious and judicious obſervations on the difference between a caſual and a philoſophical memory. "The "bulk of mankind," he obſerves, "aſſociate their ideas "chiefly according to the moſt obvious relations, ſuch as "reſemblance and analogy, and, above all, according to "the caſual relations ariſing from contiguity of time and "place: whereas in the mind of a philoſopher ideas are "aſſociated according to the relations of cauſe and effect, "or of premiſes and concluſion. The advantage is "greatly in favour of the philoſopher; the arrangement "he uſes ſtrengthens his memory, aſſiſts his invention, "enables him to reaſon ſynthetically, and to correct his "intellectual defects: but this kind of memory is not "favourable to converſation. The man of caſual me- "mory is open to every impreſſion, and readily accom- "modates his ideas to any circumſtance which may "occur. But the philoſopher who thinks cloſely and "reaſons ſyſtematically is deficient in eaſe and quickneſs, "and is in danger of becoming tedious by long diſ- "courſes. And as nothing appears weaker or more ab- "ſurd than a theory partially ſtated, it frequently hap- "pens, that men of ingenuity, by attempting it, ſink in "the vulgar apprehenſion, below the level of ordinary "underſtandings."—Stewart on the Intellectual Powers, page 411—417. Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. x. Hartley on Man, part i. ch. iii. ſect. iv. prop. 90. Doddridge's Lectures, prop. viii. Reid on Intellect. Powers, eſſay iii. ch. i. ii. vii. Stewart, Elem. of Mind, ch. vi. ſect. i. ii. viii.

and

and if time ſufficient be allowed, by the power of aſſociation all pain will be ultimately abſorbed, and the pleaſures of memory will be pure and unmixed with miſery*.

The memory is a faculty of the greateſt importance, and deſerving the moſt careful and aſſiduous cultivation. The natural means of improving it are attention and exerciſe, frequent reviews, and converſation. Many artificial contrivances have been invented to aſſiſt the memory, ſome account of which may be found in the references below†.

The deſign of Grey's Memoria Technica is to facilitate the recollection of numbers by ſubſtituting letters for figures, forming them into technical words, and then throwing them into a ſort of barbarous verſe. This contrivance is particularly applicable to dates, weights, and meaſures, and in general to all caſes in which numbers are concerned‡.

* Rogers's Pleaſures of Memory.

† Watts's Improvement of the Mind, part i. ch. 17. Rollin's Belles Lettres, vol. i. page 277—280. Stewart, ibid, ch. vi. ſect. 3—7.

‡ Dr. Prieſtley's Lectures on Hiſtory, vol. i. page 278. Dugald Stewart, ibid. page 453—456.

SECTION II.

Of Succeſſion and Duration.

A SUCCESSION of ſenſations and ideas is continually paſſing through the mind, during the ſtate of vigilance, the knowledge of which we attain by conſciouſneſs.

The IDEA OF SUCCESSION is acquired by reflecting upon this train of ideas, and from no other ſource: for real ſucceſſions exiſting without us excite the idea of ſucceſſion, only ſo far as they excite a ſucceſſion of ſenſations*.

Succeſſion is not MOTION: for though all motion is ſucceſſive, yet all motions do not excite the idea of ſucceſſion: and real ſucceſſions of ideas might exiſt in the mind of a ſentient being, independent of all external ſucceſſions.

The VELOCITY of the ſucceſſion of ideas in the SAME PERSON, is different at different times. This is evident from the capacity we

* Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xiv. ſect. iv.

poſſeſs,

poſſeſs, of diſtinctly perceiving different velocities in the ſucceſſions of external objects, which are only diſcerned by the changes they produce in the velocities of the correſponding ſenſations.

This VARIATION in the velocity of the ſucceſſion of ſenſations and ideas, is ſometimes VOLUNTARY and ſometimes INVOLUNTARY. The velocity of ſenſations muſt always correſpond with that of the external impreſſions. That of ideas depends very much upon the ſtate of the body: they ſeem to ſucceed to each other with greater rapidity in the evening than in the morning; in youth than in age; in health than in ſickneſs; when a perſon is in good ſpirits, than when he is under mental depreſſion. Phrenſy and delirium accelerate the train of ideas, and ſtupor retards them. The courſe of ideas appears likewiſe, in ſome degree, obedient to voluntary efforts.

The variation in the velocity of theſe ſucceſſions hath certain LIMITS. Some external ſucceſſions are too RAPID to excite ſenſations; ſuch, for inſtance, are the motion of light, electricity, and ſound. Other ſucceſſions are too SLOW and ſubtle to be the objects of perception,

ception, as the motion of the ſhadow upon the dial.

Of IDEAS, we cannot with the utmoſt effort retain any one in the mind beyond a very ſhort time, nor can we call up any given number of ideas in a given time.

Upon the whole it is highly probable, that in health the ſucceſſion of ideas, like that of the pulſe, is nearly EQUABLE: otherwiſe the idea of duration, which depends upon the ſucceſſion of ideas, would not be equable.

It is not at all improbable that the velocity of the ſucceſſion of ideas of DIFFERENT PERSONS, may vary much more conſiderably than that of the ſame perſon at different times. This is agreeable to the analogy of human nature, in which great variety is blended with general uniformity, and ſeems to be confirmed by the variety which is apparent in the mental improvement of different perſons who poſſeſs equal advantages and are equally induſtrious*.

DURATION, as applied to any finite being, ſignifies continued ſucceſſive exiſtence.

* Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xix. ſect. vi—xiv.

The

The IDEA OF DURATION is acquired from reflecting upon the ſucceſſion of our ideas.

While the ſucceſſion of ideas continues we are conſcious of the continuance of exiſtence: when that ſucceſſion is ſuſpended or forgotten, as in ſleep, or deliquium, or trance, the conſciouſneſs of exiſtence and the idea of duration is proportionably interrupted. Alſo, any portion of duration appears longer or ſhorter in exact proportion to the number of ideas which are recollected in a given interval*.

While we ourſelves continue to exiſt, we perceive that other beings, whether ſimilar or diſſimilar to ourſelves, alſo continue in exiſtence. Hence we transfer the idea of duration, and even of ſucceſſive duration, to them and to all other beings that exiſt; and duration becomes a MEASURE common to univerſal exiſtence.

As the ſucceſſion of ideas is, properly ſpeaking, the exponent of duration, ſo that what is predicated of one may be predicated

* See a remarkable caſe of ſuſpended conſciouſneſs, and the conſequent ſuſpenſion of the idea of duration, in Beattie's Eſſay on Truth, page 84, note.

of

of the other, it is plain that, ſtrictly ſpeaking, there can be no duration where there is no ſucceſſion of ideas: and that when ſucceſſive duration is applied to inanimate objects, it muſt be in an improper ſenſe, and with reference to the perceptions of ſome being whoſe ideas are ſucceſſive.

Hence it follows, that ABSOLUTE DURATION has no real exiſtence in nature: it is nothing more than the abſtract idea of ſucceſſion applied to that of exiſtence.

The reaſon why the idea of duration ſeems to force itſelf upon the intellect, is, that in the human mind the ſucceſſion of ideas, and conſequently the idea of ſucceſſion, can never be ſeparated from conſcious exiſtence.

Duration is either LIMITED or UNLIMITED. Limited duration is TIME, unlimited is ETERNITY. Time often ſignifies the period between the creation and the diſſolution of the world. An ÆRA is a remarkable event from which time is reckoned. An EPOCHA or PERIOD is the number of years comprehended between one æra and another.

Duration, like ſpace, can only be MEASURED by itſelf; but it wants an advantage which extenſion poſſeſſes, and which ariſes

from the poſſibility of applying one portion of it to another.

The time that any one idea continues to exiſt in the mind is an INSTANT, and during this inſtant we are inſenſible of duration, the very notion of which involves ſucceſſion.

The moſt NATURAL MEASURE of time, is the number of ideas recollected to have intervened between any two given inſtants; and where all other meaſures are wanting, this will often anſwer tolerably well. Thus, a labourer or manufacturer may judge of the time that has elapſed, by the quantity of work performed.

If it can be proved that any ſucceſſions really exiſting, and regularly returning, are EQUABLE, ſuppoſing the ſucceſſions of ideas nearly equable, theſe will ſerve as the moſt correct MEASURES of time.

Such are the revolutions of the CELESTIAL BODIES, which, being alſo various and publicly viſible, have been univerſally adopted, in all ages, as the moſt convenient meaſures of time.

The moſt obvious way of determining the equality between the intervals of any two re-

gularly returning phenomena, is by comparing together the number of ideas which ſucceed each other during thoſe intervals. But the vibrations of pendulums in certain caſes may, upon mathematical principles, be demonſtrated to be equal.

Much confuſion with reſpect to this abſtruſe and difficult ſubject might be avoided, by diſtinguiſhing accurately between the ſucceſſion of ideas, which is true duration, and the revolutions of the celeſtial bodies, which are only the meaſures of duration, though the term duration is often improperly applied to them.

If the continued ſucceſſion of ideas conſtitute the true duration of intelligent beings ſimilar to ourſelves, it will follow:

1. That if thought be ſuſpended between death and the reſurrection, the two inſtants will appear to be contiguous, and with reſpect to every individual will actually be ſo.

2. That the duration of the exiſtence of an intelligent being is to be meaſured, not by the revolutions of the celeſtial bodies, but by the number of ideas which paſs through the mind in the courſe of his life. Thus, if two perſons ſhould be born at the ſame time, live the

ſame number of years, and die on the ſame day, yet the duration of one may be double to that of the other, if twice the number of ideas ſhould have paſſed through his mind in the courſe of his life.

3. That an Omnipotent Being, by increaſing the velocity of the ſucceſſion of ideas, may cauſe the ſame revolution of the celeſtial bodies, which appears as a day to one, to appear as more than a thouſand years to another.

4. That if a being in all other reſpects conſtituted like ourſelves, ſhould have all his ideas at once preſent to his mind, without any ſucceſſion, he could form no conception of ſucceſſive duration.

5. That to an all-perfect mind, all whoſe ideas are equally, invariably, and at all times preſent, the attribute of ſucceſſive duration can with no propriety be aſcribed.

6. The ingenious ſpeculation of the late Soame Jenyns ſeems not altogether deſtitute of plauſibility, viz that the true diſtinction between time and eternity is, that the former is ſucceſſive duration, the latter duration perpetually inſtantaneous, and that one bears no more relation to the other than the ſenſation of colour

colour to that of ſound. That a being whoſe duration is temporary, can form no more idea of a duration perpetually inſtantaneous, than a blind man can judge of light. That all exiſtence which we are acquainted with, is ſucceſſive, and therefore temporary, but that exiſtence after death is eternal, that is, perpetually inſtantaneous. And this hypotheſis, according to that author, relieves many difficulties relating to the mode of the divine exiſtence, the rewards and puniſhments of a future life, and the like, which ariſe from confounding a temporary and fleeting, with an eternal and permanent ſtate of being*.

SECTION III.

Exiſtence of Space.

SPACE is TANGIBLE EXTENSION, that is, extenſion of three dimenſions, as diſtin-

* Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xiv.
Soame Jenyns's Diſquiſitions, eſſay iv.
Freethinker, vol. iii. No. 114.
Spectator, vol. ii. No. 94.
Reid on the Intellectual Powers, eſſay iii. ch. iii. v.
Price's Rev. of Difficulties in Morals, p. 30—32.
Doddridge's Lectures, No. 10.

guiſhed from viſible extenſion, which has only two.

The IDEA of ſpace is ſimple, and it is gained by the ſenſe of TOUCH only; for that ſenſe alone is capable of receiving notices of extenſion of three dimenſions.

It has been debated, whether ABSOLUTE SPACE is a REAL BEING, exiſting externally, and independently of the mind; or, whether it be any thing more than the ABSTRACT IDEA of extenſion, or the abſence of all being.

In favour of the REAL EXISTENCE of abſolute ſpace, it has been argued:

1. That the name is poſitive, and conſequently that the object has a poſitive exiſtence.

2. That the exiſtence of ſpace forces itſelf upon the mind; ſo that it cannot be annihilated even in thought*.

3. That it poſſeſſes poſitive properties, viz. length, breadth, depth, eternity, immutability, immenſity, unity.

* Intellectual Phyſics, ſect. v. page 59.
Correſpondence of Dr. Price and Dr. Prieſtley, pages 68, 103, 105, 348.

On

On the NEGATIVE ſide of the queſtion, it is urged:

1. That the arguments for the real exiſtence of ſpace, if they prove any thing, prove too much. Upon the ſame principles, darkneſs, which all allow to be nothing more than the abſence of light, might be proved to have a poſitive exiſtence, for it is expreſſed by a poſitive term; its exiſtence forces itſelf upon the mind, and it has poſitive properties like ſpace, viz. length, breadth, depth, figure, eternity, &c. But theſe, when properly conſidered, appear to be only negations of poſitive attributes*.

2. Space

* The very intelligent author of a late profound treatiſe, entitled Intellectual Phyſics, whoſe zeal for the true faith in this myſterious point has led him to denounce the advocates for the contrary opinion as "Philoſophic Sectaries," in reply to this analogical objection to the poſitive exiſtence of ſpace, obſerves, page 61: "Darkneſs, this mere privation, is removed "by the return of light, and ſilence by the return of "ſound: but is ſpace removed, or can it be ſuppoſed "to be removed, by the return of the exiſtence of "body?" But with all due reſpect to this worthy champion of metaphyſical orthodoxy, I cannot but conceive that vacuum is as much removed by the return of plenum, nothing by the return of ſomething, or, which is

2. SPACE either expreſſes the relation of diſtance, or the property of extenſion, or abſolute void.

If ſpace is uſed to expreſs DISTANCE, it is a relative idea, which implies the exiſtence and compariſon of at leaſt two ſeparate objects. In this ſenſe it can have no independent exiſtence.

If ſpace ſignifies EXTENSION, it implies the exiſtence of an extended ſubject, and can

the ſame thing, ſpace by the return of matter, as darkneſs is excluded by the introduction of light, and ſilence by the return of ſound.

The reſpectable writer adds, page 62: "That inſtead "of annihilating ſpace by the exiſtence of body, that por-"tion of abſolute ſpace which the body occupies is called "*the place* in which it is." But here he again falls into a miſtake: it is very ſeldom, if ever, that the word place is uſed for the portion of abſolute ſpace occupied by a given body; it almoſt uniformly ſignifies the ſituation of a body, in reſpect to other bodies with which it may be compared. A cheſs man is in the ſame place if it occupies the ſame ſquare on the board, though the board be removed from the table: the table is in the ſame place if it occupies the ſame part of the cabin, though the ſhip may have ſailed a hundred leagues: and the ſhip is in the ſame place if it lies in the ſame harbour, though the earth may have moved a hundred million miles in her orbit.—Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xiii. ſect. 7—9.

have

have no being distinct from the substance of which it is a mode.

If space signifies ABSOLUTE VOID, the idea expressed by it is necessarily negative, implying the absence of all being: real existence is therefore excluded.

FIGURE is LIMITED EXTENSION: but this does not prove the existence of absolute space. The walls of a room inclose space to which dimensions are applied: but this no more proves the existence of a positive being of which figure is a mode, than the conical figure of the earth's shadow proves that darkness is a positive being. In one case the figure is, properly speaking, the termination of the wall, in the other the termination of the solar rays.

To affirm that space is eternal, immense, immutable, and the like, is only saying that nothing has neither beginning, nor end, nor limit, nor change, nor number.

The reason why the idea of space forces itself upon the mind, when we endeavour to exclude all ideas of existing objects, seems to be, that it is absolutely impossible in a state of vigilance to divest the mind wholly of its ideas; and extension being the property of

all

all external objects, and therefore the most familiar of all our ideas, is that which most naturally occurs. At any rate, we cannot argue the real existence of any thing from our inability to divest ourselves of the idea of it.

No one who is even superficially versed in logic, can seriously argue the positive existence of an object from its having a positive name. Notwithstanding, such is the influence of language upon our ideas, that without great caution we are very liable to be misled by words, and to believe that where names are positive, corresponding ideas are so too. The ideas annexed to the terms death, darkness, silence, &c. are generally but erroneously supposed to be positive: and a similar error seems to have given rise to the controversy concerning the existence of space.

The question, whether space has a real existence, though apparently trivial, has been thought by some to be of great importance, as lying at the foundation of what is called the demonstration a priori, of the existence and attributes of God. The advocates for this argument assume as a principle, the real and necessary existence of space and duration: but

but as theſe are not ſubſtances, they muſt be modes. Therefore, there is One Supreme Being, of whom eternity, immenſity, independence, and immutability, are the eſſential attributes; that is, there is a God who is the neceſſary ſubject of all poſſible perfections. But the fallacy of this reaſoning is ſufficiently apparent from the preceding obſervations*.

SECTION IV.

Concerning Identity.

IDENTITY is a ſimple idea which cannot be defined.

Identity is an idea which ariſes from comparing an object with itſelf: as that of diverſity ariſes from comparing it with ſome other

* Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xiii.
Colliber's Inquiry, page 261—263.
Watts's Eſſays, No. 1.
Clarke at Boyle's Lect. page 16, 17, 39, 40, octavo.
Jackſon on the Exiſtence and Unity of God.
Law's Inquiry into Space and Time.
Waterland upon Law, page 14—16.
Clarke and Leibnitz, ſect. 4, 5, 13, 52, 53.
Doddridge's Lectures, page 89, 92.
Intellectual Phyſics, ſect, 6, page 73.

object.

object. Thus, ſimilarity is an idea which is gained by the compariſon of ſimilar; and equality, by that of equal objects. Strictly ſpeaking, indeed, an object cannot be compared with itſelf: but the preſent impreſſion is compared with the recollected idea of the object acquired by a preceding perception.

The IDEA OF IDENTITY is perfectly CLEAR and DISTINCT, and many controverſies which have been agitated upon this ſubject in the ſchools, appear to have been little more than diſputes concerning the proper application of the term. For example, whether the ſhip which the Athenians ſent annually to Delos, in the time of Demetrius Phalereus, was the ſame with that which conveyed Theſeus, above five hundred years before? whether the oak of a hundred years ſtanding be the ſame with the plant of a year's growth? whether Methuſelah, at the age of nine hundred years, was the ſame as the infant eight days old? and the like. The queſtion here ſeems to be nothing more than, whether the term identity may be applied with propriety to an object which, though in ſome reſpects the ſame, is in moſt circumſtances different *.

* Beattie on Truth, part i. ch. ii. ſect. iii.

The

The word identity is ſometimes uſed in a lax and popular, and ſometimes in a ſtrict and philoſophical ſenſe.

In a POPULAR SENSE identity is predicated of thoſe things in which there is no perceptible alteration, or in which the change is very ſlow and gradual. Identity, in the PHILOSOPHICAL SENSE, is perfect ſameneſs without any change whatever.

It has been queſtioned by philoſophers, whether PERFECT IDENTITY, that is, exiſtence continued without any change, can be predicated of any created being.

It has been ſaid that we have no PROPER EVIDENCE of the identity of any being. An object ſeen to-day is ſuppoſed to be the ſame with what we ſaw yeſterday, becauſe the preſent impreſſion is ſimilar to the recollected one. But the moſt exact ſimilarity would not prove identity; much leſs can this be argued from a general reſemblance, in which there will always be found a great variety in the aſſociated circumſtances.

But it may be replied, that the permanent identity of the object in a diverſity of circumſtances, is a hypotheſis which accounts more

more ſimply, and therefore more probably, for the general ſimilarity of the impreſſions, than the ſuppoſition of a new and diſtinct object for every diſtinct impreſſion.

It is further urged, that the PROPERTIES of all known ſubſtances are variable; but we know nothing of ſubſtances but from their properties; hence it is reaſonable to conclude, that all ſubſtances are likewiſe variable.

In INANIMATE SUBSTANCES compoſitions and decompoſitions are continually taking place, by the action of the atmoſphere, of heat, and of various principles and powers, known and unknown, which ſometimes rapidly, and ſometimes by a ſlow and gradual proceſs, produce radical changes in the ſtructure even of the moſt durable of natural bodies, ſuch as gold and gems.

In VEGETABLE AND ANIMAL SUBSTANCES, continual acceſſions are made by nutriment, and diminutions by inſenſible perſpiration, &c.; the component particles are continually changing, the organization fluctuates, and conſequently life and perception, which depend upon the animal ſtructure, are likewiſe in a continual flux.

THE

THE HUMAN BODY undergoes changes ſimilar to thoſe of other animals: it paſſes by inſenſible degrees from infancy to youth, to mature age, to advancing and declining years, to old age, decrepitude, and death. And ſome have conjectured, that in the ſpace of fourteen years the whole ſyſtem of particles undergoes a total change.

The SENTIENT PRINCIPLE in man, whatever be its metaphyſical nature, keeps pace with the changes of the corporeal ſyſtem: the intellectual powers ſucceſſively ſpring up, and in proportion to the cultivation beſtowed upon them they gradually advance to maturity, and commonly decline as the body, and particularly the brain, decays; ſo that there is as great a difference in the mental powers, as there is in the perſonal appearance of the infant, the man, and the dotard.

The fair concluſion therefore is, that ALL SUBSTANCES which fall under our cognizance are variable; and that permanent identity cannot be predicated of any created being.

An important queſtion ariſes upon this ſubject, WHAT CONSTITUTES PERSONAL IDENTITY? what makes a human being the

the ſame conſcious individual accountable SELF, through every period of life, and every viciſſitude of body and mind?

That we are through life the ſame intelligent accountable beings, is a fact which we know by conſciouſneſs; and whether we will or no, we muſt accept of this evidence*. The only queſtion is, What are the circumſtances which conſtitute identity of perſon, amidſt all the changes of body and mind which a man undergoes in the courſe of a long life? If any hypotheſis which may be propoſed for the ſolution of this problem be inſufficient, it does not follow that there is no ſuch thing as perſonal identity, but merely that the hypotheſis in queſtion is unſatisfactory and untrue.

Dr. Watts advanced the ingenious ſuppoſition, that perſonal identity conſiſts in the union of the ſame immaterial ſpirit to a body, which, though in many reſpects variable,

* In this view the aſſertion of Dr. Reid, though ſomewhat harſh, may perhaps be juſtified: "The conviction "which every man has of his identity, as far back as his "memory reaches, needs no aid of philoſophy to ſtrengthen "it: and no philoſophy can weaken it without firſt pro-"ducing ſome degree of inſanity."—Reid on the Intellectual Powers, page 315.

poſſeſſes

poſſeſſes certain permanent ſtamina which in all changes remain the ſame, and never become the ſtamina of other bodies. The objection to this hypotheſis is, that it wants proof, and is not favoured by natural phenomena.

Mr. Locke contended that identity of conſciouſneſs conſtitutes identity of perſon. It was objected by Dr. Watts, that upon this hypotheſis, transferred conſciouſneſs would transfer perſonality. But this ſuppoſition is, perhaps, impoſſible. A madman may imagine himſelf an emperor; but imagination is not conſciouſneſs. Biſhop Butler obſerves, that conſciouſneſs is a property preſuppoſing, and proving, the exiſtence and identity of ſubſtance. Collins and Cooper contend, that conſciouſneſs is a property exiſting in ſucceſſion, and that no conſciouſneſs exiſting at different times can be numerically the ſame.

Some have ſuppoſed that perſonal identity conſiſts in the identity of the immaterial ſpirit, whether it be, or be not united to the ſame ſyſtem of matter. But to wave for the preſent the queſtion concerning the exiſtence of an immaterial ſoul, it may juſtly be objected that all we know of mind, viz.

thought, habit, affection, intellect, memory, will, and the like, are as variable as any properties of matter: from attributes so mutable, therefore, the immutability or permanent identity of the thinking principle cannot surely be inferred.

The author of Intellectual Physics* maintains, that we have a distinct and clear consciousness that identity of person is formed by the union of the two substances body and mind, and that this union produces a strict unity which cannot be divided even in thought: the sentient being is by nature, and in nature, an atom, a monad. God, who made me an unit, may divide my unity into its original parts, and thus annihilate me as a thinking being; but no power in nature can divide what he has thus made one†.

Mr. Cooper argues, that identity is not a property even of man as an intelligent being; and he thinks that upon this hypothesis the

* Supposed to be Governor Pownall.

† Perhaps the observation which this author makes upon an expression of Dr. H. More may be applied to his own account of identity and unity: "This is ingenious; yet it "is but the shadow of an idea."----Intellectual Physics, sect. iv. page 55.

christian

chriſtian doctrine of the reſurrection is cleared of many difficulties; that the moral government of God, and the production of the greateſt ſum of happineſs, may be effected by the transfer of habits, feelings and aſſociations, to ſucceſſive ſubſtances and organizations, and that the intereſt of virtue will be ſufficiently ſupported by the intereſt which every exiſting being muſt feel in the welfare of the being who is to ſucceed him, and whoſe happineſs or miſery will reſult from the habits and aſſociations that will be transferred to him.

If Mr. Cooper's hypotheſis were generally admitted and acted upon, it would be very injurious to the cauſe of virtue: for few would be encouraged to virtue, or deterred from vice, if they had no intereſt in the reward or puniſhment conſequent upon their moral conduct. But men are ſo much the creatures of habit, that the moſt extravagant opinions ſeldom produce any conſiderable change in their conduct. And in the preſent caſe, the conviction of permanent identity, however acquired, is ſo firmly fixed in the mind that it is impoſſible to root it out.

Upon the whole, whether we can, or cannot diſtinctly analyſe perſonal identity, the

conſciouſneſs of every individual is to himſelf a ſufficient ground for admitting the fact. Whether the ſyſtem of habits and feelings, to which the word SELF is applied, be connected with one maſs of matter or another, is of little conſequence. But if any require that the ſame ſyſtem of particles ſhould be always connected with the ſame ſyſtem of feelings, in order to conſtitute identity of perſon, Dr. Watts's hypotheſis of permanent ſtamina, which, if not actually proved, has never been diſproved, affords a proof of the poſſibility of permanent identity in this ſenſe of the word, which may ſatisfy the moſt ſcrupulous materialiſt, and the moſt captious ſceptic.

The ſame hypotheſis likewiſe eſtabliſhes the poſſibility of a reſurrection after death; a reſurrection not only of the ſame conſcious ſelf, but even of the ſame body, that is, of the ſame ſtamina, if that ſhould be thought neceſſary to conſtitute perſonal identity, which, however, cannot be proved. And upon the whole, till it can be clearly ſhown in what perſonal identity conſiſts, it can never be proved that the reſurrection of the ſame perſon is an abſurdity or impoſſibility. This therefore is a doctrine which, being contradictory

to no phenomenon of human nature, is capable of being eſtabliſhed by ſufficient authority.

It has been aſked, whether, if a ſubſtance be annihilated, it can, by omnipotence, be reproduced: and the negative of the queſtion has generally been aſſumed as a ſelf-evident principle. "A being in all reſpects ſimilar "may be created, but the ſame being cannot "again be brought into exiſtence." But why not? Why ſhould it be more difficult to reproduce the ſame being, than to produce one ſimilar? "We cannot conceive how "it is poſſible." But can we conceive of creation in any form? "Identity, it is ſaid, is "*continued* exiſtence." But this is begging the queſtion. "No being," ſays Dr. Reid, page 337, "can have two beginnings of ex-"iſtence." But this is merely a verbal objection. It may have a beginning, and a renovation. The uſual appeal is made to "common ſenſe." But that is open to both parties. Let a contradiction be proved, and the point muſt be given up: till then, a renovation of exiſtence ought not to be aſſumed by philoſophers as a thing impoſſible.

Hence it follows, that if, as ſome philoſophers have maintained, the whole man is "deſtroyed by death," a reſurrection, even upon this ſuppoſition, cannot be proved impoſſible: much leſs if deſtruction means nothing more than the diſorganization of a material ſyſtem, no particle of which is annihilated*.

SECTION V.

Whether Conſciouſneſs be ever interrupted.

THAT in a ſtate of vigilance thought continues without any intermiſſion, is a fact which admits of no diſpute. But whether CONSCIOUSNESS be not altogether SUSPENDED during profound ſleep, deliquium, or trance, has been the ſubject of eager debate.

That CONSCIOUSNESS in theſe caſes is SUS-

* Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xxvii. ſect. 9. 27.
Watts's Eſſays, No. xii. ſect. 7.
Doddridge's Lect. No. xii.
Butler's Analogy, diſſ. i. page 439—450.
Reid on Intellectual Powers, eſſay iii. ch. iv. vi.
Cooper's Tracts, page 305—465.
Adventurer, No. 88. vol. 3.

PENDED,

PENDED, is argued from the total want of recollection of the ideas which, in ſuch ſtates, are ſuppoſed to have paſſed through the mind.

From the ABSOLUTE INSENSIBILITY to the lapſe of duration.

From the USELESSNESS OF THOUGHT in a ſtate in which it is never remembered.

From the CASE OF INFANTS, who ſleep much, who have few ideas, and who cannot be ſuppoſed to be always thinking.

And from the PHENOMENA OF SLEEP, in approaching to which we appear to approach to inſenſibility*.

That thought CONTINUES without any intermiſſion, is argued from the active nature of the ſoul, of which thought conſtitutes the very ESSENCE. This, though an argument upon which the Carteſian philoſophers lay great ſtreſs, is evidently begging the queſtion.

It is further urged, that we often think when we do not RECOLLECT our thoughts: the language and emotions of perſons in profound ſleep, often prove to by-ſtanders that they are dreaming, when in the morning the dream is

* Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. i. ſect. 10. 23.

forgotten; and dreams are ſometimes not recollected, till ſome accidental occurrence afterwards brings them to mind. It ſeems reaſonable therefore to conclude, that thought is never intermitted, though it may be often forgotten.

The poſſibility of the hypotheſis of uninterrupted conſciouſneſs muſt be allowed; but this will not prove that it is either true, or probable. Dreaming ſeems to be an approach to vigilance, and dreaming-ſleep is not found ſleep. A perſon aſleep, whoſe external emotions diſcover that he is dreaming, if he were awaked at the time, would probably recollect his dream, though a ſounder ſleep afterwards may have effaced it from his memory.

It has been aſked, If thought be intermitted, how can it be recovered? The anſwer is, that ſleep is not a voluntary, but a mechanical effect. And the converſe of that affection of the brain which produces ſleep and inſenſibility, may produce vigilance and thought.

That we approach to incogitation as we approach to ſleep, is denied by the advocates for uninterrupted conſciouſneſs. And they contend that thought without intermiſſion may conſtitute a neceſſary part of a wiſe general

neral plan, though we may not in every inſtance diſcern its utility.

Upon the whole, the materialiſts, and thoſe philoſophers who maintain that animal organization, and a ſound ſtate of the body is neceſſary to the operations of the mind, have generally admitted the hypotheſis of the occaſional ſuſpenſion of thought. The Carteſians, who contend that thought is the eſſence of the ſoul, and the philoſophers, who maintain that the immaterial ſpirit can perceive and act better in a ſtate of ſeparation from the body than in conjunction with it, have univerſally pleaded for the uninterrupted conſciouſneſs of the human mind*.

* Watts's Eſſays, No. v.
Baxter on the Soul, vol. i. page 330—346.
Doddridge's Lectures, prop. xii. No. 13.

CHAP-

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE IMAGINATION *.

SECTION I.

Phenomena of Imagination.—Reveries.—Dreams.

IMAGINATION is the faculty to which we aſcribe the recurrence of ideas in a vivid manner, without regard to the order of paſt impreſſions.

All ideas are the reſult either of new impreſſions, or of aſſociation with preceding ideas, though the connection cannot in every inſtance be immediately traced out.

In a REVERIE, a perſon being more attentive to his own thoughts than to external objects, more of his ideas are deducible from aſſociation, and fewer from external impreſſions.

* The two firſt ſections of this chapter are chiefly abridged from Hartley.

DREAMS are the imaginations or reveries of a ſleeping man. Theſe are deducible, Firſt, From impreſſions lately received; Secondly, From the ſtate of the body, and particularly of the ſtomach and brain; and, Thirdly, From aſſociation. This is evident from the frequent recurrence of impreſſions of the preceding day, from the dreams of ſick perſons, and from experience. Concerning dreams it may be obſerved:

1. That the ſcenes which preſent themſelves are miſtaken for real. This is owing, Firſt, To the excluſion of real impreſſions with which they may be compared. Secondly, To the increaſed vividneſs in the trains of viſible ideas, to whatever cauſe that phenomenon may be owing.

2. Dreams are wild and inconſiſtent. For the brain is in a very different ſtate from that of vigilance; and vibrations of the ſtomach, pleaſant or otherwiſe, being propagated to the brain, produce ſucceſſions of ideas, dependent indeed upon aſſociation, but very different from thoſe which would take place in a ſtate of vigilance.

3. We take no notice of, and are not offended at, theſe inconſiſtencies; for thoſe aſſo-

aſſociations which ſhould lead us to take notice of them, are as it were aſleep: and bodily cauſes hurry us into new trains ſucceſſively. But if the ſtate of the brain be ſuch as to favour ideas of anxiety and perplexity, the apparent inconſiſtencies give great uneaſineſs.

4. Perſons often appear to be transferred to different places by a kind of ſailing or flying motion. This is owing to the change of magnitude and poſition of viſible images, ſuch as would be effected by a change of diſtance. But if there are no ideas correſponding with the impreſſions of walking, we appear to ourſelves to fly, or ride.

When perſons walk and talk in their ſleep, the vibrations deſcend into the motory muſcles: at the ſame time the brain is oppreſſed, and they have no memory. Similar to this is the caſe of a perſon reading inattentively, and forgetting every thing immediately*.

5. Dreams conſiſt chiefly of viſible imagery: for vivid impreſſions are made perpetually

* See a remarkable caſe of ſomnambulancy in Dodſley's Annual Regiſter for 1760, part ii. page 72.

upon

upon the optic nerve during vigilance. Viſible ſcenes are made up of the fragments of the viſible images lately impreſſed. Theſe ſcenes are ſometimes repeated again and again, and by repetition coaleſce.

6. Many of the things preſented in dreams appear to be remembered by us and familiar to us, becauſe of the readineſs with which they ſucceed each other in the fancy.

7. Dreams are ſoon forgotten, becauſe of their incoherence, and of the change which takes place in the brain in paſſing from ſleep to vigilance.

8. Dreams preſented in the firſt part of the night, are more confuſed and irregular than morning dreams: for in the firſt caſe we approach to ſleep, in the latter to vigilance.

9. Many prophecies were communicated in dreams and trances, and the deſcriptions of them bear a ſtriking reſemblance to the phenomena of dreams, which Dr. Hartley regards as a conſiderable internal proof of their genuineneſs and credibility.

10. Dreams are uſeful by interrupting and breaking accidental aſſociations, which might by continuance be ſo cloſely cemented that nothing

nothing could disjoin them; which would be madneſs.

11. A perſon may form a judgment of his health and temperance by the pleaſantneſs or unpleaſantneſs of his dreams, and likewiſe learn ſome uſeful hints relating to the ſtrength of the paſſions*.

SECTION II.

Of Imperfections in the rational Faculties.

THE ſeveral CASES of imperfection of the rational faculties are,

1. ERRO-

* Andrew Baxter attempts to account for the phenomena of dreams by the influence of ſpirits of an inferior order, whoſe employment it is to ſport at ſuch times with the human fancy; a hypotheſis too fanciful and arbitrary to merit ſerious examination.—Baxter on the Soul, ch. x.

Profeſſor Dugald Stewart ſuppoſes that during ſleep the influence of the will is ſuſpended, and that the phenomena of dreams are produced by the ſucceſſion of our thoughts in ſleep, regulated by the ſame laws of aſſociation to which it is ſubjected while we are awake. The profeſſor does not ſeem to be aware, or perhaps is not willing to admit, that volition itſelf has been proved by Dr. Hartley to be a caſe of aſſociation, and the neceſſary reſult

1. ERRONEOUSNESS OF JUDGMENT in children and idiots.

In such persons the memory is fallacious, judgment weak, affections disproportionate to the object, and connecting consciousness is imperfect. The disposition of the brain is such, as either not to receive, or not to retain miniature vibrations.

2. DOTAGE of old persons.

In this case the memory is imperfect; things present are mistaken for others; discourse is foreign to the objects presented to them. The brain in such persons may be decayed, or wasted, the sinuses distended, and the fine vessels obstructed, &c.

3. DRUNKENNESS.

Agreeable impressions upon the stomach produce corresponding effects upon the brain, and dispose to cheerfulness. When too long continued, or in too great a degree, they enter the limits of pain, and pass into the disagreeable vibrations belonging to anger, jealousy,

result of previous circumstances, which therefore may and actually does occur in dreaming like any other mental phenomenon.—Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, ch. v. part i. sect. 5. Hartley on Man, part i. ch. iii. sect. 5.

and

and the like. Confuſed vibrations propagated from the ſtomach into the brain, produce correſponding confuſion in the ideas and voluntary motions. Vinous particles abſorbed into the ſyſtem muſt diſtend the blood in the veins and ſinuſes, compreſs the medullary ſubſtance, and diſpoſe to ſleep, or to a paralytic affection of the nervous ſyſtem.

4. DELIRIUM.

This is owing to the diſagreeable ſtate into which the whole nervous ſyſtem is brought by bodily diſorder, which often particularly affects the optic nerves, and produces vivid trains of viſible images, forcing themſelves upon the patient's eye. Diſcourſe becomes incoherent by being accommodated to this incoherent train of ideas, and not expreſſing even this adequately, becauſe of the general diſordered ſtate of the brain.

5. FREQUENT RECURRENCY of the ſame ideas.

This happens when a perſon applies cloſely and long to any particular ſubject, and is little converſant with other branches of knowledge: the ideas become vivid; the aſſociated vibrations peculiarly vigorous; the mind is contracted; every thing belonging to the favourite

vourite ſubject is magnified, every other ſubject is leſſened and thought meanly of, and the perpetual recurrency of the ſame vibrations in the ſame parts of the brain irritates the medullary ſubſtance, and produces fear, anxiety, peeviſhneſs, and the like. Sleep, and change of ſtudies, by breaking theſe aſſociations, tend to cure this narrowmindedneſs and the diſorders flowing from it: but above all, a rational and cloſe attention to religion and virtue, the objects of which are of the higheſt importance, and have a direct tendency to enlarge and improve the mind, and to correct all miſapprehenſions of the relative importance of inferior purſuits.

6. VIOLENT PASSIONS.

Theſe produce diſorder in the underſtanding, by magnifying and exciting unnatural aſſociations amongſt thoſe ideas which are the objects of the prevailing paſſion, and preventing or obſcuring thoſe aſſociations which lead to right apprehenſions of facts. Hence all violent paſſions are temporary madneſſes.

7. MELANCHOLY.

This riſes from intemperance, want of due bodily labour, injuries done to the brain, too

much application to the ſame ſubject, violent and long continued paſſions, profuſe evacuations, and hereditary diſpoſition, or an undue make of the brain.

Irritability of the medullary ſubſtance is the immediate cauſe of melancholy: hence ſuch perſons are eaſily pleaſed, or provoked, often diſpoſed to laughter upon trifling occaſions, and are very fickle and changeable.

When ſuch perſons endeavour to gratify very abſurd deſires, or loſe connecting conſciouſneſs, or violate the rules of decency and virtue, this diſtemper paſſes into madneſs.

8. MADNESS.

Mad perſons differ from others in judging wrong of paſt and future events and facts; their affections and actions are violent, being different from thoſe of other perſons upon like occaſions, and contrary to their true happineſs; their memory is fallacious, their diſcourſe incoherent, and they loſe in a great meaſure their connecting conſciouſneſs.

The cauſes of madneſs are either bodily or mental.

That which ariſes from bodily cauſes is related to drunkenneſs, or delirium; that which

riſes

riſes from mental cauſes is ſimilar to the effects of violent paſſions, and narrowmindedneſs. Theſe two cauſes are generally united.

Mad perſons often ſpeak rationally upon all ſubjects unconnected with the immediate occaſion of their inſanity; that is, one part of the brain only is diſordered, and the vibrations and ideas connected with it are magnified, the reſt remaining nearly the ſame.

Memory is often impaired in madneſs, which is a bad prognoſtic. If a new ſtate of body and mind can be early introduced before unnatural aſſociations are too much cemented, madneſs may be cured; otherwiſe not.

In diſſections after madneſs the brain appears dry, and the blood-veſſels much diſtended.

In maniacs the vibrations belonging to the external organs are defective: they take little food, the animal ſecretions are inconſiderable, and they attend but little to external impreſſions. Violent vibrations ſometimes deſcending into the motory nerves give great muſcular ſtrength; but maniacs are often ſluggiſh, from the prevalence of ideal vibrations, like perſons in a reverie.

The beſt preſervatives from madneſs are religious conſiderations, and virtuous conduct, which excite a ſteady and continually increaſing hope; bodily labour, variety of mental occupations, and conſiderable abſtemiouſneſs*.

SECTION III.

Phenomena of Brutes analogous to the Faculties of the Human Mind.—Percipiency of Vegetables.

FIRST, The principal points of RESEMBLANCE between the faculties of brutes and thoſe of men, are the following:

1. Brutes poſſeſs a power of PERCEPTION by the medium of corporeal organs: and ſome of their ſenſes, particularly thoſe of ſight, and ſmell, and probably of taſte, in many animals, appear to be more acute than the correſpondent ſenſes in the human ſpecies.

2. Brutes have MEMORY; they retain ſenſible impreſſions; and in ſome caſes they ſeem to poſſeſs voluntary recollection. Thus, birds

* Hartley, part i. ch. iii. ſect. 6.

perfect

perfect themſelves by exerciſe, in tunes which they have imperfectly learned.

3. The power of ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS in a manner ſimilar, but in a degree inferior, to that which exiſts in men.

Senſations are aſſociated with ideas and with muſcular motions. "The ox knoweth his owner." The appearance of the perſon who feeds the cattle at the regular hour, excites attention, deſire, and pleaſing expectation. The ſound of the laſh or the touch of the ſpur excites motion in the horſe, and the voice of the maſter rouſes the activity of the dog.

By the influence of aſſociation animals are taught uſeful habits; horſes to carry and to draw; dogs to watch, to point, to turn ſpits, &c.

By the ſame means brutes are taught to perform tricks: dogs learn to dance; horſes, and even pigs, to ſpell, and the like.

By the power of aſſociation, brutes acquire cunning and ſkill by experience. An old hound can be more depended upon than a puppy; and an old horſe will draw with more eaſe than a young one; and, if he is not watched, will ſave himſelf, and leave his

younger and inexperienced companion an undue proportion of labour. Alſo in new and unuſual circumſtances, an old animal will, from experience, know how to adapt itſelf to the ſituation better than a young one.

4. Animals form VOLITIONS, and execute them by correſpondent MUSCULAR MOTIONS.

The dog wills to bark, to bite, to fawn; the cow to give, or to withhold her milk; the horſe to neigh, to walk, to gallop: and in each caſe the action appears to correſpond with the volition, as regularly as in mankind.

5. Brutes are impreſſed with PASSIONS; ſuch as joy, ſorrow, fear, hope, anger, gratitude, and ſhame*.

6. They poſſeſs INSTINCTIVE principles in a greater variety and in a higher degree than men. Theſe will be the ſubject of future conſideration.

SECONDLY, Brutes are DISSIMILAR and greatly inferior to men.

1. As they have few or no GENERAL IDEAS†, moſt if not all their ideas are reſemblances

* Guardian, vol. ii. No. 139.

† Mr. Locke denies that brutes have any abſtract ideas whatever,

blances or ſymbols of particular objects. Hence they have no general expreſſions of ideas; and though they will reaſon in a low degree, as far as their ideas go, they ſeem utterly incapable of all general and abſtract reaſoning*.

2. Brutes have a very limited power of receiving or communicating ideas by SIGNS and ARTICULATE SOUNDS. That brute animals have ſounds and ſymbols by which they expreſs in a very intelligible manner their feelings of hunger, joy, pain, fear, and the like; and that they have a perfect underſtanding of certain articulate ſounds or tones, or other SIGNS, by which attention is to be rouſed, or fear, or hope, or pleaſure excited, is obvious to all who are in the leaſt degree converſant with them. But theſe ſymbols are very few.

It has been doubted whether thoſe animals, parrots, for inſtance, which are capable of forming articulate ſounds, can uſe them as

whatever, and thinks that this power is the chief diſtinction between man and brutes. This ſeems to be incorrect. A ſhepherd's cur muſt have a general idea of a ſheep, and a pointer of a partridge, to be able to diſtinguiſh thoſe animals from all others.

* Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xi. ſect. 10, 11. Proced. of Underſt. page 188, 189.

ſigns of their ideas. But as they poſſeſs in ſome degree the power of aſſociation, there ſeems to be no reaſon why they ſhould not aſſociate their feelings with articulate, as well as inarticulate ſounds; but rather the contrary: and experience ſeems to bear teſtimony to the fact. A ſingular inſtance of this, related by Sir W. Temple, of the parrot ſhown to Prince Maurice, in Brazil, is quoted by Mr. Locke*.

3. Brutes appear to have no conſciouſneſs of IDENTITY, and no capacity to compare themſelves with themſelves in different ſituations: they have no ſenſe of RELIGION, no idea of God, no expectation of a future life, and little or no capacity for looking forward into futurity.

Dr. Hartley thinks that brutes are a compound of inſtinct, of obſervation, and imitation: that the former of theſe has exerted its whole influence when the creature has arrived at maturity, but that their intellectual acquiſitions from obſervation and imitation continue through life†.

* Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xxvii. ſect. 8.

† Hartley, page 245, quarto.
Doddridge's Lectures, No. iii. page 7.
Hume's Eſſays, vol. ii. ſect. 9.

Carteſias,

Carteſias, to avoid the conſequence that brutes have immaterial and immortal ſouls, contends that they are mere impercipient machines, moved by the animal ſpirits as an automaton by its ſprings.

But the phenomena of brutes lead us by analogy to a different concluſion: indeed the evidence of the percipiency of brutes is equal to that of the ſentient powers of human beings. Nor will it be allowed without proof that immateriality neceſſarily follows from percipiency, much leſs that immortality is the invariable conſequence of immateriality. But if it were, why may not brutes be both immaterial and immortal* ?

To account for the inferiority of the faculties of brutes to thoſe of men, Dr. Hartley obſerves,

1. That it may ariſe from the ſmall proportionate ſize of the brain, and particularly of the region occupied by the optic and auditory nerves, which are the chief ſources of intellectual ideas.

* Des Cartes de Method. ſect. 8. page 34—36.
Le Clerc's Phyſ. Lect. iv. ch. xii. ſect. 9—13.
Brown's Proced. of Underſt. page 170—174.

2. From

2. From the imperfection of the matter of their brain, which being more callous than that of men, the young of brutes receive and retain ideas more eaſily than infants, but ſooner loſe the power of acquiring new ones.

3. From their want of words and ſuch like ſymbols.

4. From the inſtinctive powers which they bring into the world with them, or which riſe up from internal cauſes as they advance to adult age.

5. From the difference between the external impreſſions made upon the brute creation and upon mankind; the greater number and variety of impreſſions on the human mind neceſſarily generating greater powers of intellect and extent of knowledge.

He concludes with obſerving, "That we "ſeem to be in the place of God to them, to "be his vicegerents, and empowered to receive "homage from them in his name: and we "are obliged by the ſame tenure to be their "guardians and benefactors*."

That VEGETABLES poſſeſs ſome, though

* Hartley on Man, part i. ch. iii. ſect. vii. prop. 93.

probably

probably a ſmall degree of PERCIPIENCY, has been argued,

1. From their poſſeſſing a principle of life, from their organical ſtructure, from the circulation of their fluids, from their muſcular motion, and from the phenomena of their reſpiration and perſpiration.

2. From the diſtinction of ſexes in vegetables, and from the mode of their propagation.

3. The ſtate of vegetables in the night and through the winter is analogous to the ſleep of animals. The vital functions are in a degree ſuſpended.

4. Vegetables, like animals, ſeek after their proper pabulum; they are nouriſhed by wholeſome, and injured by unwholeſome food; and, like animals, they are ſuſceptible of health and vigour, and liable to diſeaſe and death.

There are in vegetables few if any appearances of voluntary effort, and none of locomotion; but this is no proof that they are deſtitute of perception: the ſtrongeſt objection againſt the percipiency of vegetables, is the want of an organical ſubſtance analogous to the brain; but this perhaps may be diſcovered

discovered by future and more accurate observation*.

* This question of the percipiency of vegetables, and even of minerals, is discussed with great ingenuity by bishop Watson—Chemical Essays, vol. v. page 128—175. See also Redi de Generat. Insect. pages 245—249, and 257—260.—Edwards Exercit. No. 8, ad fin.—Priestley's Abridgement of Hartley, Introd. page xx.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONCERNING THE AFFECTIONS, NATURAL AND ACQUIRED.

AFFECTIONS are MODIFICATIONS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN; by them we are excited to purſue happineſs and all its means, and to flee from miſery and all its apparent cauſes.

Affections are either NATURAL or ACQUIRED. NATURAL affections are called INSTINCTS; ACQUIRED affections are generated by certain impreſſions and aſſociations.

SECTION I.

Concerning Inſtincts.

INSTINCT is a natural propenſity to the performance of certain actions, and is uſually underſtood to be accompanied with a natural knowledge of the manner in which the action is to be performed.

The

The exiſtence of this principle in brutes, and that in a very high degree, is allowed almoſt univerſally: and inſtinct is obſerved to lead them to thoſe actions which are moſt neceſſary to their own preſervation, and to the continuance of the ſpecies.

Dr. Darwin has endeavoured to prove, that what is called inſtinct in brutes, is the effect of imitation, inſtruction, and experience. His facts are curious, and his reaſonings are ingenious and plauſible. He has at leaſt proved that inſtinct is not always uniform; and that it is modified by circumſtances. He has alſo ſhown great ſagacity in analyſing the natural ſymbols of the affections, fear, grief, pleaſure, and the like; and without natural ſigns, as he obſerves after Dr. Reid, no artificial ones could be invented or underſtood*.

All actions to which animals are impelled by inſtinct, are performed with ſo much readineſs and aſſiduity, that it ſeems reaſonable to believe they are attended with pleaſure, though ſome of them are effected with great labour. Such is the inſtinct by which a bird

* Darwin's Zoonomia, vol. i. ſect. xvi.

builds

builds its neſt, and that by which the bee conſtructs the honey-comb.

Inſtinct, as far as it goes, excels reaſon; but it is limited to few objects, and is incapable of much variety, or of conſiderable improvement. Hence it is that brutes do not profit, like rational beings, by the wiſdom and experience of former generations.

To account for the inſtincts of brutes, Dr. Hartley conjectures, that from their bodily make, certain vibrations ſpring up in them at certain ſeaſons of the year, and at certain ages, mixing themſelves with their acquired ideas, ſo as may beſt direct them to provide for and to preſerve themſelves and their young. This he calls a kind of natural inſpiration, as proceeding from the ſame ſtated laws of matter and motion, as the other phenomena of nature*.

This is a gratuitous and unſatisfactory hypotheſis; and Dr. Hartley acknowledges the extreme difficulty of the ſubject. Could Dr. Darwin's theory be eſtabliſhed, it would harmonize much more ſatisfactorily with that of the aſſociation of ideas, and with the hypotheſis of vibrations.

* Hartley, page 244, quarto.

In

In addition to the facts mentioned by Dr. Darwin in the ſection above referred to, remarkable inſtances of the wonderful power of inſtinct may be ſeen in the references below, viz. in the bee *, the ant †, the waſp ‡, the beaver ‖, and the termites §.

The natural appetites of the human ſpecies are generally regarded as inſtinctive, but perhaps improperly. The ſenſation of hunger is produced by a certain ſtate of the ſtomach, and is no more innate than the ſenſation of colour or ſound. The ſuction of an infant when applied to the breaſt, is not the reſult of a previous knowledge of the action to be performed, which would imply an innate idea, but is excited automatically by the impreſſions made upon the nervous and muſcular ſyſtem, which is then extremely irritable. And by degrees maſtication and deglutition, which were originally automatic, become voluntary acts. The origin of the other deſires, and actions, which are commonly thought

* Nature Diſplayed, vol. i. page 168—202.

† Guardian, vol. ii. No. 156, 157.

‡ Nature Diſplayed, part i. page 126—148.

‖ ————————, part ii. page 106—114.

§ Philoſophical Tranſactions, vol. 71. page 139—193.

inſtinctive, admits of a ſimilar explanation*.

The uniformity and univerſality of theſe feelings is no proof that they are inſtinctive: ſimilarity of natural conſtitution and of external circumſtances ſufficiently account for theſe facts.

The error of thoſe philoſophers who trace all the affections of human nature, and the phenomena of mind, to inſtinctive principles, has been already ſtated and obviated.

SECTION II.

Habit.

HABIT is an inclination to a given action, accompanied with a facility and expertneſs in the performance of it, generated by frequent repetition.

Habit is a term which may be applied to all actions which are ſecondarily automatic, ſuch as walking, ſpeaking, deglutition, and the like. But it is uſually reſtricted to thoſe actions which are peculiar to ſome individuals,

* Hartley, prop. 40. 41. 73.

and which are performed at regular intervals, ſuch as drinking tea or wine, ſmoking tobacco, or taking ſnuff; it is alſo applied to muſic, dancing, and playing at cards, frequenting the theatre, or going to church, and to many other caſes: all ſubject to the ſame law of aſſociation by which motions, originally voluntary, become ſecondarily automatic.

If the exiſtence of natural inſtincts be admitted, habit may be diſtinguiſhed from inſtinct by the following particulars. Inſtinct is natural, habit is acquired. Inſtinct is a univerſal principle, extending to all individuals of the ſame ſpecies: habit is limited to thoſe only who are placed in particular circumſtances, and expoſed to certain impreſſions. Inſtinct is univerſally of a uſeful tendency; habit is often uſeleſs, and even injurious, though the tendency in human nature to the acquiſition of habits is capable of being directed to the moſt beneficial purpoſes. Laſtly, inſtinctive actions are conſtantly accompanied with pleaſure; habitual actions are often perfectly mechanical and unperceived by the agent, though the omiſſion of them would be productive of a conſiderable degree of pain.

The

The principal PHENOMENA OF HABIT are reducible to the following facts:

1. An action to become habitual is at first attended with a low degree of pleasure, and often even with a sensation of considerable pain. Taking snuff, smoking tobacco, and drinking fermented or distilled liquors, are not originally pleasing. Men are influenced to begin such habits by some other motive than the gratification of the senses, such as regard to health, the love of company, emulation, and the like.

2. The speediest and surest method of acquiring a habit, is by the repetition of the action at regular and moderate intervals. A rapid succession in a very short time, or a very slow succession through a considerable length of time, or an irregular succession of actions in any time, will not produce the habit. In the first case, the organs would grow weary, the vibrations would not have time to fix, pain would be excited, and disgust would follow. In the second, the tendency to vibrate in a particular direction would be lost before a second impulse was given. In the third case, the associations would want that regular connection which is necessary to constitute fixed habit.

3. The frequent regular repetition of an action produces facility and dexterity in the performance of it. By the law of aſſociation the actions gradually cling to and generate each other, without the intervention of the voluntary power.

4. Aſſociated circumſtances never fail to excite the habitual inclination to the performance of the action at the regular time. The removal of the table-cloth and the appearance of the bottle excite the deſire of wine; the return of the ſeaſon reminds the ſportſman of his dogs and gun, the fine lady of her routs and parties, and the ſchool-boy of his ſkates and ſnow-balls. Hence it follows, that if the aſſociated circumſtances are interrupted the deſire is not excited, at leaſt in ſo great a degree. And this conſideration leads to the beſt and indeed the only effectual means of breaking off inconvenient or bad habits, namely, by reſolutely changing the aſſociated circumſtances, flying from ſeducing company, altering the courſe of life, and the like.

5. A perſon often ſuffers more from the denial of a factitious inclination than from reſiſting a natural appetite. But the pleaſure ariſing

ariſing from the indulgence of a habit is aſſociated with a greater variety of circumſtances, and is therefore more moderate, and more permanent, than the gratification of an inſtinctive feeling, which, however exquiſite, is of very limited duration.

6. The progreſs of the pleaſure of gratification, and of the pain of denial, in the caſe of habits, is far from bearing an exact, or at leaſt an obvious ratio to each other.

The action which becomes habitual is perhaps originally in a ſlight degree painful. By repetition the pain gradually diminiſhes, and the uneaſy ſenſations ſubſide within the limits of pleaſure. But by degrees this pleaſure vaniſhes, and the action is aſſociated with ideas or ſenſations which are ſcarcely perceptible, and becomes ſecondarily automatic; ſo that it is performed without any conſciouſneſs of the operation.

The progreſs of the pain of denial is very different. It advances with the pleaſure of gratification till this riſes to its higheſt degree, it continues increaſing while this declines, and is then ſtrongeſt and moſt inſupportable when the pleaſure of gratification is

totally loſt, and the action is performed without any exertion of the will. The truth of this obſervation is apparent in the common habits of ſmoking tobacco, and of taking ſnuff, and even in the odious cuſtom of dram-drinking: and it will be found to be equally applicable to habits of the moſt important practical tendency.

In this ſtate an habitual affection is ſaid to be diſintereſted, becauſe it has no further end in view than its own immediate gratification, or the removal of the preſent pain. When it has advanced to this ſtage, habit has attained its higheſt degree, and cannot without the utmoſt difficulty be oppoſed or changed. Moral habits, when they are thus formed and matured, conſtitute the perfection, either of the virtuous or the vicious character. Diſintereſted benevolence is the higheſt eminence of virtue, diſintereſted malignity the loweſt ſtage of vice.

That the pain of denial ſhould increaſe while the ſenſible pleaſure of the habit diminiſhes, and even after it is become almoſt imperceptible, may be explained thus. The ſimple ſenſible pleaſure of the action conſti-

tutes

tutes a very ſmall part of the actual gratification. The pleaſurable feelings which have accompanied the progreſs of the habit, having aſſociated themſelves with the perſons, places, actions, and other circumſtances which have been the uſual adjuncts of the ſituation in which the habit has been contracted, have thus, as it were, transferred a luſtre to thoſe objects, which totally diſappears when the habit is interrupted. The ſtudent cannot reliſh his author, nor the diſputant his argument, if he is denied the accuſtomed indulgence of his pipe: nor can the convivial man enjoy the company, or the converſation of his friends, if the bottle does not circulate with the uſual freedom. Thus by the power of aſſociation the real pleaſure of the gratification of habit is in exact proportion to the pain of want, though the immediate ſenſible pleaſure may be loſt.

7. Men fall inſenſibly under the power of habit: and it is often remarked that the influence of habit is moſt conſpicuous, and even irreſiſtible, where the ſubject of it is leaſt aware of his bondage, and is moſt forward in boaſting of his liberty.

8. Moſt if not all the affections which have uſually been regarded as inſtinctive or natural, will be found upon attentive examination to be acquired: and the progreſs of the moſt important moral habits is exactly ſimilar to that of the moſt common and frivolous of the acquired affections. The analyſis of theſe will be purſued in a ſubſequent ſection*.

SECTION III.

Of Wit.

WIT, being a ſpecies of intellectual habit, may, not improperly, be treated of in this place.

Dryden defines wit, to be "a propriety of "words and thoughts adapted to the ſubject." Upon which Addiſon remarks, that "if this "be a true definition of wit, then Euclid was

* Hartley on Man, prop. 21. 77.
Darwin's Zoonomia, vol. i. ſect. 17.
Lord Kames's Elements of Criticiſm, vol. ii. ch. 14.
Preceptor, vol. ii. page 516—526.
Dr. Prieſtley's Sermon on the Danger of Bad Habits.
Search's (Abraham Tucker's) Light of Nature Purſued, vol. ii. part ii. ch. xxi. ſect. 19.

"the

" the greateſt wit that ever ſet pen to paper:
" for it is certain there never was a greater
" propriety of words and thoughts adapted to
" the ſubject, than what that author has made
" uſe of in his Elements. I ſhall only ap-
" peal to the reader," continues this author,
" whether this definition agrees with any
" notion he has of wit. If it be a true one,
" then I am ſure that Mr. Dryden was not
" only a better poet, but a greater wit than
" Cowley, and Virgil a much more facetious
" man than either Ovid, or Martial. It is not
" ſo properly a definition of wit, as of fine
" writing."

Pope ſays, that " Wit is that which has
" been often thought, but never before ſo hap-
" pily expreſſed." " This," ſays Dr. John-
ſon, " is undoubtedly erroneous; he de-
" preſſes it below its natural dignity, and re-
" duces it from ſtrength of thought to hap-
" pineſs of language."

Addiſon, in thoſe admirable eſſays in the Spectator, in which he both illuſtrates and exemplifies this delicate ſubject, coincides with Locke, who repreſents wit as " conſiſting in " putting thoſe ideas together with quickneſs " and variety, wherein can be found any re-

" ſemblance or congruity, thereby to make up " pleaſant pictures, and agreeable viſions to " the fancy." To this Addiſon adds, " That " it is not every reſemblance of ideas that we " call wit, unleſs it gives delight and ſurpriſe: " for inſtance, when a poet tells us that the " boſom of his miſtreſs is as white as ſnow, " this is not wit; but when he adds, with a " ſigh, that it is as cold too, it then grows " into wit."

Cowley has written an ode deſcribing wit by its contraries: this Dr. Johnſon declares, " both as a deſcription, and as an example of " wit, is without a rival." " Wit," ſays Dr. Johnſon, " is that which is at once both na- " tural and new, that, which though not ob- " vious, is at its firſt production allowed to be " juſt: it is that, which he that never found " wonders how he miſſed."

" But," adds he, " abſtracted from its ef- " fect upon the reader, wit may be more ri- " gorouſly and philoſophically conſidered as a " kind of concordia diſcors, a combination of " diſſimilar images, or diſcovery of occult re- " ſemblances in things apparently unlike."

Lord Kames obſerves that " Wit is a qua- " lity either of thoughts or words.

" Wit

" Wit in thoughts is an agreeable, uncom-
" mon, and ſomewhat ludicrous aſſemblage of
" ideas." " True wit," ſays Lord Cheſter-
field, " never yet made any perſon laugh,
" though it never fails to produce a ſmile."

This obſervation is not perfectly correct. Lively unexpected ſallies of genuine wit in converſation ſeldom fail to excite a laugh: but wit in compoſition does not often produce this effect; it excites a pleaſing ſenſation, ſimilar, but much ſuperior to that which produces laughter.

Wit in words is a ludicrous turn depending ſolely upon the ambiguity of language: it is far inferior to wit in thoughts, although, as Lord Kames juſtly enough obſerves, " it
" pleaſes all men at ſome times, and ſome
" men at all times*."

Dr. Hartley gives the following ingenious analyſis of the ORIGIN OF LAUGHTER, and of

* Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xi. ſect. 2.
Johnſon's Prefaces, vol. i. page 40—43.
Spectator, vol. i. No. 58—63.
Cowley's Works, page 2.
Lord Kames's Elements of Criticiſm, vol. ii. ch xiii.
Prieſtley's Lectures on Criticiſm, lect. xxiv.

the

the pleaſure that we derive from the productions of wit and humour:

He obſerves that children do not laugh loud for ſome months; that laughter is a naſcent cry ſtopped on a ſudden, occaſioned by ſurpriſe, bringing on a momentary fear firſt, and then a momentary joy upon the removal of that fear.

The tendency to laughter is increaſed by imitation: children laugh moſt when they ſee others laugh.

By aſſociation, the motions of the cheſt following with continually greater facility the ſame degrees of mental emotion, children at laſt laugh upon the moſt trifling occaſions, where there is no perceptible fear, and little ſurpriſe.

By degrees, they acquire a power of ſuſpending the actions both of laughing and crying, and aſſociate this power with ideas of decency, fear, ſhame, &c. and the diſpoſition to laughter decreaſes by obſerving that their equals laugh leſs.

As children learn the uſe of language, they learn to laugh at ſentences or ſtories which excite alarms and diſſipate them inſtantaneouſly.

ouſly. By degrees, agreeably to the proceſs before deſcribed, they come to be diverted by every little jingle, pun, contraſt, &c. though the harſhneſs and inconſiſtency with which it firſt ſtrikes the fancy, be ſo minute as ſcarcely to be perceived. This is the origin of the laughter excited by wit, humour, buffoonery, and the like.

But by degrees this ſpecies of laughter abates, from the ſame cauſes as the other before mentioned, ſo that adults, and thoſe who are judges of politeneſs and propriety, laugh only at ſuch ſtrokes of wit and humour as ſurpriſe by ſome unuſual degree of contraſt or coincidence, and have at the ſame time a due connection with pleaſure and pain, ſo as neither to be too glaring nor too faint: in the firſt caſe the repreſentation raiſes diſlike, in the latter it becomes inſipid.

Hence it appears that laughter will be excited in different perſons according to their different opinions or diſpoſitions: that perſons of light minds will be diſpoſed to profuſe laughter by the application of low contraſts, ſimilitudes, &c. to ſerious ſubjects, and that this levity of diſpoſition will be increaſed by it. Alſo, that perſons who give themſelves up

up to mirth, wit, and humour, muſt thereby diſqualify their underſtandings for the ſearch after truth; as by perpetually hunting after apparent and partial agreements and diſagreements, while the true nature of things affords real agreements or diſagreements that are perhaps quite oppoſite, a man muſt by degrees pervert all his notions of things themſelves, and become unable to ſee them as they really are*.

SECTION IV.

Origin of the Affections.

SOME of the AFFECTIONS, beſides what are called the natural appetites, are commonly believed to be inſtinctive, and therefore take the name of NATURAL. Such are the parental, filial, and fraternal affections. Alſo the love of truth and virtue. Other affections are evidently FACTITIOUS, ſuch as avarice, friendſhip, patriotiſm, the love of riding, hunting, muſic, dancing, and the like, which no

* Hartley, page 258—260, quarto, vol. i. page 437—441, octavo.
Search's Light of Nature, vol. ii. part ii. ch. xxi. ſect. 14—17.

conſiderate perſon regards as original and inſtinctive feelings.

The PHENOMENA which countenance the ſuppoſition that certain affections are implanted by nature in the human mind, are theſe: the apparent ſimplicity, and likewiſe the ſtrength and vividneſs of theſe feelings, together with the difficulty, and ſuppoſed impoſſibility of tracing them to any other cauſe. Alſo, the aſſumed univerſality, and general uniformity of ſuch affections in the human ſpecies.

It is however a preſumption againſt this ſuppoſition of a double origin of the affections, that feelings ſo ſimilar in their nature and effects ſhould be ſo unlike in their origin: the general rule of philoſophiſing is, that phenomena of the ſame kind are to be traced up to the ſame cauſe. ASSOCIATION is the acknowledged cauſe of ſome of the affections, therefore probably of all.

The affections are ſtates of conſiderable pleaſure or pain: they are evidently excited by external objects; but theſe, excepting in the caſe of impreſſed ſenſations, can only affect us by aſſociation: therefore all the affections are the reſult of aſſociation.

Succeſſive

Succeſſive impreſſions, pleaſing or painful, are made upon the mind by the objects of the affection: the COALESCENCE of theſe impreſſions conſtitutes the affection either of love or hatred, according to the predominance either of pleaſing or painful ideas: the affection thus formed is modified by the circumſtances of probable or improbable, paſt, preſent, future, and the like; and is aſſociated with the ſenſation of the object, with the idea, with the name, and with a variety of accidental circumſtances.

I love my friend: this affection is compounded of complacency and good will. I think upon him with complacency becauſe he poſſeſſes many virtues, becauſe he has been the immediate cauſe of many pleaſing ſenſations and recollections, becauſe his idea is aſſociated with many other pleaſures than thoſe which he has directly produced: I deſire his happineſs from a ſenſe of gratitude, from the delight I take in ſeeing him happy, from the conviction that the greater his happineſs is, the greater will be his capacity for communicating happineſs to others, &c. Theſe feelings coaleſce into a complex and vivid affection: I call it friendſhip: it aſſociates itſelf with

the

the perſon of my friend, with his idea, with his name, and with many circumſtances naturally or fortuitouſly connected with him.

A child is continually receiving marks of kindneſs from his father: theſe produce complacency, and by reciprocal expreſſions of complacency benevolence is generated. The parent ſometimes contradicts the will of the child, ſometimes expreſſes diſpleaſure, ſometimes corrects and chaſtiſes him. This produces fear. Complacency, benevolence, and fear, combined together, conſtitute filial reverence and affection. If the parent is wiſe, and maintains in his conduct a juſt medium between indulgence and ſeverity, the filial affection generated thereby is of the moſt perfect kind, and productive of the beſt effects of filial duty and mutual happineſs. If indulgence predominates, the child becomes a prey to ungovernable paſſions and ſelf-will; and as he advances to maturity, ſeeing the folly of his parent, and feeling its pernicious effects, filial affection degenerates into contempt. If ſeverity is the character of the father, fear and averſion will be the inevitable feeling of the child; and the harſh and unkind parent will in vain look for the attentions of a du-

tiful and affectionate family to ſoothe the infirmities of declining years.

In a ſimilar way it would be eaſy to analyſe the conjugal, parental, and fraternal affections, patriotiſm or the love of one's country, benevolence, the love of truth and virtue, the love of God, &c. and thus to prove that all the affections of the human mind are the effect of aſſociation, and not of inſtinct.

It is to be remembered that, according to the theory of Dr. Hartley, all impreſſions upon the mind are produced by vibrations; all revived impreſſions, i. e. ideas, by revived vibrations; and all aſſociated impreſſions, whether ſenſations or ideas, by aſſociated vibrations or vibratiuncles. But whether this theory be true or falſe, the generation of the affections by the aſſociation of ideas remains the ſame, being eſtabliſhed upon independent evidence.

That the affections are very COMPLEX feelings, though apparently ſimple, is evident from the preceding analyſis. What the elements are which combine to conſtitute an affection in any given caſe, and in what proportion they are blended together, is very difficult if not impoſſible to aſcertain. The various cauſes which combine to modify and di-

verſify

verſify the affections are very judiciouſly enumerated by Dr. Cogan in his late ingenious Treatiſe on the Paſſions*.

The doctrine of aſſociation accounts for the ſeeming SIMPLICITY of theſe complex feelings, by the perfect coaleſcence of their component parts: juſt as the whiteneſs of the ſun's light is produced by the perfect mixture of the ſeven primary colours.

The VIVIDNESS, and vigour of the compound feeling may be equal to that of a ſenſation: for, though each miniature is leſs than a ſenſation, yet all the ideas combined together, and mutually ſupporting each other, may produce a feeling that ſhall even exceed the impreſſion of an external object upon the organs of ſenſe.

Impreſſions which are the elements of filial and fraternal affection, and of the love of truth and virtue, and the like, are made upon the mind before the memory begins to record its ideas: hence theſe affections are regarded as having a peculiar claim to the character of NATURAL. The univerſality of parental affection ſeems to have gained it the character

* Cogan's Philoſ. Treatiſe on the Paſſions, b. ii. ch. ii.

of inſtinctive. But the transfer of the mutual affection of the parents to their infant offspring, ſeems ſufficient to account for the origin of the affection; while the helpleſſneſs of the infant, the hopes of the parent, and a multitude of other circumſtances which it is unneceſſary, and would indeed be tedious, to enumerate, eaſily explain the growth of parental affection.

The ſimilarity of the natural conſtitution of mankind, of the circumſtances in which they are placed, and of the impreſſions to which they are expoſed, ſufficiently accounts for the ſuppoſed UNIFORMITY and UNIVERSALITY of the affections, without having recourſe to the needleſs hypotheſis of inſtinctive principles.

The doctrine of aſſociation alone accounts in an eaſy and ſatisfactory manner for that VARIETY which obviouſly prevails in thoſe affections which are commonly believed to be implanted by nature in the mind of man; and which, if the common hypotheſis be true, ought to be as uniform and invariable as the appetites of hunger and thirſt, or the ſenſations of colour and ſound. This alſo is a ſtrong preſumption in favour of the truth

of

of the theory itſelf, becauſe it explains phænomena which cannot be ſolved upon any other hypotheſis.

If this analyſis of the affections be correct, and it ſeems to be favoured by every phenomenon of human nature, it is certainly of great PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE, as it leads to the right diſcipline of the affections, which is the true art of life; and the moſt effectual means of ſecuring ultimate happineſs, the great end of intellectual exiſtence*.

SECTION V.

Claſſification of the Affections.

AFFECTIONS are modifications of pleaſure and pain, ariſing from the perception of natural good or evil, according to the circumſtances in which they occur to the notice of the mind.

They are ſometimes called PASSIONS, as oppoſed to actions: the latter being perfectly

* Hartley on Man, prop. 14—89.
Search's Light of Nature purſued, vol. ii. part ii. ch. xxi.

voluntary, the former not being immediately dependent on the will.

Dr. Cogan makes a curious and perhaps a juſt diſtinction between paſſion, emotion, and affection. PASSION is the firſt feeling of which the mind is conſcious, from ſome impulſive cauſe by which it is wholly acted upon, without any efforts of its own either to ſolicit or to eſcape the impreſſion. EMOTIONS are the ſenſible effects, produced by the impetus of the paſſion upon the corporeal ſyſtem. AFFECTIONS ſignify the leſs violent, more deliberate, and more permanent impreſſions, whether pleaſing or painful, whether of a benevolent or malevolent character*.

The PRIMARY or general paſſions, according to Dr. Hartley's diſtribution of them, are ten: five grateful, and five ungrateful.

Of the five grateful paſſions the firſt is LOVE, which ariſes from the contemplation of good in the abſtract.

2. DESIRE, which is love excited ſo as to put us upon action.

3. HOPE, which ariſes from the probability of attaining abſent good.

* Cogan on the Paſſions, ch. i. ſect. i.

4. JOY,

4. JOY, from the poſſeſſion of the preſent good. And

5. PLEASING RECOLLECTION, which takes place when the object is withdrawn, and keeps up love to it.

Mr. Locke maintains that deſire is univerſally a ſtate of uneaſineſs. Dr. Hartley thinks that it is originally a ſtate of pleaſure; but allows that by the mixture of fears, diſappointments, and ſtrong agitations of mind, it is greatly chequered with miſery*.

The five ungrateful primary paſſions correſponding with the five grateful ones, and excited by the perception of evil in ſimilar circumſtances, are HATRED, AVERSION, that is, active hatred, FEAR, GRIEF, and DISPLEASING RECOLLECTION†.

The affections, or, as Dr. Hartley calls them, the INTELLECTUAL PLEASURES AND PAINS, are arranged by him under ſix general claſſes, viz. imagination, ambition, ſelf-intereſt, ſympathy, theopathy, and the moral

* Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xxi. ſect. 32—34.
Hartley on Man, vol. i. page 372, octavo; 220, quarto.
Grove's Works, vol. iv. pages 136, 137.

† Hartley on Man, prop. 89.

ſenſe: all which may be traced up to the aſſociation of ideas; being deducible either from ſenſible pleaſures and pains, which are evidently original, or from the combination of other intellectual pleaſures or pains which are derived from ſenſible ones.

Firſt, The pleaſures and pains of IMAGINATION: theſe ariſe from the perception of natural or artificial beauty or deformity, and are diſtinguiſhed into ſeven kinds,

1. Thoſe pleaſures which ariſe from the beauty of the natural world.

2. From the works of art.

3. From the liberal arts of muſic, painting, and poetry.

4. From the ſciences.

5. From beauty of perſon.

6. From wit and humour.

7. The pains which ariſe from groſs abſurdity, inconſiſtency, or deformity*.

Secondly, the pleaſures and pains of AMBITION, which ariſe from the opinions of others concerning us; the ſenſe of honour and of ſhame. Theſe reſpect,

1. EXTERNAL ADVANTAGES OR DISAD-

* Hartley, ch. iv. ſect. i. prop. 94.

VANTAGES: the principal of these are fine clothes, riches, titles, and high birth; with their opposites, rags, poverty, obscurity, and low birth.

2. BODILY PERFECTIONS AND IMPERFECTIONS; these are beauty, strength, and health; or deformity, imbecility, and disease.

3. INTELLECTUAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND DEFECTS: these are sagacity, memory, invention, wit, learning; and their opposites, folly, dulness, and ignorance.

4. VIRTUE AND VICE; namely, piety, benevolence, courage, temperance, chastity, humility; and the vices contrary to these*.

Thirdly, The pleasures and pains of SELF-INTEREST; arising from the possession or want of the means of happiness; and security from or subjection to the hazards of misery. Self-interest is of three kinds.

1. GROSS SELF-INTEREST, or the cool pursuit of the means whereby the pleasures of sensation, imagination, and ambition, are to be attained, and their pains avoided; of this the chief species is the love of money.

2. REFINED SELF-INTEREST, or the de-

* Hartley, ch. iv. sect. ii. prop. 95.

liberate

liberate purſuit of the means that relate to the pleaſures and pains of ſympathy, theopathy, and the moral ſenſe; when religion, virtue, and benevolence, are practiſed with an explicit view to our own happineſs.

3. RATIONAL SELF-INTEREST, or the purſuit of the greateſt poſſible happineſs, without any partiality to this or that kind of happineſs, means of happineſs, &c. This is the ſame thing with the abſtract deſire of happineſs and averſion to miſery, which is not, however, a univerſal affection, though commonly believed to be ſuch. The hopes and fears relating to a future ſtate, or to death, are of this kind.

That theſe feelings are factitious, and deducible from aſſociation, may be illuſtrated by tracing the origin and progreſs of one of the moſt conſpicuous of our intereſted affections, the LOVE OF MONEY, which eminently elucidates the origin of the affections, and the doctrine of aſſociation in general.

When children firſt ſee a piece of money, they are pleaſed with it as with any other toy. By degrees they find that it is the means of procuring other toys and objects which they deſire. Hence they firſt learn to value

it.

it. As they advance to maturity they ſee more of the uſes of money; that it produces neceſſaries, conveniences, comforts, reſpect, influence, &c. This increaſes the deſire of money: deſire produces the cuſtom of making efforts to obtain it, and of treaſuring it up: cuſtom generates habit, and by degrees the love of money becomes one of the ſtrongeſt and moſt diſintereſted affections of the human mind; that is, an affection which ſeeks for nothing but its own gratification, without any view to further uſe or advantage.

The love of money, which would otherwiſe ſwallow up the other affections, is checked by the ſtrong deſires of all, and eſpecially young perſons, after particular gratifications, to obtain which they are inclined to part with it; by the inſignificance of riches in warding off contempt, diſeaſe, and death, and in obtaining the pleaſures of intellect, of the moral ſenſe, and ſometimes even of ſympathy, ambition, imagination, and ſenſation; laſtly, by the eager purſuit of any particular end, ſuch as fame, learning, &c. or the indulgence of taſte, and the like*.

Hence

* The pleaſures to be acquired by parting with money leſſen

Hence we see the reason of the mixture of different and seemingly opposite qualities in the same character, as that a man should be both niggardly and profuse: also, why the love of money must in general grow stronger with age, especially if particular gratifications to which a person is most inclined become insipid or unattainable*.

Fourthly, The pleasures and pains of SYMPATHY, that is, those which arise from the pleasures and pains of our fellow-creatures. Of these there are four classes:

1. Those by which we REJOICE AT THE HAPPINESS OF OTHERS; these are sociality, benevolence, generosity, gratitude.

SOCIALITY is the pleasure we take in the company and conversation of others, and par-

lessen the desire of keeping it, and by association weaken in some degree the desire of obtaining it. Yet in another view the desire of the pleasures to be purchased by money increases the desire of obtaining it, and by association the pleasure of keeping it. This contrariety in our associations, Dr. Hartley thinks, is not only the means of limiting certain passions, but is a mark set upon them by the Author of Nature, to show that they ought to be limited even in our progress through this life, and that they must ultimately be annihilated, every one in their proper order.—Hartley, page 271, 272, quarto; vol. i. page 460, octavo.

* Hartley, part i. ch. iv. sect. iii. prop. 96.

ticularly

ticularly of our friends and acquaintance, and is attended with affability, complaiſance, and candour. In children it is generated by the preponderance of pleaſure which they receive from, or in company with, others, and the ſame cauſe generally operates to produce the ſame effect through life.

BENEVOLENCE is that pleaſing affection which engages us to promote the welfare of others to the beſt of our power. It riſes from ſources ſimilar to ſociality, and it is cheriſhed by the high degree of eſteem annexed to it, and the advantages it procures.

GENEROSITY is an affection which diſpoſes us to forego great pleaſures, or to endure great pains, for the benefit of others: it is benevolence in a high degree.

GRATITUDE is benevolence exerciſed towards a benefactor.

2. Thoſe by which we GRIEVE FOR THE MISERY OF OTHERS; theſe are compaſſion and mercy.

COMPASSION is the uneaſineſs which a man feels at the miſery of another. It is generated in children by thoſe expreſſions of pain in others which excite ſimilar feelings in themſelves; by the pains taken

taken to excite the ſympathy of children when parents, attendants, and others, are ſuffering; by the reſtraints they often undergo from the uneaſineſſes and pains of others: and in adults, it is confirmed by irritability of nerves, by great ſimilar trials and afflictions, by benevolence to ſuffering friends, by the eſteem and praiſe annexed to it, and the like.

MERCY is compaſſion exerciſed to an object that has forfeited his title to the continuance of happineſs, or to the removal of miſery, by ſome demerit, particularly againſt ourſelves.

3. Thoſe by which we REJOICE AT THE MISERY OF OTHERS: theſe are moroſeneſs, anger, revenge, jealouſy, cruelty, and malice.

MOROSENESS, peeviſhneſs, and ſeverity, ariſe from whatever makes diſagreeable impreſſions upon the mind, while our fellow-creatures or their ideas are preſent with us.

ANGER is a ſudden ſtart of paſſion, by which men wiſh and endeavour harm to others.

REVENGE rejoices in it when done.

Anger is generated by the deſire to prevent harm to ourſelves, which leads us to threaten

threaten it to others, to desire their harm, and so to inflict it: but in proportion as a correct moral sense gains its due influence over us, anger is restricted to voluntary agents who intentionally injure us, and proportioned to the degree of injury received.

MALICE deliberately wishes the misery of others. CRUELTY delights in the view and infliction of it, without the consideration of injury received. These are habits of mind. They originate in anger indulged and gratified, and are most apt to rise in the minds of the proud, the selfish, and the timorous.

JEALOUSY arises from the suspicion of a rival in the affections of a person of the other sex. It is a species of anger.

4. Those affections by which we GRIEVE FOR THE HAPPINESS OF OTHERS, are EMULATION and ENVY. These arise from the eager desire of riches, honour, power, &c. which leads us to think that our happiness is diminished by what others enjoy*.

Fifthly, The pleasures and pains of THEOPATHY, or those which arise from the contemplation of God, of his attributes, and of

* Hartley, part i. ch. iv. sect. 4. prop. 97.

our

our relation to him. Theſe are love and fear.

LOVE is aſſociated with gratitude, confidence, and reſignation. It is produced by the contemplation of divine bounty and benignity; and it is ſupported and increaſed by the conſciouſneſs of upright intentions, the hope of future reward, by prayer, converſation, and contemplation.

The love of God riſes in part from intereſted motives; but when all the ſources of it coaleſce, it becomes as diſintereſted as any other affection, and may riſe to ſuch a height as to prevail over all other deſires, intereſted or diſintereſted.

ENTHUSIASM is a miſtaken perſuaſion of any perſon that he is a peculiar favourite with God, and that he receives ſupernatural marks thereof. It is a degeneration of love.

The FEAR of God ariſes from a view of the evils of life, the threatenings of ſcripture, the ſenſe of guilt, the infinity of the divine attributes, from prayer, meditation, and the like. When reſtrained within proper limits, it is awe and reverence; when exceſſive or not duly regarded, it degenerates into ſuperſtition, or atheiſm.

SUPER-

SUPERSTITION is a miſtaken opinion concerning the ſeverity and puniſhments of God, magnifying theſe in reſpect of ourſelves or others.

ATHEISM is ſpeculative or practical. Speculative atheiſm denies the exiſtence of God. Practical atheiſm is the neglect of God; thinking of him ſeldom and with reluctance; diſregarding him in actions, though not denying him in words. Both kinds may be ſuppoſed often to proceed from a ſenſe of guilt, and conſequent fear of God, producing averſion to him*.

Sixthly, The pleaſures and pains of the MORAL SENSE, excited by the contemplation of moral beauty and deformity.

The MORAL SENSE is the diſintereſted approbation of piety, benevolence, and ſelf-government in ourſelves and others, and the correſpondent diſapprobation of vice. It is the reſult of education and mental diſcipline; it leads to the pure love of God and the practice of univerſal virtue.

SCRUPULOSITY is a degeneration of the moral ſenſe, which ariſes from a conſciouſ-

* Hartley, part i. ch. iv. ſect. v. prop. 98.

neſs of guilt, and an erroneous method of reaſoning*.

* Dr. Cogan's Philoſophical Treatiſe on the Paſſions, ch. ii. iii.

Hartley, part i. ch. iv. ſect. 6. prop. 99.

I prefer the arrangement of Dr. Hartley to that of Dr. Cogan, as better adapted to illuſtrate the doctrine of the aſſociation of ideas, and the origin of the affections: but it would not be doing juſtice to the laſt-mentioned excellent writer not to refer to him upon this ſubject, as having given a very comprehenſive detail of the various affections of the human mind, and diſtinguiſhing them from each other with correct philoſophical preciſion.

CHAP-

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE WILL.—DISCUSSION OF THE DOCTRINES OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

SECTION I.

The Question ſtated.

VOLITION is that ſtate of mind which is immediately previous to actions which are called voluntary. The WILL is the faculty which the mind poſſeſſes, or is ſuppoſed to poſſeſs, of bringing itſelf into that ſtate.

VOLITION is a modification of the paſſion of deſire.

NATURAL LIBERTY, or, as it is more properly called, PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERTY, or LIBERTY OF CHOICE, is a power of doing an action or its contrary, all the previous circumſtances remaining the ſame*.

Or, in other words, NATURAL LIBERTY

* Hartley on Man, vol. i. page 500, octavo; 296, quarto.

conſiſts in a power of chooſing without motive, where motives are equal, or in oppoſition to the ſtrongeſt motive*.

MOTIVE, in this diſcuſſion, is to be underſtood in its moſt extenſive ſenſe; it expreſſes whatever MOVES or influences the mind in its choice: it includes the bias of the mind as well as the end in view: it comprehends both reaſon and inclination, and, in a word, every circumſtance immediately previous to the volition, and which in the leaſt degree contributes to generate the choice. It is of great importance in this controverſy, in order to preclude verbal diſputes, to keep this ſenſe of the word continually in view†.

Dr. Reid defines the liberty of a moral agent to be, "a power over the determinations "of his own will."

This definition is exceptionable. It implies that the will forms determinations, and that the mind may *if it pleaſes* overrule theſe determinations. It ſuppoſes that the mind has two wills: firſt, the will to form volitions; and ſecondly, the will which governs thoſe volitions. But if this be the caſe, it

* Dr. Gregory's Philoſophical Eſſays, ſect. i. page 3.
† Edwards on the Will, page 7, 8.

may be aſked, What governs the governing will* ?

Dr. Reid's definition, however, as far as it is intelligible, ſeems to coincide with the preceding ones. The mind in all circumſtances might have choſen differently; and he expreſsly contends for the ſuperiority of the mind to whatever falls under the definition of motive†.

Mr. Abraham Tucker, the acute author of a work, intitled The Light of Nature purſued, by Edward Search, Eſq., after having argued ſtrenuouſly againſt the exiſtence of a liberty of indifference, that is, a power of chooſing without regard to motive, contends for the exiſtence of free will, the exerciſe of which he conceives "to be only a particular ſpe-"cies of action, performed in raiſing up ideas, "or fixing them in the mind, which ſhall de-"termine us to ſuch volitions as we want." And he expreſsly diſavows the doctrine of neceſſity. But this is a verbal diſpute. The liberty of indifference which this author denies, is philoſophical liberty; and the free

* Reid on the Active Powers, Eſſay iv. ch. i. page 267.

† Reid, ibid. ch. iv.

will for which he pleads, is nothing more than liberty of action, which no one controverts*.

The only queſtion in diſpute between the advocates for philoſophical liberty and the neceſſarians, is this: Whether volition can take place independently of motive? The libertarian contends, that in the ſame previous circumſtances, and with views and inclinations preciſely the ſame, a different choice may be made. The neceſſarian denies this, and maintains that there can be no difference in the choice without a correſpondent difference in the previous ſtate of the mind, that is, in the judgment or the inclination of the agent. If I reſolve to take a journey, it is becauſe I am inclined to it, or have a reaſon for it, or both. While this ſtate of mind continues my reſolution continues. If the reſolution is laid aſide, it is owing to a previous change in the judgment, or in the inclination, or, as we commonly expreſs it, the mind is altered. If this poſtulate of the neceſſarians be granted, the controverſy is at an end.

* Search's Light of Nature purſued, vol. i. ch. vi, ſect. 34, 35.

Libertarians

Libertarians differ among themſelves with regard to the extent of this "ſelf-determining power," as they chooſe to call it. Some extend its influence to all voluntary actions; others limit the exerciſe of it to ſome mental operations only: ſuch, for example, as the act of ſuſpending the choice, of deliberating, of chooſing out of contending motives, and the like.

But this makes no difference in the ſtate of the queſtion. Limit the ſelf-determining power as much as you pleaſe, the queſtion ſtill recurs, Can you ſuſpend, deliberate, &c. without a reaſon for it, without inclination to it, and where you have the ſtrongeſt motives to the contrary? The libertarian replies Yes; the neceſſarian No; and upon this fact they join iſſue.

It is neceſſary to keep this preciſe ſtate of the queſtion ſteadily in view, to avoid being miſled by the declamation of either party.

The reaſon why liberty of choice is reſtricted by ſome philoſophers to mental operations, ſeems to be this: that the dependence of volition upon motive in voluntary external actions, is ſo obvious that it can hardly eſcape

the notice of the moſt ſuperficial obſerver, ſo that few who pay any attention to what is paſſing in their own minds will call it in queſtion. But the influence of motives in mental operations, is more ſubtile and leſs eaſily diſtinguiſhed. Attentive obſervation, however, will ſufficiently prove, what indeed we might with reaſon antecedently expect, that the ſame faculty is governed by the ſame law, in its leſs obvious, as in its more ſenſible operations*.

EXTERNAL LIBERTY, or LIBERTY OF ACTION, is the power of doing what we pleaſe, or will; or, in other words, the power

* Mr. Locke was the firſt philoſopher who introduced this curious limitation of free will to the act of deliberation only. Could this ſagacious writer really fall into ſuch an unaccountable confuſion of ideas? Or was Mr. Locke apprehenſive that if he avowed neceſſarianiſm, he ſhould be expoſed to the invidious charge of Hobbiſm, and atheiſm? Perhaps, indeed, Mr. Locke himſelf might not ſee the reconcileableneſs of the neceſſity of human actions to moral agency and accountableneſs; and, through a virtuous though unneceſſary fear of moral conſequences, might be driven to this miſerable refuge.—Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xxi. W. Belſham's Eſſays, Philoſophical, Hiſtorical, and Literary, vol. i. No. ii. ed. 2.

of

of carrying our volitions or purpoſes into effect.

EXTERNAL LIBERTY is oppoſed to COMPULSION from external force, as philoſophical liberty is to neceſſity, or the definite influence of motives, in definite circumſtances. Liberty of action may exiſt independently of liberty of choice; that is, the mind may be wholly unreſtrained in the execution of its volitions, though in the ſame circumſtances it could not have made a different choice; liberty of choice likewiſe, if it exiſts at all, is perfectly independent of liberty of action*.

SECTION II.

Arguments in favour of Philoſophical Liberty.

THE libertarians contend that man poſſeſſes "an independent, ſelf-governing, ſelf-"determining power, which he may at his "own diſcretion exert, by acting either ac-

* Hartley on Man, vol. i. page 501, octavo; 296, quarto.
Prieſtley's Illuſtrations of Neceſſity, ſect. i.
Palmer on Liberty, ſect. i.

"cording

" cording to motives, or in oppoſition to mo-
" tives, or without any motives at all*." In other words, that a man may chooſe differently, the previous circumſtances remaining the ſame.

To prove the exiſtence of this ſelf-determining power, which is capable of chooſing and acting independently of motive,

Firſt, an appeal is made to CONSCIOUSNESS†.

We

* Theſe are Dr. Gregory's words in the paſſage before referred to; and they contain a very clear, conciſe, and conſiſtent ſtatement of the doctrine of philoſophical liberty.

† " We have by our conſtitution," ſays Dr. Reid, " a
" natural conviction or belief that we act freely; a con-
" viction ſo early and ſo univerſal, that it muſt be the
" reſult of our conſtitution, and the work of him that
" made us." " The genuine dictate of our natural fa-
" culties is the voice of God no leſs than what he reveals
" from heaven; and to ſay that it is fallacious, is to impute
" a lie to the God of truth."—Eſſay on Active Powers, page 312.

This " natural conviction that we act freely," is preciſely the ſame with the natural conviction which every child and every illiterate perſon feels, that the earth is at reſt, and that the ſun revolves. The ſolemn air with which the obſervation is introduced, is perfectly ludicrous. Will any man of reaſon and reflection ſeriouſly maintain,

We are conſcious, it is ſaid, that we do in fact ſometimes chooſe without any motive, or where motives are equal, and even in oppoſition to the influence of motive.

We are alſo conſcious, that in every inſtance we might chooſe otherwiſe than we do.

We applaud ourſelves for ſome actions, and condemn ourſelves for others; and this ſelf-applauſe and ſelf-condemnation is founded on the conſciouſneſs of liberty of choice.

Secondly, Free will is argued from COMMON SENSE; that is, from the irreſiſtible conviction and univerſal conſent of mankind.

1. Very few have denied the exiſtence of liberty of choice even in THEORY*. There have

rain, that he is taught "by the voice of God" to believe, that in circumſtances preciſely ſimilar, with inclinations and views in every reſpect the ſame, it would be in his power to make a different choice? Such an one may conſiſtently enough "defy the tribunal of reaſon, and "laugh at the artillery of the logician;" but let him not at the ſame time aſſume the ſtyle and character of a philoſopher.

* This is only ſaying that there have been few philoſophers; the great maſs of mankind content themſelves in this, as in many other philoſophical ſpeculations, with not

have been many fataliſts, but few neceſſarians: the fataliſts themſelves abſurdly attempting to reconcile fate with freedom.

2. All men, without excepting profeſſed neceſſarians themſelves, are under the neceſſity of ACTING upon the principles of liberty, whatever their hypothetical ſpeculations may be.

All men agree in applauding ſome actions and condemning others; which would be abſurd, upon the ſuppoſition that men were deſtitute of free will.

All men make a diſtinction between harm and injury: for example, between a blow given by deſign and one occaſioned by accident. In the former caſe the agent is believed to be free, and to have had it in his power to have avoided giving the blow: in the latter caſe there was no intention and no liberty; and therefore, though the hurt and

not thinking at all about the matter, or with very crude and inconſiſtent ideas upon the ſubject. There have been many Ptolemeans, but few Copernicans, even in theory; and of theſe few, moſt, if not all, have ſpoken, and acted in the intercourſes of life, as if the earth was at reſt and the ſun moved. Will any man of underſtanding be convinced by ſuch reaſoning, that the Ptolemaic ſyſtem is true, and the Copernican falſe?

the

the ſmart is the ſame as in the former, the ſufferer feels no reſentment.

The laws of all nations agree to puniſh an action performed by a man in poſſeſſion of reaſon, which they excuſe in a lunatic: the former is free, the latter not.

Thirdly, The exiſtence of a ſelf-determining power, is argued from the ABSURD, immoral, impious, and dangerous CONSEQUENCES of philoſophical neceſſity.

1. To act upon the principles of neceſſity would expoſe a perſon to univerſal ridicule and contempt*.

2. The doctrine of neceſſity ſubverts the

* Dr. Gregory has been pleaſed to make himſelf very merry at the expence, as he imagines, of the neceſſarians, by exhibiting what he erroneouſly ſuppoſes to be the practical effect of the neceſſarian hypotheſis. Such ridicule injures no one but its author. At any rate the practical neceſſarian is as conſiſtent a character as the practical freewiller. What does Dr. Gregory think would be the conſequence, if men were to act ſometimes "according to motives," ſometimes "in oppoſition to "motives," and ſometimes "without any motive at "all?" which is his definition of free will. A lunatic aſylum is the only place where ſuch lawleſs and capricious beings could exiſt in ſafety either to themſelves or others.—Dr. Gregory's Eſſay, ſect. xi. page 249—266. Dr. Crombie on Neceſſity, page 379—382.

argument

argument for the divine exiſtence. If every thing is neceſſary, there is no proper agent in the univerſe, no proper cauſe of any effect: therefore, there is no God*.

3. The doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity deſtroys the diſtinction between natural and moral qualities; it annihilates virtue and vice, merit and demerit.

4. It is inconſiſtent with all moral diſcipline and moral government: there can be no proper foundation for praiſe or blame: to reward virtue would be folly, and to puniſh vice would be tyranny and injuſtice. Remorſe for the moſt criminal actions would be abſurd; all repentance needleſs, and all exhortations to reformation and virtue, nugatory.

5. All the declarations in ſcripture of rewards to the virtuous are abſurd; all expreſſions of diſpleaſure againſt vice, and all threatenings of puniſhment are unjuſt; all profeſſions of compaſſion for ſinners are inſincere; all exhortations to repentance, and all offers of mercy addreſſed to perſons placed in circumſtances in which it is impoſſible for

* Dr. Reid on the Active Powers, page 289.

them to comply with ſuch exhortations, are injury and inſult.

6. Upon the ſyſtem of neceſſity God is the only agent in the univerſe, and the proper, efficient cauſe of all evil, natural and moral*.

SECTION III.

Doctrine of Neceſſity. — Argument from Conſciouſneſs.

THE advocates for the doctrine of neceſſity maintain that the will is never determined without a motive, and that motives always influence the will in a definite and invariable manner, ſo that it is impoſſible to chooſe the action *A*, and its contrary *a*, the motives or previous circumſtances remaining the ſame.

NECESSITY is to be carefully diſtinguiſhed from COMPULSION, from which it is eſſen-

* Beattie on Truth, part ii. ch. ii.
Prieſtley againſt Beattie, ch. v.
Reid on Active Powers, eſſay iii.
Gregory's Eſſay on the Relation between Motive and Action, &c.

tially

tially different. Compulſion is external force operating in oppoſition to judgment or inclination. Neceſſity excludes all foreign controul, and allows no influence but that of motive in the extenſive ſenſe already defined, including the bias of the mind as well as the end in view. The will is as effectually determined by motives, when judgment and inclination concur in the choice, as when there is a conflict of oppoſing motives, and the ſtronger prevails. Neceſſity by no means implies any reluctance in the mind againſt the choice it makes. All words therefore which ſeem to imply external force, or which convey the idea of a will oppoſing the will which precedes the action, that is, of two diſtinct wills exiſting together in the mind, ought to be avoided as tending to introduce confuſion into the ſubject. For this reaſon, it is improper to ſpeak of the irreſiſtible or the invincible power of motives, and of the power which the mind has over its own determinations.

The fact contended for is, that the ſame volitions certainly and invariably follow the ſame motives or previous circumſtances, and that there can be no change in the volition but

but in conſequence of a correſpondent change in the previous circumſtances, that is, in the views or ſtate of the mind.

If definite volitions be the invariable reſult of definite previous circumſtances, there muſt be ſome reaſon for, ſome cauſe of, this conſtant conjunction of motive and volition: this CAUSE, known or unknown, is called NECESSITY. The word neceſſity, therefore, like the words gravitation, electricity, magnetiſm, and many others, is a term invented to expreſs the undefined cauſe of a known effect.

It has been queſtioned whether motives are phyſical cauſes of volitions. But the diſpute upon this ſubject is trifling, and merely verbal. Let motives be denominated at pleaſure mechanical, phyſical, or moral cauſes, or no cauſes of volition at all, the fact ſtill remains the ſame. Definite volitions follow definite motives, with the ſame invariable conſtancy with which the needle follows the magnet, or a ſtone obeys the law of gravitation. All theſe effects follow their reſpective preceding circumſtances with equal certainty; but no intelligent perſon will aſcribe phenomena ſo widely different to the ſame cauſes.

Cuſtom, the arbitreſs of language, has applied the term *phyſical* to effects produced upon involuntary ſubjects, and to the cauſes by which ſuch effects are produced; but to the previous circumſtances which govern the will, and to the volitions reſulting from them, it has given the name of *moral* cauſes and effects; and the diſtinction is ſufficiently obvious and intelligible, even though as the neceſſarians contend, moral cauſes are evidently as invariable in their operation as phyſical ones. As to the mode in which cauſes, either phyſical or moral, operate to produce their reſpective effects, it is beyond the comprehenſion of the human intellect: but this will be the ſubject of future diſquiſition.

The doctrine of NECESSITY, aſſerting ſimply the conſtant invariable conjunction of motive with volition, might with equal propriety have been denominated by the leſs invidious name of CERTAINTY; but an impartial inquirer after truth will learn to diveſt himſelf of verbal prejudices, and to attend ſolely to fact and argument*.

* Edwards on the Will, part i. ſect. 3, 4.

The

The firſt argument in favour of the doctrine of neceſſity, is derived from CONSCIOUSNESS.

1. We are conſcious that we never do nor can form a volition, or perform a voluntary action, without an aſſignable motive.

If we really poſſeſs this boaſted ſelf-determining power, and if this faculty lies, as we are aſſured it does, at the foundation of all moral agency and accountableneſs, its exiſtence may be eaſily aſcertained. Let the experiment be tried: let a man attempt to perform a voluntary action without a motive; to walk, for example, or to ſpeak, or to ſtrike a blow. He will find it impoſſible. He will find it as eaſy to move a mountain from its baſe as to riſe from his chair by a ſovereign act of the will, without either reaſon or inclination for the choice. Of this fact we have ſo clear a conſciouſneſs, that many libertarians themſelves allow it, though not very conſiſtently with the definition of free will, or with the notion of a ſelf-determining power*.

2. We

* The libertarians complain that the neceſſarians miſtate their doctrine, and repreſent them as totally denying

2. We are alſo conſcious that the vigour of the action is uniformly proportioned to the vigour of the motive.

If the motive be feeble the volition is languid, and hardly riſes above a ſtate of indifference; if the motive be ſtrong, if reaſon and inclination concur in an eminent degree to prompt the mind to action, the volition is proportionably vigorous and active; if there be an oppoſition of motives, the vigour of the choice is proportioned to the exceſs of the preponderating motive.

nying the influence of motives. This charge againſt the neceſſarians is unfounded. The fact is, that they have no controverſy with the advocates for philoſophical liberty, as far as the influence of motives is admitted by them. But libertarians contend for the exiſtence of what they call a ſelf-determining power, ſuperior to whatever falls under the definition of motive, which may act arbitrarily either in concurrence with motive, or in oppoſition to it. Some maintain that this power is frequently exerted, others that its operations are very rare, and even reſtricted to certain narrow limits. The neceſſarian philoſopher utterly denies the exiſtence of any ſuch power, in any ſhape, and in every degree; and it is againſt this power, and this alone, that all his arguments are levelled, whether it be ſuppoſed to exert itſelf in every voluntary act, or only in one among ten thouſand.—Search's Light of Nature purſued, vol. i. ch. 6. ſect. 22—33. page 146, &c.

3. In

3. In proportion as motives approach to equality, the choice becomes more difficult; it is reaſonable to conclude therefore, that if they were perfectly equal no choice could be made.

It is objected, that, in fact, we often do chooſe out of equal things: for example, out of a number of guineas laid upon the table, freſh from the mint, I can ſelect one in preference to the reſt, though there is no aſſignable reaſon for the preference. But the truth is, that although the caſe of equal motives is often imagined, it very ſeldom occurs in fact. The ſlighteſt conſideration is ſufficient to turn the ſcale where the balance of motives is perfectly even. In the caſe ſuppoſed, I take the guinea which firſt attracts the eye, or which lies neareſt or moſt convenient to the hand, or the like. And if we accuſtom ourſelves to cloſe reflection, we ſhall find, that in every caſe where the objects of choice are perfectly equal, there is ſomething in the ſtate of the mind which leads it to fix upon one in preference to the other.

It is proper to remark, that all the obſervations ſtated above, and all the appeals to conſciouſneſs in favour of the doctrine of

neceſſity, apply to voluntary operations of the mind, to ſuſpending the choice, comparing, deliberating, and the like, as well as to external actions.

To aſſert, that though the volition does in fact uniformly correſpond with the motive, or the previous circumſtances, it might nevertheleſs in every inſtance have proved otherwiſe; and that the mind had a power in every caſe of making a different choice, is perfectly gratuitous; and it concedes all for which the advocates for neceſſity think it worth while to contend, viz. the conſtant conjunction of the motive with the volition: and few will maintain that conſtant uniform conjunction does not imply neceſſary connexion*.

SECTION IV.

Argument from Cauſe and Effect.

THE SECOND argument in favour of the neceſſity of human actions, is taken from

* Edwards on the Will, part i.
Prieſtley's Illuſtrations, ſect. i.

the relation of CAUSE AND EFFECT. The following obſervations will illuſtrate this proof:

1. Certain conſequents are found by obſervation invariably to follow certain antecedents. A ſtone projected falls to the ground. Iron ſinks in water. A balance ſupporting equal weights ſtands at an equilibrium. When the ſun is in cancer the days are long and the weather warm. A perſon who forms a part of the electric circuit feels the electric ſhock when the jar is diſcharged.

2. In theſe caſes the antecedent circumſtances are ſaid to be the CAUSE, and the conſequents the EFFECT. Thus the equality of weights is the cauſe of the equilibrium; the ſun is the cauſe of heat and light; and the diſcharge of the jar the cauſe of the electric ſhock.

3. Philoſophers who ſtudy with attention the phenomena of nature, are better acquainted with antecedent circumſtances than ignorant perſons, and form a different and more correct judgment of the cauſes of thoſe phenomena. Thus, common people ſuppoſe that the riſing of the ſun produces day: the philoſopher, more correctly, aſcribes the effect

to the revolution of the earth upon its axis. The circumſtances really previous to the effect, whether known or unknown, are conſidered as the proper cauſes of the effect.

4. The invariable connexion between antecedents and conſequents gradually produces an aſſociation of ideas ſo fixed, as to excite a firm, unheſitating expectation of the conſequents wherever the antecedents are obſerved to occur. We uniformly expect that the diſlocation of a limb will produce pain, and that the return of the ſun to capricorn will produce winter.

5. From the uniform conjunction of antecedents and conſequents, we always infer that there muſt be ſome ſufficient reaſon for this conjunction; or, in other words, that conſtant conjunction implies neceſſary connexion, whether we are able to diſcover this connexion or not. There is ſome reaſon why water runs down hill, why iron ſinks, and cork floats upon water, why heat diſſolves, and cold congeals.

6. If the effect produced is different from what we have been uſed to expect, we immediately conclude that there is ſome change in the previous circumſtances: if all the previous circumſtances appear to be the ſame,

the effect is miraculous, and produced by a power which counteracts the eſtabliſhed laws of nature: if all the circumſtances remain the ſame, and no ſuperior power is introduced, we heſitate not to ſay that a variation in the effect is a natural impoſſibility: for the ſame previous circumſtances cannot produce an effect and its contrary; they cannot cauſe the ſame thing to be and not to be. If iron is ſaid to float upon the ſurface of water, we immediately conclude that it reſts upon a ſubſtance ſpecifically lighter than the water, or that it is ſupported by miraculous power: if both theſe are denied, we pronounce the fact an impoſſibility.

7. Definite volitions are found by experience to follow definite ſtates of mind, as invariably as natural phenomena follow their known antecedents.

8. The obſervation of this fact generates the ſame unheſitating expectations of definite actions in definite circumſtances, as in the caſe of natural phenomena. Every one expects that an avaricious man will embrace any favourable opportunity of increaſing his wealth; that an ambitious man will ſeek the beſt means to gratify his luſt of power; and that the

the benevolent man will rejoice in opportunities of relieving misery and doing good. If expectations of events depending upon intelligent agents are not so uniform as the expectations of natural phenomena from definite previous circumstances, it is not because we suspect that in the same circumstances different volitions may be generated, but because we cannot enter precisely into the views of the agent, nor perceive the exact state of his mind.

9. Hence it follows, that upon principles precisely the same with those upon which we reason and judge in the case of natural phenomena, STATES OF MIND AND MOTIVES may be called CAUSES; and VOLITIONS, EFFECTS; NECESSARY CONNEXION may be argued from CONSTANT CONJUNCTION; and a variation in the volition, when the previous circumstances remain precisely the same, is either a MIRACLE or an IMPOSSIBILITY. For example, that Judas, under the influence of the same bad passions, and with the same expectations of gain and of impunity, should have formed any other volition than that of betraying his master, was impossible. Had he acted differently, it must have been either

either becauſe he relented, that is, becauſe there was a change in the ſtate of his mind, or becauſe his volition was ſupernaturally controuled. But that the very ſame ſtate of mind which prompted him to the commiſſion of the crime, ſhould alſo prompt him to abſtain from it, is a natural impoſſibility, it is a contradiction in terms*.

10. This reaſoning appears to be irrefragable with regard to the production of any volition A, and its contrary a; and even with regard to any volitions A and B, which, though not oppoſite, are in the view of the mind unequal. The ſame ſtate of mind which generates the one cannot give birth to the other. But it does not hold with equal force againſt the ſelection of one object out of many, A, A, &c. which are perfectly equal. I ſee no ſufficient reaſon why the ſame ſtate of mind which generates one may not generate the other. In other words,

* Edwards on the Will, part ii. ſect. iii.
Hume's Eſſays, vol. ii. ſect. vii. viii.
Hartley on Man, page 347, quarto.
Prieſtley's Illuſtrations, ſect. ii.
——— Correſpondence with Price, p. 294, 295.
W. Belſham's Eſſays, vol. i. eſſay i.

the

the reaſoning does not hold againſt a power of chooſing one out of equal objects, where there is ſufficient reaſon for chooſing one, but no reaſon for a preference of one above another.

That what is called the liberty of indifference, or the power of chooſing out of equal objects, is not an attribute of the human mind, we know by experience, and eſpecially by the argument from the divine preſcience, which neceſſarily excludes all contingency. But that ſuch a power, though to us inconceivable, is in itſelf poſſible, and that it may exiſt in the Supreme Being, and even that he has in ſome caſes actually exerciſed this liberty, appears to me highly probable.

That the power of chooſing out of equal objects is a perfection, none will diſpute; for without it, in certain ſuppoſable caſes, the Deity could not act at all, or muſt neceſſarily chooſe the inferior object when the ſuperior was equally in his view, for want of power to make a choice amongſt equals. For inſtance, if two or more ſyſtems equally good, and better than which could not exiſt, were at the ſame time preſent to the divine contemplation, it would either be impoſſible for

God

God to act at all, or he must necessarily choose a system of inferior excellence, in preference to any one of these. But this difficulty could have no place if he possesses, as no doubt he does, a power of choosing one out of an infinite number of systems all equally worthy of his attributes.

It may be said, that the possibility of equal objects cannot be proved. Agreed: but neither can the contrary be proved, and therefore it ought not to be assumed as a fact. Appearances are favourable to the supposition of equal objects of choice. For example, whether a cubic inch of water should have been placed originally in the Atlantic or the Pacific ocean? whether a blade of grass should grow in England or in China? and the like.

It has been said, that there can be only one best; but this is a grammatical quibble. By the best possible system, is meant a system, a better than which could not have been chosen: and this is all that any argument can prove to exist.

It is to be observed, that the liberty of indifference, though a perfection, is only a natural attribute, it is not a moral excellence. There can be no merit, though there may be great

great advantage, in a power of chooſing out of equal things. Where there is a real difference in the objects of choice, it is the honour of God to be limited by his wiſdom and his goodneſs to the choice of that which is beſt, and moſt worthy of his character: and this the libertarian philoſophers are as ready to allow as the neceſſarians themſelves*.

The preſcience of God excludes the liberty of indifference from all his rational creatures, as well as from mankind. For under the government of God no event can be contingent. And thus liberty of choice, in the only caſe in which liberty is a perfection, is left with the Supreme Being, who is the Cauſe of all cauſes, and the only proper Agent in the univerſe†.

* Clarke Dem. prop. xii. Boyle's Lectures, folio, vol. ii. page 50, 51.
Correſp. Price and Prieſtley, page 395, 396.
Cooper's Tracts, No. 2.
Reid on Active Powers, page 292.

† Did not his eye rule all things, and intend
The leaſt of our concerns, ſince from the leaſt
The greateſt oft originate,—could chance
Find place in his dominion, or diſpoſe
One lawleſs particle to thwart his plan,—
Then God might be ſurpriſed; and unforeſeen
Contingence might alarm him, and diſturb
The ſmooth and equal courſe of his affairs.
COWPER.

The

The libertarians have univerſally aſcribed to the Deity the power of chooſing out of equal objects. The neceſſarian philoſophers have argued obſcurely, not to ſay inconſiſtently, upon this ſubject, and have often ſubſtituted aſſertion for proof.

Leibnitz expreſsly denies the poſſibility of the exiſtence of two things perfectly equal, becauſe it would be impoſſible to place them in any part of ſpace: and he affirms, that if there was not a beſt amongſt all worlds God would not have made any. Dr. Hartley * declines giving any anſwer to the queſtion whether God might have made a different univerſe equally perfect with that which now exiſts? He ſays, "One cannot in the leaſt pre-"tend either to deny or to affirm this kind of "freedom in God." Mr. Cooper aſſerts, page 156, that there can be but one *beſt*; but this, as I have before obſerved, is either a mere verbal argument, or a gratuitous aſſertion †.

Dr. Prieſtley, in his controverſy with Dr. Price, allows, perhaps inadvertently, that God is a ſelf-moving and ſelf-determining Being,

* Clarke and Leibnitz, page 93—95, 121—123, 173—177. App. page 251—257.

† Vol. ii. page 36, octavo; 331, quarto.

Correſp.

Correſp. page 105, 147, and his acute opponent triumphs very much in this apparent conceſſion, page 350. But Dr. Prieſtley, in his reply, page 395, explains himſelf as meaning nothing more than that "God is the "firſt cauſe and mover of all things." And he expreſsly reprobates the idea of aſcribing a ſelf-determining power to the Divine Being; "meaning by it that he acts without a mo-"tive." And as, page 404 he calls the power of chooſing where motives are equal, "the abſurdity of determining without a mo-"tive," and thinks that the "ſame conſtitution "of mind would enable a perſon to determine "contrary to all motive," he would, no doubt, upon the ſame principles, deny to the Deity the liberty of indifference, though he no where, as far as I can recollect, ſtates his opinion explicitly upon that queſtion.

SECTION V.

Objections againſt Philoſophical Liberty.

THE THIRD argument in favour of philoſophical neceſſity ariſes from the abſurd and and PERNICIOUS CONSEQUENCES of philoſophical liberty.

I. Philo-

I. Philoſophical liberty ſuppoſes either that an EFFECT EXISTS WITHOUT A CAUSE, OR THAT AN INFINITE PRECESSION OF VOLITIONS is neceſſary to every operative volition.

When a volition riſes in the mind, it is either produced by motive, or it riſes of itſelf, or it is the effect of an antecedent volition.

If it is produced by motive, this is neceſſity; if it riſes of itſelf, it is an effect without a cauſe; if it is the reſult of a previous volition, this previous volition muſt either riſe of itſelf, or be ſuggeſted by motive, or the effect of an antecedent volition, and ſo on ad infinitum; which is abſurd.

Some have contended, that the mind chooſes the motive by which it will be influenced when various and oppoſing motives are preſented to its view: but this is only ſuppoſing a volition preceding the volition which produces the action; and by parity of reaſon this volition requires an antecedent volition, and ſo on ad infinitum; ſo that every diſtinct operative volition requires an infinite preceſſion of volitions to produce it*.

II. Philoſophical

* Edwards on the Will, part ii. ſect. iv.

II. PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERTY, as ſtated by ſome of its ableſt advocates, is OF LITTLE USE; for it is limited to a caſe which very ſeldom if ever occurs, namely, that in which motives are perfectly equal*.

III. PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERTY CONFOUNDS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN VIRTUE AND VICE†.

Upon this hypotheſis, a being acting from the beſt principles, diſpoſitions, and habits, is incapable of virtue if deſtitute of liberty; and a being acting under the influence of the worſt principles and affections, is in like manner incapable of vice. The eſſence, therefore, of virtue and vice conſiſts in liberty. But philoſophical liberty bears an equal relation to all voluntary actions; therefore all voluntary actions are equally good or evil; that is, there is no moral diſtinction between one action and another.

For example, benevolence without liberty

Prieſtley's Illuſtrations, ſect. iv.

——— Correſpondence with Price, page 344—348, 381—385.

* Price and Prieſtley, page 340—349, 381—405.

† "If a man had no power," that is, free will, "he "could neither be wiſe nor fooliſh, virtuous nor vicious." —Reid on Active Powers, page 328.

is no virtue; malignity without liberty is no vice. Both are equally in a neutral ſtate. Add a portion of liberty to both; benevolence inſtantly becomes an eminent virtue, and malignity an odious vice. That is, if to equals you add equals, the wholes will be unequal. By parity of reaſon, if to each of two equal veſſels filled with pure water you add a grain of ſalt, one will be converted into a ſalutary draught, the other into a deadly poiſon; or if to each end of a balance ſuſpended in equilibrio you add an equal weight, you deſtroy the equilibrium. Than which nothing can be more abſurd.

IV. THE DOCTRINE OF A PHILOSOPHICAL FREE WILL IS DANGEROUS TO VIRTUE.

1. As it makes virtue and vice to conſiſt in ſomething different from, and indeed independent on, motive, habit, and character, it tends to diminiſh the attention which ought to be paid to the diſcipline of the mind, to the formation of right principles, and to the acquiſition of virtuous habits.

2. A belief in a ſelf-determining power will encourage an inexperienced and thoughtleſs perſon to venture, if curioſity or inclination prompt, into circumſtances of tempta-

tion and danger, becauſe he conceives that he is poſſeſſed of a power ſufficient to vanquiſh every motive to vice; and if his virtue has been ſubdued ever ſo often, he has no fear of expoſing himſelf to the ſame trials, becauſe he believes that in circumſtances preciſely the ſame it will be in his power to make a different choice. And experience proves that multitudes are daily falling victims to this dangerous ſelf-deluſion.

On the other hand, the neceſſarian who is true to his principles, knows that, whatever be the force of virtuous principles, and the ſtability of virtuous habits, there are temptations which will overpower the moſt conſummate virtue, and therefore he will not needleſsly expoſe himſelf to any. And if he has found by experience that in any given circumſtances his virtuous reſolutions have failed, being aſſured by his principles that in the ſame circumſtances he will inevitably act again in the ſame manner, he will ſee that his only ſecurity conſiſts in avoiding temptation*.

* Mrs. Macaulay's Lett. on Education, page 485—490.

SECTION VI.

Objections againſt Philoſophical Liberty continued.

V. PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERTY IS INCONSISTENT WITH MORAL DISCIPLINE; it confounds all moral diſtinctions; and wherever it exiſts it ſubverts the foundation of approbation and diſapprobation, of praiſe and blame, of reward and puniſhment.

Three caſes only can be ſuppoſed. An intelligent and voluntary agent may be perfectly free, and indifferent to all motive; or perfectly neceſſary, and uniformly governed by motive; or his conduct may be regulated partly by motive, and partly by the ſelf-determining power.

CASE I. If any intelligent agent is philoſophically free, and perfectly indifferent to all motive, ſuch an agent is not a proper ſubject either of approbation or diſapprobation, of praiſe or blame, of reward or puniſhment.

1. Such a being performs an action which is regarded as morally good; he feeds the

hungry, he clothes the naked, he viſits the priſoner. But he is not therefore deſerving of APPROBATION. For approbation is a pleaſing emotion of the mind, ariſing from the perception of actions which indicate, or are believed to indicate, good diſpoſitions, and a good deſign. But by hypotheſis the agent in queſtion is void of both. Neither is he a proper ſubject of PRAISE; for praiſe is nothing more than the expreſſion of approbation. Nor would it be of any uſe to REWARD an agent perfectly free; for, being wholly indifferent to motive, reward would neither influence him to the repetition of virtuous actions, nor would it ſtimulate other agents ſimilarly conſtituted to follow his example.

2. Let an agent philoſophically free perform an action commonly regarded as criminal; let him voluntarily kill an innocent man, or let him ſet fire to his neighbour's houſe. There is no ground for moral DISAPPROBATION. For diſapprobation is a painful ſtate of mind excited by the perception of conduct, which indicates or is thought to indicate bad diſpoſitions or bad deſigns; but the agent in queſtion is incapable

pable of either. It would be abſurd to BLAME him, for blame is only the expreſſion of diſapprobation. It would be unjuſt to PUNISH him, for puniſhment would have no effect either to reclaim the ſufferer, or to deter other beings ſimilarly conſtituted, from ſimilar miſchief: and to puniſh with any other view is not juſtice, but revenge. Such a being ought to be reſtrained by force from doing further injury to himſelf or others: but this is not puniſhment in the proper ſenſe of the word, any more than the confinement of a lunatic.

CASE II. An intelligent being may be a perfectly neceſſary agent, invariably influenced by the perception of motives to make a definite choice in definite circumſtances. Such an agent is the proper ſubject of moral diſcipline.

If ſuch a being perform an action morally right, if, prompted by compaſſion, he viſit the ſick, relieve the poor, and protect the fatherleſs, he is worthy of APPROBATION; he has performed a virtuous action, from a virtuous motive, from the beſt diſpoſition and with the beſt deſign. He is therefore

entitled to PRAISE, the expreſſion of moral approbation. And if his virtue be REWARDED by the ſucceſs of his exertions, by the approbation of conſcience, by the applauſe of the virtuous and the wiſe, by the bleſſing of heaven, or in any other ſuitable and conſpicuous manner, it will in ſuch an agent ſtrengthen the motives to virtue, and will alſo ſtimulate other beings whoſe moral conſtitution is ſimilar to his own, to imitate his virtuous example. A neceſſary agent therefore is the proper ſubject of approbation, praiſe, and reward.

Again, if ſuch a being perform an action denominated vicious, if moved by envy he calumniate his neighbour, if prompted by avarice he defraud the orphan, and oppreſs the poor, or if ſtimulated by malice he delight in miſchief, his character and conduct muſt be viewed with the higheſt DISAPPROBATION by every moral agent who is capable of diſcerning the malignity of his heart, and the wickedneſs of his deſigns. And the greater the aſcendancy of theſe odious diſpoſitions, the leſs inclination or deſire there is to reſiſt them, the more deteſtable the character

of the agent, and the greater the diſapprobation it excites.

But the expreſſion of this diſapprobation is BLAME. And if ſuch a being is PUNISHED by the miſery of a diſordered mind and the torture of ſelf-reproach, by the failure of his vicious purpoſes, and by the contempt and indignation of mankind, and if his vices ſhould incur the poſitive penalties of juſt and equitable laws, the ſufferings of the offender would tend to reſtrain his vices, to bring him to thoughtfulneſs, reflection, contrition and repentance; and the puniſhment thus inflicted upon him would deter others in ſimilar circumſtances from a ſimilar conduct, leſt they ſhould incur a ſimilar fate. Thus it appears that a neceſſary agent is the proper ſubject of diſapprobation, blame and puniſhment. To affirm that ſuffering applied to neceſſary agents, is not, properly ſpeaking, puniſhment, which always ſuppoſes free agency, meaning by this philoſophical liberty, is begging the queſtion.

CASE III. An intelligent agent may be ſuppoſed to be governed in his choice ſometimes by a regard to motive, and ſometimes by

by the ſelf-determining power. This is the ſituation in which man is by the libertarians commonly ſuppoſed to be placed*.

Now in this caſe it is manifeſt, from what has been already proved, that preciſely to the degree in which an agent ſo heteroclite would be ſubject to the influence of motives, and no further, he would be ſuſceptible of moral diſcipline, and the proper object of approbation or diſapprobation, praiſe or blame, reward or puniſhment. But wherever the ſelf-determining power begins, moral diſcipline ends. Philoſophical liberty and moral government are incompatible with each other.

From the preceding analyſis of the moral ſentiments of approbation, praiſe, reward, diſapprobation, blame, and puniſhment, it is evident that a belief in the power of the agent to have acted differently in the ſame circum-

* It is not in itſelf probable, nor at all agreeable to the analogy of nature, that a being ſo heterogeneous in its conſtitution, and governed by laws ſo diametrically oppoſite as thoſe of liberty and neceſſity, motive and no motive, ſhould exiſt. An order of beings ſo conſtituted, would be exactly ſimilar to one in which it ſhould be the eſtabliſhed law of their nature to be ſometimes rational, and ſometimes inſane.

ſtances,

ſtances, is by no means neceſſary to their exiſtence and beneficial effect. A confuſed notion of ſuch a power as this, ariſing from want of due attention to, or the correct recollection of, all the previous circumſtances, does indeed often attach itſelf to theſe ſentiments; but it is unfounded in fact, and, like other popular deluſions, vaniſhes before the light of reaſon and truth*.

IV. THE DOCTRINE OF PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERTY IS ABSOLUTELY INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRESCIENCE OF GOD.

A contingent event depending upon the choice of an agent whoſe volitions are formed by a ſelf-determining power, independent of motive, having no certain or neceſſary connexion with previous circumſtances, muſt conſequently be uncertain till the previous volition which ordains its exiſtence actually takes place. Till that inſtant it either may, or may not, come to paſs.

Therefore certainly to foreknow a contingent event, which is in other words to know that a future contingent event will certainly

* Prieſtley's Diſquiſitions, ſect. vii.

take

take place, would be the ſame as to know that an event which is in its own nature uncertain, is at the ſame time certain, that is, to know a thing to be what it is not; which is a contradiction in terms.

Philoſophical liberty, therefore, is abſolutely inconſiſtent with the attribute of foreknowledge.

To ſay that the mode of the divine knowledge is infinitely different from and ſuperior to that of human beings, and therefore that it may extend to future contingencies, is nothing to the purpoſe. The knowledge of God is indeed infinite both in extent and in degree, and ſurpaſſes all comprehenſion. But it can only extend to thoſe things which are the objects of knowledge. It cannot include contradictions; he cannot know a thing to be what it is not. Contingency and preſcience muſt therefore be incompatible.

If it be urged that contingent events, though not neceſſary, may nevertheleſs be CERTAIN; this is plainly inconſiſtent with the definition of contingency, as has been already proved. But, admitting the fact, all is conceded for which the neceſſarians contend. If all events

are

are certain, that certainty muſt have a cauſe; and this cauſe, known or unknown, they call neceſſity*.

VII. THE DOCTRINE OF PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERTY LEADS TO ATHEISM, as it ſaps the

* "It muſt be granted," ſays Dr. Reid, "that as "whatever was, certainly was, and whatever is, certainly "is, ſo whatever ſhall be, certainly ſhall be. Theſe are "identical propoſitions, and cannot be doubted by thoſe "who conceive them diſtinctly. I grant, therefore, that, "from events being foreſeen, it may be juſtly concluded "that they are certainly future." — Reid on the Active Powers, page 348.

This ſingle conceſſion overſets all the learned profeſſor's reaſoning or rather his declamation againſt the doctrine of neceſſity, unleſs any one is prepared to maintain that an event which is *certainly future* may poſſibly *not come to paſs*. "But this," to adopt a phraſe of Dr. Reid's upon another occaſion, "it would require "much ſtrength of countenance to profeſs." If voluntary actions are certainly future, it can be aſcribed to no other cauſe but to the definite influence of motives in definite circumſtances, unleſs the will is bent by ſome external force, which is what no philoſopher will aſſert. The actions of a being who in the ſame circumſtances can form different volitions, can never become certain till the volition itſelf is formed; a fact to which the advocates for liberty and preſcience do not ſufficiently advert.—Edwards on the Will, part ii. ſect. 11, 12. Clarke againſt Collins, page 38—40. Reid on the Active Powers, eſſay iv. ch. x.

foundation

foundation of the principal argument to prove the exiſtence of God.

For, if a given volition is not produced by motive, nor by an antecedent volition of the agent, it muſt riſe of itſelf, that is, it muſt begin to exiſt without any proper cauſe. But if a volition may begin to exiſt without a cauſe, a planet, a ſyſtem, or even the univerſe, might have begun to exiſt without a cauſe. Conſequently there would be no ground from the works of nature to infer the exiſtence of an intelligent, powerful, and benevolent author*.

VIII. PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERTY IS INCONSISTENT WITH MORAL PERFECTION in any being, and particularly with the neceſſary rectitude of God.

1. The progreſs of an imperfect moral agent in virtue is in exact ratio to the improvement, eſtabliſhment, and aſcendancy of virtuous principles, and habits. The more direct, conſtant, and uncontroulable the influence of theſe principles and affections upon the choice, the leſs inclination and the

* Hartley on Man, vol. ii. page 67, octavo; 347, quarto.
Correſp. of Price and Prieſtley, page 294, 295.

leſs

leſs power there is to reſiſt the feelings of juſtice and truth, benevolence and piety, the nearer does the character approach to perfection. When therefore theſe principles and feelings become abſolutely and in all caſes predominant, ſo that the mind cannot even will any thing contrary to virtue, the character has attained the higheſt ſummit of moral excellence. But the doctrine of philoſophical liberty aſſerts, that when the character has reached this ſtate it inſtantly ceaſes to be virtuous, it loſes all moral quality, and becomes perfectly neutral. The concluſion is exactly ſimilar in the progreſs of vice. The greater the aſcendancy of vicious principles and bad paſſions the worſe the character, till they have acquired an abſolute dominion over the will, when the character inſtantly loſes all moral quality, and becomes perfectly neutral, and thus riſes to a level with that which is governed uncontroulably by benevolence, juſtice, and piety. This conſequence is evidently abſurd; therefore the doctrine of philoſophical liberty cannot be true.

2. Philoſophical liberty is inconſiſtent with

with the neceſſary rectitude of the Supreme Being.

It is the glory of God that he is neceſſarily wiſe, juſt, and benevolent. It is as impoſſible that he ſhould act inconſiſtently with truth, rectitude, and goodneſs, as that he ſhould ceaſe to be. Liberty of choice, or a power of chooſing to act in contradiction to the rules of juſtice and wiſdom, would be the greateſt imperfection, and the belief of it would be an endleſs ſource of anxiety and diſquiet to his intelligent, and eſpecially to his virtuous creatures. It is indeed a contradiction in terms; for to aſcribe philoſophical liberty to God in any other ſenſe than the choice of equal objects, which is no moral quality, would be the ſame as to ſay that perfect wiſdom may act fooliſhly, that perfect rectitude may act unjuſtly, and that perfect benevolence may be cruel and malignant; than which nothing can be more abſurd.

This is ſo evident a caſe that it is admitted in the moſt diſtinct and deciſive language by the advocates for liberty themſelves*. But they

* "The moſt perfect being," ſays Dr. Reid, (Active Powers,

they qualify the conceſſion by aſſerting that the neceſſity for which they plead is not phyſical but moral. God is good by neceſſity; but not by the ſame neceſſity by which he exiſts, though equally certain in its effect.

This

" Powers, p. 292.) always infallibly acts according to the " beſt motives; for it is a contradiction to ſay that a per- " fect Being does what is wrong or unreaſonable." What is this but to ſay that it is a contradiction to aſcribe philoſophical liberty to God?

The Doctor adds: " Moral perfection does not conſiſt " in having no power to *do* ill." Certainly not, but in having no power to *will* what is evil. God may do ill *if he pleaſe*, but it is his glory that he cannot chooſe it.

Dr. Clarke ſays, (Boyle's Lect. fol. vol. ii. p. 51. Dem. prop. 12.) "Though all the actions of God are entirely free, " yet theſe moral attributes are really and truly neceſſary " by ſuch a neceſſity as, though it be not at all inconſiſtent " with liberty, yet is equally certain, infallible, and to be de- " pended upon, as even the exiſtence itſelf or the eternity " of God." Again, p. 52. " It is as truly and abſolutely " impoſſible for God not to do, or to do any thing contrary " to, what his moral attributes require him to do, as if he " was really not a free but a neceſſary agent."

Philoſophical liberty is the power of chooſing differently, the previous circumſtances remaining the ſame; and this liberty it is evident that Dr. Clarke denies to the Deity: his doctrine therefore coincides with that of the neceſſarians.

This is all for which the neceſſarians contend. If it is allowed that the divine mind is ſo determined in its choice of the wiſeſt and the beſt, that the Supreme Being could not in any inſtance *will* otherwiſe than he does, they are perfectly indifferent whether the neceſſity which thus uniformly governs the divine will, be called phyſical or moral:

"It may be infinitely more depended upon," ſays Dr. Price, "that God will never do wrong, than that the "wiſeſt created being will not do what is moſt deſtructive "to him without having the leaſt temptation to it. There "is in truth equal impoſſibility, though not the ſame kind "of impoſſibility, that he who is the abſtract of all per-"fection ſhould deviate into imperfection in his conduct, "infinite reaſon act unreaſonably, or eternal righteouſ-"neſs unrighteouſly, as that infinite knowledge ſhould "miſtake, infinite power be conquered, or neceſſary "exiſtence ceaſe to exiſt."—Price's Rev. of Morals, p. 430, 431.

What can a neceſſarian ſay more than this? What liberty is allowed by theſe writers to the Supreme Being, but the power, not of chooſing differently, which would be philoſophical liberty, but that of doing what he pleaſes? a power which no neceſſarian denies.

The Doctor adds, "What good reaſon can there be "againſt calling one a moral, the other a natural im-"poſſibility?" I ſee none; but let it be remembered that both are equally inconſiſtent with natural liberty.

the

the latter perhaps is the more proper phraſe, to diſtinguiſh this ſpecies of neceſſity from that which is involuntary.

It may be ſaid that the excluſion of philoſophical liberty, from the divine mind does not abſolutely prove that his creatures are alſo neceſſary agents. True, but it proves two important points. Firſt, that liberty is an imperfection; and, ſecondly, that it is not eſſential to virtue.

SECTION VII.

Objections againſt Philoſophical Neceſſity ſtated and anſwered.

THERE are two ways of obviating objections. The firſt, and the moſt direct, is by proving that they do not apply to the doctrine in queſtion. The ſecond, is by retorting the objection, and ſhowing that it holds with equal or ſuperior force againſt the contrary hypotheſis, ſo as to leave only a choice of difficulties. In one or other of theſe methods all the objections againſt philoſophical neceſſity may be ſatisfactorily repelled.

OBJECTION THE FIRST.

The doctrine of neceſſity is reducible to an abſurdity. For, if action is conſtantly conjoined with motive, a man urged by equal motives to go in different directions would, by the laws of motion, be neceſſitated to advance neither in one direction nor the other, but in the diagonal of both; which is contrary to experience*.

ANSWER.

The motives in queſtion are either equal or unequal; if equal, by the principles of neceſſity no volition can take place; if unequal, the greater motive will prevail†.

* This is the ſubſtance of the objection which Dr. Gregory has urged in two ponderous volumes with all the parade of mathematical demonſtration, and with a ſpirit of arrogance and inſult, by no means warranted either by the force, or the novelty of his argument, and which does little credit to the author either as a philoſopher or a polite writer.

† Gregory's Eſſay, vol. ii. ſect. 9, 10.
Crombie on Neceſſity, chap. iii.

OBJEC-

OBJECTION THE SECOND.

If the doctrine of neceſſity be true, mankind are under a perpetual and unavoidable deluſion, inconſiſtent with the moral perfections of God; for all men believe, and cannot but believe, that they poſſeſs liberty of choice.

ANSWER.

1. The ideas of men in general extend no further than to practical liberty, or the power of doing what they pleaſe*.

2. Superficial views of human nature lead men to believe that they could have acted

* Aſk a day labourer, Could you have abſtained from going to work this morning? he will anſwer, Yes, I could have ſtaid at home if I pleaſed. That is, if I had willed to have ſtaid at home, I could have done ſo. But this is external liberty; the only liberty of which the labourer has any idea. For, if the inquirer further aſks, Could you have ſtaid at home while you retained the ſame inclination to work, and the ſame reaſon for going abroad? If he underſtands the queſtion, he will certainly reply, That without *changing his mind*, that is, without an alteration either of inclination or reaſon, he could not have abſtained from going to his work.

differently in the ſame circumſtances; but this error is eaſily rectified by a cloſe attention to the proceſs of the mind in its voluntary acts.

3. The notion, that in any paſt circumſtances we might have choſen differently, ariſes entirely from our not recollecting with exact preciſion all the motives by which the volition was influenced, and the actual ſituation in which the mind was placed; ſo that the pretended conſciouſneſs of free-will amounts to nothing more than forgetfulneſs of the motive.

4. The error into which ſuperficial obſervers fall with reſpect to philoſophical liberty is perfectly analogous to that into which unlearned perſons are led with reſpect to the ſolar ſyſtem; both are occaſioned by ſuperficial views of obvious appearances, both are corrected by more attentive obſervation. Neither are attended with any material practical inconvenience; nor can it be juſtly regarded as any impeachment of the moral character of the Deity that his creatures ſhould be liable to errors of this kind, unleſs it could be proved that the truth of God

God obliges him to make all his creatures omniſcient and infallible.

5. Vicious inclinations ſometimes hurry men into the commiſſion of crimes which their better judgement diſapproves, and againſt which, even at the time, it ſtrongly remonſtrates: this occaſions an inward ſelf-upbraiding, which embitters vicious pleaſure, and to which is given the name of diſapprobation, ſhame, and remorſe. But though this ſtate of mind demonſtrates the ſtrength and the malignity of the vicious inclination, it by no means proves that while the habit or affection remains in its preſent force, the choice could have been different.

When men who have been guilty of crime review the action in calmer moments, when the ſtrength of paſſion has ſubſided, and the contrary motives appear in all their force, and perhaps magnified by the evil conſequences of their vice and folly, they are ready to think that they might at the time have thought and acted as they now think and act: but this is a fallacious feeling, and ariſes from their not placing themſelves in circumſtances exactly ſimilar. And it is alſo

a dangerous concluſion; for, if it leads them into ſcenes of ſimilar hazard, in the deluſive hope that it will be in their power, in the ſame circumſtances, to act otherwiſe, they will inevitably repeat the crime, and confirm the tendency to vice.

OBJECTION THE THIRD.

The doctrine of neceſſity is inconſiſtent with all proper agency; it annihilates virtue and vice, merit and demerit.

ANSWER.

This objection is entirely verbal. If in the definition of proper agency, virtue, merit, and the like, philoſophical liberty, be included, neceſſity muſt of courſe be inconſiſtent with it. But if by proper agency be meant, the poſſeſſion of rational, voluntary, and active powers; if virtue be defined a courſe of action flowing from the love of God and our neighbour, and tending to the greateſt ultimate happineſs; and if vice be defined a ſyſtem of affections and courſe of conduct which tends to ultimate miſery, and the like; it is plain that theſe diſtinctions are perfectly

perfectly conſiſtent with philoſophical neceſſity*.

OBJECTION THE FOURTH.

The doctrine of neceſſity is inconſiſtent with moral diſcipline, and with the juſtice of future reward and puniſhment.

ANSWER.

This caſe has been already conſidered (Sect. VI.), and it has been ſhown that upon the principles of neceſſity there is a real uſe in moral diſcipline, and an inſeparable connexion between virtue and happineſs, vice and miſery; whereas the doctrine of liberty makes all diſcipline uſeleſs and nugatory. Neceſſity is the only rational ground upon which the doctrine of future rewards and puniſhment can be juſtified, becauſe it is the only ſuppoſition upon which they can appear to be of any uſe. This hypotheſis therefore adds to the credibility of the ſcripture doctrine

* Hartley, p. 301, 4to.

upon

upon this ſubject, while that of liberty is inconſiſtent with it, and ſubverſive of it. Upon the neceſſarian ſyſtem, indeed, all evil is remedial, and the pains even of a future life are to be inflicted for the benefit of the ſufferer himſelf, as well as for the admonition of others: but this the neceſſarians regard as ſo far from being an objection to their hypotheſis, that it is a conſiderable preſumption in its favour. Nor is this doctrine contradictory to what the ſcriptures teach concerning the final ſtate of mankind and the ultimate iſſue of the divine diſpenſations. See 1 Cor. xv. 23. 28.*

OBJECTION THE FIFTH.

The doctrine of neceſſity confounds natural and moral qualities; upon this hypotheſis both are conſtitutional and unavoidable. To be beautiful, is as meritorious as to be benevolent, and it would be as wiſe and

* Edwards on the Will, part iv. ſect. 3, 4.
Price and Prieſtley, p. 149. 155.
Palmer againſt Prieſtley, ſect. 7.
Prieſtley's Reply, p. 79.

as

as juſt to puniſh a man for being deformed, as for committing a theft.

ANSWER.

This objection nearly coincides with the third, and is altogether verbal. Natural and moral qualities are indeed equally neceſſary; but the latter being voluntary, and the former involuntary, they require the application of means proportionably different either to produce or to correct them. Motives operate in one caſe, and phyſical cauſes in the other. If expoſing the body to pain would correct deformity, which indeed ſometimes happens, it would be reaſonable to apply pain as a remedy for natural defects; and if the uſe of coſmetics would make a man benevolent and wiſe, extreme attention to perſonal decoration would ceaſe to be the characteriſtic of a fop.

OBJECTION THE SIXTH.

The doctrine of neceſſity is an encouragement to vice. It tranquillizes the mind of guilt, and ſuperſedes all motives to repentance,

pentance. Why ſhould a man repent of what he could not avoid? Why not rejoice in conduct which, however malignant in principle or miſchievous in its immediate conſequences, will ultimately conduce to the greateſt poſſible good, and is indeed, according to this hypotheſis, an eſſential part of the beſt poſſible ſyſtem?

ANSWER.

The queſtion ſimply ſtated is this: Whether the doctrine of neceſſity lays a proper foundation for repentance, and ſupplies ſufficient motives to it?

REPENTANCE is a change of mind from vice to virtue, and the ſentiments which uſually combine to produce it are Remorſe, Sorrow, Shame, and Fear.

REMORSE is the exquiſitely painful feeling which ariſes from the belief that, in circumſtances preciſely the ſame, we might have choſen and acted differently. This fallacious feeling is of courſe ſuperſeded by the doctrine of neceſſity.

This ſentiment, however, is of little practical value. A patient ſuffering under a fever is

is not influenced to ſeek for a remedy becauſe he believes that he might have avoided taking the cold which produced the diſeaſe, but becauſe he deſires to be relieved from his preſent pain, and is apprehenſive that if the diſorder is not removed, death will enſue. By parity of reaſon, a man ſeeks a remedy for vicious habit, the malady of the mind, not becauſe in the ſame circumſtances he might have avoided contracting it, but becauſe he deſires to be delivered from preſent miſery, and is fearful that, if vice be not eradicated, it will tend to ſtill greater and more inſupportable diſtreſs.

SORROW is a painful feeling which ariſes from the diſordered ſtate of the mind under the dominion of vice: it naturally prompts to repentance, and is perfectly conſiſtent with the doctrine of neceſſity.

SHAME is an uneaſy ſenſation excited by the apprehenſion, recollection, or imputation of any thing which is regarded as unworthy of the perſon who is the ſubject of it, or which tends to expoſe him to diſgrace and infamy. A belief in the poſſibility of avoiding the cauſes of ſhame has no concern in the

the production of that painful emotion. Men are often ashamed of loathsome and offensive diseases, though constitutional or accidental. And persons of refined feelings are ashamed of dishonourable conduct in any who are related to them, or any way connected with them, though they have done all that was in their power to prevent it. Upon the same principles a man may be ashamed of a vicious action as mean and degrading, and what if known will expose him to reproach and infamy, though, with the same habits of mind and in the same circumstances, he could not have chosen otherwise.

FEAR is excited by the apprehension of future probable evil. ABHORRENCE is a mixture of fear and hatred. These are feelings for which the doctrine of necessity lays a proper foundation, and the genuine effect of which is to reclaim men from the practice of vice, and to diminish the influence of vicious habits; that is, to produce repentance.

The doctrine of philosophical necessity teaches that in the same circumstances men will invariably act in the same manner: hence,

hence, if they are ſincerely deſirous of repentance and a change of mental habits, they will ſee the neceſſity of avoiding temptation. This doctrine alſo places perſonal virtue in principle, habit, and character, which is inconſiſtent with the expectation of ſudden converſions, and even with the poſſibility of death-bed repentance: and, as it has been already obſerved, by confirming the credibility, it ſtrengthens the moral efficacy of the doctrine of future puniſhment.

Theſe advantages are appropriate to philoſophical neceſſity: the doctrine of liberty, if purſued to its genuine conſequences, leads to preſumption, to fallacious expectation, and to religious ſcepticiſm.

So far as the objection relates to moral evil as the appointment of God, and forming an eſſential part of a ſyſtem upon the whole the beſt, the objection is not peculiar to neceſſity, but holds equally againſt the doctrine of liberty and preſcience, as will hereafter be proved*. In the mean time it is ſufficient to obſerve, that moral evil being utterly inconſiſtent with the happineſs of the agent, he muſt know that

* See the anſwer to the eighth objection.

whatever

whatever uſe the wiſdom of providence may ultimately make of his crimes, they will prove to himſelf a ſource of exquiſite miſery*.

SECTION VIII.

Objections continued.

OBJECTION THE SEVENTH.

The doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity diſcourages all attempts for the reformation of others. "If every intention and action of "my life is fixed by eternal laws which I can "neither elude nor alter, it is as abſurd to ſay "to me, You ought to be honeſt to-morrow, as "to ſay, You ought to ſtop the motion "of the planets to-morrow†."

ANSWER.

It is univerſally allowed by all who admit the divine foreknowledge, that certainty of event does not preclude the uſe of means. If ends are predeſtinated, the means neceſſary to the accompliſhment of thoſe ends are equally

* Dawſon's Neceſſitarian, paſſim.
Palmer againſt Prieſtley, ſect. 6.
Prieſtley's Reply to Palmer, ſect. 6.

† Beattie on Truth, page 353.

predeſtinated. So far the objection holds as forcibly againſt liberty and preſcience as againſt neceſſity; or, rather, it has no force againſt either hypotheſis. But to maintain that a being upon whom definite motives invariably produce a definite effect, is for that reaſon an improper ſubject for exhortation, that is, for the application of motives, while motives may with propriety be addreſſed to a being who is indifferent, or ſuperior to them, is palpably abſurd. It is the ſame as to maintain that it is wrong to chaſtiſe the child A, for telling a falſehood, becauſe ſuch diſcipline will infallibly prevent him from repeating the fault; but it is very proper to correct the child B, becauſe, he being independent of all motive, it is very uncertain whether correction will produce any good effect: or, rather, if he is, ſtrictly ſpeaking, a free agent, it is certain that it can produce no effect at all.

OBJECTION THE EIGHTH.

The doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity makes God the only proper agent in the univerſe, and the author of all evil both natural and moral.

ANSWER.

1. The doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity does not make God the APPROVER of evil, nor repreſent him as chooſing it for its own ſake.

2. This doctrine ſuppoſes that a certain quantity of evil, natural and moral, was unavoidable in a ſyſtem upon the whole moſt worthy of the Supreme Being, and eventually productive of the greateſt good. In this view God may be ſaid to be the AUTHOR of evil; he permitted and appointed it by placing his creatures in circumſtances of which natural and moral evil were the neceſſary and foreſeen reſult.

3. The doctrine of liberty and preſcience is open to the ſame difficulty. All who admit theſe principles muſt, if conſiſtent with themſelves, allow that the Deity has placed his creatures in circumſtances, the foreknown, certain, inevitable, and therefore *intended* conſequence of which, was the introduction of natural and moral evil.

To ſay that the creatures of God might in every particular inſtance have avoided vice, is frivolous, and groundleſs. How could

could that be avoided which was foreknown as a certain event?

To argue that foreknowledge had no influence over the event, which would have happened with equal certainty if it had not been foreſeen, is nothing to the purpoſe. The preſcience of a mere SPECTATOR implies indeed nothing more than certainty of event, in the production of which, the ſpectator as ſuch hath no concern. The preſcience of an AGENT is materially different. Every intelligent being muſt mean to produce that effect which he foreſees will be the certain conſequence of his own voluntary act. The Supreme Being, therefore, is in this ſenſe the author of evil, upon the hypotheſis of liberty and preſcience, as much as upon the principle of neceſſity. The diſtinction attempted to be made in this caſe between permiſſion and appointment, is altogether verbal*.

4. The ſcriptures both of the old and new Teſtament repreſent the Deity as the author of evil in the ſenſe already explained. Iſaiah xiv. 7. Amos iii. 6. Rom. ix. 18.

* Correſpondence of Price and Prieſtley, p. 416, 417.

5. That God is in this ſenſe the author of evil, will not juſtify his creatures in violating the rules of virtue, and doing evil under pretence of accompliſhing a greater good. It is not unjuſt in the Deity to expoſe any of his creatures to a limited degree of evil, as the beſt means of accompliſhing his own benevolent purpoſes; for God is the ſovereign proprietor of all, and may diſpoſe of his creatures as he pleaſes without being accountable to any, nor have they any claim upon their Maker further than this, that exiſtence ſhall not be eventually a curſe. It is alſo in his power to make ample and infinite compenſation for whatever temporary evils they may endure. But it does not therefore follow that a being whoſe character is imperfect, and whoſe views are limited, is at liberty to inflict upon a fellow-being, over whoſe exiſtence and happineſs he has no inherent authority, a portion of evil which it is not in his power to redreſs or to compenſate, in order to obtain what he preſumes to call a greater good, but of which he is neither competent nor authoriſed to judge. To plead the example of the Deity in a caſe ſo totally diſſimilar

diſſimilar as not to afford the ſlighteſt analogy, is folly and impiety in the extreme.

6. If the introduction of evil be really contrary to the divine intention, as contradiction to the will of any being neceſſarily produces uneaſineſs, and moral evil is infinitely odious to the Deity, God muſt be infinitely unhappy.

7. To deny, or to limit the preſcience of God leads to conſequences ſo abſurd, and ſo diſhonourable to the Supreme Being and his government, and is ſo directly contradictory to the whole tenor of divine revelation, and ſubverſive of its principal evidence, that it affords a ſtrong preſumption againſt the truth of a hypotheſis of which this is the neceſſary or the probable conſequence. Upon the whole, therefore, the advocates for philoſophical liberty are reduced to the dilemma, either of denying the foreknowledge of God, and thus robbing the Deity of one of his moſt glorious attributes, or of admitting that God is the author of evil, in the ſame ſenſe and in the ſame degree, in which this doctrine is charged upon the neceſſarians*.

OBJECTION

* Edwards on the Will, part iv. ſect. ix.

OBJECTION THE NINTH.

The doctrine of neceſſity is inconſiſtent with the veracity of God, in the declarations and promiſes, the invitations and the threatenings, of the ſcriptures.

ANSWER.

1. The difficulty, if any, is equally great upon the hypotheſis of liberty and preſcience: for, how can the creatures of God act otherwiſe than as he foreknows? Why then invite them to repent, or tantalize them with promiſes? The objection, therefore, is not peculiar to the doctrine of neceſſity.

2. Expreſſions implying the exiſtence of human paſſions in the Divine Being, ſuch as anger, ſympathy, and the like, cannot be underſtood literally without an anthropomorphitiſm almoſt as groſs as it would be to ſuppoſe that God had eyes, and ears, and hands. The ſcriptures being intended for the uſe of the unlearned, the language of them is adapted

Prieſtley's Illuſtrations, ſect. 10.
Palmer againſt Prieſtley, ſect. 10.
Prieſtley's Reply, ſect. 10.

to

to popular conceptions, and is not to be taken in a groſs literal ſenſe.

3. All that can be admitted as philoſophically true by perſons of reflection is, that evil natural or moral, as ſuch, is not pleaſing to God; that he takes no delight in ſeeing or making his creatures miſerable; that moral evil if perſiſted in will infallibly entail natural evil, that is puniſhment; and that virtue ſhall in the end be crowned with happineſs.

4. Exhortations, invitations, promiſes and threatenings addreſſed to neceſſary agents operate as motives to deter from vice, and to excite to the practice of virtue. But, when applied to beings who poſſeſs a ſelf-determining power, they are of no uſe any further than as ſuch beings may be influenced by motives, that is, when the ſelf-determining power is ſuperſeded*.

OBJECTION THE TENTH.

The doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity involves predeſtination and fataliſm, diſcourages

* Edwards on the Will, part iii. ſect. 4.
Prieſtley's Illuſtrations, ſect. 11.
Palmer againſt Prieſtley, ſect. 11.

exertion, and tends to produce univerſal torpor and inactivity.

ANSWER.

1. This objection cannot be urged by the advocates for liberty and preſcience, as it preſſes upon their own hypotheſis with equal force; for preſcience neceſſarily includes certainty of event.

2. Whatever certainty may belong to events themſelves, our ignorance of futurity will and ought to operate upon us in the ſame manner as if there was a real uncertainty in the nature and order of things.

3. If ends are fixed and neceſſary, the means of accompliſhing thoſe ends are likewiſe neceſſary; and if voluntary action is perceived to be a neceſſary link in the chain of cauſes, this perception will operate as a motive to exertion in the agent who deſires the end, and in proportion to the intenſity of that deſire. At any rate, no being who knows that the accompliſhment of ends depends upon the intervention of voluntary acts, can be ſo ſenſeleſs as to expect the end where the neceſſary means are not applied.

4. Daily

4. Daily obſervation proves that the firmeſt belief in the certainty of event does not abate the vigour of exertion. Neceſſarians and predeſtinarians are not in fact more indolent than other men. The farmer who believes that God knows, and has ordained that the next harveſt ſhall be plentiful, or otherwiſe, does not for that reaſon neglect to cultivate and to ſow the ground. Nor does the almoſt univerſal perſuaſion that the time and circumſtances of diſſolution are irrevocably fixed for every individual, leſſen men's exertions for the preſervation of life*.

SECTION IX.

Recapitulation and General Obſervations.

FIRST, CONCERNING PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERTY.

1. Philoſophical liberty, ſo far as it conſiſts in a power of chooſing where motives are equal, is undoubtedly a perfection; and

* Edwards on the Will, part iv. ſect. 5, 6, 12. Prieſtley's Illuſtrations, ſect. 8—12, and appendix. Palmer againſt Prieſtley, ſect. 8, p. 146, &c. Prieſtley's Reply, p. 83, &c.

as

as it cannot be proved to involve a contradiction, I do not see how it can be denied of the Supreme Being. Without it he could not act, if a case should occur, which none can prove to be impossible, and which indeed does not seem to be improbable, in which it would be necessary to adopt one out of two or more equal modes of action, or not to act at all.

2. Liberty in this case is not a moral excellence; it is mere power, and bears no more relation to rectitude than the power of moving a limb. God is not more just, more wise, nor more benevolent, because he possesses a power of selecting one out of two or more equal systems, in preference to absolute inaction. Nor can it be proved that philosophical liberty, in any circumstances, is a moral quality.

3. Admitting that liberty of choice out of equal things is an attribute of God, it plainly follows, that every argument adduced to prove liberty, in this sense of it, to be a contradiction, or to imply the existence of an effect without a proper cause, is fallacious. For this argument, if it proved any thing, would prove the impossibility of liberty in all cases

and

and in all beings; and it would extend to the Deity equally with all other intelligent agents.

4. If it ſhould be granted that this liberty of indifference exiſts in the Supreme Being, there appears no reaſonable ground for denying the poſſibility of its being communicated to the intelligent creatures of God. But this poſſibility, if conceded, will by no means prove that ſuch a power has actually been communicated to any; much leſs that the poſſeſſion of it is eſſential to moral agency and reſponſibility.

5. The increaſing difficulty of determining the choice in proportion to the apparent approximation of motives to equality, renders it probable that the power of chooſing where motives are perfectly equal, is not an attribute of the human mind. Nor can it ever be proved that a choice has in any inſtance been actually made, where the motives have been exactly balanced.

6. The exiſtence of philoſophical liberty in human agents is favoured by ſuperficial views of human nature: and perſons not converſant with the controverſy, if taken by ſurpriſe, when the queſtion is firſt propoſed,

will generally decide in favour of liberty. This, in the language of the Scotch philoſophers, is the appeal to common ſenſe; the dictates of which, according to their ſyſtem, are authoritative and infallible. Indeed moſt of the advocates for philoſophical liberty appeal to this fact, as proving an inſtinctive conſciouſneſs of liberty, implanted by the Supreme Being in the human mind; to contradict which is to inſult the moral attributes of God. Yet ſo very ſuperficial is that view of human nature upon which this boaſted argument reſts, that, if the queſtion be propoſed with any tolerable degree of correctneſs and preciſion, the reply will be almoſt uniformly favourable to the doctrine of neceſſity.

7. The notion of philoſophical liberty ſeems to be countenanced by the popular language of the ſcriptures, taken in the literal ſenſe: and ſo is anthropomorphitiſm; for the ſcripture ſpeaks of the eyes, the hands, and the ears of God, and of his moving from place to place. It alſo aſcribes human affections, ſuch as anger, grief, joy, repentance, and the like, to the Supreme Being. But it has been ſhown, that all theſe objections preſs with equal weight upon the hypotheſis which

combines liberty and prescience, and the answer which serves to repel them in one case will hold equally good in the other. So that the libertarian, to avail himself of these objections, must deny the foreknowledge of God.

8. The power of choosing without motive, or in opposition to the strongest motive, is so evidently contrary to universal experience, that many modern advocates for liberty have conceded this point to the necessarians, and represent this view of the doctrine as false and unjust. Others, more consistently, extend the dominion of the self-determining power to every voluntary act. If liberty be limited to the choice of equal things, without any preponderating motive, admitting that such a case never occurs, the power would be nugatory; but if in any instance a choice should be made where the motives were perfectly equal, the exercise of liberty would be absolutely inconsistent with the certainty of divine prescience; for the event, and all succeeding events depending upon it, could not become certain, and therefore could not be certainly foreseen till the option actually took place.

9. Hence

9. Hence it follows that the principal argument in favour of moral neceſſity, and that the inſurmountable objection againſt the exiſtence of philoſophical liberty, in any degree, and under any reſtrictions whatever, ariſes from the preſcience of God. Liberty and preſcience ſtand in direct hoſtility to each other. A philoſopher, to be conſiſtent, muſt give up one or the other. They are mutually and eſſentially contradictory, and the contradiction reſpects not the *mode* of the divine foreknowledge, of which we have no conception, but the *object* of it, which we diſtinctly comprehend. An event cannot at the ſame time be both certain and uncertain. If it certainly will come to paſs, it is abſurd to ſay that it may poſſibly not take place. To affirm that theſe things, though very myſterious, are nevertheleſs capable of being reconciled we know not how, is exactly the ſame as it would be to affirm that three and two may make ſix, though we know not how. A contradiction is a ſelf-deſtructive idea, and can have no objective exiſtence. Such are the ideas of contingency and foreknowledge.

10. The

10. The liberty of indifference, or the power of chooſing out of objects perfectly equal, if men were endued with it, would be no moral quality, nor would it have any relation to moral conduct. The actions propoſed are by ſuppoſition equally eligible in themſelves, and equally the objects of deſire antecedent to the actual choice. An election in ſuch circumſtances can poſſeſs no moral value. Much leſs can ſuch a power as this lie at the foundation of all moral conduct, and be eſſential to moral agency and moral diſcipline.

SECTION X.

Recapitulation continued. — General Obſervations concerning the Doctrine of Philoſophical Neceſſity.

SECONDLY, CONCERNING PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY.

1. The doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity agrees beſt with the moſt accurate obſervations upon human nature, and affords the eaſieſt ſolution of its moſt difficult and curious phenomena.

It

It accounts for the uniform influence of motives, for the impoſſibility of choice where motives are wanting, and for the increaſing difficulty of chooſing in proportion as motives approach to equality.

Philoſophical neceſſity is the only theory which is reconcileable to the exiſtence of virtue, and of moral obligation: in connection with the theory of aſſociation, of which indeed it is an eſſential part, it well accounts for the phenomena of habit in general, and of moral habits in particular; and it lays the only proper foundation for moral diſcipline. The judgments which men form, and the language which is commonly employed to expreſs the merit or demerit of action and character, is intelligible and correct upon the hypotheſis of neceſſity, but improper and unmeaning when applied to agents philoſophically free.

2. The doctrine of neceſſity is moſt honourable to the Deity.

It is the glory of the Supreme Being to be a neceſſary agent, that is, to be invariably influenced in all his counſels, and in all his works, by the beſt affections and the moſt honourable and beneficent deſigns; or, in other

other words, to be uniformly governed by the dictates of infinite goodneſs, and infinite wiſdom, in every choice where there is any difference in the object, or the leaſt foundation for preference. Whether the Deity may not alſo poſſeſs a power of chooſing one out of a number of objects perfectly equal, has been already conſidered. But this power, if it exiſts, is by no means inconſiſtent with the uniform influence of benevolence and wiſdom, wherever there may be a real difference however minute in the objects of choice*.

The neceſſary agency of created beings, and the certainty of event reſulting from it, conſtitute a proper foundation for certainty of foreknowledge, which is abſolutely incompatible with philoſophical liberty, under every limitation, and in every degree.

3. The doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity affords a proper ſolution of thoſe phenomena which have been commonly urged as moſt favourable to the hypotheſis of liberty, if not deciſive of its truth.

In the ſuppoſed choice out of equal things,

* Clarke on the Attributes, prop. xii.

the mind in its preference is determined by conſiderations ſo trivial that they are inſtantly forgotten if they are not at the time vigilantly marked.

The popular opinion, that in many caſes it was in the power of the agent to have choſen differently, the previous circumſtances remaining exactly the ſame, ariſes either from a miſtake of the queſtion, from a forgetfulneſs of the motives by which our choice was determined, or from the extreme difficulty of placing ourſelves in imagination in circumſtances exactly ſimilar to thoſe in which the election was made.

4. The principal objections againſt the doctrine of neceſſity, are ſuch as may be urged with equal force againſt the hypotheſis of liberty combined with the doctrine of the divine preſcience; and the ſame ſolution which applies to one caſe is equally applicable to the other. At any rate the doctrine of neceſſity is not alone reſponſible for a difficulty which preſſes with equal force upon the oppoſite hypotheſis.

That God is the only proper agent in the univerſe, that he is the author of evil natural and moral, that he is inſincere in the offers of

mercy, and unjuſt in the puniſhment of vice; that all characters and all events are predeſtinated, and that the doctrine tends to produce indolence, fataliſm, and licentiouſneſs; of theſe objections it has been ſhown, that the greater number are founded in ignorance, that they are more formidable in appearance than in reality, and that all of them apply with equal effect to the combined doctrines of human liberty and divine preſcience, as to the doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity, ſo that the ſame anſwer will ſerve for both.

It is always to be remembered, that the preſcience of an agent neceſſarily includes predeſtination, though that of a ſpectator may not. It is nonſenſe to ſay that a being does not mean to bring an event to paſs which he foreſees to be the certain and inevitable conſequence of his own previous voluntary action.

5. The difficulties peculiar to the doctrine of neceſſity are more eaſily obviated than thoſe which are peculiar to liberty.

The doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity ſuperſedes remorſe, ſo far as remorſe is founded upon the belief that in the ſame previous circumſtances it was poſſible to have acted otherwiſe. But remorſe is not repentance, nor eſ-

ſential to it. And the error upon which it is founded is pernicious in proportion as it diminiſhes moral vigilance, and ſeduces men into ſcenes of danger.

Neceſſity is charged with confounding natural and moral qualities, both being equally neceſſary, and therefore equally meritorious. But natural and moral qualities, though equally neceſſary, are no more identical than colour and ſound. And by the eſtabliſhed uſe of language, the words merit and demerit are limited to thoſe mental affections and voluntary actions, which are productive of happineſs or miſery, and which are capable of being cheriſhed or reſtrained by the application of ſuitable motives, by praiſe or blame, by reward or puniſhment.

The doctrine of neceſſity countenances the expectation of the ultimate reſtoration of all the rational creatures of God to virtue and to happineſs. Nor is this expectation, ſo dear to every virtuous and benevolent mind, contradicted either by the phenomena of nature or the declarations of revelation. This concluſion, however, does not follow from the principles of neceſſity by direct and inevitable conſequence. All that theſe prin-

ciples certainly prove is, that under the wiſe and juſt government of God, the gift of exiſtence, whether for a longer or a ſhorter period, whether finite or infinite, will not eventually prove a curſe to any of his creatures.

Upon the theory of neceſſity, the complex ideas of praiſe and blame, reward and puniſhment, are corrected, at leaſt ſo far as to exclude the uſeleſs and unfounded notion of the poſſibility of having choſen differently in circumſtances preciſely ſimilar; and likewiſe the abſurd ſuppoſition of intrinſic merit or demerit of actions independent on their conſequences. But in all other ſciences, as well as in metaphyſics and morals, popular notions muſt be corrected by the more accurate judgments of thoſe who think profoundly and philoſophically. And it has been proved to demonſtration that the principles of neceſſity, and thoſe alone, lay a proper foundation for mental diſcipline and moral government.

Neceſſity has been charged with a tendency to generate preſumption and licentiouſneſs. It has been ſaid, that God cannot puniſh what man cannot avoid. But if

all evil is remedial, which it muſt be upon the ſyſtem of neceſſity, and if all puniſhment is unjuſt which is not beneficial in its tendency, either to the individual or to the public, it cannot be unjuſt to inflict that degree of ſuffering upon an offending creature, which may be neceſſary to produce repentance and reformation in himſelf, and to make his example an awful warning to others. It is therefore the glory of the doctrine of neceſſity, that it demonſtrates the inſeparable connexion between moral and natural evil, and proves that by the eſtabliſhed courſe of nature every vice ſhall be followed by adequate puniſhment.

The objections againſt the hypotheſis of philoſophical liberty are far more difficult of ſolution than thoſe againſt the doctrine of neceſſity. If the preſcience of God be admitted in connexion with liberty in moral agents, it involves a palpable contradiction; and this hypotheſis is expoſed to all the difficulties which are regarded as moſt formidable in the theory of neceſſity. But if preſcience be denied, the Supreme Being is robbed of one of his moſt glorious attributes; confuſion and miſery are introduced into the divine government; the foundations of revelation are ſapped,

ſapped, and the Deity himſelf is expoſed to diſappointment, to vexation, and to impotent regret.

6. Some have thought that the doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity, if true, ought to be concealed, becauſe it is difficult of comprehenſion and liable to abuſe.

That ſome arguments which have been advanced by the advocates of philoſophical neceſſity, and upon which ſome of its acuteſt ſupporters have laid the principal ſtreſs, are difficult to be underſtood, cannot be denied: but the ſame may be ſaid of the arguments for the exiſtence of God. It will not, however, be readily conceded, that the doctrine itſelf is obſcure and unintelligible, or that the evidence of it is above the capacity of common minds. Nothing ſurely can be more obvious to a perſon of the leaſt reflection, than that no voluntary action can be performed or determined upon, without reaſon or inclination or both, and that there can be no change in the determination or the conduct, without a previous change in the poſture of the mind. This ſtate of the queſtion is ſo very obvious that common language is founded upon it; and it is not without ſome difficulty that a

perſon unuſed to reflection can be made to comprehend the definition of liberty of choice. It may therefore be ſaid with truth, that the language and the feelings of mankind are in favour of the doctrine of neceſſity.

But, if the doctrine be true, the diffuſion of it can do no harm. It is an eſtabliſhed and undeniable principle, that truth muſt be favourable to virtue. Nor is there any evidence that the neceſſarians are leſs virtuous, or worſe members of ſociety, or leſs attentive to diſcharge the duties of life, than the loudeſt declaimers for natural liberty.

Nevertheleſs, many ſenſible and cautious perſons, who are themſelves convinced of the truth of the doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity, ſeem to be unwilling that it ſhould be made the ſubject of diſcuſſion, leſt the general belief of it ſhould have a pernicious effect upon the public morals. But this is the kind of language which has always been held by the advocates for eſtabliſhed corruptions, and by the enemies to truth and reformation of every kind, and which ought therefore to be ſuſpected by the friends to freedom of thought and inquiry. The ſame objection was urged againſt the chriſtian religion at its

firſt

firſt promulgation, and againſt the reformation from popery. But if its futility is apparent when applied to the doctrines of theology, why ſhould it not be regarded as equally futile in its application to metaphyſics and morals?

And where can be the practical danger of the doctrine of neceſſity? It is upon the ground of moral neceſſity, and upon that alone, that the doctrine of future puniſhment and reward can be made intelligible or credible, and that the moſt powerful motives to virtue can be applied to the human mind. At any rate, the doctrine of neceſſity, if it ſhould become the popular ſyſtem, cannot be more abuſed than the notion of liberty very commonly is, by thoſe who act under the deluſive preſumption that in a ſituation preciſely ſimilar it will be in their power to chooſe differently: yet who objects for this reaſon to tell men that they are free agents?

7. The doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity is attended with many beneficial practical conſequences.

1. It makes men cautious of venturing into circumſtances of temptation, eſpecially if they have at any time been deluded into vice. Their principles teach them that ſimilar cauſes will

will produce ſimilar effects, as invariably in the moral as in the natural world, and that ſafety can only be ſecured by avoiding the ſcene of danger.

2. The doctrine of neceſſity leads thoſe who practically adopt it to lay great ſtreſs upon moral habits, to be indefatigable in cultivating virtuous affections and principles, and not to preſume upon a power of reforming at pleaſure, nor to rely upon the efficacy, or even the poſſibility, of death-bed repentance.

3. The doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity ſupplies the moſt powerful motives to virtue, by exhibiting the inſeparable connexion between natural and moral good and evil, and by demonſtrating the reaſonableneſs, and thus eſtabliſhing the credibility and increaſing the influence, of the ſcripture account of the rewards and puniſhments of a future life.

4. The doctrine of neceſſity, which ſuppoſes the intellectual and moral as well as the viſible world to be ſubject to general laws, is the fundamental principle of the philoſophical argument for the truth of chriſtianity. For, if the leading facts of the chriſtian religion are not true, the primitive chriſtians could not, in conſiſtency with the known and eſtabliſhed

bliſhed laws of the human mind, that is, they could not without a proper miracle, have acted and ſuffered as they are credibly reported to have done.

5. The doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity is inſeparably connected with that of optimiſm. It teaches us to ſee God in every thing, and every thing in God. It directs our regard to the Supreme Being, as the ſole agent in the univerſe; the proper and primary cauſe of all that happens: it reconciles the mind to all events, leading us to regard them as neceſſary parts of a great ſyſtem, which ſhall eventually produce the greateſt poſſible ſum of happineſs and virtue, both to the univerſe and to individuals; and that every pain will have its proper effect in preparing and qualifying the ſufferer for ultimate and unlimited felicity.

The hypotheſis of liberty which excludes preſcience, and which ſuppoſes that the Divine Being may be baffled and diſappointed by the perverſeneſs of his creatures, fills the reflecting mind with gloom and terror. But upon the principles of neceſſity nothing can come to paſs but what is foreknown and predeſtinated; nothing but what conſtitutes an eſſential part of

of a ſyſtem upon the whole the wiſeſt and the beſt, and what therefore a pious mind may reaſonably acquieſce and even rejoice in, as ultimately productive of the greateſt good.

6. The doctrine of the neceſſity of human actions conciliates good will to men. It leads us to regard all men as brethren, as children of the ſame wiſe and benevolent parent, who are intended to ſhare in the ſame everlaſting inheritance, and who are gradually training up under various proceſſes of moral diſcipline, ſome for a longer and others for a ſhorter period, till they become qualified for the poſſeſſion of it. By teaching us to look up to God as the prime agent, and the proper cauſe of every thing that happens, and to regard men as nothing more than inſtruments which he employs for accompliſhing his good pleaſure, it tends to ſuppreſs all reſentment, malice, and revenge; while it induces us to regard our worſt enemies with compaſſion rather than with hatred, and to return good for evil.

7. The doctrine of neceſſity ſuggeſts the moſt animating motives to exertion, for the generous purpoſe of the inſtruction and improvement of mankind, and eſpecially for the education

education of the young and tender mind in principles and habits of wiſdom and piety, of honour and virtue: for, if the influence of moral conſiderations is as invariable in definite circumſtances as that of phyſical cauſes, which is the definition of philoſophical neceſſity, we may be aſſured that no well-directed effort will be loſt.

8. The doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity, when it produces its full effect upon the mind, generates ſelf-annihilation, or that complete and habitual conformity of the will of man to the will of God, in which the true dignity and happineſs of human nature entirely conſiſt. The more ſteadily and habitually we fix our attention on this important point, that all things are under the beſt direction, and invariably cooperating in the beſt manner to accompliſh the beſt end, the more ſhall we be diſpoſed to acquieſce and to rejoice in all that happens, and to ſubmit our own limited views, and erroneous deſires, to the decrees of Divine Providence. And in the end, the will of the pious and upright mind will be ſo completely abſorbed in that of God, as to deſire nothing to happen different from what actually comes to paſs, and to aſpire after

after no other honour or felicity than that of being a humble coadjutor with God, in the accompliſhment of his magnificent deſign of univerſal order, virtue and happineſs*.

* General references upon the ſubject of liberty and neceſſity are:

Hobbes on Neceſſity.
Controverſy between Clarke and Leibnitz.
Collins on Neceſſity.
Edwards on the Will.
Hume's Eſſays, vol. ii. numb. 8.
Hartley on Man, part i. Concluſion.
Prieſtley's Illuſtrations of the Doctrine of Neceſſity.
Correſpondence between Dr. Price and Dr. Prieſtley.
Palmer's Remarks on Prieſtley, and Prieſtley's Reply.
Reid on the Active Powers, eſſay iv.
Dr. Gregory's Eſſay on the Difference between the Relation of Motive and Action, and that of Cauſe and Effect.
Crombie, Eſſay on Philoſophical Neceſſity.
Godwin's Enquiry concerning Polit. Juſtice, book iv. ch. 7—9.

CHAP-

CHAPTER X.

CONCERNING POWER.

POWER IS THAT QUALITY OR ATTRIBUTE OF ANY BEING WHICH PRODUCES CHANGE IN THE NATURE, PROPERTIES, OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THINGS. Thus we ſay, that clay becomes hard, and wax ſoft, by the power of heat. A bee is ſaid to have power to build a cell, a bird to make a neſt, a man to conſtruct a houſe or a ſhip, and the like.

FIRST, POWER is aſcribed to INANIMATE SUBSTANCES.

1. It is obſerved that certain CONSEQUENTS regularly follow certain ANTECEDENTS. Wax applied to the fire diſſolves; a needle offered to a magnet moves towards it; a ſtone projected falls to the ground; a feather held near an excited electric is firſt attracted and then repelled, and the like.

2. Theſe antecedents are called CAUSES, and the conſequents EFFECTS: the unknown energy by which the change is produced is called

called POWER, and is commonly ſuppoſed to reſide in the cauſe, that is, in the immediate antecedent. Thus, a magnet is ſaid to have power to attract iron; water has power to diſſolve ſalt; a mirror has power to reflect rays of light, and the like.

3. All that we know of the ſubject is, that certain changes uniformly ſucceed to certain previous circumſtances; from which we infer, that there is SOME SUFFICIENT REASON FOR THIS CONSTANT CONJUNCTION. But what the nature of this connexion is, what the power by which the change is effected, or where that power reſides, are ſubjects of which we are totally ignorant, and concerning which we have no means of information.

4. As it is a received principle amongſt philoſophers, that no being can act where it does not exiſt, from whence it is inferred that matter cannot act beyond its ſurface; and as it is known that ultimate atoms, if any ſuch there be, are ſeparated from each other by ſpheres of repulſion within the ſpheres of the attraction of coheſion, it is concluded that all the active powers which are vulgarly believed to reſide in matter, are in truth energies of the Divine Being, exerted uniformly in different

different circumſtances, agreeably to certain laws, which for the benefit of his creatures he has been pleaſed to preſcribe to himſelf*.

Locke, and others, are miſtaken in repreſenting the idea of power as an idea of ſenſation, acquired by obſerving the changes which take place in objects around us, whether agents or patients. Power is not an object of ſenſe. All that our ſenſes teach us is, that certain phenomena are invariably conjoined with certain previous circumſtances; but of the mode of connection, or of the energy by which the change is produced, we are left in total ignorance†.

6. Powers are either attributes of inanimate ſubſtances, or divine energies exerted according to certain preſcribed laws. If they are attributes of inanimate ſubſtances, the effects produced by them in given circumſtances are neceſſary effects, and could not have happened otherwiſe, the previous circumſtances being the ſame. In this ſenſe, every ſuch cauſe is a *neceſſary cauſe*. But if all powers are divine energies, the effects pro-

* Price and Prieſtley, page 5. 230.
Price's Diſſertations, page 39, &c.

† Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xxi. ſect. 1, 2.

duced by them are no further neceſſary than as it is the will of God that ſuch effects ſhould take place, under certain circumſtances. And the immutability of the courſe of nature in this caſe depends, not upon the neceſſary operation of the powers of nature, but upon the immutability of the divine character.

7. The word power, when applied to inanimate ſubſtances, like the words principle, electricity, magnetiſm, gravitation, &c. is a term invented to expreſs the unknown cauſe of known effects which are reducible to certain general laws.

8. Conſtant conjunction is a proof of *neceſſary connexion* between antecedents and conſequents, if powers are attributes of inanimate ſubſtances. But if all powers are divine energies, the conſtant conjunction of antecedents and conſequents proves nothing more than the immutability of the divine purpoſe; there being no other aſſignable reaſon for the undeviating uniformity of the courſe of nature. But as God is perfectly wiſe and benevolent, the effect is equally certain as if it was mechanical and involuntary, in all caſes where there is a ground of preference. The neceſſity in theſe inſtances is not phyſical but

moral. And with this reſtriction it may be allowed as a general principle, that conſtant conjunction implies neceſſary connexion.

9. It is difficult to aſcertain whether powers are, properly ſpeaking, attributes of inanimate ſubſtances. To allow that they are, ſeems to imply that power may exiſt without an agent, and that beings may act where they do not exiſt. This abſurdity follows, if, for example, gravitation is ſuppoſed to be a power inherent in matter, by which bodies act upon each other at immenſe diſtances. But, on the contrary, to deny that powers may be attributes of inanimate ſubſtances, leads to the concluſion that nothing exiſts in the univerſe but God and his energies; which coincides with pantheiſm, and even tends to atheiſm.

SECONDLY, POWER may be conſidered as an ATTRIBUTE OF MIND.

POWER, in this view of it, may be defined, the CAPACITY OF CARRYING INTO EFFECT THE DETERMINATIONS OF THE WILL.

The philoſophers who maintain that power is an attribute of the human mind, argue,

1. From conſciouſneſs and obſervation. I will to walk, to ſpeak, to write; the feet, the

lips, and the fingers inſtantly obey; and I am as conſcious that I perform the action, as that I form the volition.

Other agents alſo appear to poſſeſs a ſimilar power of carrying their volitions into effect.

2. They affirm that we have a CONCEPTION of power, though we cannot define it. The frequent and proper uſe of the word in the Engliſh language, and of correſponding words in all languages, proves that all men have a conception of power, and therefore poſſeſs the attribute*.

The philoſophers who deny that power is an attribute of the human mind, contend on the contrary,

1. That we have no conſciouſneſs of its exiſtence.

All that we are conſcious of is, volition and the effect produced. That we are conſcious of exerting power in any caſe, is peremptorily denied. What ſome call a conſciouſneſs of power, is nothing more than a belief that the effect will follow the volition; which belief is ſometimes erroneous. A man who is deprived of the faculty of ſpeech, or the uſe of his limbs, by a ſtroke of the palſy, ſtill

* Reid on Active Powers, eſſay i.

feels

feels what is called a conſciouſneſs of power: that is, he expects ſpeech and motion to follow volition as uſual, till by experience he is undeceived.

2. Theſe philoſophers further argue, that our total ignorance of the manner in which muſcular motion is produced, proves that the mind is not the efficient and proper cauſe of this wonderful effect.

Every proper cauſe comprehends its own effect. A man who makes a watch, or who builds a houſe, forms a diſtinct idea of the effect he intends to produce, and of the means neceſſary for accompliſhing his purpoſe. A muſician who underſtands his art, and who by his ſkill in touching an inſtrument brings forth the tones, and produces the harmony which his mind previouſly conceives, is ſo far the proper cauſe of the effect produced. But the man who, turning the winch of a machine, the conſtruction of which he does not comprehend, produces a melody which he neither underſtands nor expects, is no more the proper cauſe of the effect produced than the unconſcious inſtrument itſelf. And ſimilar to this is the ſituation of the mind in the production of muſcular motion.

Of the nature of muſcular motion we are completely ignorant. The immediate effect is very different from that intended by the agent. The deſign is to move a limb: but the effect actually produced is ſome affection of the brain, of which we are quite ignorant; which, being gradually communicated to the adjacent parts, at length deſcends to the muſcle in queſtion, and, by a forcible contraction of the fibres, in a way of which we are alſo profoundly ignorant, it moves the limb. But what the medium of nervous influence may be, in what manner the muſcular fibres are excited to action with ſuch aſtoniſhing force; and by what chance, or ſagacity, the proper nerves and muſcles are affected, ſo that we ſeldom or never commit the miſtake of moving one limb when we deſign to move another, are myſteries to the ſolution of which the human intellect is unequal.

Hence it follows:

1. That power is not an attribute of the human mind: and as a divine energy is neceſſary to account for the exiſtence of ſenſations in conſequence of ſenſory vibrations, ſo it ſeems equally neceſſary, to account for the connexion between volition and muſcular

cular motion. Thus God appears to be the primary cauſe of all the phenomena of mind as well as of thoſe of matter, and the only proper agent in the univerſe.

2. We have no adequate idea, or conception, of power. It is not an object of ſenſe, nor can it be acquired by reflection. The uſe of the word to expreſs the unknown cauſe of known effects, no more proves that we have a diſtinct poſitive conception of the thing, than the uſe of the words gravitation, coheſion, repulſion, and the like, proves that we have diſtinct ideas correſponding to thoſe terms.

3. If the queſtion be aſked, Whether we may not poſſeſs power, as we do perception, though we do not comprehend it? it may be replied, That though we do not underſtand the nature of perception, we are conſcious of its exiſtence; but we are not conſcious of the exiſtence of power.

4. According to Dr. Hartley's theory, muſcular action is excited by the vibrations of the motory nerves. Theſe vibrations are originally excited by irritation; and, being communicated to the brain, they become aſſociated with and modified by ſenſory vibra-

tions, and by degrees with that ſtate of the brain which generates, or is uniformly aſſociated with, the affection of deſire. In this caſe the motion is ſaid to be perfectly voluntary. It afterwards becomes aſſociated with ſenſory vibrations, or cluſters of vibrations, or miniatures of leſs magnitude, or even with other motory vibrations, ſo that one muſcular motion will generate another without any perception of the mind or act of the will, as in ſpeaking, walking, or performing upon an inſtrument of muſic.

It is obvious to obſerve, that how ingenious and plauſible ſoever this theory may be, it by no means accounts, nor was it intended to account, for the nature of power, nor does it explain the manner in which the nervous particles are made to vibrate, or in what way the vibrations of the nerve affect the muſcular fibres*.

5. Dr. Reid's theory of power reduces itſelf to a concluſion ſimilar to that which has been already ſtated, though he begins with a pompous proof of the exiſtence of power in the human mind. He even nearly coincides

* Hartley on Man, ch. i. ſect. 3. ch. ii. ſect. 7.

with

with Mr. Hume, whoſe hypotheſis he profeſſes to ridicule and explode. His words, page 57, are: "We perceive one event to follow another according to eſtabliſhed laws of nature: and we are accuſtomed to call the firſt "the cauſe, and the laſt the effect, without "knowing what is the bond that unites "them." And again, page 56: "How far "we are properly efficient cauſes, how far occaſional cauſes, I cannot pretend to determine*."

* Locke's Eſſay, book ii. ch. xxi.
Hume's Eſſays, vol. ii. ſect. vii.
Search's (Tucker's) Light of Nature Purſued, vol. i. part i. ch. iv.

CHAP-

CHAPTER XI.

CONCERNING IMMATERIALITY AND MATERIALISM.

SECTION I.

The Queſtion ſtated.—Arguments for each Hypotheſis.

THE IMMATERIALISTS contend that man is compounded of two diſtinct ſubſtances: BODY, which according to them is extended, ſolid, inert ſubſtance; and MIND, which is percipient, active, and indiviſible ſubſtance.

Of immaterialiſts, ſome, as Dr. Clarke and Dr. Price, maintain that mind has one property, viz. extenſion, in common with matter, and conſequently that it occupies ſpace, and has a proper locality, or, as the ſchoolmen expreſs it, ubiety. This is alſo the vulgar opinion*.

* Correſpondence of Price and Prieſtley, page 54, 55.

Others,

Others, with the Carteſians, Andrew Baxter, and Watts, more conſiſtently and philoſophically contend, that mind has no common property with matter, that it is inextended, does not occupy ſpace, and has no proper locality*.

The MATERIALISTS, as they are commonly called, though with ſome impropriety of expreſſion, maintain, that man conſiſts of one uniform ſubſtance, the object of the ſenſes; and that perception, with its modes, is the reſult, neceſſary or otherwiſe, of the organization of the brain.

They alſo think that the immaterialiſts are miſtaken in their repreſentations of the eſſential properties of matter.

ARGUMENTS FOR IMMATERIALISM.

I. Perception and its modes, viz. memory, intellect, affection, volition, and the like, have no reſemblance to, nor correſpondence nor affinity with, any of the known properties of matter, ſuch as extenſion, reſiſtance, ſolidity, and the like, ſo that it is unreaſonable to conclude that they are the reſult

* Correſpondence of Price and Prieſtley, page 370, 371.

of

of theſe properties, however modified: attributes ſo different muſt inhere in different ſubjects. To this argument the materialiſts reply,

1. That ignorance of the connexion between different properties of the ſame ſubject is no objection againſt their coexiſtence, or even their mutual dependance. We ſee no connexion between the colour and the odour of a roſe, the malleability, fixity, and ſpecific gravity of gold, and the like. Our knowledge of the coexiſtence of various properties and powers in the ſame ſubſtance, is acquired only by obſervation and experience: we know nothing of real eſſences.

2. The argument proves too much. Mechanical, electrical, and magnetic attractions and repulſions, chemical principles, and vegetable life, have no more reſemblance to the obvious properties of matter than perception. Do they alſo require an immaterial ſubject?

II. The eſſential properties of matter, namely, ſolidity, extenſion, inertia, and its acknowledged impercipiency except in an organized ſtate, are ſaid to be abſolutely inconſiſtent with the material hypotheſis.

The materialiſts, in reply, contend that

theſe

theſe properties either do not belong to matter, or that they are not inconſiſtent with perception. Their arguments will be produced under the next head.

ARGUMENTS FOR MATERIALISM.

That perception, with its modes, is the reſult of the organical ſtructure of the brain, has been argued from the following conſiderations:

When there is no organization, as far as our obſervation extends, there is no perception.

Wherever ſuch an organic ſtructure as the brain exiſts, perception exiſts.

Where this organization is imperfect, perception is imperfect.

Where the organization is ſound, vigorous, and healthy, perception is proportionably vigorous and clear.

Where the organization is impaired, perception is enfeebled and obſcured.

And when the organization ceaſes, perception appears to ceaſe.

It is generally admitted by thoſe who have thought upon the ſubject, that certain ſtates of the brain exactly correſpond with certain ſtates of mind, and every change in the ſtate of the brain is aſſociated with a correſponding

change in the ſtate of the mind. Diſorders in the brain are accompanied with proportionable diſorders in the intellect, as in drowſineſs, intemperance, fever, delirium, and lunacy. If the brain remains unimpaired, intellect continues even upon the verge of diſſolution, as in conſumptions, dropſies, and other diſeaſes which do not immediately affect the head*. It is therefore as reaſonable to conclude that perception is the reſult of organization, as that pointing the hour is the reſult of the mechaniſm of a watch, or that the colour and odour of the violet is the conſequence of its peculiar ſtructure: and we have as good reaſon to believe that thought is an affection or attribute of the brain, as that fragrance is a property of a roſe, or that light and heat proceed from the ſun.

SECTION II.

Objections againſt the Hypotheſis of Materialiſm, ſtated and ſolved.

BY the adverſaries of the hypotheſis of materialiſm it is urged, in a lofty and triumphant tone, that the known eſſential proper-

* Hence ſome have inferred, though unphiloſophically, the immateriality and ſeparate exiſtence of the ſoul.

ties

ties of matter are ABSOLUTELY INCONSISTENT with perception and activity, the eſſential attributes of mind.

Theſe properties are SOLIDITY, EXTENSION and DIVISIBILITY, INERTIA, and the acknowledged IMPERCIPIENCY of ultimate atoms, or of matter in general, in an unorganized ſtate.

I. SOLIDITY, by which is meant the cauſe of impenetrability*, is ſaid to be inconſiſtent with the power of thinking. To this aſſertion the materialiſts reply,

1. That admitting ſolidity to be an attribute of matter, it cannot be proved to be inconſiſtent with perception. No evidence is produced for this purpoſe but gratuitous aſſertion, which cannot be admitted in oppoſition to facts, nor to probable appearances.

2. There is no reaſon to aſcribe ſolidity to matter as a diſtinct property.

The ſolidity of matter is inferred only from its reſiſtance. Now all the phenomena

* Mr. Locke calls ſolidity an idea of ſenſation; Dr. Price claſſes it amongſt thoſe ideas which are derived from the underſtanding only. The truth is, that the word is unconnected with any poſitive idea. It expreſſes no more than the unknown cauſe of *reſiſtance*.—Locke on the Underſtanding, book ii. ch. iv. Price's Review of Morals, page 26—28.

of

of reſiſtance may be accounted for by that repulſive power, the exiſtence of which, in a degree far beyond that of any artificial force which can be applied to overcome it, is univerſally admitted. It is contrary, therefore, to the received rules of philoſophiſing, to introduce a new and imaginary cauſe, to explain phenomena which may be ſufficiently accounted for by another cauſe already known to exiſt*.

But if matter be not ſolid it is not impenetrable: the ſtrongeſt repulſive force actually exiſting may be overcome by a ſuperior power; and the hypotheſis of the penetrability of matter may, perhaps, afford the beſt

* The following phenomena, amongſt others, are adduced as proofs of the exiſtence of a repulſive force diffuſed over the ſurfaces of bodies without the ſphere of coheſion.

1. The rolling of a dew-drop upon a cabbage-leaf, and the motion of a fly upon the ſurface of a pool.

2. The equable reflexion of light from the ſurface of a mirror.

3. The viſibility of the electric ſpark in paſſing from link to link of a metal chain.

4. The extreme difficulty of bringing two bodies within the ſphere of each other's coheſion.

5. The compreſſion of all bodies by cold, their expanſion by heat, and the irreſiſtible force of this expanſive power.—Prieſtley on Matter and Spirit, ſect. ii.

ſolution

ſolution of the phenomena of tranſparent bodies.

If matter be penetrable, it approximates very nearly to Dr. Clarke's and to the vulgar hypotheſis of immaterial ſubſtance; and the advocates for this doctrine can have no juſt objection againſt the hypotheſis which maintains man to be of one uniform ſubſtance, and thought the reſult of organization. It is to be preſumed that theſe philoſophers will not aſſert that immaterial ſubſtance, as ſuch, is neceſſarily percipient*.

II. Matter is a DIVISIBLE SUBSTANCE; perception is an INDIVISIBLE PRINCIPLE: therefore it cannot be a property of matter. To this objection it is replied,

1. That of the nature of perception we are totally ignorant. The mind can no more comprehend † this faculty than the eye can ſee itſelf. And it would be as rational for a man ignorant of the ſtructure of the eye to maintain that the eye was an indiviſible or-

* Price and Prieſtley, page 268—273.

† Non valet tantum animus ut ſeipſum ipſe videat; at, ut oculus ſic animus ſe non videns, alia cernit.—Cic. Tuſc. Quæſt. lib. i. ſect. xxviii.

gan, as that perception is an indiviſible principle.

2. The ſimplicity of the *faculty* cannot be inferred from the ſimplicity of the *feeling* of perception. A white colour, the flavour of a compound medicine, an abſtract idea, and the like, are judged to be ſimple feelings, but they are in fact produced by the coaleſcence of many ſimple ſenſations and ideas.

3. The principles of heat, of acidity, of vegetation, of animal life, and many others, are allowed to belong to matter; but theſe principles have as great pretenſions to indiviſibility as perception.

4. An indiviſible principle may as well exiſt in a diviſible ſubſtance, as a diviſible idea, ſuch for example as the idea of a yard, or a mile, in an indiviſible ſubſtance*.

5. Many immaterialiſts admit the extenſion and locality of ſpirit; the difficulty therefore preſſes equally upon this hypotheſis as upon materialiſm.

To evade this concluſion by maintaining that ſpirits, though extended, are indiſcerptible, is trifling, it is not reaſoning. The

* Hallet on Scripture, vol. i. page 216—219.

ſimple

ſimple queſtion is, Whether an inextended principle can be a property of an extended ſubſtance?

III. Matter is ESSENTIALLY INERT, mind ESSENTIALLY ACTIVE; therefore the ſubſtances are eſſentially different.

But this fact is denied by the materialiſts. Inertia, if by this expreſſion be meant the entire abſence of all active power, is not a property of matter. The laws of communication of motion do not prove it. Andrew Baxter's laboured argument, ſo far as it is ſelf-conſiſtent, amounts to no more than that every effect muſt have an adequate cauſe. All we know of matter is active powers; and all improvements in philoſophy, and particularly in chemiſtry, tend to confirm this doctrine, and to extend our knowledge of the energies of inanimate nature*.

IV. It is not pretended that ULTIMATE ATOMS, that is, that the ſmalleſt particles into which matter is ever actually divided,

* Baxter on the Soul, vol. i.
Franklin's Works, page 479.
Prieſtley on Matter and Spirit, page 17.
Price and Prieſtley, page 236.

are poſſeſſed of PERCIPIENCY; it is therefore incredible that any combination, organization, motion, or colliſion of inſenſible atoms, ſhould produce thought. The properties of the whole are no more than the aggregate of the properties of the parts; and magnitude and motion, however combined, can produce nothing but magnitude and motion ſtill.

To this very plauſible objection ſome have replied,

1. By maintaining that all atoms poſſeſs an imperfect conſciouſneſs, which is improved by organization: but this is an unſupported hypotheſis*.

2. Others have aſſerted that all atoms may poſſeſs the ſame original powers, which in ſome circumſtances may be dormant, in others they may become ſenſible. In chemical compounds it often happens that the reſult of the proceſs is a tertium quid, the properties of which are eſſentially different from thoſe of the component ſubſtances, and could never have been predicted from them. In like manner, the latent powers of perception which

* Hobbes's Phyſic. c. xxv. ſect. v.

each

each particle poſſeſſes may by organization be brought into action*.

3. The difficulty preſſes equally upon the hypotheſis of immaterialiſm.

The ſuppoſed immaterial ſubſtance either perceives and acts in a ſtate of ſeparation from the body, or not.

To ſay that it can perceive and act in a ſtate of ſeparation from the body, is a gratuitous hypotheſis, contradicted by all the phenomena of human nature, and unſupported by a ſingle fact.

But if ſeparate conſciouſneſs be denied to the immaterial part of man, it is as inconceivable how a thinking being can be formed by the union of unconſcious immaterial ſubſtance with unconſcious matter, or of an unthinking ſoul with an unthinking body,

* Qu. Do not appearances rather favour the ſuppoſition of different kinds of elementary atoms, ſome only of which poſſeſs the percipient principle ?

It is well known that many ſeeds will preſerve for years their vegetative power; but this principle does not diſcover itſelf except in certain favourable circumſtances.—Clarke and Collins, page 116. Cooper's Tracts, page 275—285.

as by the organization of impercipient particles.

GENERAL REMARKS.

1. This controverſy was once conſidered as of great importance, the immateriality of the ſoul being regarded as a proof of its natural immortality; for it was preſumed that what is immaterial muſt neceſſarily be incorruptible.

But, admitting the premiſes, the concluſion will not follow. What proof is there that immaterial ſubſtances are neceſſarily indiſſoluble and immortal? We may make what ſuppoſitions we pleaſe; but our imaginations are no criteria of real exiſtences. Continuance in being depends upon the will of God, who may either perpetuate a material, or extinguiſh an immaterial ſubſtance. Of his will in this inſtance we can only judge from natural appearances, or immediate revelation.

2. How far materialiſm is conſiſtent with identity, has been already conſidered. Though the whole man is deſtroyed by death, yet the re-organization of the ſame particles will reproduce the ſame individual being; and a ſimilar re-organization even of different par-

ticles would be to all practical purpoſes a reproduction of the ſame perſon. For, of what conſequence is it to what maſs of atoms a particular organization is applied, and the correſponding ſyſtem of feelings annexed? At any rate Dr. Watts's hypotheſis of permanent ſtamina would preſerve the individuality of the reſurrection-man as perfectly as the hypotheſis of immaterialiſm itſelf.

3. The denial of ſolidity and inertia reduces matter, very nearly, to the commonly received notion of ſpirit*; ſo that Dr. Prieſtley's hypotheſis may with as much propriety be called ſpiritualiſm as materialiſm. The true queſtion is, Does man conſiſt of one uniform ſubſtance, or is he compounded of

* Dr. Price ſays, page 85: "Upon the whole, it may, "perhaps, be poſſible to convince me that there is no ſuch "thing as matter; and Dr. Prieſtley has contributed a "little to it. But I cannot be convinced that there is no "ſuch thing as ſpirit; meaning by ſpirit, ſuch a thinking "intelligent nature as I feel myſelf to be." Upon which Dr. Prieſtley juſtly obſerves, page 86, that Dr. Price and he "are very nearly agreed, though in words they differ "ſo widely." Dr. Prieſtley's matter being penetrable extenſion without ſolidity, nearly coincides with Dr. Price's ſpirit, or immaterial ſubſtance.

two distinct substances, which, for aught that appears, have no common property* ?

* Clarke's Letters to Dodwell, and Controversy with Collins.
Doddridge's Lectures, lect. 94—96.
Priestley's Disquisitions, and Correspondence with Price.
Cooper's Tracts, page 167, &c.
W. Belsham's Essays, vol. i. ch. ii. essay xii. xiii.
Baxter on the Soul, part i.

CHAP.

CHAPTER XII.

CONCERNING THE NATURAL EVIDENCE OF A FUTURE LIFE.

SECTION I.

Inconclusive Arguments.

FIRST. The soul is immaterial, distinct from the body, and naturally indiscerptible, incorruptible, and immortal.

ANSWER.

1. The existence of an immaterial soul distinct from the body in which it resides, and which it is supposed to animate, cannot be proved, and must not be assumed as the foundation of so important an argument. The evidence for and against this hypothesis has been discussed in the preceding chapter.

2. That a human soul, if such a being should be supposed to exist, is capable of perception and activity in a state of separation from the body, is an arbitrary hypothesis,

theſis, unſupported by a ſingle fact, and contrary to every known phenomenon of human nature. It is indeed ſo unphiloſophical, that the ſuppoſition is abandoned by the moſt rational and judicious advocates of the immaterial ſyſtem.

3. That immateriality neceſſarily implies indiſcerptibility, incorruptibility, and natural immortality, is an aſſertion perfectly gratuitous; a mere argumentum ad ignorantiam. For any thing that appears or can poſſibly be proved to the contrary, immaterial ſubſtance may be as liable, or even more liable to injury and diſſolution than matter itſelf. We may fancy what we pleaſe, but vague hypotheſes are not to be admitted as ſerious argument. The truth is, that of the nature and contexture of immaterial ſubſtance we know abſolutely nothing, and can therefore have no right either to affirm or deny any thing concerning it.

4. If the exiſtence of an immaterial principle in man could be eſtabliſhed by proof, no argument could be drawn from this fact in favour of a future life. Continued, or revived exiſtence depends wholly upon the pleaſure of God, who can with equal eaſe extinguiſh an immaterial

immaterial, and preſerve or renew the exiſtence and powers of a material, being.

SECONDLY. The natural deſire of life, and horror at the thought of annihilation, is intended by the author of the human conſtitution as an intimation that man is deſigned for immortality.

ANSWER.

1. The deſire of life, though very general, is not an inſtinctive principle, but generated by the preponderance of pleaſing aſſociations, which lay a foundation for pleaſing hopes; together with a ſtrong apprehenſion, whether well or ill founded, of the pains of diſſolution. When pain preponderates over pleaſure, life ceaſes to be pleaſing, and exiſtence ceaſes to be deſirable. As to what ſome have pretended, that exiſtence in pain is preferable to non-exiſtence, it is mere rant, and has no foundation either in reaſon or experience.

2. The love of life, however generated, and independent on all connexion with future exiſtence, is a principle of great importance, and particularly, as a preventative of ſuicide upon trivial occaſions.

3. The

3. The desire of life, however universal and predominant, no more proves that man will be immortal, than the desire of health, ease, or opulence, proves that he will be rich, or free from disease and pain.

THIRDLY. Conscience is a natural and instinctive principle, implanted in the breast to direct the moral conduct of men, and the sanctions of her dictates are the rewards and punishments of a future life; of the existence of which, it forms a strong presumption.

ANSWER.

Conscience is not instinctive. It is the acquired habit of referring our actions to an established rule, and of applauding or condemning them as they agree or disagree with the standard assumed. Conscience depends wholly upon education, both as to the standard and the sanction. The well informed person guides his moral conduct by a correct rule, and is influenced to the practice of virtue by various considerations relative both to the present, and the future life. But a man whose moral education has been defective

and

and erroneous, forms a falſe judgment of the rule of right, and is often influenced by public opinion, or ſome other motive foreign to the expectation of a future exiſtence.

FOURTHLY. The capacity which the human mind naturally poſſeſſes for progreſſive and endleſs improvement, is a farther preſumption that it is intended for endleſs exiſtence.

ANSWER.

This argument, though often and triumphantly inſiſted upon as abſolutely unanſwerable, is contrary to palpable facts. So far are the faculties of the mind from improving with age, that it is notorious that as men advance in life, and as the vigour of the body declines, the ſenſes become more obtuſe, the apprehenſion more dull, the imagination leſs fervid, the memory leſs tenacious, and the judgment leſs correct; prejudices become more fixed and unalterable, new ideas are acquired with greater difficulty, and the ſtock of knowledge is daily diminiſhing. Exceptions to theſe facts are very uncommon. And the juſt concluſion from theſe premiſes ſeems to be, that the intellectual

tellectual principle declines and decays with the body, and ultimately dies with it, without any hope of renovation but what arises from the Christian doctrine of a resurrection of the dead.

FIFTHLY. The justice of God requires that there should be a future state of existence in which the characters of moral agents shall be publicly discriminated, and all shall be openly rewarded or punished, in exact proportion to the real merit or demerit of their respective characters.

ANSWER.

1. The justice of God requires that he should do no injury to his creatures, that he should invade no right, and deprive them of no blessing to which they have a just claim, and that misery should not preponderate over happiness through the whole extent of individual existence, so that being should upon the whole be a curse to any of his creatures. Beyond this, no percipient being can have any claim upon the justice of his maker.

2. It cannot be proved to be an act of injustice, that a being should be brought into existence to answer some important and beneficial

neficial purpoſe under the divine government, and that after paſſing through a variety of ſcenes diverſified with pleaſure and pain, but in which happineſs predominates upon the whole, when the end for which he was created is accompliſhed, he ſhould ceaſe to exiſt.

3. Virtue is the conduct which leads to the greateſt ultimate happineſs; vice, that which leads to miſery. And in the preſent ſtate the preponderance of happineſs is, generally ſpeaking, very conſiderably on the ſide of virtue; a happineſs ariſing from the conſciouſneſs of moral worth, from peace of mind, from general eſteem, from pleaſing reflections, and joyful expectations. And the tendency of virtue to happineſs is far greater than a ſuperficial obſerver would imagine. Alſo, the tendencies of vice to produce miſery are very ſtrong; and that diſordered ſtate of mind which either conſtitutes vice or is produced by it, is a ſtate of uneaſineſs, and often, even of torment, which no external proſperity can alleviate, or compenſate. So that, generally ſpeaking, every purpoſe of ſubſtantial juſtice is anſwered independent of a future ſtate.

4. Though

4. Though the exact correſpondence of the final ſtate of moral agents with their real character under the government of God, approves itſelf to the underſtanding as a beautiful and deſirable arrangement; yet, independent of revelation, it would not be eaſy to prove, that ſuch an arrangement was either neceſſary, or expedient. Nor can it be proved to be impoſſible that the ends of the divine government may be beſt anſwered, by treating all in ſuch a manner that none may have reaſon to complain, and that ſome might have a greater ſhare of happineſs than could reaſonably have been expected to have fallen to their lot.

5. Much leſs can it be proved, that juſtice requires that the exact adjuſtment of good and evil, to the moral characters of men, ſhould be made apparent to every individual. This indeed would be ſcarcely practicable, unleſs every creature were omniſcient. And what obligation can the Supreme Being be under to give an account of his government to all his creatures? It is amply ſufficient if every percipient and intelligent being has reaſon to be ſatisfied that he is himſelf not treated with injuſtice. If it be urged that the public triumph

triumph of virtue, in the ultimate equal distribution of punishments and rewards, would be a powerful encouragement to the practice of it; it may be answered, that if the practice of virtue be sufficiently enforced by the discipline to which moral agents are subjected in the present life, what necessity is there for further sanctions or more powerful motives?

6. It must however be admitted, that the moral state of the world is upon the whole favourable to the expectation of a future life, as will hereafter be explained.

SIXTHLY. It has been argued, that it is more probable that we shall live hereafter, than it was a hundred years ago that we should live at all*.

ANSWER.

Though the causes which necessarily led to the production of the being which now actually exists, were themselves in existence a hundred years ago, yet their operation being unknown they could excite no expectation. And by parity of reason, whatever certainty there may be of a future existence; yet, if we are ignorant of the grounds of that certainty,

* Paine's Age of Reason.

they can excite no rational expectation of a life to come.

FINALLY, Few perſons will be diſpoſed to maintain, that on the hypotheſis of atheiſm the appearances of things lay any juſt foundation for the expectation of a future ſtate of exiſtence. Nor can the arguments for the ſoul's immortality in the Phædo of Plato, that contraries produce each other, and that all knowledge is merely the reminiſcence of a pre-exiſtent ſtate, be now thought to prove any thing more, than the deplorable ignorance and perplexity of the ſtrongeſt minds when deſtitute of the light of divine revelation.

SECTION II.

Probable Arguments for a future Life. General Remarks.

ASSURED as we are by divine revelation of the future exiſtence of man, it is no leſs certain that the preſent ſtate of things muſt be ſo conſtituted, as to have a bearing towards it, and an intimate inſeparable connexion with it: ſo that, to a being who could comprehend

prehend the whole of the divine plan, the reſtoration of the human race to life and immortality would appear to be an indiſpenſable part of the general ſyſtem, and all the phenomena of the natural and moral world would be ſeen to point towards it, and to harmonize with it. It is alſo reaſonable to expect that ſome of thoſe phenomena, which have an aſpect towards a future life, and which admit of the moſt ſatisfactory ſolution upon that hypotheſis, would occur to the notice of an upright and inquiſitive mind; and that ſuch phenomena would appear more numerous, and that the evidence would riſe, in proportion to the improvements that are made in phyſical and moral ſcience. But whether this evidence would ever become ſo clear and diſtinct, as to countervail the objections ariſing from the contrary phenomena, to preclude all anxious ſuſpicions, and to afford complete ſatisfaction to a ſerious and candid inquirer, will admit of very conſiderable doubt.

The principal phenomena which countenance the doctrine of a future life, by admitting of the beſt, and perhaps the only

ſolution upon that hypotheſis, are the following.

1. The capacity which, ſo far as appears, is peculiar to man, of forming expectations of a ſtate of exiſtence after death, of being ſtrongly impreſſed by theſe expectations, of deſiring or fearing a future life, and of regulating his conduct by an habitual regard to it. Why is man allowed this painful pre-eminence, if, like the brute, he is only the creature of an hour?

2. The moral conſtitution of human nature is beſt explained upon the ſuppoſition of a future life. Men are placed in circumſtances which neceſſarily generate the benevolent affections, and that in a degree which often induces them to make the greateſt ſacrifices to the good of others, without a proſpect or even a poſſibility of adequate recompenſe if there be no future life. This conſtitution of things is indeed productive of great benefit to the ſyſtem, even if there ſhould be no ſtate of exiſtence after the preſent; but every difficulty vaniſhes if a future life be admitted, in which all generous ſacrifices to the public good will be ſuitably and amply recompenſed

recompenſed to the individual himſelf. This is the only ſuppoſition which eſtabliſhes moral obligation upon a firm and ſolid baſis, which completely reconciles generoſity and wiſdom, benevolence and ſelf-love, and which makes human nature conſiſtent with itſelf.

3. The appearances of a moral government over the world; the tendencies of things to the encouragement and reward of virtue, and to the diſcountenance and puniſhment of vice; the exiſtence of conſcience, not indeed as an inſtinctive and infallible principle, but as a capacity in man to refer his actions to a moral rule, and to a future retribution, and of deriving exquiſite pleaſure or pain from the deciſions of this interior tribunal. Theſe facts conſidered in connexion with the many exceptions to the general rule; the inſtances in which vice is apparently triumphant, and virtue depreſſed and abandoned; the want of a public retribution exactly correſponding with men's moral character; the caſes of martyrs and others who are ſufferers in the cauſe of truth and virtue without a poſſibility of compenſation, and the like, naturally tend to excite the ex-

pectation of a future life in the minds of ſerious inquirers who have formed juſt, however inadequate, conceptions of the moral character of God. And if theſe facts do not prove that the creatures of God have any demands upon his juſtice, they are at leaſt of ſuch a nature as to be with great difficulty accounted for, if the doctrine of a future life is denied: but to admit of a very eaſy ſolution, if the preſent be regarded as a ſtate of of probation preparatory to a future recompenſe.

4. The pains of death, which, though probably not equal to the apprehenſions generally entertained concerning them, are nevertheleſs in many inſtances very acute and ſevere, are moſt eaſily accounted for upon the ſuppoſition of a future life. If exiſtence muſt terminate with life, why ſhould it terminate in pain? All other evils, as far as we can judge, have their proper uſe; they are cautionary or remedial; they ſubſide into pleaſure, or they are introductory to it: at leaſt they are intended to prevent greater evils. Why ſhould the pains of dying, the moſt formidable of all, be an exception to the general rule? Admit the doctrine of a future exiſtence, and the pains

pains of death may have their proper uſe equally with thoſe of life; and under the divine government the wiſe and benevolent law may prevail univerſally, that no evil ſhall exiſt which is not productive of preponderant good*.

5. The wonderful proviſion made for the diſcipline of the mind, and for training mankind to knowledge, virtue and happineſs; the wiſdom and benevolence of the deſign; the imperfect manner in which it is accompliſhed in the preſent ſtate, conſidered in connexion with the knowledge and power of God, are appearances favourable to the expectation that this important proceſs ſhall be reſumed in ſome future ſtate of exiſtence, and that the glorious ſcheme ſhall be completed in the perfect virtue and felicity of every individual. That this is poſſible, few will diſpute; and

* Dr. Hartley ſays, "It is hardly reconcileable to the beauty and harmony of the viſible world, to the general prepollency of pleaſure over pain, and ſubſerviency of pain to pleaſure, and it would be very diſſonant to the other events of life, that death ſhould be the laſt, that the ſcene ſhould conclude with ſuffering." Hartley, vol. ii. p. 386, 8vo.

If any ſhould object that this argument would prove the future exiſtence of brutes, it may be replied, that with

and that ſuch ſhould be the happy reſult of the divine plan, is conſonant with the beſt conceptions we can form of infinite wiſdom and goodneſs.

This argument does not neceſſarily aſſume the exiſtence of an immaterial ſoul, naturally capable of progreſſive and perpetual improvement, or even of perception and action independent on the body. But in reply to this pleaſing ſpeculation it may perhaps reaſonably be aſked, Whether we have ſufficient proof of the perpetual improveableneſs of the individual? and whether appearances will warrant any further expectation, than that of the gradual improvement, and ultimate perfection of the ſpecies?

6. The general expectation of a future exiſtence which has prevailed in the world, is favourable to the truth of the doctrine. This belief was not the reſult of argument, for, phi-

their deſtiny we have no concern; and that man is capable of anticipating the pangs of diſſolution with anxiety and terror, which the brute is not. It is the hope of a future life alone which can "deliver thoſe, who would "otherwiſe through the fear of death, be all their life-"time ſubject to bondage."

loſophers

loſophers who reaſoned moſt upon the ſubject were leaſt inclined to admit the concluſion*: and the common people who ſpeculated the leaſt were the firmeſt believers in the doctrine. It alſo appears that the moſt rational expectations of a future life were thoſe of the earlieſt ages†. Hence it ſeems probable that the prevalence of this expectation muſt have been the conſequence of a revelation communicated to the firſt anceſtors of mankind, and by

* Cicero, ſpeaking of the hypotheſes of the philoſophers concerning the nature and future exiſtence of the ſoul, ſays, Harum ſententiarum quæ vera ſit Deus aliquis viderit, quæ veriſimillima magna quæſtio eſt.—Tuſc. Quæſt. l. i. ſect. 11.

One of the interlocutors, ſpeaking of the argument of Plato, which he had often read, ſays, Neſcio quomodo dum lego aſſentior, cum poſui librum et mecum ipſe de immortalitate animorum cœpi cogitare, aſſenſio omnis illa illabitur.—Ibid.

Catervæ veniunt contradicentium non ſolum Epicureorum, ſed neſcio quomodo doctiſſimus quiſque contemnit. i. e. immortalitatem.—Ibid. ſect. 31.

† Auctoribus quidem ad iſtam ſententiam quam vis obtineri uti optimis poſſumus—et primum quidem omni antiquitate, quæ quo propius aberat ab ortu et divina progenie, hoc melius fortaſſe quæ erant vera cernebat.—Ibid. ſect. 12.

them

them tranſmitted to their poſterity, who have preſerved it by tradition from generation to generation, and have fondly cheriſhed it as coinciding with the prevailing earneſt deſire of continued exiſtence, and the almoſt univerſal dread of annihilation.

REMARKS.

1. This argument aſſumes as a principle, what is neverthelefs contradictory to univerſal experience, that juſt conceptions of the attributes, character and government of God might have been attained without the aſſiſtance of revelation; whereas we certainly know that the moſt ſagacious and enlightened of the heathen philoſophers fell into the moſt deplorable errors upon this ſubject, or remained in a ſtate of the moſt diſtreſſing ignorance and uncertainty*.

2. The whole of this argument would be oppoſed, and, in the eſtimation of a ſerious and inquiſitive mind, would probably be overruled, by the palpable fact, that when the

* Cicero de Natura Deorum.
Leland on Neceſſity of Divine Revelation, part i.

man

man dies, his whole ſubſtance is diſſolved and diſſipated; and that there is on the one hand, no rational evidence of the permanent exiſtence of a principle capable of perception and action in a ſtate of ſeparation from the body; nor, on the other, any fact or analogy to lead to the concluſion, that the being who is thus reduced to his original duſt, might ever in ſome future period of duration be recalled to life. All analogies which have been produced in favour of a reſurrection from the grave, ſuch, for example, as the revival of vegetables in the ſpring, the growth of a plant from ſeed, the transformation of a caterpillar into a butterfly after having paſſed through the intermediate ſtate of a chryſalis, and the like, are deficient in a moſt eſſential circumſtance, namely, the extinction of life. In no caſe whatever has a revival taken place after the principle of life has become extinct, and the proceſs of putrefaction has begun.

3. It appears in fact, that the heathen philoſophers, who profeſſed to believe in the doctrine of a future life, were ſo far from building their expectations upon a reſurrection from the grave that, when this doctrine was made

made known to them, they treated it with the moſt indecent levity and ridicule*. And the great maſs of modern unbelievers, who ſee the fallacy of the immaterial hypotheſis, and its irreconcileableneſs with the moſt obvious phenomena of human nature, reſign the glorious expectation of a future life, and have no proſpect before them but that of a dark unfathomable gulf, into which they muſt ſhortly be precipitated, without hope of ever emerging again to life, action, and enjoyment†.

4. The grand concluſion from all the preceding facts and reaſonings is the INFINITE VALUE OF THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION, of the divine origin of which they conſtitute a ſtrong preſumptive argument.

The chriſtian religion teaches with authority the doctrine of a future life; it places this doctrine upon its proper ground, a reſurrection from the grave; it proves the truth of it by the miracles of thoſe who were commiſſioned to publiſh it to the world; and it exhibits an example and a pledge of the final

* Celſus ſpeaks of the doctrine of the reſurrection as fitter for worms than men.—Origen. cont. Celſum, lib. v. page 240.

† Leland on Neceſſity of Revelation, part iii.

reſurrection

resurrection of all mankind in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, the great MESSENGER OF TRUTH, and the FOUNDER OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH*.

* Clarke at Boyle's Lectures, page 269, 270.
Religion of Nature, page 208—211.
Howe's Vanity of Man, &c. Opp. vol. i. p. 640—650.
Hallet on Scripture, vol. i. page 236—289. vol. ii. page 259—263.
Foster's Sermons, vol. ii. numb. 3.
Hartley on Man, vol. ii. page 382—392.

THE END.

ELEMENTS

OF

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

QUID UTILE, QUID NON.

ELEMENTS

OF

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

SECTION I.

Definitions of Virtue and Vice.—Diſtinction between Natural and Moral Qualities.

THE only valuable end of exiſtence is HAPPINESS.

This is plain; for no perſon, if he had it in his option, would accept of exiſtence but upon condition of a preponderance of happineſs. Who, for example, would deſire, or, if he could avoid it, would ſubmit, to exiſt in a future ſtate, if he had not reaſon to expect that it would be a ſtate of preponderant felicity?

Alſo, when exiſtence ceaſes to be happy, it ſoon ceaſes to be deſirable.

Put the caſe, that exiſtence in miſery ſhould be offered to any being, as a neceſſary means of good to others.

No one would accept of the propoſal, who did not expect that the delightful conſciouſneſs of his generous feeling, would counterbalance the miſery to which he expoſed himſelf.

But this is contrary to the hypotheſis, which aſſumes the ſuppoſition of unalleviated miſery.

The caſe ſuppoſed is an extreme one; but by the law of aſſociation preponderant miſery ultimately reſolves itſelf into an exceſs of clear, unalleviated miſery. Sothat all ſuppoſitions ultimately terminate in pure miſery or happineſs, which therefore are the only caſes which need to be conſidered. And whatever ſome may have imagined, or how incorrectly ſoever they may have expreſſed themſelves upon the ſubject, no axiom can be more indubitable than this, that exiſtence in pure unalleviated miſery cannot be the object of rational choice.

VIRTUE, in propriety of language, is applied only to voluntary qualities, viz. action, affection,

affection, habit, and character, and expreſſes what is excellent and worthy of choice.

VICE, in propriety of language, is applicable to the ſame qualities, and expreſſes ſomething which renders them ineligible, and worthy of being avoided.

ACTIONS are volitions carried into effect.

AFFECTIONS AND HABITS are tendencies to action, either natural or acquired.

CHARACTER is the ſum total of affections and habits.

VIRTUE IS THE TENDENCY OF AN ACTION, AFFECTION, HABIT, OR CHARACTER, TO THE ULTIMATE HAPPINESS OF THE AGENT.

For, happineſs being the only conſideration which renders exiſtence valuable, the tendency to it is the only quality which renders any diſpoſition or action eligible.

VICE IS THE REVERSE OF VIRTUE; IT IS THE TENDENCY OF ACTION, AFFECTION, HABIT, OR CHARACTER, TO PRODUCE ULTIMATE MISERY, OR TO DIMINISH ULTIMATE HAPPINESS.

An action, or affection, accompanied with the moſt exquiſite preſent gratification, may nevertheleſs be vicious, and that, even in a

high degree, as it may tend ultimately to diminiſh happineſs or to produce miſery.

Converſely, actions and affections, the performance or exerciſe of which may be accompanied with great preſent pain, may nevertheleſs be highly virtuous, as they may ultimately be productive of the greateſt happineſs.

Natural qualities, ſuch as beauty, health, deformity, ſickneſs, and the like, though productive of pleaſure or pain, are neither virtuous nor vicious, becauſe they are involuntary.

SECTION II.

Objections anſwered.

OBJECTION I.

ACCORDING to this definition of virtue, injuſtice, malice, treachery, and the like, would be virtues, if their tendency in any given inſtance was to produce the happineſs of the agent; and juſtice, faithfulneſs, piety, and benevolence, would be vices, if they could be proved in any caſe to diminiſh the happineſs of the agent. So that the moral value of

of an action depends not upon its nature, but its tendency*.

ANSWER.

Agreed. If abſurd principles are true, abſurd concluſions will follow. Injuſtice, malignity, and the like, never can, in the preſent conſtitution of things, tend to happineſs. It might with equal propriety be alleged, that if pain ſhould ever become pleaſure it would ceaſe to be an evil.

OBJECTION II.

This definition of virtue will not apply to the moral rectitude of the Supreme Being.

ANSWER.

We neceſſarily conceive of God by analogy

* Dr. Price objects, (Review of Mor. p. 183), "Any "the moſt pernicious and horrible effects will become "juſt, and fit to be produced by any being, if but the "minuteſt degree of clear advantage or pleaſure may "reſult to him from them."

Cooper replies (Tracts, p. 103): "Granted. But let "God look to that. A future ſtate of retribution has "been aſcertained for the very purpoſe of obviating this "objection: and it is ſufficiently obviated." The expreſſion is harſh, and hardly conſiſtent with the reverence due to the Supreme Being; but the meaning is juſt, and the reply ſatisfactory.

to the faculties and feelings of the human mind. It is happineſs alone which gives value to exiſtence, in an infinite as well as a finite being. Nor is it derogatory from the excellence of the Supreme Being, to maintain that his felicity is the reſult of the uncontrouled exerciſe of infinite benevolence; and that the rectitude of his character and conduct conſiſts in its undeviating tendency to this moſt important end.

OBJECTION III.

This definition leaves it doubtful in ſome caſes, whether an action be virtuous or vicious, as the ultimate tendency of an action cannot always be aſcertained.

ANSWER.

The difficulty is real; but, it is no greater upon this, than upon any other definition of virtue*.

* For example, if it be required to aſcertain whether truth is to be invariably obſerved. This is a practical difficulty, and remains preciſely the ſame, whether virtue be defined as a tendency to individual happineſs, or to the general good, or as the congruity of an action to the relations and character of the agent.

OBJECTION IV.

This definition derogates from the dignity, of virtue, and repreſents it as a mere matter of calculation.

ANSWER.

The queſtion is not concerning the dignity, but the eſſence of virtue; and this plainly conſiſts in its tendency to happineſs, the only valuable end of intellectual exiſtence.

SECTION III.

Theory of the diſintereſted Affections.—Reconcileableneſs of Benevolence with Self-Intereſt.

OBJECTION V.

THIS definition is inconſiſtent with the diſintereſted love of virtue, and the practice of it for its own ſake, which is nevertheleſs the higheſt ſtate of moral excellence.

ANSWER.

For the ſolution of this difficulty it will be proper to pay a little attention to the hiſtory of thoſe affections which are called diſintereſted.

Actions originally pleaſurable, or indifferent, or even in a conſiderable degree painful, are performed at firſt from an intereſted motive; that is, with a view to gratification, or advantage.

Actions repeated a ſufficient number of times generate affections, or tendencies to perform the action independent of the advantage to be derived from it.

The ſame cauſes continuing to operate, the affection will gradually attain ſuch a degree of vigour, as to be of itſelf ſufficient to produce the action, without any attention whatever to the intereſted motive.

The affection in this ſtate is called diſintereſted; and the eſſence of a diſintereſted affection is, that its only object is its own gratification.

Hence it follows, that diſintereſtedneſs reſpects the *degree*, not the *tendency*, of the affection, and that it is equally applicable to affections of good or bad tendency, that is, either virtuous or vicious. Thus *avarice* as well as *benevolence* may be in a high degree diſintereſted, that is, when money is ſaved from a mere habit of ſaving, without any explicit view either to preſent or to future advantage.

An

An affection, therefore, the tendency of which is to ultimate happineſs, may at the ſame time be perfectly diſintereſted: and it is neceſſary to conſummate virtue, that is, to perfect felicity, that it ſhould be ſo. The objection therefore againſt the definition of virtue given above, as being inconſiſtent with the diſintereſted love of virtue, is of no weight, being founded in ignorance of, or inattention to, the true theory of human nature.

From the hiſtory of the diſintereſted affections it is alſo obvious, that virtuous actions are firſt performed from intereſted motives, and that by the repetition of theſe actions virtuous affections are generated, which gradually become diſintereſted.

Hence it follows, that it is an error to repreſent virtuous affections as innate, and likewiſe to aſſert that a diſintereſted love of virtue is the firſt approach to a virtuous character: it would be equally conſiſtent with the true philoſophy of the mind to maintain, that the firſt ſtep towards avarice is a diſintereſted love of money.

OBJECTION VI.

This definition of virtue is inconſiſtent with pure

pure benevolence, which requires the production of the greateſt ſum of happineſs upon the whole, and the ſacrifice of ſelf-intereſt to the general good.

ANSWER.

1. It has been ſhown that happineſs alone gives value to exiſtence, and conſequently that the true rule of life is to purſue happineſs by the moſt efficacious means.

2. Experience proves that the practice of benevolence is, generally ſpeaking, the moſt efficacious means of happineſs; and that it is ſo in proportion to the ſtrength, that is, to the diſintereſtedneſs, of the benevolent affection.

3. It is reaſonable to believe that if *benevolence* were perfect, and *ſelf* annihilated, happineſs would be compiete. Hence it follows that benevolence is the *rule*, and ſelf-intereſt the *obligation*, of virtue*.

4. If

* Self-annihilation is eſſential to perfect virtue, and therefore to perfect happineſs. If virtuous affections are not ſufficiently powerful to produce their correſponding effects without the additional ſtimulus of ſelf-intereſt, it is a proof that theſe affections are imperfect: for, in their higheſt or diſintereſted ſtate, the impulſe of the affection will always produce its correſponding act. So that the moſt

4. If the above ſtatement be admitted, our definition of virtue ultimately coincides with that which places it in the voluntary production of the greateſt ſum of happineſs, or in unlimited benevolence.

5. This concluſion is ſtrongly confirmed, if it be admitted that the world is governed by infinite wiſdom and benevolence, and that men are deſtined to a future ſtate of exiſtence. It is incredible that, under the government of God, any of his creatures ſhould be ultimately loſers by any ſacrifices which they can make to the happineſs of others.

6. Hence it follows that the doctrine of a future life gives conſiſtency to the theory of

moſt refined ſelf-intereſt, or that by which we practiſe virtue and piety with a view to ultimate reward, is inconſiſtent with the perfection of virtue and happineſs. The idea of *ſelf* is aſſociated with ſo many ideas of anxiety and uneaſineſs, that, till this is excluded, there can be no pure unmixed felicity. Thus we ſee in the world, that the men who are moſt active and uſeful are moſt happy; while thoſe who have no ſufficient object to draw off their attention from ſelf are moſt miſerable. Such is the exquiſite contrivance of nature, by which the ſelfiſh and ſocial affections are reconciled and harmonized. — See Dr. Prieſtley's Sermon upon the Duty of not Living to Ourſelves. Hartley's Obſervations, vol. ii. prop. 66, 67.

virtue,

virtue, and completely reconciles the moſt exalted benevolence to ſelf-intereſt. This fact is a natural preſumption in favour of that doctrine, and likewiſe of the truth of the chriſtian revelation, which confirms this concluſion, and obviates the principal objections againſt it.

7. The perfect conſiſtency and harmony of benevolence with ſelf-intereſt is far from being ſelf-evident, if the doctrine of a future life be denied. Caſes may be ſuppoſed, and would probably occur, in which the intereſt of the individual would interfere with the general good. What obligation can a perſon in ſuch circumſtances be under to ſacrifice his own happineſs to that of others? What right can others have to demand this ſacrifice?

8. Hence it follows that atheiſm, and infidelity, are inconſiſtent with a perfect theory of morals, and incapable of reconciling the oppoſing intereſts of benevolence and ſelf-love.

9. No great ſacrifices to the happineſs of others are generally to be expected, nor have they frequently occurred, in men* who diſbelieve

* Nemo unquam ſine magna ſpe immortalitatis ſe pro patria offerret ad mortem.—Cicero. Tuſc. Quæſt. lib. i.

Titus

lieve a future life : and where they have occurred, they cannot be approved by wiſdom, nor could they have been required by virtue.

SECTION IV.

Moral Obligation explained.—Different Kinds of Obligation.

OBLIGATION expreſſes the neceſſary connexion between means and ends, in voluntary acts.

Titus exhorts his ſoldiers to mount a breach, by the promiſe of immortality to thoſe who fell. "Who does "not know that the ſouls of thoſe brave men who fall in "battle are placed amongſt the ſtars, and appear to their "poſterity as benevolent dæmons and heroes?" δαιμονες δε αγαθοι, και ἡρωες ευμενεις ιδιοις εκγονοις εμφανιζονται.—Joſ. Bell. Jud. lib. vi. c. i. ſect. 5.

It muſt however be admitted, that men who have rejected the doctrine of a future life have ſometimes made great ſacrifices to the public good, from a ſenſe of honour, enthuſiaſtic patriotiſm, and the like; and wiſdom will juſtify the ſacrifice, when what they reſign is of leſs value than the gratification of the feeling which prompts them to the act, however generated. But it is obvious, that the man who looks for recompenſe to a future life, will be prompted by this hope to make the greateſt ſacrifices to the good of others, in circumſtances in which ſuch ſacrifices would be the extreme of folly in a perſon who has no ſuch expectation.

For

For example: A man is obliged by law to pay his debts; that is, if the end be to satisfy the law, the necessary means is the payment of his debts. So, a man is obliged in honour, to keep his word; he is obliged from regard to health, to use necessary exercise; if he would be rich, he is obliged to be industrious and frugal. In these cases and in all others, obligation expresses the inseparable connexion between means and ends.

OBLIGATION differs from COMPULSION; the former respects voluntary, the latter involuntary acts, and is the effect of external force.

MORAL OBLIGATION EXPRESSES, THE NECESSARY CONNEXION BETWEEN THE PRACTICE OF VIRTUE, AND THE ATTAINMENT OF CERTAIN PROPOSED ENDS.

Moral agents are OBLIGED to the practice of virtue, in INTEREST, in REASON, and by the WILL OF GOD.

That is, if the end in view is to secure their most valuable interest, to act up to the dictates of reason, or to obey the will of God, the necessary means is, the practice of virtue.

These, though the principal, are not the only obligations to the practice of virtue.

Men

Men are obliged to be virtuous in many inſtances, by a regard to health, to reputation, to the law of the land, and the like.

Of the obligations from intereſt, reaſon, and the will of God, a queſtion has been ſtarted concerning their reſpective ANTECEDENCY.

ANTECEDENCY may reſpect the order of time, the order of our conceptions, or the force of the obligation.

In ORDER OF TIME, the three obligations are coincident with each other; they all commence with a capacity for moral agency.

In the ORDER OF OUR CONCEPTIONS, the obligation of intereſt is antecedent to the other two; becauſe it is the foundation of the obligation to act in conformity to right reaſon, and in obedience to the will of God.

With regard to the FORCE OF OBLIGATION, it is uſeleſs, not to ſay unbecoming, to inquire into the antecedency; for it is impoſſible that the will of God, or the dictates of right reaſon, ſhould require any thing contrary to the greateſt ultimate happineſs of the agent, which alone conſtitutes the true value of intellectual exiſtence.

SECTION V.

Concerning the Moral Senſe.—Abſtract Ideas of Right and Wrong, Fit and Unfit.

THE MORAL SENSE IS THAT FACULTY, AFFECTION, OR STATE OF MIND, WHICH EXCITES AN INSTANTANEOUS, DISINTERESTED APPROBATION AND LOVE OF WHAT IS CONSIDERED AS VIRTUE, AND DISAPPROBATION AND ABHORRENCE OF WHAT IS CONSIDERED AS VICE, WHEN PERCEIVED IN OURSELVES OR OTHERS.

The EXISTENCE of this principle we learn by experience and obſervation. It has been queſtioned whether it be inſtinctive or acquired.

The conſciouſneſs of it in ourſelves; its early appearance in children, who conſtantly ſpeak truth till they learn the contrary; the univerſality of its exiſtence in all ages and countries, and the general uniformity of its dictates, are the principal arguments to prove that the moral ſenſe is INSTINCTIVE.

But the diverſity, and even contrariety of the dictates of the moral ſenſe, in different ages and countries, is an inſuperable objection againſt this hypotheſis. Inſtinct is uniform

and univerſal: but the moral ſenſe in one age and country approves, and in another reprobates, the expoſing of children or old people, concubinage, inceſt, ſlavery, and the like.

The MORAL SENSE is an affection of mind, the origin and progreſs of which is ſimilar to that of other mental affections, generated by the impreſſion of external circumſtances; intereſted in its commencement, and gradually purifying itſelf in its courſe, till in its higheſt and moſt perfect ſtate it becomes completely diſintereſted.

It is a very complex feeling, compounded of feelings which are themſelves likewiſe very complex, and with difficulty analyſed into their component principles.

Filial affection is one of the firſt ingredients in the moral ſenſe. Frequent ſucceſſive pleaſurable impreſſions made upon the mind of the child by the kindneſs of the parent, coaleſce into a pleaſurable feeling, which aſſociates itſelf with the viſible appearance of the parent, with the idea, the name, &c. &c. This is the origin of filial affection; it is, properly ſpeaking, complacency.

Expreſſions of complacency produce increaſed expreſſions of kindneſs in the parent,

which in their turn generate renewed expreſſions of complacency; and the pleaſurable feeling formed by the coaleſcence of the correſponding ideas conſtitutes filial benevolence, which is alſo aſſociated with the viſible appearance, the name, the idea, &c. as before.

Painful impreſſions are ſometimes made upon the mind of a child by anger, reproof, correction, &c. of a parent; the coaleſcence of the correſponding ideas produces in a certain degree averſion, fear, and the like, which alſo aſſociates itſelf with the viſible appearance, name, idea, &c. of the parent.

The coaleſcence of complacency, benevolence, and fear, produces that complex feeling which is called filial affection.

To this affection and the expreſſions of it a child is taught to apply the term, RIGHT; to a contrary diſpoſition and conduct he is taught to apply the term, WRONG.

In the ſame manner it would be eaſy to trace the origin of fraternal affection, the love of truth, and of juſtice, general benevolence, compaſſion, the fear and love of God, and the like. To each of theſe feelings, and to their correſpondent expreſſions, the word RIGHT is conſtantly annexed; and to their contra-

ries,

ries, viz. falſehood, malignity, injuſtice, ingratitude, impiety, and the like, generated in a ſimilar manner, the expreſſion WRONG is uniformly joined.

Hence the word RIGHT ſtands for that complex idea or feeling which is generated by the COALESCENCE OF ALL THOSE AFFECTIONS, and their correſpondent expreſſions, to which the term RIGHT has been applied. In like manner, the word WRONG expreſſes the complex idea formed by the COALESCENCE of THOSE AFFECTIONS which individually have been denominated WRONG.

From the firſt dawn of reaſon the child is taught by precept, example, and motive, by praiſe and blame, promiſe and threatening, reward and puniſhment, to do what is called RIGHT, and to abſtain from what is called WRONG.

Hence to the word RIGHT is gradually annexed the idea of ſomething that is to be encouraged and practiſed; to the word WRONG, ſomething that is to be diſcouraged and avoided.

The PERCEPTION of right and wrong is acquired by INSTRUCTION: the TENDENCY to practiſe the former, and to avoid the latter,

is generated by DISCIPLINE, that is, by placing a perſon in circumſtances, and expoſing him to impreſſions, which ſhall lead him to purſue the one, and to abſtain from the other.

The MORAL SENSE includes both; namely, the perception of right and wrong, together with the tendency to practiſe one, and to avoid the other.

The MORAL SENSE originates in education, and is corrected, improved, and confirmed, as men advance in life, by obſervation and experience, by the diſcipline of the world, by reading and converſation, and by the exerciſe of the underſtanding upon moral ſubjects.

The terms RIGHT and WRONG are annexed to the ſame diſpoſitions and actions in others, to which we annex them in ourſelves. And with the ſame terms we combine the ſame ideas of approbation or diſapprobation, of what is fit or unfit to be practiſed.

SECTION

SECTION VI.

Inferences from the above Analyſis of the Moral Senſe.

1. THE moral ſenſe is not an inſtinctive principle. The law of aſſociation, by which ſimple ideas run into complex, and complex into decomplex ideas, is ſufficient to account for this affection in all its varieties, and is indeed alone adequate to the ſolution of this phenomenon; for, as has been before obſerved, if the moral ſenſe were inſtinctive, its perceptions and dictates would be as ſimple, invariable, and univerſal, as thoſe of the external ſenſes.

2. The perfection of the moral ſenſe conſiſts in the conformity of its dictates to *truth*, that is, when thoſe actions and affections, and thoſe only, are approved as right, which tend to the ultimate happineſs of the agent; and vice verſa. The character of a moral agent is perfect, when this perception of right is in every inſtance ſufficient to govern the practice.

3. The moral ſenſe may be, and often is, miſled by education: the dictates of this feel-

ing, therefore, are not a perfect and infallible rule of right conduct.

4. Nevertheleſs, in perſons tolerably well educated, the dictates of the moral ſenſe are generally favourable to virtue; they ought therefore to be regarded as a good general rule of conduct, eſpecially upon emergent occaſions, where there is no time for deliberation.

5. To cultivate and enlighten the moral ſenſe in ourſelves and others, is a duty of the higheſt obligation, the moſt diſaſtrous conſequences having enſued both to individuals and to ſociety from obedience to the dictates of a miſguided conſcience.

6. If the moral ſenſe be, as we maintain, the reſult of education, early impreſſions, and external circumſtances, the general ſimilarity of its dictates in all ages and nations is eaſily accounted for, by the ſimilarity of the conſtitution and circumſtances of mankind, and the diverſity of it in ſome inſtances, from a correſponding diverſity of circumſtances, and impreſſions.

7. It is eaſy to ſee what has induced ſome philoſophers to repreſent the moral ſenſe as an inſtinctive principle: namely, that beſides the

general uniformity of its dictates, this affection commences at a very early age, before the memory begins to regiſter impreſſions and events. And men of the beſt education and diſpoſitions are moſt liable to this error: not recollecting any time in which they did not think and feel as they now do.

8. Hence likewiſe it is eaſy to account for the error of ſome philoſophers, ſuch as Dr. Clarke*, Dr. Price, and others, who repreſent the perception of right as conſtituting the obligation to practiſe it. By confirmed habits of virtue, the perception of right becomes a ſufficient inducement to a right practice: and by inattention to the true theory of human nature, that is repreſented as a primary motive to the practice of virtue, which is only the reſult of eſtabliſhed habit.

9. The analyſis of the moral ſenſe ſhows how improper it is, with Dr. Hutcheſon and others, to repreſent the obligation to virtue as conſiſting in the impulſe of this internal feeling. The pleaſures and pains of the moral ſenſe are undoubtedly powerful motives to practiſe what it decides to be virtue, and to

* See Sect. XII.

abſtain from what it regards as vice. But motive and obligation are diſtinct ideas*. And the moral ſenſe being a factitious principle, the dictates of which are ſometimes erroneous, the impulſe of its feelings cannot be univerſally obligatory with regard to practice.

SECTION VII.

Moral Value of an Action eſtimated.

REASON and CHOICE are eſſential to the MORAL VALUE of an action.

The DEGREE OF VIRTUE in a given action is univerſally eſtimated by the ſuppoſed EXCELLENCE OF THE MOTIVE.

The DEGREE OF VICE is eſtimated by the ſuppoſed meanneſs or MALIGNITY OF THE MOTIVE.

The conſideration of philoſophical liberty, or a power of chooſing differently, the previous circumſtances continuing the ſame, ſeldom or never enters into the eſtimation of the moral value of actions. But where hypotheſis is not in queſtion, the degree of virtue or vice in a given action, is eſtimated at the higheſt where there is the leaſt room for the exerciſe

* Vide Sect. IV.

of

of free will, that is, where the virtuous or vicious affection is the moſt powerful and governs with the leaſt controul.

The ſame external act may be either more or leſs virtuous, more or leſs vicious, or perfectly indifferent and deſtitute of all moral quality, in exact proportion to the moral value of the motive: for example,

CASE I. A perſon delivers his purſe into the hands of another. It is required to determine the moral value of the action.

1. It was a child delivering up his toy; it was an idiot, or lunatic, parting with that, of the value of which it was incapable of judging. —Reaſon was wanting; the action has no moral quality.

2. It was yielded to ſuperior force.—Volition is wanting, and conſequently moral quality.

3. It was given voluntarily, but without inclination or deſign good or bad; it was the act of pure free will.

The ſuppoſition is impoſſible; but, if true, the action, wanting motive, would be deſtitute of moral quality.

4. It was delivered as a bribe for the commiſſion of a crime.

The motive is deteſtable, and the action proportionably vicious.

5. It was the promiſed reward of a crime committed.

The motive is ſtill baſe, and the action vicious, though perhaps not in ſo great a degree.

6. It was delivered to a highwayman under the impreſſion of terror.

The motive is innocent; the action neither virtuous nor vicious.

7. It was the payment of a juſt debt.

The motive is virtuous; the action laudable.

8. It was given to charity, but from a motive of oſtentation.

The motive is contemptible; ſuch likewiſe is the action.

9. It was given from compaſſion, but without diſcretion.

The motive is moderately good, and the action proportionably ſuch.

10. It was given by benevolence, under the direction of prudence.

The dignity of the action riſes with the dignity of the motive.

11. It

11. It was the gift of benevolence, guided by diſcretion, and animated with piety.

This combination of the beſt motives, conſtitutes the action in the higheſt degree virtuous.

CASE II. A man takes away the life of another: the moral value of the action is required.

1. He was a lunatic; reaſon was wanting, therefore moral quality.

2. It was accidental; volition was wanting, conſequently moral quality.

3. It was voluntary, without inclination or deſign good or ill.

The ſuppoſition is impoſſible; but, if true, the want of motive would be the want of moral quality.

4. It was the effect of wanton cruelty, of deliberate malice, of deſperate revenge.

The execrable malignity of the motive conſtitutes the action atrociouſly criminal.

5. It was the momentary and inconſiderate effect of violent paſſion upon ſudden and great provocation.

The malignity of the motive is diminiſhed, and the degree of moral evil in the action proportionably

proportionably abated, but not entirely annihilated.

6. It was the executioner carrying into effect the ſentence of a *juſt* law.

If ſuch a caſe is ſuppoſeable, the act is innocent.

7. It was in ſelf-defence.

In this caſe, the act is both innocent and juſtifiable.

8. It was the act of a hero and a patriot, defending the liberties of his country againſt an unjuſt aggreſſor.

The motive is laudable, and the action greatly virtuous.

Could motives be analyſed, and the proportionate value of each be accurately aſcertained, there might be a propriety in the introduction of algebraic notation, and operations, for the ſolution of moral problems. But, the former being impracticable, the latter ſeems to be of little uſe*.

* Hutcheſon's Inquiry, page 168—178.
Hartley on Man, part ii. prop. 171, Scholium.

SECTION

SECTION VIII.

Moral Value of Character.

CHARACTER, IS THE SUM TOTAL OF MORAL HABITS AND AFFECTIONS.

That character is PERFECTLY VIRTUOUS, all whoſe affections and habits tend to produce the greateſt ultimate happineſs of the agent, and in which each virtuous habit and affection, is advanced to its higheſt, or moſt diſintereſted ſtate: that is, to the ſtate in which it has no other object than its own immediate gratification*.

That character is PERFECTLY VICIOUS, all whoſe affections and habits tend to produce the greateſt ultimate miſery of the agent, and in which every vicious affection exiſts in its moſt diſintereſted ſtate.

The former character, though poſſible, is rarely to be found; but the tendency of moral diſcipline is to produce a continual approximation towards it; and it will probably be the ultimate moral ſtate of all the rational creatures of God.

* Vide Sect. III.

The

The character of perfect vice is impoſſible; it can never actually exiſt. For no being can purſue miſery for its own ſake.

That agent is ſaid to be virtuous, though IMPERFECTLY ſo, all whoſe habits and affections tend to his own ultimate felicity, but, not having attained their moſt perfect ſtate, are ſubject to occaſional deviations from the rule of right.

That agent is denominated vicious, but IMPERFECTLY ſo, in whom there is ONE moral habit which tends to produce miſery, or to diminiſh happineſs: for example, intemperance, avarice, diſhoneſty, impiety*.

The

* "He that is juſt, kind, meek, and humble, but at the "ſame time a drunkard, or intemperate, has no pretence "to true virtue. The ſame is true of him who is ſober, "temperate, and generous, but gives himſelf up to any "kind of impurity; of him who reads, prays, and faſts, "is exact in all the external parts of religion, and zealous "for truth and piety, but wants candour, gentleneſs, "meekneſs, veracity, and charity; of him who is chaſte, "inoffenſive, friendly, faithful, and, it may be, uſeful and "valuable in his ſtation, but wants piety, &c. An habi-"tual breach of *one* divine law, or retention of *one* "favourite failure or boſom vice, demonſtrates that, "had the perſon equal temptation to tranſgreſs in "all other inſtances, he would do it, and be totally "abandoned."

The reaſon is obvious: the exiſtence of a ſingle habit of this deſcription is inconſiſtent with the perfect happineſs of the agent, and neceſſarily involves him in proportionable miſery.

So the prevalence of a ſingle diſorder is inconſiſtent with perfect health, and, if a remedy be not applied in time, may be productive of the moſt fatal conſequences.

"abandoned."—Price's Review of Morals, page 384, 385, firſt edition.

Upon the above extract it may be remarked, that the Doctor is right in the fact, but wrong in the argument. It is true that the prevalence of one vice conſtitutes a character vicious, but not becauſe with equal temptation the agent would be chargeable with every other vice; for, if this doctrine were true, every man would be chargeable with every vice; as in given circumſtances, every vice would be contracted by every man. And the only difference between the moſt virtuous and the moſt vicious perſon is, that the former was placed in circumſtances, and expoſed to impreſſions, which generated virtuous habits and affections, and the latter in circumſtances by which vicious principles and diſpoſitions were produced. Had the circumſtances been different, the characters would have proportionably varied. And this, by the way, is an additional preſumptive argument in favour of the ultimate happineſs of all the moral creatures of God. The true reaſon why one vice only, is ſaid to conſtitute a character vicious is, that the exiſtence of one vicious affection is inconſiſtent with pure unmingled happineſs.

The

The following ſeems to be at preſent the true moral ſtate of the WORLD:

In every moral agent the number of virtuous actions greatly exceeds that of vicious ones. The moſt notorious liar ſpeaks truth much oftener than falſehood; and the moſt ſavage tyrant performs more acts of beneficence than cruelty.

In by far the greater number of moral agents, and even amongſt thoſe who are conſidered as moſt vicious and profligate, the number of virtuous affections and habits greatly preponderates over the vicious ones. A character in which there is a preponderance of vice, is very rarely, if ever, to be met with.

Nevertheleſs, as *one* vicious habit, in the uſual, and even proper acceptation of the words, conſtitutes a vicious character, though balanced by many virtues, it is obvious that the number of vicious characters in the world, greatly exceeds that of the imperfectly virtuous.

Yet upon the whole the *ſum* of virtue, probably in every character, and certainly in the world at large, greatly preponderates over the ſum of vice.

COROLLARIES.

1. It ſeems reaſonable to conclude that virtue will ultimately triumph, in every individual, and in the world in general; in other words, that every individual will ultimately attain pure and perfect happineſs, and that the world will be reſtored to a paradiſiacal ſtate.

This concluſion would be probable, even if the preſent preponderance were on the ſide of vice; for the tendency of all moral evil, and of its concomitant, natural evil, is to their own extermination, while that of moral and natural good is to produce and to extend themſelves ad infinitum.

Much more evident does the inference in favour of univerſal happineſs appear, now that the actually exiſting evil bears but a ſmall proportion to the actually exiſting good. There is even reaſon to preſume that the production of good will advance with accelerated rapidity: and experience evidently favours this concluſion.

Alſo, it ſeems more worthy of the wiſdom and benevolence of the Supreme Being, gradually to refine his works from every impure mixture, and to carry them on to ultimate perfection, rather than to deſtroy them on ac-

count of a ſmall proportion of evil, when they contain upon the whole a great preponderance of good.

2. Nevertheleſs, if there be a future life, the immediate condition of the great maſs of mankind when they enter upon it, muſt be a ſtate of very conſiderable pain and ſuffering.

For the great majority of human characters are alloyed with one or more vicious habits, and affections. Theſe muſt be put under a proceſs of cure, more or leſs ſevere in proportion to the malignity of the moral diſeaſe: but probably beyond conception more painful than any ſufferings experienced in the preſent ſtate; the diſcipline of this life having been found inſufficient to complete the moral recovery.

3. This view of the moral ſtate of the world remarkably coincides with the repreſentations of the Scriptures, which uniformly declare, that the number of thoſe who are ſaved, will bear but a ſmall proportion to that of thoſe who are to be condemned, that is conſigned to ſuffering. But the revelation of a future ſtate of ſuffering for the vicious, amounts, when duly conſidered, to a revelation of an *ultimate* ſtate of happineſs for all.

For

For it is very harſh to ſuppoſe that God will raiſe the vicious from a ſtate of inſenſibility which has endured for ages, to annihilate them immediately. Still leſs can it be reconciled to wiſdom and benevolence, that the wicked ſhould be recalled to life, ſolely for the purpoſe of undergoing intenſe ſufferings for an indefinite period, to be terminated by total deſtruction. As to the hypotheſis of eternal torments, it is a doctrine for which few reflecting perſons now contend. Since therefore the vicious are to be raiſed and expoſed to ſuffering, it is highly reaſonable to believe that theſe ſufferings will be remedial, and will terminate with the vices which gave birth to them, ſo that in the end "death will be ſwallowed up in victory."

SECTION IX.

Analyſis of the Ideas of Merit and Demerit, Approbation and Diſapprobation, Praiſe and Blame, Reward and Puniſhment. - Alſo of Fear, Shame, Remorſe, and Repentance.

MERIT, is that quality in an action or affection, which attracts, or is aſſociated with approbation, praiſe, or reward.

DEMERIT, is that quality which attracts diſapprobation, blame, and puniſhment.

Hence it appears that virtue conſtitutes merit; and vice, demerit.

APPROBATION, is the name given to the pleaſurable feelings of the moral ſenſe. It ariſes upon the perception of virtue in ourſelves or others: it is a very complex feeling, compounded of the veſtiges of all the pleaſurable ſenſations and ideas which have been aſſociated with the affections or actions which are denominated virtuous. Vid. Sect. V.

DISAPPROBATION, expreſſes the pains of the moral ſenſe. It is uneaſineſs excited by the perception of vice in ourſelves and others.

PRAISE, is the expreſſion of approbation: BLAME, is the expreſſion of diſapprobation.

REWARD, is natural good annexed to the practice of virtue, either by neceſſary conſequence, or poſitive appointment, and the deſign of it is to encourage the practice of virtue both in the agent himſelf and in other beings ſimilarly conſtituted.

PUNISHMENT, is natural evil annexed to the practice of vice by neceſſary conſequence or poſitive appointment, the deſign of which

is to reclaim the ſufferer, and to warn others againſt following his example.

It is obvious to remark, that neither merit nor demerit, approbation nor diſapprobation, praiſe nor blame, reward nor puniſhment, ſuppoſe the exiſtence of philoſophical free will; they are related to motives only. An agent is the proper object of theſe feelings only ſo far as he acts under the influence of motives; and a being perfectly free, that is, independent on all motive, would be, ipſo facto, incapable of all moral diſcipline, and no more the proper object of praiſe or blame, reward or puniſhment, than an infant or a lunatic*.

Repentance, is a change in the ſtate of mind from vice to virtue, by whatever means this change may be be effected.

Contrition, is ſorrow ariſing from the conſciouſneſs of defective virtue, of the pre-

* It is the more neceſſary to inſiſt upon this point, becauſe ſome neceſſarian philoſophers of late, inattentive to the true conſequences of their principles, have repreſented neceſſary agents as incapable of moral diſcipline: a conceſſion which gives great and unjuſt advantage to the libertarians, as it is true only of thoſe agents, if any ſuch there be, who are philoſophically free. See Godwin's Political Juſtice, book iv. ch. 8.

Prieſtley on Neceſſity, ſect. 7.

valence of vicious affections, or of the performance of a vicious action.

SHAME, is a painful emotion arising from the imputation or consciousness of some affection or action, which will expose us to contempt.

FEAR, arises from the probable expectation of the punishment annexed to vice, here or hereafter.

REMORSE, is a painful emotion arising from the apprehension that under the existing circumstances it was in the power of the agent to have made a different choice.

COROLLARIES.

1. Repentance, Contrition, Shame, and Fear, are independent upon philosophical liberty, and are attributes of mind only so far as it is governed by motives.

2. Remorse supposes free will. It arises from forgetfulness of the precise state of mind when the action was performed. It is of little or no use in moral discipline. In a degree it is even pernicious. The vain supposition of a power of acting differently in the same circumstances induces men to venture into similar circumstances, fondly presuming upon

upon the exertion of their free will, when true wiſdom and philoſophy would dictate flight from temptation as the only effectual means of ſafety*.

3. From all that has been ſaid it appears that philoſophical free will is not eſſential either to moral agency, or moral diſcipline, but incompatible with both; ſo that a being partly free, and partly acting under the neceſſary influence of motives, is partly a moral agent and partly otherwiſe; while a being perfectly free, and entirely independent of motives, would be utterly incapable of moral agency and moral diſcipline, and could not

* If it be aſked, How is that remorſe which a perſon feels while he is actually performing a vicious action to be reconciled to the doctrine of neceſſity? It may be anſwered, that a man acting under the influence of an evil motive may be conſcious of the badneſs of the motive, and may feel the ſentiments of ſorrow, ſhame, and fear; which combined, ſufficiently account for the horror ſometimes experienced during the actual commiſſion of a crime. But if to this be added the belief, that with the ſame violence of vicious affections, and in the ſame circumſtances, he could have acted differently, the notion is founded in a miſtake. If the conduct upon a ſimilar occaſion is different, it muſt be either becauſe the circumſtances are leſs favourable to the perpetration of the crime, or becauſe the vicious habit is leſs imperious.

without the greateſt folly and injuſtice be made accountable, that is, ſubject either to reward or puniſhment, for his actions or character*.

SECTION X.

Means of Virtue.

SUPPOSE an intelligent being to exiſt in a ſtate of perfect neutrality between vice and virtue, convinced that happineſs is the only valuable end of exiſtence, and deſirous of knowing the means by which the greateſt ſum of happineſs is to be attained, the firſt queſtion to be ſettled is, Whether there be a God; and, if there be, what is the character of the Supreme Being.

If there be a God, the maker of the world and its inhabitants, the happineſs of his creatures muſt depend upon his pleaſure; to pleaſe him therefore muſt be an object of the higheſt concern.

Conſequently, it muſt be a concern of prime importance to intelligent creatures to form

* See this ſubject diſcuſſed more at large in The Philoſophy of the Human Mind, chap. ix. ſect. 6.

juſt

juſt ideas of the character of this great Being, that ſo they may know what courſe of conduct will be moſt acceptable to him, and moſt conducive to their own happineſs.

The next point to be aſcertained is, Whether the exiſtence of man terminate at death, or whether there be any reaſon to expect a future ſtate of being, which will take its character of happineſs, or miſery, from the moral conduct of men in the preſent life.

If the exiſtence of man be limited to the preſent life, the only remaining queſtion is, how muſt he act ſo as to attain the greateſt ſum of happineſs for the momentary period allotted to him? for this, to him, will be wiſdom and virtue.

It would not be difficult to prove that temperance, purity, juſtice, and benevolence would generally be productive of the greateſt ſum of happineſs to the agent, even without the expectation of a future ſtate of exiſtence and reward*.

But it can never be proved that the intereſt of the agent himſelf might not in ſome inſtances be promoted by an occaſional deviation

* Hume's Inquiry, Eſſays, vol. ii. ſect. ix. part i. Syſtême de la Nat. part. i. c. 15. part. ii. c. 12.

from

from the ſtrict rule of truth, juſtice, and benevolence. The contrary is in ſome caſes highly probable*.

What obligation can any man who has no expectation of a future life be under, to ſacrifice his own greateſt temporal advantage and happineſs to the intereſt of another?

But, if man be deſtined for a future life, many actions will be highly virtuous and wiſe, which upon the contrary ſuppoſition would be fooliſh in the extreme, and therefore vicious; for that may be very conducive to ultimate and permanent felicity, which may very conſiderably detract from preſent enjoyment: for example, ſufferings and martyrdom in the cauſe of truth and virtue, or for the public good. Upon the ſame principle, if exiſtence terminated in the preſent life, it would ſtill be wiſdom to ſacrifice the gratification of an hour to ſecure health and permanent enjoyment†.

No perfect rule of virtue, therefore, can be formed, till the important queſtion is ſettled,

* Hume's Eſſays, vol. ii. p. 334, 335.

† It is the doctrine of a future life only, which completely reconciles ſelf-intereſt with benevolence. Vid. Sect. III.

whether or no the exiſtence of man terminates with the preſent life†.

Admitting then the exiſtence of an All-perfect Being, and the doctrine of a future life, the next inquiry is, What are thoſe affections and habits, the encouragement and cultivation of which will conduce to the greateſt ultimate happineſs?

Now, the ſuppoſed neutral intelligent agent, in order to aſcertain this fact, muſt,

1. Exerciſe his reaſon in comparing various habits, affections, and actions, ſuch as truth, juſtice, benevolence, falſehood, malice, revenge, in order to diſcover their reſpective bearings and tendencies. Let him judge which of theſe diſpoſitions are moſt promiſing, and moſt likely to produce happineſs.

2. He muſt hazard experiment. Let him

† This is not the proper place to purſue the argument for a future life. It may however be proper to obſerve, that the phenomena of the moral world are highly favourable to this concluſion, and that the grand natural objection againſt it is completely ſurmounted by the chriſtian doctrine of the reſurrection of the dead, and the exemplification of the fact in the perſon of the founder of the chriſtian faith. See Philoſophy of the Human Mind, ch. xi.

make

make trial of the affections which appear moſt conducive to felicity. This guide will be at firſt erroneous, becauſe it will recommend immediate and temporary gratification, which will often be found inconſiſtent with ultimate good. It will however in time correct itſelf, but not till after many failures, and ſevere ſufferings.

3. Obſervation of what paſſes in the world will aſſiſt in correcting experience. By ſeeing the conſequences of experiments made by others, a wiſe obſerver will learn to imitate them when they ſucceed, and to avoid the errors, by which they ſuffer.

4. The teſtimony and advice of wiſe and experienced perſons, concerning that mental diſcipline which they have found, or obſerved, to be conducive to the diminution of evil, and the increaſe of happineſs, will be of the greateſt uſe to correct and improve the judgment upon moral ſubjects.

5. Great advantage may be derived from the writings of moral philoſophers, of thoſe eſpecially who diſcover the moſt accurate acquaintance with the ſtructure of the human mind, and who form the moſt juſt and comprehenſive

prehenſive views of virtue and moral obligation*.

6. Juſt views of the character and government of God will naturally prompt to that courſe of conduct which is moſt acceptable to him, and moſt conducive to happineſs. If benevolence be regarded as the great principle of the divine government, it cannot be doubted that the true way to pleaſe God, and to ſecure ultimate felicity, is by wiſe, active, and perſevering exertions in doing good.

7. If the will of God concerning the rule of life has been revealed to mankind, this revelation, thoroughly underſtood, muſt be an infallible guide to ultimate happineſs†.

8. The

* Hartley's Obſervations on the Rule of Life, (part ii. c. 3.) with a few exceptions, which will readily occur to a judicious reader, contain an admirable outline of practical morality, founded upon the true philoſophy of the human mind, which few perſons can read with proper attention, without being made both wiſer and better.

† The extreme improbability that a Jew, in the unfavourable circumſtances in which Jeſus was educated, ſhould, by the native energy of his mind, have emancipated himſelf from the narrow prejudices of his countrymen, and have formed a wiſe and benevolent ſyſtem of morals, ſo complete

8. The affections which are eſſential to virtue and happineſs, being generated by the frequent repetition of thoſe actions in which they originate, by the law of aſſociation gradually coaleſce into that complex ſtate of mind called the Moral Senſe (Sect. V.); which, continually improving by reflection and exerciſe, will upon every emergent occaſion prompt to the practice of virtue, will form its judgments with preciſion, and will gradually acquire that uniform aſcendency over

plete and enlarged as to be incapable of being improved by the moſt enlightened philoſophy of ancient and modern times, and the authority with which he delivered his precepts, prove that Jeſus taught with a conſciouſneſs of a divine commiſſion. And it is allowed almoſt univerſally, even by unbelievers themſelves, that the precepts of the chriſtian religion are agreeable to enlightened reaſon, and form a juſt rule of life. But the voice of reaſon is the voice of God.

" The morality that Jeſus preached and practiſed " (ſays a celebrated champion of infidelity) was of the " moſt benevolent kind; and though ſimilar ſyſtems of " morality had been preached by Confucius, and by ſome " of the Greek philoſophers, many years before, by the " Quakers ſince, and by many good men in all ages, it " *has never been exceeded by any.*" Age of Reaſon, p. 9, 10.

the

the conduct, which conſtitutes the perfection of a virtuous character, and the trueſt felicity of a moral agent.

SECTION XI.

Obſervations on the preceding Rules.

1. THE preceding rules have been laid down, upon the ſuppoſition that an intelligent being, capable of virtue, had reached maturity in a ſtate of perfect moral neutrality, and before the moral ſenſe was in any degree formed. But the fact is univerſally otherwiſe. Moral ſentiments are naturally, and neceſſarily, generated in the mind by education, and the impreſſion of external circumſtances. Theſe ſentiments are often erroneous. The duty therefore of a moral agent, when he has attained to years of diſcretion, is to review and examine cloſely the dictates of the moral ſenſe, to bring them to the teſt of the abovementioned principles, and ſtandards of judgment, to ſupply what is wanting, to correct what is erroneous, to confirm and improve what appears to be right,

right, and thus to advance gradually to the perfection of moral character.

2. As it is impoſſible that the mind ſhould grow up in a ſtate of abſolute moral neutrality; as ſuch a ſtate would be very undeſirable, even if it were poſſible; as vicious principles and affections will certainly introduce themſelves, if wiſe and virtuous ones do not preoccupy the mind; and as the affections and habits cannot be fixed too early on the ſide of virtue; it is a duty of the firſt importance in parents and inſtructors of youth to inſtill thoſe principles, and to exerciſe that diſcipline, which will give a right direction to the moral ſenſe, which will lead young perſons to form a true judgment concerning right and wrong, and which will generate benevolent affections, and habits of virtue. And it is a dangerous miſtake of ſome, to neglect the moral inſtruction of children and young perſons, leſt they ſhould inadvertently inſtill error and prejudice. The preponderance of principles and habits in a moral education will undoubtedly be on the ſide of truth and virtue; and it is much eaſier in after life to rectify the defects of an erroneous, than of a neglected and immoral education.

3. Amongſt

3. Amongſt the means of improving the Moral Senſe, the Law of Honour, and the Law of the Land, have ſometimes been reckoned; but theſe can by no means be admitted as correct ſtandards of virtue.

The LAW OF HONOUR, is defined by Dr. Paley, to be "a ſyſtem of rules conſtructed "by people of faſhion to facilitate their inter-"courſe with each other."

This is a powerful principle of action in certain claſſes of ſociety; but it is no proper rule of life, unleſs it can be proved that people of faſhion are the beſt judges concerning the ultimate tendency of human actions. But it is too apparent that the law of honour, though often coincident with that of virtue, ſometimes prohibits what virtue requires; and more frequently permits, and even requires, what virtue expreſsly forbids. The moſt remarkable inſtance of which is the caſe of duelling, which the law of honour ſometimes imperiouſly enjoins, though evidently contrary to common ſenſe, to the law of the land, to the rules of virtue, and to the will of God*.

* Paley's Moral Philoſophy, book i. ch. ii.

The LAW OF THE LAND, is a very imperfect ſtandard of virtue. Laws indeed are not often inconſiſtent with morals; and obedience to them is a duty of unqueſtionable obligation, when not ſuperſeded by duties of ſuperior importance. But the wiſeſt laws can only controul external actions, while virtue chiefly reſpects habit, affection, and motive. And if the law of the land requires, what the law of virtue prohibits, diſobedience is not only innocent, but indiſpenſable*.

SECTION XII.

Examination of the Theories of Dr. Clarke, Dr. Hutcheſon, Dr. Reid, and Dr. Price.

HAVING ſtated and eſtabliſhed what appears to be the moſt probable theory of morals, we now proceed to exhibit the different accounts of virtue and moral obligation, which have been given by ſome of the moſt celebrated writers on the ſubject.

I. Dr. Clarke maintains, " that the eternal " neceſſary differences in things, obvious to " all whoſe underſtandings are not depraved, " lay a foundation for different relations, and

* Acts iv. xix. v. 29.—Paley, book i. ch. iii.

for

" for the fitneſs or unfitneſs of certain actions " to theſe relations." The congruity of the action to the circumſtances or relations in which the agent is placed, is Virtue ; its incongruity is Vice.

" Theſe eternal neceſſary differences lay an " obligation upon men to act virtuouſly, ſepa- " rate from any conſideration of the will of " God, or any expectation of advantage or " diſadvantage annexed, by natural conſe- " quence, or poſitive appointment*."

Againſt this theory of virtue and moral obligation, it may be objected :

1. That if the fitneſs or unfitneſs of actions means any thing different from their tendency to happineſs or miſery, the expreſſion is unintelligible.

2. That it is a mere petitio principii to aſſert, that the perception of fitneſs conſtitutes an obligation paramount to all other conſiderations, or even any obligation at all to the practice of thoſe actions which are denominated fit.

3. It makes virtue and vice perfectly arbitrary, as depending upon the imagined perception of an imaginary congruity, or incon-

* Clarke at Boyle's Lectures, fol. vol. ii. page 79—88.

gruity. It is in vain to say that these fitnesses are self-evident: for in that case they would be undisputed; which is contrary to fact.

4. It is a very gloomy system of morals. For, virtue consisting in fitness, and the obligation to virtue being paramount to that of interest, and sometimes even inconsistent with it, a moral agent may, by the practice of virtue, diminish his own happiness and that of others; and the Supreme Being himself may have an end in view distinct from, and inconsistent with, the happiness of his creatures*.

Bishop Butler assumes the principle that men possess a power of reflection upon actions and characters: that we naturally and unavoidably approve some as virtuous, and condemn others as vicious. This faculty is moral reason, moral sense, &c. The objects of this faculty are actions and principles, as truth and falsehood are of reason; and that it is accompanied with a real though inexplicable sense of good or ill desert†.

* Balguy's Inquiry into the Nature of Moral Goodness.
Doddridge's Lectures, lect. 52, 53.
Cooper's Essays, essay i. page 20—29.

† Butler's Anal. ad fin. Diss. ii.

Obj.

OBJ. 1. Butler miſtakes an acquired for a natural principle.

2. He gives up as inexplicable the ſenſe of good and ill deſert, which upon the theory of aſſociation is eaſily explained, and its varieties ſatisfactorily accounted for; which, if inſtinctive, is impoſſible.

II. DR. HUTCHESON defines moral goodneſs to be "a property apprehended in ſome "actions which produces approbation and "love toward the actor, from thoſe who re-"ceive no benefit from the action," and ſuppoſes a Moral Senſe implanted in our natures, which, independent of any argument, leads us to perform virtuous actions ourſelves, or to approve them when performed by others*.

The whole of this theory being founded upon the ſuppoſition that the Moral Senſe is an inſtinctive principle, is refuted by every argument and fact, which proves that affection to be the reſult of education and habit. Vide ect. V. VI.

DR. REID warmly patronizes the doc-

* Hutcheſon's Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue, page 101—149.

trine of inſtinctive principles. "Moral obligation," he ſays, "is a relation which every one underſtands, but is too ſimple to admit of logical definition." This obſervation is not correct if the analyſis of Moral Obligation, Sect. IV. is allowed to be juſt*.

III. DR. PRICE maintains, that "Right and "Wrong are ſimple ideas acquired by the un-"derſtanding," which, according to him, is a diſtinct ſource of perceptions. That Virtue is right and ought to be practiſed, is ſelf-evident; alſo, that Vice is wrong and ought to be avoided. The perception of this truth conſtitutes moral Obligation, without any proſpect of advantage, or reference to any other conſideration. "The queſtion why "we ought to do what is right," ſays he, "is identical and abſurd†."

OBJ. 1. This account of virtue and moral obligation is obſcure and unintelligible; it does

* Reid on the Active Powers, Eſſay iii. ch. v. vi.
Cooper's Eſſays, page 29—45.
Beattie on Truth, part i. ch. ii. ſect. iii.
Prieſtley's Anſwer to Beattie, ſect. iv.

† *Q.* What is Right according to this hypotheſis?
A. A ſimple idea that cannot be defined.

Q. What

does not indeed profeſs to explain any thing, but refers to a kind of infallible judge within, the dictates of which appear in fact to be very different in different perſons.

2. The ideas of right and wrong are not ſimple, but very complex notions, formed, like all other complex ideas, by aſſociation, and by the coaleſcence of the component ſimple ideas. Vide Sect. V.

3. The practice of what we believe to be right, will automatically follow the perception of right, where they have long been aſſociated

Q. What is Wrong?
A. The ſame.
Q. What is Virtue?
A. Doing right.
Q. What is Vice?
A. Doing wrong,
Q. What is the Obligation to practiſe virtue?
A. Perceiving it to be right.
Q. What is the Obligation to abſtain from vice?
A. Perceiving it to be wrong.
Q. But why ought I to do what is right, and to abſtain from what is wrong?
A. The queſtion is identical and abſurd.

All this is, no doubt, very inſtructive and convincing.

Price's Review of Differences in Morals, ch. i.—vi. Prieſtley's Anſwer to Reid, Oſwald, and Beattie, Appendix, no. i.

together, by the invariable law of human nature: but this is a very different thing from moral obligation, as explained Sect. IV, and by no means proves either that our idea of right is juſt, or that we are in any given inſtance obliged either in reaſon, intereſt, or duty, to follow the impulſe of the moral perception. If I believe perſecution to be right, my idea in this inſtance is incorrect; and however *prone* I may be to act upon it, I can be under no rational or moral obligation to perſecute*.

SECTION XIII.

Theories of Wollaſton—of ſome of the Ancients —of Cumberland, Rutherforth, Browne, and Adam Smith.

IV. WOLLASTON places virtue in regard to truth. He ſuppoſes that all voluntary actions have a language; that when this language is agreeable to truth the action is virtuous; that when it implies a falſehood

* Cooper's Tracts, page 60—64.

the

the action is vicious. This distinction of action implies obligation to the practice of virtue. Happiness follows an habitual regard to truth, but is not represented by this author, as the primary obligation to virtue*.

Upon this fanciful definition of virtue it is sufficient to remark, that if the language of a given action is supposed to be, "This action tends to the ultimate happiness of the agent;" if the assertion be true, it is virtuous; if false, the action is vicious; and this definition might be admitted as just, though vaguely and obscurely expressed†.

V. MANY WRITERS, ancient and modern, place virtue in the "imitation of God."

But this definition will not apply to the moral rectitude of the Supreme Being; it is therefore defective.

The same objection lies against that definition of virtue which places it in "obedience "to the will of God."

It may be asked *why* the Deity requires obedience? The answer to this question

* Religion of Nature, page 1—40.

† Cooper's Essays, page 70—73.

proves

proves the exiſtence of ſome reaſon for this duty diſtinct from the will of the Deity: namely, that which determined his will.

It may alſo be aſked, Why am I obliged to obey the will of God? The anſwer to this queſtion proves the exiſtence of a diſtinct ſource of obligation*.

The hypotheſis that virtue conſiſts in "mediocrity," is too vague and indefinite to merit any attention†.

VI. BISHOP CUMBERLAND places virtue in benevolence, and its obligation in ſelf-intereſt. The foundation of all natural law is this: "The greateſt benevolence of every "rational agent towards all, forms the happieſt ſtate of every, and of all the benevolent, ſo far as it is in their power, and is "neceſſarily requiſite to the happieſt ſtate "they can attain, and therefore the common "good is the ſupreme law‡."

It is plain that Cumberland's definition

* Cooper's Eſſays, page 11—19.
Doddridge's Lectures, page 122.

† Ariſtotle's Eth. lib. ii. ch. vi.
Grot. de Jure B. et P. proleg. ſect. 43—45.
Rel. of Nat. page 24, 25.

‡ Cumberland's Law of Nature, ch. i. ſect. iv.

coincides with that which has been ſtated in theſe papers as the true theory of morals.

VII. RUTHERFORTH places virtue in a "wiſe regard to our own intereſt*."

Virtue is the tendency of the action or affection to the ultimate happineſs of the agent. But it is not neceſſary that there ſhould be an explicit *regard* to this end in every action; on the contrary, even this rational ſelf-intereſt is inconſiſtent with perfect virtue. Vide Sect. III. note.

VIII. BROWNE repreſents virtue as conſiſting in "the conformity of our affections to "the public good," or "the voluntary pro-"duction of the greateſt happineſs;" and places the obligation to virtue in feeling immediate, or in the proſpect of future happineſs†.

This account of virtue coincides with that of Dr. Cumberland, No. vi.

IX. DR. ADAM SMITH places the virtue or vice of an action in the ſuitableneſs or unſuitableneſs, the proportion or diſproportion, which the affection from which it proceeds

* Eſſay on Virtue, page 153—157. 195—209.

† Browne on the Characteriſtics, no. ii. ſect. iii.—vi.

bears

bears to the cauſe or object which excites it: and the merit or demerit of the action conſiſts in the beneficial or hurtful nature of the effect which the affection aims at, or tends to produce.

SYMPATHY is the only criterion of virtue. We can uſe no rule to judge of the proportion of an affection, but by the correſpondent affection in ourſelves. Whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude appears to *deſerve* reward, and whatever appears to be the proper object of reſentment appears to *deſerve* puniſhment*.

REMARKS.

1. Dr. Smith is correct in repreſenting the virtue or merit of an affection or action in its tendency to produce happineſs.

2. He is certainly miſtaken in repreſenting the virtue of an affection as conſiſting in its proportion to the exciting cauſe, becauſe every effect muſt bear an exact proportion to its cauſe: and according to this definition all affections would be virtuous. But the author plainly means what Browne has more accurately expreſſed, by the conformity of

* Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, part i. ch. ii. ſect. i. ii.; part ii. ch. i. ſect. i. ii.

the

the affections to the public good: which is indeed a juſt definition of a virtuous character.

3. Dr. Smith's Sympathy is the ſame principle with Dr. Hutcheſon's Moral Senſe, and Dr. Clarke's and Dr. Price's Reaſon: it is judging of virtue and vice in another, by our own ſtandard of right and wrong. But, as it has been already proved that our moral perceptions are neither inſtinctive nor infallible, they cannot be an accurate criterion of virtue.

SECTION XIV.

Hume's Theory of Morals.—In what Senſe Utility is the proper Standard of Virtue.

X. HUME repreſents "perſonal merit as "conſiſting altogether in the poſſeſſion of "mental qualities, uſeful or agreeable to the "perſon himſelf or to others."

"The ſource of moral approbation is a "*natural* principle of benevolence, common "to all mankind, and extending to the actions "and conduct of perſons the moſt remote."

"The tendency of virtue to promote the "*true intereſt* of each individual, conſtitutes "our intereſted obligation to it."

"Reaſon

Reaſon may inſtruct us concerning the tendencies of actions, but it is not alone ſufficient to produce moral blame or approbation: this is the province of *humanity**.

REMARKS.

1. HUME'S definition of virtue as an uſeful or agreeable quality, is too indefinite.

2. What he calls the intereſted obligation to virtue, is the *primary* obligation, and lies at the foundation of every other moral obligation.

3. Mr. Hume's *natural benevolence* or *humanity*, which produces moral blame or approbation, is but another word for moral ſenſe, ſympathy, &c.; and he falls into the common error of ſuppoſing it to be an inſtinctive affection†.

XI. Many modern writers place virtue in UTILITY, OR EXPEDIENCE.

The principal objection againſt this account of virtue, is the ambiguity of the expreſſion, and its liableneſs to perverſion and miſconſtruction.

* Hume's Eſſays, vol. ii. eſſay ix. Appendix, i.

† Cooper's Tracts, numb. i. page 73—86.

UTILITY

UTILITY is a tendency to advantage: and it is either *individual* or *ſocial*.

1. INDIVIDUAL UTILITY is a tendency either to the greateſt ultimate advantage of the agent, or to an inferior and ſubordinate good.

If utility means the greateſt ultimate advantage of the agent, the definition is juſt: ultimate utility is the eſſence of virtue.

If utility expreſſes the tendency of an affection or an action to an inferior and ſubordinate good, for example, to life, health, ſenſual or intellectual gratification, wealth, reputation, popularity, dignity, authority, power, and the like, then utility is not ſynonymous with virtue: for a tendency to theſe ends is not the quality which renders an action or affection eligible, the attainment of them being in many inſtances inconſiſtent with the greateſt ultimate good, to which therefore they ought ever to be ſacrificed.

2. SOCIAL UTILITY ſignifies either the tendency of an affection or action to produce the greateſt ſum of univerſal happineſs, or the happineſs of a certain claſs and number of individuals; that is, it is either univerſal or partial.

The

The tendency of an affection or action to the GENERAL GOOD, coincides with its tendency to the true ultimate happineſs of the agent, and is therefore an admiſſible definition of virtue.

But if PARTIAL UTILITY be intended, when utility is repreſented as the eſſence of virtue; if by this expreſſion be meant the tendency of an affection or action to the advantage of a particular family, or ſociety, or party, or corporation, or trading company, or religious community, or eſtabliſhed government, or province, or nation, or diſtrict of the globe, or the like; this is no ſafe nor accurate criterion of virtue: for the intereſt of any ſuch ſubordinate ſocieties may be inconſiſtent with the general good.

COROLLARY.

Hence it follows that there can be but ONE RULE OF RIGHT, namely, the tendency of an action or affection to the ultimate happineſs of the agent, or what completely coincides with this, under the government of perfect wiſdom and benevolence, to the greateſt general good: and all diſtinctions between what is commercially, legally, politically, &c.

right, and what is morally or theologically right, are groundleſs, abſurd, and in practice highly pernicious*.

SECTION XV.

Account of Virtue by Hartley, Paley, Cooper, Giſborne, and Godwin.

XII. ACCORDING to Dr. HARTLEY, the rule of life is "compliance with the will "of God." This is the immediate dictate of rational ſelf-intereſt.

"The will of an infinitely benevolent Being "muſt be the love of God and our neighbour, "with moderation in all ſelfiſh enjoyments."

Virtue in creatures is founded in the love of God; which Hartley defines to be "a pleaſing "affection towards a Being infinite in know-"ledge, power, and goodneſs; who is alſo our "friend and father." This affection regulates and improves all the inferior parts of our nature, and particularly the pleaſures of ſenſation, imagination, ambition, and ſelf-intereſt; it is the only true ſource of benevolence, and the

* Bentham's Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legiſlation.

W. Belſham's Eſſays, vol. i. eſſay vii.

beſt direction and ſupport of the moral ſenſe. It affords a pleaſure ſuperior in kind and degree to all the reſt, and is therefore our primary purſuit and ultimate end*.

XIII. Dr. PALEY defines virtue, "doing "good to mankind, in obedience to the will "of God, and for the ſake of everlaſting "happineſs."

"The good of mankind is the ſubject, the "will of God is the rule, and everlaſting hap-"pineſs the motive, of human virtue."

"To be obliged, is to be urged by a violent "motive, reſulting from the command of "another."

"The will of God is to be diſcovered "either by his expreſs declarations, or by the "tendency of the action to promote or di-"miniſh the general happineſs†."

I. Concerning this definition of virtue, it may be remarked:

1. That it does not profeſs to be a definition of moral rectitude in general, but of human virtue alone.

* Hartley, part ii. ch. iii. Introduction, ſect. vii.

† Paley's Moral and Political Philoſophy, book i. ch. vii. book ii. ch. i.—v.

2. That,

2. That, even as a definition of human virtue, it is incorrect and inadequate.

For it excludes out of the catalogue of virtues the moral qualities of all who disbelieve the existence of God, or the doctrine of a future life; yet it cannot be denied that such persons may be just, temperate, humane, generous, and amiable*.

But this definition also excludes from the class of virtues, the most excellent moral habits when they have attained their disinterested, that is, their highest state. For, according to this account, no action is virtuous which is not prompted by rational self-interest. But though rational, and even gross self-interest may be the necessary motives to virtuous actions, previous to the generation of virtuous habits; yet, when these affections are thus formed and advanced to maturity, they do of themselves furnish a sufficient sti-

* The existence of God, and the doctrine of a future life, are of the highest importance in a system of morals. But Dr. Paley is a philosopher of too liberal a mind, and too accurate in the use of language, to deny the name of virtues to temperance, justice, truth, and goodness, though the men in whom they are found should be unbelievers in what he justly deems fundamental truths.

mulus to virtuous actions, without any explicit regard even to the moſt refined and rational ſelf-intereſt. And the expectation of future reward is ſo far from being eſſential to the exiſtence of human virtue, that an explicit regard to it as a motive, is even inconſiſtent with a ſtate of complete, that is, of abſolutely diſintereſted virtue. Self-annihilation, as was before obſerved, being eſſential to perfect virtue and perfect happineſs. Sect. III. note.

II. Concerning Dr. Paley's account of obligation it may be remarked:

1. That a *violent motive* is a phraſe ſcarcely intelligible. Motive addreſſes itſelf to the will. Violence conſtantly expreſſes compulſion, or external force. A "violent motive" is therefore an inconſiſtent idea.

2. Obligation by no means uniformly implies an obliger, as Dr. Paley affirms: authority is *one*, but not the *only* ſource of obligation. Reaſon, intereſt, convenience, honour, conſcience, and the like, are all occaſionally ſources of obligation. Thus, a child may be obliged by* the authority of a parent

* Obligation by authority ſometimes ſignifies compulſion;

parent to do that, to which he is alſo obliged. in honour and intereſt. Vide Sect. IV.

XIV. Mr. COOPER puts the queſtion, "Why do you act thus?" His anſwer is, "Be-"cauſe it is conducive to my happineſs on the "whole." That this is the true anſwer, he ſays, appears from conſidering,

"That it is founded on fact. No further "inquiry can be made."

"That no motive can be the ultimate motive "which admits of inconſiſtency with our hap-"pineſs."

"That we do above all things ſeek and de-"ſire our happineſs."

"That the ultimate end of the whole crea-"tion, as far as we can judge, is the produc-"tion of happineſs."

"That Revelation itſelf aſſigns this as the "ultimate reaſon of its requiſitions."

"That ſelf-love is the foundation of all the "other affections, even the ſocial and theo-"pathetic."

"That it is confirmed by the common ſenſe "of all mankind," and

pulſion, as in this inſtance of a parent and a child; but obligation when it becomes compulſory ceaſes to be moral.

" That all voluntary actions are the imme-
" diate conſequences of inclinations and aver-
" ſions*."

XV. Mr. GISBORNE ſtates, that " the pri-
" mary end of the being of every man is to
" promote and ſecure his own final happineſs."

" That this object can be attained by no
" other method than by obedience to the will
" of his Maker."

That " promoting the final welfare of his
" fellow-creatures, and their preſent happineſs,
" is a ſubordinate purpoſe, conducive to the
" principal end of exiſtence."

Alſo, that every man has certain natural rights; and that " he ſins againſt God, who
" either deprives another of his rights un-
" juſtly, or who does not act in ſuch a man-
" ner with reſpect to the uſe, defence, and
" diſpoſal of his rights, as he is of opinion
" will, upon the whole, fulfil moſt effectually
" the purpoſes of his being†."

Theſe

* Cooper's Tracts, numb. i. page 86, &c.

† Mr. Giſborne objects to Dr. Paley's definition of virtue, as conſiſting in *expedience*, that man has not faculties capable of diſcovering what is generally expedient. But it does not appear to have occurred to this reſpectable

Theſe principles plainly coincide with the account of virtue, which repreſents it as that courſe of conduct which tends to the greateſt ultimate happineſs of the agent.

It is ſo expreſſed as only to define human virtue. With a little alteration it would be applicable to the rectitude of all moral and intelligent beings.

XVI. Mr. GODWIN aſſumes JUSTICE as a "general appellation for all moral duty*." He defines juſtice to be "that impartial "treatment of every man in matters that re- "late to his happineſs, which is meaſured "ſolely by a conſideration of the properties of

ſpectable writer that his own definition is liable to a ſimilar objection. It is as difficult for a man to judge, in all caſes, what uſe of his rights will moſt effectually fulfil the purpoſes of his being, as what conduct will be moſt conducive to general happineſs. The truth is, that in all common caſes it is eaſy to aſcertain what will be moſt conducive both to our own happineſs and that of others; but that in ſome extraordinary emergencies it is difficult to form a right deciſion. This difficulty, however, preſſes equally upon the two hypotheſes; and conſequently cannot be urged by the advocates of one as an objection againſt the other.—Giſborne's Principles of Moral Philoſophy, ch. i.—iv.

Godwin's Enquiry concerning Polit. Juſt. page 86—103.

* Godwin's Political Juſtice, book ii. ch. ii. page 126.

" the receiver, and the capacity of him that " beſtows*."

Enquiring into the degree in which we are obliged to conſult the good of others, he decides, that " it is juſt I ſhould do all " the good in my power†."

And, " if the extraordinary caſe ſhould " occur in which I can promote the general " good by my death, more than by my life, " juſtice requires that I ſhould be content to " die‡."

He defines virtue " to be any action or ac- " tions of an intelligent being, proceeding " from kind and benevolent intention, and " having a tendency to contribute to general " happineſs§."

He repreſents it as the fundamental principle of morality, " that each man is bound " to conſider himſelf as a debtor in all his fa- " culties, his opportunities, and his induſtry, " to the general welfare. This is a debt " which muſt be always paying, never diſ- " charged‖."

* Godwin's Political Juſtice, book ii. ch. ii. page 127.

† Ibid. page 134.

‡ Ibid. page 135.

§ Ibid. ch. iv. page 150.

‖ Ibid. book iv. ch. vi. page 352.

He

He maintains that "morality is nothing "else but a calculation of conſequences, and "an adoption of that mode of conduct which, "upon the moſt comprehenſive view, appears "to be attended with a balance of general "pleaſure and happineſs*."

The motive to virtue is diſintereſted benevolence, which indeed he admits to be generated by ſelf-love, in the ſame way as avarice or any other paſſion or habit. "The good "of our neighbour, like the poſſeſſion of "money, is originally purſued for the ſake "of its advantage to ourſelves†."

Diſintereſted benevolence is however "con-"firmed by reflection in a ſenſe in which it "never can confirm" the meaner paſſions‡.

Mr. Godwin declaims againſt the hypotheſis of ſelf-love. He nevertheleſs allows that the pleaſures and pains of benevolence, "though not the authors of the determi-"nation, undoubtedly tend to perpetuate and "to ſtrengthen it§."

* Godwin's Political Juſtice, book iv. ch. vi. page 344.
† Ibid. ch. x. page 426.
‡ Ibid. page 428.
§ Ibid. page 430.

He

He remarks that "the man of benevo-
"lence aſcends to the higheſt of human plea-
"ſures, the pleaſures of diſintereſtedneſs. No
"man ſo truly promotes his own intereſt as
"he that forgets it. No man reaps ſo co-
"pious a harveſt of pleaſure as he who thinks
"only on the pleaſures of other men*."

He adds, "that virtue is upon no other
"account valuable, than as it is the inſtru-
"ment of the moſt exquiſite pleaſure†."

From this view of Mr. Godwin's theory of virtue it appears,

1. That this theory directly coincides with that of thoſe philoſophers who place virtue in utility, or in the voluntary production of the greateſt good, and ultimately with that which places the virtue of an action in its tendency to produce the greateſt ultimate happineſs of the agent. Juſtice uſually ſignifies abſtaining from injury; but in the ſenſe in which it is uſed by Mr. Godwin, who aſſumes it as a general appellation for all moral duty, it expreſſes benevolence under the direction of wiſdom.

* Godwin's Political Juſtice, book iv. ch. x. page 447.
† Ibid. page 449.

2. Mr.

2. Mr. Godwin adopts Dr. Hartley's theory of deriving the diſintereſted from the ſelfiſh affections: and he juſtly contends, that when affections have reached their diſintereſted ſtate, they will prompt to action without any regard to ſelfiſh conſiderations. He expreſsly ſays, that "it is incontrovertibly evident that the direct motive to "many of our actions is purely diſintereſted. "We are capable of ſelf-oblivion as well as "of ſacrifice*."

All this follows by neceſſary conſequence from the doctrine of aſſociation.

3. The hypotheſis of ſelf-love to which Mr. Godwin ſo ſtrongly objects, page 429, is that explicit regard to ſelf-intereſt which Dr. Hartley has demonſtrated, and which indeed every man's own conſciouſneſs may prove to himſelf, to be inconſiſtent with true happineſs; and this not only in the caſe of groſs ſelf-intereſt, ſuch as the purſuit of gain, but even of refined ſelf-intereſt, ſuch as the practice of virtue from a reſpect to preſent or future reward. Though ſuch conſiderations may be and in fact are the neceſſary

* Godwin's Political Juſtice, book iv. ch. x. page 432.

means

means of generating virtuous and benevolent affections, yet virtue and happineſs can never be complete till theſe affections have advanced to a diſintereſted ſtate, and all conſideration of ſelf is completely excluded. This Mr. Godwin calls ſelf-oblivion, and Dr. Hartley ſelf-annihilation.

4. Mr. Godwin has no where diſtinctly explained the obligation which moral agents are under to the practice of virtue, which is a material defect in his theory of morals. He has affirmed, but he has not ſatisfactorily proved, that a man *ought* to ſacrifice his intereſt and even his exiſtence to the general good. Juſtice may indeed require that in ſuch circumſtances "I ſhould be content to die." But the queſtion ſtill recurs, Why am I obliged to do what juſtice requires? Mr. Godwin will hardly be contented with the ſhort anſwer which ſome have given, viz. that "the queſtion is identical and abſurd." He has indeed himſelf ſuggeſted the proper reply to it. The pleaſures of diſintereſtedneſs are repreſented by him as "the higheſt of human "pleaſures. No man ſo truly promotes his "own intereſt as he that forgets it." And again, "He who ſits looſe to life and all its "pleaſures,

" pleaſures, and is ready without a ſigh to " ſacrifice them to the public good, has an " uncommonly exquiſite ſource of happi- " neſs*."

This conſideration might have led Mr. Godwin to the true notion of moral obligation, as conſiſting ſolely in the tendency of a virtuous action to the ultimate happineſs of the agent. But he ſeems unwilling to admit the pleaſure ariſing from diſintereſted benevolence as the foundation of obligation, and only repreſents it as " tending to perpetuate and ſtrengthen" the benevolent principle. But when he aſſerts that " morality is no- " thing elſe but a calculation of conſe- " quences," and that " virtue is upon no " other account valuable, than as it is the in- " ſtrument of the moſt exquiſite pleaſure," he ſeems to concede that rational ſelf-intereſt is the baſis of moral obligation†.

Upon the whole, Mr. Godwin's account of virtue labours under the eſſential defect of omitting a clear and diſtinct analyſis of moral obligation; and if he has proved that juſtice

* Godwin's Political Juſtice, book iv. ch. x. page 431.

† Ibid. 449.

requires

requires the ſacrifice of individual intereſt, to general good, he has not made out in a ſatisfactory manner the reaſon why the individual in extreme caſes is bound to obey the requiſition of juſtice.

5. The true ſtate of the queſtion therefore appears to be this: not whether men whoſe minds have been exerciſed with a certain diſcipline, will in given circumſtances readily ſacrifice their intereſt and even their exiſtence to the public good, for this is an undoubted fact: nor yet whether ſuch conduct would meet with general applauſe, for that likewiſe muſt be admitted; but whether ſuch conduct is obligatory upon the individual, and whether ſuch applauſe is judicious and well-founded. Men's actual conduct, and general approbation are very inaccurate criteria of real merit. If the individual is told that he is under indiſpenſable obligation to ſacrifice his own greateſt ultimate good to the happineſs of others, he has a right to enquire, and it behoves him with the utmoſt ſolicitude to examine, upon what ground he is obliged to make ſo precious a ſacrifice: and it will be found much eaſier to make the aſſertion, than to eſtabliſh the obligation.

If A is to decide upon the deſtiny of B and C, he may with propriety, from regard to the general good, ſacrifice the intereſt of B to that of C. But this can never prove to B that it is his duty to ſacrifice his own greateſt ultimate good to the intereſt of C. To the "valet of Fenelon" his own felicity muſt be more dear than that of Fenelon himſelf: and why *ought* he to part with his all, that Fenelon and a few others may each receive an addition, whether leſs or more, to their reſpective ſums of happineſs? No ſacrifices therefore to the general good are, or can be obligatory, where there is not a proſpect of adequate compenſation. But this in extreme caſes is poſſible only upon the hypotheſis of a future life, and under the government of a Being of conſummate wiſdom and benevolence. In which caſe, to ſuppoſe that any being can be ultimately a loſer by the greateſt ſacrifices he can make of ſelf-intereſt to the good of others would be extravagant and abſurd. And this brings us to the important concluſion, that SELF-LOVE AND BENEVOLENCE CAN ONLY BE RECONCILED BY RELIGION.

THE END.

Lately published, by the same Author,

I. FREEDOM OF ENQUIRY,

And ZEAL in the DIFFUSION of CHRISTIAN TRUTH ASSERTED, AND RECOMMENDED.

In a Discourse delivered at Bristol, July 9, 1800, before the Society of Unitarian Christians, established in the West of England, for promoting Christian Knowledge, and the Practice of Virtue, by the Distribution of Books. Price 1s.

II. DISHONEST SHAME THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF THE CORRUPTIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

A Sermon, preached at Hackney. Price 6d.

III. KNOWLEDGE THE FOUNDATION OF VIRTUE.

A Sermon addressed to the young Persons who attend at the Gravel-Pit Meeting at Hackney. Price 6d.

IV. A SERIOUS CAUTION AGAINST POPULAR ERRORS. A Sermon. Price 1s.

V. A REVIEW of Mr. WILBERFORCE'S TREATISE ENTITLED

"*A Practical View of the prevailing religious System of professed Christians, &c.*"

In LETTERS to a LADY. Price 4s. in Boards.

Taylor and Wilks, Printers, Chancery-Lane.